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1SUMMARY
I attempt a reasoned, qualified defence of zoos, but in 
full recognition of the moral challenge to them.
This challenge is mainly examined in chapters 3 to 7. 
Animals are indeed free in the wild, and must lose that 
freedom in some degree in zoos (3)*. However animal 
captivity need only share with human captivity its being 
brought about by an external agent, it can and should be 
captivity in a technical sense only, and at its best can 
clearly be morally acceptable (3). But there appear to be 
in all essential respects differences only of degree 
between animals and humans (4) and no reason therefore why 
their moral claims upon us should be any different in 
principle from humans' claims (5). As, in addition, there 
appears to be a dominating tendency in human nature which, 
though no doubt useful or even essential in itself, also 
on occasion allows us to be oblivious to our own cruelty 
to other humans or animals or, worse, actively to enjoy 
such cruelty, bad captivity is a real possibility which 
needs to be vigorously guarded against (6).
A comparison of the respective advantages for an animal 
of free and captive life shows that captivity can have 
the advantages of longer, more comfortable life with 
medical attention, but the likely drawback of an absence
2of the normal problems of living, especially food-seeking, 
in which animals, adapted to their natural ways of life by 
selection through millions of years, are likely to find 
satisfaction (7). However the state of domestication is 
not normally regarded as morally objectionable, and 
animals in zoos are in fact slightly domesticated (8). 
Interestingly, domesticated animals also retain far more 
of their natural behaviour than is normally appreciated 
(8) .
Certain criteria, such as health, breeding, and 
occurrence of natural behaviour, enable us both to assess 
the wellbeing or otherwise of captive animals kept in 
different ways, and to improve the quality of 
animal-keeping, as well as providing us with a means of 
articulating specifically and scientifically which ways of 
keeping certain animals are morally wrong, and which 
animals, if any, should not be kept at all (9). Study of 
an animal's natural behaviour and way of life is here of 
fundamental importance, as it also is in assessing the 
moral acceptability of ways of keeping domesticated 
animals (9).
Certain animals in zoos and ways of keeping them are 
considered in the light of the criteria, and it is 
suggested that there are clear indications in some cases 
of animals' wellbeing in captivity (10). There are also 
undoubted failings in much zookeeping, and it is 
emphasised that keeping animals should be a continuing 
process of search for improvements. While traditional
expertise is of great value, the importance also of being 
open to and endeavouring to make the fullest use of new 
ethological and other scientific knowledge cannot be 
over-emphasised (10).
The major justification for keeping any animals captive 
must be a demonstration of their wellbeing on the lines 
above (9 and 10), but there are powerful supplementary 
justifications which I examine in chapters 11 to 16. I see 
wildlife conservation as part of a moral attitude of 
responsibility (or "stewardship") towards anything which 
may reasonably be regarded as of value (11). Valuing 
itself I see as a fundamental moral concept, and 
stewardship, which term I use without any implied 
religious connotations, as necessarily avoiding any 
narrowly selfish or purely financial motivation in, 
especially, management of the natural world (11).
Animals themselves have exceptional and remarkable 
claims for being conserved, aesthetic as well as 
scientific (12). Respect for their own lives as 
individuals (as seen in 4 and 5 above) should also be a 
motive for their conservation (12) .
While conservation in the wild must be our primary 
concern, zoos have a considerable supplementary 
conservation role to play (13). This role, if zoos can 
only grasp it responsibly as they should, will transform 
them from being the independent wildlife consumers of past 
history into cooperating guardians of centrally managed 
captive populations of endangered and other species, whose
4genetic variation will be safeguarded with a view to 
future reintroductions if and when necessary (13). Zoos' 
scientific and educational roles (14 and 15 respectively) 
also have strong conservational connections. Zoos may also 
assist the protection of natural areas by satisfying much 
of humans' urge for wildlife contact: zoos are visited by 
millions of people who could never, in comparable numbers, 
visit "the wild" without irreparably damaging it (13).
Zoos assist science by making possible much study of 
animals which would be impractical if theoretically 
possible in the field, and allow some discoveries to be 
made which would be literally impossible otherwise. Many 
zoos should be much more scientific than they are, and 
human failings are often all too evident, but there is no 
question of the contribution zoos can make scientifically, 
as well as conservationally, if they will only grasp 
their responsibilities (14).
There is no question too of the value of real animals as 
an aid and as a stimulus in education, perhaps education 
of the feelings and the spirit even more than in academic
study as such (15). It is also simply untrue that some of
the animals in zoos (such as tigers) could be seen in the 
wild by ordinary people (15). The special value and 
age-old attraction for humans of involvement with animals 
should not be underrated (16), and, provided the kind of 
criteria examined earlier (9 and 10) are met, life close 
to man can be seen as also acceptable, though not in
itself better than life in the wild (16).
5However the capture and transport of, and trade in, 
wild-caught animals is morally wrong because of the 
suffering thereby caused except when carried out with the 
utmost responsibility and competence (17). There is an 
urgent need for protection of all wild animals on welfare 
as well as conservation grounds (17).
* NOTE:
Bracketed figures in the Summary refer to chapters. 
Bracketed figures after the Summary refer to the notes at 
the end of each respective chapter. Figures which include 
a full stop (e.g. 10.3) refer to sections of chapters: 
i.e., in this case, chapter 10, section 3.
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INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE DISCUSSION
Clearly zoos pose a moral problem. Almost every writer 
on the subject with a general audience in mind accepts 
that zoos can be challenged on moral grounds, though in 
most cases that challenge is regarded as easy to meet at 
least with regard to the best zoos (1). Through the years 
writers such as novelists and poets have sometimes voiced 
criticisms (2). Letters to the Press are often written on 
the subject (3) and no doubt have been since at least the 
Thirties, though not it seems taken seriously at that time 
by London Zoo (4).
Criticisms of the keeping of birds in cages, though
not of zoos as such, were voiced by Chaucer and in the
17th and 18th Centuries (5). Chaucer's strong criticism -
he assumes what are supposed to be good captive
conditions, and the best of intentions on the part of the
"keeper" - is worth quoting:
Tak any brid, and put it in a cage,
And do al thyn entente and thy corage 
To fostre it tendrely with mete and drinke,
Of alle deyntees that thou canst bithinke.
And keep it al-so clenly as thou may;
Al-though his cage of gold be never so gay,
Yet hath this brid, by twenty thousand fold.
7Lever in a forest, that is rude and cold,
Gon ete wormes and swich wrecchednesse.
For ever this brid wol doon his bisinesse 
To escape out of his cage, if he may;
His libertee this brid desireth ay. (5)
Bacon's preference for large, naturally planted aviaries 
sounds surprisingly modern (6). It was suggested in 1762 
that animals should not be kept in a menagerie "far 
removed from their native element" (7).
In recent years many widespread practises which 
involve hurting, killing or at least using animals - e.g., 
medical and psychological experimentation on animals, 
testing of drugs and other materials, meat eating and 
avoidable or excessive use of other animal products, and, 
in particular, intensive husbandry systems or factory 
farms - have been strongly argued (and in many cases 
conclusively demonstrated, I would think) by philosophers 
and others to involve unnecessary suffering and to be 
unjust and thus immoral (8). Singer has argued on 
utilitarian grounds, quoting some now famous words of 
Bentham (9), that the capacity to suffer undoubtedly found 
in animals above the level of, say, bivalve molluscs, 
requires a concern from us equal to that we would feel for 
any human suffering we have reason to regard as 
comparable. To fail to be equally considerate to a 
non-human except where a given and relevant difference 
from humans can be demonstrated is "speciesist" (10) .
Clark has argued more positively than Singer, and from a 
different base, one which emphasises our bonds with and
8justified affection for animals, for their right to live 
and enjoy their own lives uninterfered with by us, rather 
than merely be spared pain and suffering (11). Regan has 
explored the concept of animal rights particularly 
thoroughly and clearly, though with an eschewing of any 
suggestion of compromise, when it comes to consideration 
of specific treatments of animals practised today, which 
is perhaps unrealistic (13). Interestingly he is at odds 
(as Singer and perhaps Clark would tend to be also) with 
those who demand a respect, even a reverence, not for the 
lives and interests of higher vertebrates or even sentient 
beings as such, but rather for the natural world itself, 
an attitude stemming from Aldo Leopold (14) and well 
expressed by Rodman (15). Such an ecological ethic would 
seem of particular relevance to the ethics of zoos in its 
vision of conservation of the natural world, including its 
animal and plant species, as essentially ethical, were it 
not for its tendency to value exclusively a nature wholly 
unaltered and unmanaged by man. That ecological questions 
have in any sense given birth to a new ethics is firmly 
and convincingly denied by Passmore (16). The need for a 
practical approach to animal welfare problems, prepared to 
compromise if that means positive achievement, has been 
argued by Roll in, whose example as one firmly established 
in a real world I shall try to follow. Philosophers have 
also examined, in recent years, various non-ethical 
aspects of animals, though aspects related to debate about 
their possession or non-possession of interests and
9rights: such questions as whether animals can be 
reasonably, even coherently, regarded as having thoughts, 
beliefs, emotions and so on (17).
Specific discussions of the ethics of zoos are not 
many but include papers by Rachels, Jamieson, and Midgley 
(18). Jamieson argues the case against zoos neatly and 
briskly, if rather too hastily to convince that a death 
sentence rather than reform is required. He notes and 
disposes of the muddled defence which claims zoos are a 
good thing because they offer opportunities for research 
to make them better. That there is a moral presumption 
against zoos (19), I will, in effect, take as my starting 
point: I shall mainly be examining what can be said in 
defence of zoos in the light of Jamieson's apt comment 
(20). Some of zoos' "defences" are of special interest and 
importance: conservation, certainly (and new understanding 
of population genetics in particular is making zoos' role 
here a much more practicable and precise one than it was 
until very recently), and more generally their educational 
role in providing opportunities for, in some degree, a 
direct encounter with living animals (21). There is at 
least rather more to be said, and worth saying, than 
Singer indicates when, dismissing them as entertainment 
along with circuses and rodeos, he would sweep them away 
with the self-same broom that he has applied so 
effectively to factory farming and to painful, unnecessary 
experimentation (22).
Apart from philosophical discussion as such, there
10
have also been several recent books and articles strongly 
critical of zoos, either against them specifically in 
practise only (23), or in some cases in principle, some of 
these supported by a recently founded British pressure 
group called Zoo Check, which is specifically aimed, at 
least in the view of its founders, at "phasing out" zoos
(24). At the same time there has been enormous progress in 
recent years in the scientific understanding of animals' 
behavioural needs, including their captive requirements
(25). Veterinary study and practice, which at one time 
rather tended to concentrate on the treatment of sickness 
exclusively, has now to a great extent wedded itself with 
ethological study of animals' behavioural needs, and of 
how at least in some cases their needs in captivity can be 
met as a result of study of their behaviour in the wild 
state.
So there are several diverse strands of thought and 
controversy which form the background and make the time 
ripe for an attempt to look carefully at the whole issue 
of the ethics of keeping animals in zoos.
1.2 OBJECTIONS TO ZOOS
I shall start by assembling a list of the various 
objections that could be made to the practise of keeping 
animals in zoos. Although I shall be putting forward, in 
the course of the following chapters, a qualified case for 
zoos, I shall also attempt to give full weight to the 
various arguments that can be brought against them (26).
11
Table 1. Some possible objections to captivity:
la We have no right to keep animals in captivity, 
lb It is unjust to do so.
lc It is arrogant to do so.
Id We have no right to keep animals in bad conditions.
2a Animals have a right to be free.
2b They have a right to live their own lives.
3 We would dislike being in captivity; animals in zoos 
must too.
4 Animals should not be kept in climates different from 
their natural ones.
5 Animals in captivity are likely to be deprived of any 
or all of the following:
a. Adequate space.
b. An interesting and variable environment,
c. with a variety of sensory experience.
d. Normal social relations.
e. Exercise.
f. The chance to seek and/or catch food.
g. The opportunity to live natural lives.
h. A sense of purpose or meaning.
Any or all of these deprivations may make them bored 
or frustrated or generally miserable, conditions we should 
obviously not subject them to if we can avoid it.
6 This occurs for such reasons as the following:
a. Our ignorance of different species' requirements.
12
b. Our stupidity.
c. Our carelessness.
d. Our pigheadedness.
e. Habit, tradition, the attitude "it has always been 
like this".
f. Our lack of motivation to bother.
g. Lack of money.
h. Lack of time.
i. Practical circumstances. 
j. Economic considerations.
7 Various kinds of unnatural behaviour are shown by 
captive animals and indicate how bad their conditions are 
and how badly affected they can be by their conditions.
8a Animals are better off in the wild.
8b Wild animals as opposed to domesticated animals are 
better off in the wild.
9 Keeping any wild animals in captivity involves the 
capture and transport of either them or their ancestors, 
processes often accompanied by suffering and excessive 
death.
10 Taking animals from the wild is likely to damage wild 
populations, in some cases already endangered populations.
11 The claimed conservational role of zoos is window 
dressing or rationalising.
12 a) It is unaesthetic, vulgar and insulting to the 
dignity of animals to keep them in captivity.
b) It is bizarre and sad to see animals in zoos.
c) "Animals are seen there as dependent upon us and
13
submissive to our needs."
13 Animals should not be kept in captivity for ignorant 
people to gape at. Those wishing to see them should be 
prepared to go and do so in the wild. We would not think 
of transporting the Taj Mahal for tourists' convenience.
14 Film and television have made the natural lives of 
animals familiar and available to us all, so that the 
educational role of zoos has become superfluous.
15 Animals should not be bought and sold as if they 
were just marketable goods instead of creatures with lives 
of their own to lead.
With every one of these objections, I have some 
sympathy; none of them, I think, is frivolous; many of 
them are valid criticisms of much actual zookeeping as it 
still occurs today. However, I shall try to show in the 
course of my eighteen chapters that none of these points 
constitutes a final indictment of zoos; that there are 
today good zoos, and that there should be more tomorrow, 
to which none of these objections is really applicable.
1.3 DEFENCES OF ZOOS
I think it will be useful to follow the list of 
objections with a list of possible defences of captivity. 
Here, certainly, I am not providing a list of defences 
which I necessarily think are justified, but rather a list 
of arguments, or in some cases (such as No 3) mere 
rejoinders, which are the kind of things some people do in
14
fact say (or at least Imply by what they say) In defending 
zoos. I will, to a great extent, be making what I think is 
a good case for zoos, but that does not mean using any and 
every argument for them. But for reference I am here 
including the bad arguments as well as the good ones:
Table 2. Possible defences of captivity:
(C = either captivity itself, or a situation in which 
one benefits from an animal's captivity; A = animal kept 
captive; K = person keeping, arranging or benefiting 
from the keeping of the animal)
la C is a technical matter which you are in no position 
to criticise without proper qualifications.
lb The proper qualification is to be a practiser of C.
2 A is not important so that it does not matter what is
done to him or it.
3 Whether A is important or not, we are going to do it 
anyway; it is none of your business; it is a purely 
personal or internal or local matter.
4a You are being sentimental.
4b You are being emotional.
5 You are being anthropomorphic; A is just different
from us.
6 A deserves C through guilt.
15
7 C is in some other way appropriate for A.
8a C of A is traditional.
8b C should be conserved.
9a A is in a state of wellbeing in C.
9b A, given the choice, would choose C.
10 You are picking bad examples of C; they are not a 
fair sample.
11 C of A gives K or others one or more of the following 
benef its:
a. Pleasure.
b . Money.
c. Employment.
d. Occupation and interest.
e. Life-enrichment.
12 C of A assists the conservation of A's species.
13 C of A gives K or others one or more of the following 
benefits:
a. Knowledge and understanding of how to breed A in 
captivity.
b. Knowledge and understanding of A's biology etc in 
general.
c. Appreciation of A or A's species or other species.
d. Help in alleviating suffering, disease etc in man.
e. Help in alleviating suffering, disease etc in 
animals.
14a K cannot help carrying out C;
14b In carrying out C, K is fulfilling an instinctive 
part of his nature;
16
14c C makes K feel better;
14d C assists K's mental health.
15 It is not practicable to stop C of A.
Of these possible defences of zoos, I think that the
following are bad arguments:
lb ("Need to be involved to criticise.")
2 ("Animals are not important...") (27)
3 ("Not your business...") (28)
4a ("Sentimental...")
4b ("Emotional...")
6 ("Guilt...")
7 ("Otherwise appropriate...")
11a ("Pleasure to people...")
lib ("Earns money.")
11c ("Provides employment.")
13a ("Understanding of captive breeding..."): To strive 
for this is very important because of (if it is accepted 
as valid) zoos' conservational captive breeding role. But 
13a can not in itself constitute a justification of zoos.
14a ("Can not help it."): one has just got to control 
one's activities if they are immoral; inability to do so 
is not a moral justification, though it may be a 
psychological or legal one.
The good arguments, I think, are:
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la ("Technical matter."): this Is certainly often 
relevant (not least, today, with the conservational role 
of zoos), though it can not constitute a final moral 
justification (29). It can hardly be universally valid 
else we could not condemn bullfighting without being 
matadors or burglary without being burglars.
5 ("Anthropomorphic"): This is sometimes valid, but often 
not (see chapters 4 and 9.5 below).
8a ("Traditional")
8b ("The practice should be conserved"): I think that 
both these defences, especially 8b, are worth something: 
they are reasons for not charging in too readily to 
condemn or abolish. But they obviously have to be used 
with caution (see chapters 11, 13 and 14 below).
9a ("State of wellbeing in captivity..."): I regard this 
as the major, and in the end the only individually valid, 
defence of zoos, though I well understand those who feel 
that only a combination of this one with 12 ("Conservation 
of species") constitutes a valid defence of any 
zookeeping. I look at defence 9a mainly in chapters 9 and 
10 below.
9b ("Would choose it.") : Where we really can be sure that 
this is the case, it is probably the surest demonstration 
of the truth of 9a, and thus a very strong defence. (See 
particularly 9.5 below.)
10 ("Bad examples..."): I think this often is a fair 
point. It is merely to say that from the fact that some
18
zoos are bad In whole or part It does not follow that all 
zoos are bad. If any profession (e.g. that of the police, 
the army, the clergy, politicians) is to be entirely 
condemned on the grounds that some practisers of that 
profession somewhere in the world are bad, a great many 
obviously honourable people stand condemned. There are 
some very good zoos, and there are good parts of less good 
zoos. It is only the good zoos, and the good parts of less 
good zoos, that I am attempting to justify. (Of course, no 
zoo is going to be entirely good; but that applies to any 
human institution whatever.) I refer frequently to certain 
good zoos, especially in chapter 2 and chapters 9 and 10.
lid ("Occupation and interest"): This is perhaps worth 
something as a moral defence, but only as a supplement to 
9a.
lie ("Life-enrichment for people..."): I think this is an 
important justification, but again only as a supplement to 
9a.
12 ("Conservation of species..."): This is, in my view, a 
very serious and important justification, even though it 
should not be used, as admittedly it often is, as a 
blanket defence of all zookeeping. I look at it in 
chapters 11, 12 and, especially, chapter 13.
13b ("Understanding of biology in general..."): This is 
in my view an important justification, much underrated by 
some zoo critics, though only valid as a supplement to 
Defence 9a. I examine it in both chapters 14 and 15.
13c ("Appreciation..."): Again, a very important
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justification, though only as a supplement to 9a. I look 
at this in chapters 15 and 16. Chapter 12 is also very 
re levant.
13d ("Disease alleviation in man. . .") .* This seems very 
peripheral; however it is a valid supplementary 
justification for one or two zoos, such as those (London 
and Whipsnade) of the Zoological Society of London I make 
some reference to this in chapter 14.
13e ("Disease alleviation in animals..."): This is quite 
an important supplementary defence, on which see chapter 
14 below.
14b ("Fulfilling instinctive part of one's nature..."): 
Obviously such a justification has to be treated with 
great caution, and in any case can only be valid as a 
supplement to 9a. But I include it in recognition of what 
I think is the fact that some zookeeping, or some aspects 
of zookeeping, involve a relationship with an animal in 
which aspects of human nature (such as our ability to 
dominate psychologically, not necessarily improperly) are 
involved as well as, probably, similar aspects of the 
nature of the animal concerned. See, for example, my 
comments on the human ability to control an elephant (or a 
dog) in chapter 6.
14c ("Makes one feel better...")
14d ("Necessary for mental health..."): Neither 14c nor 
14d can be valid except as a supplementary justification 
to 9a, but no-one can afford to disregard them in view of 
the evidence now available of the medical and
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psychological benefits to people from keeping and from 
close contact with animals.
15 ( Not practicable..."): if a practise is immoral, then 
it is immoral, whatever the practicalities, so it may seem 
strange to include this as a good defence of zoos. I only 
see it, of course, as a supplement to 9a, but, if one is 
satisfied of the truth of 9a with regard, say, to a 
particular zoo, then it is worth observing that zoos have 
all sorts of minor useful functions such as answering the 
public's questions, advising the police or the customs on 
the identification of imported animal items like skins, 
and so on. They play a useful even if not essential part 
in society.
Before tackling any of these topics in more detail, I 
shall look, in the following chapter, at the long history 
of zoos. I shall then take a preliminary look at what we 
mean by "captivity", and also what we mean by "wildness" 
and "freedom", before examining the, to me, very striking 
and significant similarities of other animals to 
ourselves. That will be a foundation from which to 
establish what I see as the rights we should recognise 
animals as having. I then consider one of the factors in 
the extent to which animals' (and humans') rights are 
overridden, that is, man's tendency towards cruelty and 
also domination (which, unlike cruelty, I think is in many 
ways benign). I then compare conditions in the wild and in 
captivity, look at the extent to which wild animals and 
domestic animals are not (in my view) so utterly different
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as is often imagined, and attempt to establish criteria 
for j u d g m g  animals' wellbeing in 200s (or anywhere else), 
which I then attempt to apply to some selected animals 
widely kept in zoos. These chapters constitute my main 
case for the defence of zoos. I then endeavour to support 
it by examining the, to me, essentially moral aspect of 
conservation as an attitude and a practise, emphasise the 
special value of animals and try to show how zoos really 
do have a genuine role to play in animals' conservation. 
The following chapters look at the roles in science, 
education and enrichment of the human environment that (in 
my view) zoos in some degree perform. Finally I try to 
show that, although zoos can he justified, the commercial 
and uncontrolled taking of animals from the wild (even 
when they are not rare and there is no conservational 
objection to this occurring), must be condemned. But 
first, a look at zoos' history.
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Chapter 2
A HISTORY OF ZOOS
Keeping wild animals, though an extremely ancient 
practise, is recent by comparison with man's domestication 
of certain familiar species, the probable earliest dates 
of which are worth noting to emphasise how long man has 
been involved with animals (1). Wolves were probably 
domesticated (as dogs) as early as 10,000 BC, sheep and 
goats by 7000 BC (2) and cattle and pigs during or after 
the next millenium. A few animals familiar in zoos were 
early domesticated and have long been extinct as wild 
animals. These include llamas and alpacas which may have 
been domesticated as early as 5000 BC. Wild Arabian camels 
have been long extinct also, and possibly the few 
remaining wild Bactrian camels are feral. Both were early 
domesticated, Bactrians in 2600 BC (3) . Elephants too, 
though never strictly domesticated (births in captivity 
have always been rare) , may have been tamed as early as 
2000 BC (4) . Horses were probably not domesticated until
the second millenium BC (5) .
If the essence of a zoo is the keeping of relatively 
wild animals for other than the mundane purposes of
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feeding or clothing humans, there are several examples of 
ancient zoos. The earliest recorded seem to he "breeding 
farms" of various cattle and antelopes around 2500 BC near 
Saqqara in Egypt, their details recorded on tombs, one 
farm with such large herds as to suggest domestication as 
the aim (6) (which, if so, was an aim shared with the 
embryo Zoological Society of London nearly 4500 years 
later in 1824 (7)) . However the first recorded zoo 
containing animals such as lions is probably the royal 
menagerie of King Shilgai of the 3rd Dynasty of Ur, about 
2000 BC, near Nippur in Mesopotamia. It has been suggested 
that dangerous predators will have been kept in pits, and 
later in stone buildings "viewed through small barred 
hatches" (8) . Evidence of royal zoos about 700 years later 
in both Assyria and Babylon is apparently provided by 
known "correspondence" about animal deliveries between 
Assur—Uba 11 it I of Assyria and Pharaoh Amenophis IV, and 
Burnaburiash of Babylon and Pharaohs Amenophis III and 
Amenophis IV. Tiglathpi leser I of Assyria, about 1100 BC, 
received as gifts or as tribute many great beasts from 
fellow rulers, including it seems monkeys, crocodiles and
a hippopotamus from Rameses IX of Egypt (9) .
Egypt's own involvement with many wild animals was 
long continuing, with lions kept at temples such as that 
of Ammon at Karnak, about 1550 BC (10), as well as in, it 
may be assumed, royal menageries (11) . A great expedition 
of Queen Hatshepsut, apparently about 1490 BC, to Somalia, 
is recorded on reliefs at the temple at Deir el-Bahri, and
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brought back monkeys, lions, leopards, a giraffe and birds 
(12) . In Egypt animals were not only kept; many (like the 
lions at Karnak), were regarded as sacred (ibises, hawks, 
cats, dogs, weasels, even crocodiles) and sometimes 
embalmed on death, as recorded by Herodotus (13) . At 
Thebes there were some thirteen sacred animals including 
(apparently) a tamed crocodile (14). The largest ancient 
zoo was founded at Alexandria by Ptolemy II Philadelphus 
in the 3rd century BC (15) . His father Ptolemy I was a 
relation and one of the generals of Alexander the Great, 
and it is often supposed that it was animals sent back by 
Alexander to a zoo in Greece which his former tutor, 
Aristotle, was able to study for his History of Animals. 
There is unfortunately, so far as I know, no 
substantiation for this attractive notion of a 
scientifically useful early zoo, but at least it seems 
that animals such as monkeys and birds were kept by the 
Greeks humanely both as pets and in city menageries (16) , 
and also by the Romans, who apparently could be "as fond 
as other people of keeping animals as pets, or of just 
looking at them, without enjoyment of their agonies or of 
human agony" (17) .
The first exotic animal spectacle recorded at Rome 
was the appearance in a triumph of four elephants captured 
from Pyrrhus, who was defeated in 275 BC. Twenty-four 
years later more than a hundred elephants captured from 
the Carthaginians were similarly brought to Rome. 
Significantly, the elephants' mahouts "passed into the
Roman service" (18). It is known that an ostrich (admired 
for its speed) had been exhibited at the Games by about 
200 BC (19). In the 2nd century BC Rome's power in 
northern Africa enabled nobles to display African animals 
in large numbers, and the enclosed "hunting" of these 
captive beasts was no doubt all a demonstration of 
imperial domination, though the original hunting or 
baiting of (Italian) wild animals in the Circuses was 
probably partly a religious rite (20). Pompey’s great 
shows in 55 BC are notable for including not only the 
slaughter of twenty elephants but for having called forth 
disgust from the spectators at such treatment of animals 
who so impressed the crowd by their brave defence of 
themselves as to seem (so Cicero wrote in a letter) 
"somehow allied to man" (21). The appalling animal 
slaughter (Augustus recorded 3500 African animals, mostly 
lions and leopards, killed in his twenty-six "venationes" 
(22)) was to continue into the 1st century AD under, for 
example, Caligula and Nero. It does seem to me, though, 
that by then the appalling treatment of animals was 
equalled or exceeded by the way these surely psychopathic 
emperors behaved to people, even their own relations, at 
least as recounted by Suetonius (who I am told may have 
been biased) (23) . There were also performing animals — 
Suetonius speaks of a knight riding an elephant down a 
tightrope, which sounds an unlikely achievement - and 
considerable animal management and handling skills must 
have been developed (24). I comment below on the enormous
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environmental damage done by the centuries of Roman animal 
massacres (25).
In medieval and later Europe large exotic beasts 
tended to be the property of kings (and were often gifts 
from one monarch to another (26)), who kept them either in 
menageries or deerparks. The British royal menagerie at 
Woodstock (set up by the Norman kings) was transferred to 
the Tower of London by Henry III in 1252 after the receipt 
of three leopards from the emperor Frederick II (a 
remarkable naturalist who laid out a marshy area with 
ponds for waterfowl, and wrote a scholarly treatise on 
hawking) (27). The Tower zoo continued for nearly six 
centuries. Though one of its first animals, a "white 
bear", apparently swam in the Thames, most animals were 
presumably kept in bare, uninteresting cages. The 
conditions were criticised in the 18th century (28). On 
the other hand, a leopard at the Tower was admired in 1720 
for her beauty and what sounds like relaxed behaviour and 
a lioness there in the early 19th century was remarkably 
tame (29). Animals there and in other menageries were 
often kept singly. Apes or monkeys might be kept in 
palaces, but were often chained (30). On the other hand, 
royal deer in deerparks, and not just deer (31), had 
freedom to roam, enjoy normal social relations and breed, 
though there was the penalty of being on occasion hunted. 
Some animals such as the Chillingham wild cattle and the 
swans at Abbotsbury, though kept in extensive areas, were 
not there to be hunted (32). By contrast, animal-baiting
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was an amusement of high and low. James I was fond of 
1 ion—baitings, and the ordinary Londoner could amuse 
himself at a bear garden described by Aubrey (33). Henry 
III of France (in 1583) and Augustus II, Elector of 
Dresden, (in 1719) invoked the spirit of Nero to the 
extent of slaughtering, more or less on impulse, their 
entire animal collections, but such behaviour is hardly 
typical in view of the large number of rulers who kept 
animals (34).
There were zoos and deerparks also in parts of the 
world far from Britain and Europe. Marco Polo described in 
1298 the parks surrounding Khan-balik (one of many palaces 
of Kubilai Khan, and I imagine the inspiration of 
Coleridge's Xanadu), with a "great variety of game, such 
as white harts, musk-deer, roebuck, stags, squirrels, and 
many other beautiful animals", as well as fish and 
waterfowl (35). Kubilai Khan hunted not only with cheetahs 
but with caracals and tigers, referred to by Marco Polo as 
"striped lions", suggesting that tigers were unknown in 
Europe at that date (36). Deer parks and zoos in China 
had, even then, a two thousand year history (37), and at 
least one species of deer, the sse—pu—hsiang (the later 
Pere David's Deer) was apparently conserved in a deerpark 
for nearly three thousand years (then to be saved from 
extinction a second time by the Duke of Bedford). One zoo, 
Montezuma's, is known from a civilisation independent of 
the old world, Mexico. Its birds of prey (to feed which 
five hundred turkeys were killed daily), waterbirds on ten
32
ponds (maintained by three hundred keepers), rattlesnakes 
and two sorts of lion" (puma and jaguar — there was also 
a third kind of cat, possibly now extinct) enabled 
Castillo, a companion of Cortes, to send back to Spain an 
account of much of central American wildlife (38). Some 
zoos apparently more public as well as more humane than 
any in Europe until modern times were set up in India by 
the enlightened Mogul emperor Akbar (39).
European zoos in the period 1500 to 1800, if not 
rivalling the best oriental ones, had in certain cases 
some scientific and educational functions. Probably the 
oldest still continuing zoo was the Bear Pit in Berne, 
Switzerland (founded 1513). The Versailles zoo was opened 
to scholars and the public in the second half of the 17th 
century, and members of the French Academy dissected 
specimens from it (starting in 1669), a beaver first and 
later an elephant. The great naturalist Buffon was (c 
1739) director of the Jardin du Roi. A famous travelling 
menagerie, Pidcock's, was in operation from 1708 (40), and 
since long before then, perhaps the 12th century or so, 
fairs were visited by performers with Barbary apes and 
bears, both of which seem to have been trained in 
medieval, as in Roman times, to perform a surprising range 
of accomplishments from dancing to playing flutes (41). 
Pidcock's home base was at Exeter Exchange in London, 
where it continued until about 1840. Its confined 
conditions are contemporarily described by Thomas Hood:
To look around upon this brute-basti1le,
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And see the king of creatures in - a safe!
The desert's denizen in one small den.
Swallowing slavery's most bitter pills —
A bear in bars unbearable. And then
The fretful porcupine, with all its quills
Imprison'd in a pen!
A tiger limited to four feet ten; (42)
But some of the animals were treated with a kind of 
consideration for their particular tastes, and were 
well-known characters of the time, for example a mandrill 
called Jerry who "had his own rocking chair, drank gin by 
the tumbler, smoked church-wardens and was twice presented
at Court" (43). The need in zookeeping for a 
professionalism so wide-ranging as to be almost 
unattainable is demonstrated in a horrific episode at the 
'Change when an elephant called Clunie had to be killed and 
even a file of musketeers had great difficulty in doing 
so. The distinguished anatomist Richard Owen complained of 
the primate accommodation at London Zoo saying that the 
Exchange monkeys were looked after better (44). Wombwe11's 
was a travelling menagerie which became Bostock and 
Wombwell's in about 1825, and continued until 1931. That 
some of its animals were kept in small, featureless cages 
is shown in photographs (e.g. of lions and of a 
hippopotamus in Newcastle as late as 1930 (45). But many 
animals including lions were probably very tame and had a 
close relationship with their keepers (notwithstanding 
Wombwell's attempt to stage a lion fight in 1825), and 
such animals as elephants and camels obtained exercise 
and therapeutic activity from being performing and 
working animals (46). Such menageries' educational role
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in simply exhibiting animals impossible to see otherwise 
before the film and television age is illustrated by the 
royal reception (one of several through the years) given 
to Bostock and Wombwell's on a visit to Windsor Castle in 
1854 when not only the court and all the royal employees 
but the masters and boys of Eton attended as well (47).
London Zoo has a special importance in having been 
founded as a scientific institution and a continuing 
worldwide importance not least from its 150 year 
experience. (See account later in chapter 14.) It was 
London Zoo that gave the term "zoo" to the world, 
ironically, for such a serious scientific institution, 
known to all as the Zoological Gardens until a music hall 
song made the title "zoo" unavoidable (48). Not that its 
scientific role as perceived by its founders was 
necessarily one we would regard now as either scientific 
or desirable: "the introduction of new varieties, breeds, 
and races of animals for the purpose of domestication or 
for stocking our farm-yards, woods, pleasure-grounds, and 
wastes with the establishment of a general Zoological 
Collection, consisting of prepared specimens in the 
different classes and orders, so as to... point out the 
analogies between the animals already domesticated, and 
those which are similar in character upon which the first 
experiments may be made" (49). Its conditions were not all 
necessarily preferable to those at ordinary menageries, as
35
seen above in Owen s criticism. However it had good staff, 
such as its superintendent for forty years, Bartlett, who 
came to the notice of the Society first by his taxidermic 
skill. Examples of his skill with the management of living 
animals are the way in which he lanced two abscesses on 
the massive African elephant Jumbo, without, clearly, 
losing the animal's trust, and the way in which he 
organised the transfer of the big cats to new 
accommodation (by leaving the travelling boxes waiting 
with food in till the animals were accustomed to them) 
without avoidable disturbance to animals or humans (50). 
Many animals too had opportunities for activity such as 
elephant and camel rides, llamas pulling carts, cheetahs 
going for walks (51), or, from the 1920's, the 
chimpanzees' tea party (the chimps had to be trained to 
misbehave (52)) and other unexpected examples of 
animal-human contact like that of the "wolf man" who (even 
if not fully approved of) was allowed to take wolves for 
walks and wrestle with them in the manner of an early 
Aspinall (see below) (53). On the other hand the cats were 
kept in cages without much "furniture" (no doubt a log to 
climb), and no escape from the public view, and which, in 
the early twentieth century, drew Galsworthy's bitter 
condemnation. Even the Mappin Terraces, an exciting new 
development at the zoo (inspired by Hagenbeck — see below) 
were criticised by Saki, surely with perfect justification 
(54) . There was a tendency, with a long history, to 
provide accommodation designed by architects to please
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human viewers but with little consideration of the animal 
occupants' requirements (55).
The founding of the Zoological Society of London was 
followed hy other major modern zoos like Dublin and 
Bristol in the British Isles (1830 and 1834), Amsterdam 
(1838), Frankfurt (1858), Basle (1874) and Philadelphia 
(1874) , but major advances in zoo thinking came from a 
remarkable German animal trainer and trader, Carl 
Hagenbeck. He showed that tropical animals like lions 
could acclimatise successfully to temperate conditions, 
and founded his own zoo at Hamburg with moated rather than 
barred enclosures, and with carnivores and herbivores 
apparently exhibited (i.e. to the public) in the same 
enclosures, in fact separated by hidden moats (56) . 
Hagenbeck also introduced new humane training methods 
which relied on careful selection of individual animals 
amenable to training and positive reinforcement of items 
of behaviour already shown, and outlawed cruel training 
methods (the existence of which Hagenbeck confirms, though 
he regarded them as ineffective as well as dangerous 
compared to his own humane methods) (57) . German zoos have 
continued to have a much higher regard for animal 
training, even when taken to the length of circus 
performing, than do British zoos, and its occupational and 
therapeutic possibilities are stressed by Hediger (58).
Hagenbeck1s success was founded on his great animal 
collecting and trading business. Clearly he was a superb 
organiser. But his business success in this field does not
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alter the status of such collecting- as morally highly 
questionable, perhaps (even at that time) on 
conservational grounds, certainly on humane grounds. The 
Romans greed for animals did, apart from humane 
considerations, massive environmental damage to north 
Africa. This was not for zoos, of course, and it is 
doubtful whether any collecting for zoos as such has ever 
been a serious factor in environmental damage. But in 
terms of animal welfare, animal collecting through the 
centuries, whether for zoos or not, must have caused 
enormous suffering, and even Hagenbeck accepted the need, 
for example, to kill accompanying adults when young 
elephants were captured, and, worse, allowed local 
tribesmen who were assisting him to use their own, cruel 
methods (59).
However, Hagenbeck1s innovations in zoo design were 
unquestionable. Edinburgh (1909) was designed in the light 
of them. Chalmers Mitchell, Secretary of the ZSL, 
demonstrated animal losses through lack of fresh air, took 
steps to allow many animals previously protected from the 
London climate access to it, and thus greatly extended zoo 
life expectancies. He also built the Mappin Terraces 
(inspired by Hagenbeck) (see above). There were other 
far-sighted attempts to improve how animals were kept, 
such as Baboon Rock, even though disaster broke out 
because of the number of males to females being far too 
high (60), and, especially, the foundation of Whipsnade in 
1931, on an area of 500 acres in rolling Bedfordshire
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downs, with many extremely large and attractive enclosures 
(61) . Other major zoos that also run large animal parks, 
often intentionally closed to the public to safeguard 
undisturbed breeding, include New York, San Diego, 
Melbourne, Bristol and now Edinburgh. London's scientific 
pre-eminence was maintained following the last war by the 
foundation of two research institutes in comparative 
medicine and reproductive physiology, now combined as the 
Institute of Zoology.
In America and Europe and elsewhere, though not in 
Britain, national or civic zoos have been founded and, 
thanks to a degree of financial support granted in Britain 
to museums but never to zoos, not even London, have been 
able to mount large, naturalistic displays like the 
enormous aviary at the Bronx, New York, a model Antarctic 
setting at San Diego with real snow and purified air, an 
African display at Chicago with convincing rain forest and 
tropical rainstorms, a chimpanzee enclosure at Sydney, a 
chimpanzee island at Arnhem, and a polar bear display at 
Tacoma (62) . Three American zoos, New York, Washington and 
San Diego, are outstanding in their scientific research, 
work of very diverse kinds (63).
British zoos in the 20th century, while not rivalling 
the best abroad at least in elaborate displays, 
nevertheless include some fine and individually-minded 
institutions dedicated, especially in the last twenty-five 
years, to the captive breeding of endangered species. The 
example here was set by the Duke of Bedford who, in the
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early years of the century, single-handedly saved the Pere 
David s Deer from extinction by releasing the few animals 
he had managed to acquire into an idyllic area at Woburn 
where they bred very successfully (unknown to an at that 
time uncomprehending zoo world) (64) . Chester (1936) has 
developed into a very large and attractive zoo under very 
professional management. Since the last war new zoos of 
special importance have included Jersey, almost uniquely 
dedicated to conservational captive breeding and seriously 
and scientifically operated to this end, Twycross, 
specialising with considerable success in primates, the 
Woolly Monkey Sanctuary at Looe, Cornwall, a demonstration 
of how one primate species imaginatively and humanely kept 
can be not only of scientific interest but
commercially successful, Marwell, seriously and 
successfully specialising in endangered ungulates and 
cats, and Howletts and Port Limpne, together keeping and 
breeding gorillas, large cats and ungulates, with a 
concentrated aim and in exceptionally humane and 
attractive conditions (65). Other specialist institutions 
of real importance are Slimbridge, the first of many 
reserves of the Wildfowl Trust, the Norfolk Wildlife Park 
and the Otter Trust (66) . A whole new variant on the long 
established deer park (in the old sense of 'deer ) was 
established by the first safari park at Longleat in 1966. 
The advantages of greater freedom for the animals have to 
some extent been offset by a commercial management with no 
real interest in the captive breeding of endangered
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species and perhaps a tendency to be less concerned for 
the interests of the animals kept than may appear to the 
layman (67) .
Other specialist institutions have included aquaria, 
dolphinaria, and, most recently, butterfly displays. 
Despite, in general, some exceptionally fine zoos and 
animal parks, there have also continued to be many with 
much lower standards. This is even more so abroad, not 
least in America (68).
Whatever failings still continue, and these are bound 
to in activities practised by hundreds of institutions 
around the world, and receiving, in a year, perhaps the 
colossal total of 357 million or so visitors (69), a new 
professionalism and seriousness of aim has become apparent 
in the zoo world in the last quarter of a century. The 
Federation of Zoos in Britain was set up in 1966 to raise 
standards, and, to this end, introduced compulsory 
inspections for its members. A disparity of aims and 
approaches in British zoos succeeded in preventing the 
passing of zoo legislation, which the Federation was 
working for at least from the early 1970's, until the 
1980‘s (70). The International Zoo Year Books (begun by 
the Zoological Society of London (ZSL) in 1959), regular 
international conferences on captive breeding for 
conservation, the introduction of the International 
Species Inventory System (ISIS) in the mid-70s in Amei ica 
(now being followed by ARKS in Britain (70)), the 
development of inter—zoo management committees for, for
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example, anthropoid apes, all bespeak a new concern for 
captive breeding. Similarly, a voluntary decision by the 
American Association of Zoological Parks and Aquariums in 
1962 to control responsibily their own traffic in 
endangered species (72), the involvement of zoo 
authorities in CITES (73), and the emphasis of the 
Federation on the importance of co-operation with such 
measures, has utterly changed, if not before time, the 
former tendency of zoos to regard the wild as a bottomless 
purse from which to replace the animals they kept.
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Chapter 3 
THREE CONCEPTS CONSIDERED
3.1 WILDNESS
I am concerned In this section to some extent with the 
actual nature of wild animals, but mainly with the 
conflicting attitudes towards them that our concept of 
"wild" or "wildness" seems to embody, and of which we 
should be aware.
The most obvious characteristic of a wild animal is, 
traditionally, its being dangerous or fierce. This can of 
course be the case. To meet a tiger face to face could be 
a terrifying experience, though opinions on how actually 
dangerous it might be differ (1). Wild animals are often 
not dangerous, or nervous or afraid of us either. Animals 
on islands without natural predators often show no fear of 
man (2), which reminds us that those wild animals which 
are dangerous or ferocious are such because they need to 
be. Ferocity has not evolved where not needed. Ferocity is 
an adaptation to their way of life and habitat.
As well as being afraid, reasonably enough, of 
dangerous animals, we admire them — especially predators - 
for being dangerous. We are impressed by them, as in 
Blake's Tyger. Lions, tigers and eagles are the favourite
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emb 1 ems of kings and. states today as ever.
We also not only admire fierce animals, not only are 
sometimes afraid of them, but also sometimes, with 
marvellous inconsistency, blame them for being fierce or 
dangerous. We imply blame when we use a word such as 
"vicious" of, say, sharks or crocodiles, to take examples 
of Mary Midgleys's (3). North gives an example from 
vintage Attenborough of a caiman's "long evil head... 
glaring at us malevolently..." (4). We use the term 
"brute" or "vicious brute" or "wild animal" of an 
unreasonably violent human, implying that violent 
behaviour is characteristic of animals, wild animals no 
doubt in particular. We tend to be critical of an animal 
for being fierce when we should know full-well both that 
it needs to be and that it in any case can not help it.
(I could add that it is foolish to blame animals for 
fierceness, etc when we usually accept that they are not 
capable of moral judgements. But I want to leave this 
point aside, partly because I do not think moral terms of 
praise or blame are entirely inapplicable to all non-human 
animals (see chapter 4), and also because it seems strange 
to imply that we should excuse a lion from eating a zebra, 
or a domestic cat from catching a sparrow, on the grounds 
that they are incapable of behaving morally. Even if they 
had developed language as one primate species has done, 
had become rational (as the term is often used), they 
would still, for simple biological reasons, have had to go 
on catching zebras or birds. (Perhaps they would have
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farmed their prey and killed them en bloc in slaughter 
houses).)
This popular sense of “wild" is of course a hangover 
from the past. Any blame felt towards a wild animal for 
being fierce was never justifiable, but is even less so 
now because of how much more we know about various wild 
animals. Thinking of wolves in the way they must have been 
by those who treated them with appalling cruelty in 
mediaeval France (5) would be even less justified now when 
so much more is known of wolves' admirable private lives 
(6) .
Another synonym for wild is “untamed". Again we are 
perfectly capable of admiring an animal for being untamed. 
"Well-named, it is the real untamed and untameable 
savage...", as Millais said of the European wildcat (7), 
and as an animal might have been described outside an old
fashioned fair sideshow to bring in the crowds.
Conversely, "tame" is often used to mean "dull" or 
"uninteresting". But at the same time we can use "untamed1 
with the implication that the wild animal is in a rather 
reprehensible state, and presumably therefore could do 
with being removed from it, with being tamed. Southey 
caught this sense well, in these words (addressed to a 
dancing bear):
Besides
'Tis wholesome for thy morals to be brought 
From savage climes into a civilised state.
Into the decencies of Christendom. (8)
Another sense of "wild" is "disordered, chaotic,
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structureless". We can admire this too, as in an 
expression like "Let's have a wild party", but we might 
also use the word disapprovingly of the behaviour of a 
child showing tantrums or getting too excited. Presumably 
the word would have been used in this sense in "wild men", 
a sense which now seems antiquated because we appreciate 
that it is inaccurate to speak of primitive people as wild 
or as savages because they in fact have organised 
societies, rules to obey, mythologies, cultures, indeed a 
degree of civilisation (9).
We now appreciate how, to a considerable extent, this 
is true of animals also. Lions, elephants, primates, for 
example, all have their structured societies, and we 
appreciate how these, and an animal's ways of behaving 
towards its fellows, are themselves part of an animal 
species' adaptations to its way of life and habitat. Just 
as we would feel it wrong, as the European slavers did 
not, or as Captain Fitzroy of the Beagle did not, to drag 
a person out of his society and culture, we would now be 
perfectly right, I think, to wonder genuinely if we can be 
justified in removing an animal from the wild — i.e. from 
the environment, and even in some cases and in some 
degree, from the society and the culture - in which it 
naturally lives.
We clearly do have conflicting attitudes to those we 
call "wild". The term "wild animals", or even more "wild 
beasts", still tends to carry the suggestions of 
"uncontrolled, dangerous, and unlike properly domesticated
49
animals". On the other hand, "wildlife" carries all the 
positive and modern — and romantic — suggestions of 
"wild": animals (or plants presumably) living their 
natural, proper, uninterfered-with lives. This is not, by 
the way, a new sense; we get it in the seventeenth 
century, for example in Milton's lines in L'Allegro:
"..Or sweetest Shakespear fancies childe,
Warble his native Wood-notes wilde,-"
One might think it was obvious that animals in the 
wild were living in a state of freedom, but this has often 
been denied. It is this matter that I turn to now.
3.2 FREEDOM
A claim sometimes made about zoo animals is that they are 
not really unfree in captivity because they would not be 
really free in the wild state. It may be added that 
freedom is something which animals can not appreciate and 
do not care about. I want to challenge the common 
assumption that a clear line can be drawn between humans 
and other animals in regard to their experience of or 
capacity for "freedom".
The claim that animals are not truly free in the wild 
is made by Hediger in some detail. Wild animals are not 
as, he says, everyone once fondly imagined, free to wander 
where they will: they have, usually, a restricted range.
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within this a habitat (or biochore) and within this a 
biotope or niche. In addition the individual, pair or 
social unit has a territory (10). Possibly he also sees as 
limiting a freeliving animal's freedom such factors as its 
biological rank and social rank (11). This claim is also 
made by Hindle in his introduction to Hediger's book, and 
by numerous other writers (12) .
Is it true that people used to think wild animals 
were free in the sense of going wherever and doing 
whatever they liked? Perhaps they did, as Mary Midgley 
suggests (13). Hediger speaks of it as the "traditional 
idea" but adds that "as early as 1909" Seton realised it 
wasn't so (14). I should have thought that, as people knew 
they themselves were not free to go where they liked, and 
certainly knew they were not free to treat everyone as 
equals, but had to show respect to certain superiors, they 
would be likely to assume that animals were similarly 
restricted. Certainly the idea of order extending to 
animals is not new. The Elizabethan, medieval and 
originally Aristotelian idea of cosmic order involved all 
living things. All had a place, a rank. Indeed Hediger's 
examples of "biological rank" - e.g. between mountain 
eagle, raven and jackdaw — are reminiscent of Elizabethan 
(and presumably earlier) ideas of ranks among animals: 
e.g. the eagle among birds (15).
Was it not obvious that animals had to make their way 
in the world: that they had to find food, usually had to 
have homes (as in the New Testament: "the birds of the air
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have nests..."), had to avoid enemies and being eaten? So 
animals could not have been "wholly" free, free to do 
whatever they liked.
However, whatever people used to think about how 
animals lived, it is true that we now know animals to have 
territories, rules of behaviour, complicated relations to 
their fellows, and so on. But this need not be taken to 
imply, I suggest, that freeliving animals are not free. 
First, it is clear that freedom must have various degrees; 
it is not an absolute, all-or-nothing affair, and in 
particular does not have to be absolute to be worth 
calling freedom. None of us is absolutely free - we have 
to pay taxes and rates, earn our living, buy our clothes, 
and so on - but we still regard ourselves as free, 
relative to the Russians perhaps, and we regard such 
freedom as we have as worth caring about. Recognising we 
have to be restricted in some degree does not mean that we 
could not be restricted too much, or that it would not 
matter if we were.
Furthermore, it is not even merely impracticable for 
the state, say, to allow us complete freedom. It is not 
just that we could not all be wholly free because our 
freedoms would, as it were, overlap or trespass upon each 
other, though of course this is so. It is that to have 
complete freedom would be to have a state of disorder and 
chaos. We make rules for ourselves for our own interests, 
indeed for our own sanity. So we want freedom but not 
literally complete freedom (if indeed "complete freedom"
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has any meaning).
Some people feel they are not free because of having 
been conditioned by their society into behaving in a 
particular kind of way, but do not we have to be a part of 
some society? Do not we have to have certain rules or ways 
of behaving rather than others, to be able to do anything 
at all (16)? At any rate, certain rules and conventions 
enable us to do things we could not do otherwise. Rules 
seem necessary for freedom, just as rules and limitations 
within which we operate are necessary for sports and games 
and for artistic creation. So, far from it being the case 
that animals are not truly free because their freedom is 
limited, it seems to me that their freedom, just like 
humans’ freedom, could not possibly not be limited. Their 
freedom (in varying degrees) may well be more limited than 
human freedom, but this is a matter of degree, not of 
qualitative difference. No doubt a very big quantitative 
difference amounts to a qualitative one, and humans' 
freedom includes things like being able to decide to 
change their way of life, or make long-term decisions 
about the life they will need, in ways that animals no 
doubt can not. But we are not always involved with such 
radical or long-term decisions. Much of the time we are 
all merely following in our day to day routine, where 
choice is hardly involved, or making minor decisions such 
as animals to some extent can (and have to) make too: 
decisions such as whether to eat this or that food, 
whether to go to bed or stay up longer, whether to join
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our fellows or do something else alone.
It might be argued that animals are not free because 
we can predict what they are going to do. This is, in a 
way, another aspect of their having structured lives, 
social organisations, and so on. But it seems to me right, 
following Flew (17), to see a person as being free 
provided that he is not being forced by some external 
power to behave in a certain way. We do not suppose that 
free behaviour must be uncaused. If it were, it would be 
chaotic, which, approaching from a different direction, we 
have already seen not to be what being free involves. So 
long as the causal factors are internal to the person 
concerned rather than external to him and irresistible, in 
the way that manipulation by a hypnotist might be, we do
not see them as limiting his freedom. The more we
understand the various causal factors operating, the more 
we may be able to predict a person's behaviour in any 
particular set of circumstances. The situation does not 
seem to be substantially different with an animal. Some of 
the causal factors which make an animal behave in a
certain way in the wild state must be external to him, for
he must respond to the circumstances he meets. This is
true of humans too.
In any case, even if we neglect the question of 
whether a particular animal has any free choice in its 
normal life, or if we decide that it has not, we should 
still recognise that if the animal is prevented from 
leading that life, its freedom has been to a greater 01
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lesser extent removed. It has, simply, lost its freedom to 
live its normal life. I have already agreed that humans 
have a degree of freedom which it is likely no animal 
possesses. This kind of freedom an animal, if it does not 
normally have it, can not of course lose. But there is no 
reason why we should regard this as the only important 
kind of freedom. We obviously do not think it is. We 
clearly do regard it as very important that people should 
be allowed to go about their normal lives without undue 
interference, and especially without being made captive. 
And this will still apply in any particular case where we 
happen to have good reason to suppose the person concerned 
has very little control over his life, makes up his own 
mind very little, forms no long-term plans, and so on. So 
it should presumably apply also to animals.
Again, what a person chooses to do is often what it 
is best for him to do, and what we should therefore let 
him do. He may not necessarily consciously consider course 
A and course B and decide finally to follow course A; he 
just does A, without having been forced to by an outside 
agent. Of course, he chooses A because of the kind of 
person he is, and he is the kind of person he is partly 
because of heredity, as a result of which he will be (I 
suggest) to some extent adapted to a particular kind of 
life. Now what an animal does naturally is, similarly, 
what it is choosing to do. We can say that it is not free 
to choose a different kind of life (the cow won't take up 
hunting) but neither am I (Bostock) free, as it happens,
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to choose a life of, say, cricket (or hunting), because, 
as it happens, I am not that sort of person; I have the 
wrong temperament and lack the ability. True, human 
individuals seem to vary more than do individuals of other 
species but this must be at least partly what has been 
called the "Chinese effect" (18).
I have been looking at the concept of freedom 
because, although I think that good animal captivity can 
be morally justified, I do not wish to try to establish 
this by using what seem to me faulty arguments. And to 
argue that animals can not lose their freedom in captivity 
because they would have no freedom anyway in the wild 
seems to me fallacious. Despite this conclusion about 
freedom, I still think that the state of captivity in a 
good zoo can be a state of wellbeing, and it is the 
concept of "captivity" that I shall look at next.
3.3 CAPTIVITY
Anything that can be called animal captivity may seem, in 
the eyes of anyone prepared to grant animals a minimum of 
consideration, to be seIf—condemned by the very term 
"captivity", surely of necessity an oppressive treatment 
except possibly for human criminals. I want however to see 
what is involved in a human's being captive, and then 
consider how much of this applies also to animal
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captivity, and in particular to good animal captivity. It 
should then be possible to establish both that "captivity" 
is used here as a technical term without very much of the 
meaning and overtones which it carries in the case of 
human captivity, and more importantly that at least some 
forms of what would normally be counted as animal 
captivity should also be regarded as acceptable.
ASPECTS OF HUMAN CAPTIVITY 
The following aspects of captivity seem important as far 
as human captivity is concerned:
1) A captive's movements, and to some extent other 
actions of his, are prevented or restricted.
2) His freedom to communicate with his family and 
friends or other people is restricted.
3) He is not normally able to carry on family life 
and/or have children.
4) While the normal means of his being kept captive is by
means of prison walls, locked doors, etc, he could be kept
captive without any restrictions being placed on his 
actual travel if he were controlled by drugs which he was 
forced to take, or by some sort of wiring in, or 
cerebral manipulation, or hypnotism, so that he was
not acting freely, even though there were no bars or
actual physical barriers restricting his movements. If 
we thought some application of indoctrination or training 
quite excessive, and forced upon someone against his 
wishes, and particularly perhaps if we considered that it
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was such as to change his nature or personality, we might 
call this captivity.
5) The restrictions must be necessarily imposed by an 
outside agent. Not to be able to travel or communicate
or generally live one's normal life because of physical or 
mental illness, or a rail strike, or living in the 
country, would not make one strictly captive. The effects 
might be the same, but it would not be real captivity just 
because there was no outside agent purposely restricting 
one's freedom.
6) Captivity is normally, or at least very often, 
intended to be in some degree unpleasant.
7) A state of captivity is inflicted or imposed either as 
punishment or, more likely, as appropriate treatment of
a defeated enemy in war, or a member of a subject and 
perhaps (in the view of the captor) inferior race.
8) The captive will normally be aware of his state, and 
such awareness is part of or involved in his captivity, 
and it may be part of the pleasure of the captor - as in 
a Roman triumph, with prisoners/captives paraded.
ASPECTS OF ANIMAL CAPTIVITY
Now let us see how many of these are aspects also of 
good animal captivity:
1) YES, but... The movement restriction applies, and in 
some degree the restrictions on other actions. However, as 
we shall see in chapters 9 and 10, the animal ought to be 
kept in such a way that as many as possible of its natural
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activities occur.
2) YES, but... This applies, though the animal should be 
able to communicate with other animals in its group in 
captivity, though of course not usually with others in the 
wild. (This could occur, e.g. in the case of swans at
SIimbridge.)
3) NO, but... A main point of modern animal captivity is 
that breeding should occur, though it of course occurs at 
best less freely than it would in the wild, it often does
not or can not occur, and this was very often the case in
zoos historically.
4) (YES.) This does, or rather it could - i.e. we could 
wire up an animal so as to manipulate it through its brain
(19) , or use drugs, etc; more to the point, we could 
also change an animal just by taming it and also by 
training, and by selective breeding; though in this last 
case it would be on the animal's descendants, not on the 
animal itself, that the effect would be produced. The 
wiring up and use of drugs examples do not of course 
normally occur in zoos; they are merely theoretical 
possibilities. Taming in some degree does, as does in some 
cases training. It is an accepted responsibility of zoos 
to endeavour to avoid selective breeding, but, as I shall 
argue in chapter 8, I do not think a rigid distinction can
be drawn between "zoo animals" (or even fully wild
animals) on the one hand and domesticated animals on the 
other.
5) YES. The animal's situation is indeed brought about by
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an outside agent, who also belongs to a different species 
from the captive.
6) NO. The captivity is not intended to be unpleasant, 
or, if it ever is, most certainly ought not to be, though 
in some cases it is perhaps likely to be, and expected to 
be. But this is mainly so only of the actual capture of a 
wild animal and the period ensuing until it has adjusted 
to captivity. Many animals are born in zoos, and capturing 
is in any case more difficult than mere keeping captive to 
justify: I shall look at it in chapter 17.
7) NO. Again, the captivity is certainly not imposed as 
a punishment or appropriate treatment of a defeated enemy
(20) . However this may have been the situation in the 
past, and it is possible that it could be today in some 
cases.
8) NO. I think it unlikely that the captive animal will 
be aware of being captive, or at least it should not be if 
its captive conditions are adequate (21), although I do 
not think it anthropomorphic to assume an animal is aware 
of being restricted in a very confined cage (such as 
Chaucer was presumably thinking of - see 1.1 above). (I 
discuss anthropomorphism in 9.5 below.) But I think many 
zoo staff reasonably believe many of their animals are 
well enough off not to escape if they could (see 9.5 
below) .
So at least 6) ( "unpleasant") , 7) ( "punishment11) and
8)("aware"), and also 3)("breeding"), do not apply in the 
animal situation; 1)("movement and action") and
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2) ("communication") are applicable but only in some 
degree. 4) ("technological") is a special case which I will 
leave out of this particular calculation. 5)("outside 
agent ) certainly does apply to animal captivity.
4. So I suggest, at least as a preliminary conclusion, 
that animal captivity is substantially different from 
human captivity, and that we should regard the term 
"captivity" in connection with good zoos as a technical 
term. By good zoos I mean ones that are providing good 
conditions for their animals in the light of the fullest 
knowledge available of what their needs are, and this is 
something very different from what any human prisoner or 
captive would be likely to be provided with. Replacing the 
term "captivity", if we could think of a suitable 
substitute such as "keeping" or "holding" perhaps, would 
not be, I think, at least as far as good zoos are 
concerned, the mere adopting of a euphemism such as much 
of the use of the term "euthanasia", for example, is (so 
Regan convincingly argues (22)).
In my attempted analysis of the concept of captivity, 
I may seem to have left out the most important features - 
bars, concrete floors, a life of unremitting dullness, and 
so on. Bars, as I discuss elsewhere, are not
necessarily objectionable in themselves, but seem so 
because of the other features with which they are so often 
associated. But in any case this sort of captivity, 
anything which can reasonably be called prison-like, I am 
not trying to justify or defend. The point is, I think,
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that we now have ways, or at least we know now how to set 
about discovering ways, of keeping animals so that their 
real needs are fulfilled, as I will look at in chapters 9 
and 10. It might be, I suppose, that some animal's need 
differed so much from ours that what looked like a prison 
to us actually fulfilled its needs very well. An actual 
human prison might suit mice very well. But generally 
speaking, if a cage or enclosure looks prison-like to us, 
the chances are it will also be highly unsuitable for most 
zoo animals, not least because, perhaps, many of the 
animals kept in zoos are a great deal more like us - who 
are, after all, primates - than is often supposed (23). A 
comparison of ourselves and other animals is what I turn 
to now.
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Chapter 4 
ANIMALS HUMAN AND NONHUMAN
I have already suggested (see 3.2) that there is no 
difference in principle between humans and other animals 
with regard to freedom. I want to try to show now how 
difficult it is to pinpoint any such difference of 
principle between humans and other animals. Obviously 
there are differences.- the human species differs in all 
kinds of respects from any of the other primate species, 
never mind other mammals. But the point is that animals 
seem to have consciousness or awareness, to be individuals 
and even perhaps persons, to show feelings and experience 
pleasures very like humans. The strongest candidate for 
marking humans off as something quite different from 
animals is perhaps still today, and has certainly 
historically been assumed to be, man's possession of 
language and his rationality (whatever that exactly is). 
Even there, as I shall try to show in 4.4, there are 
indications of much more continuity between us and animals 
than is usually supposed. But first, the question of 
animals' consciousness or awareness, including their 
experience of pain.
4.1 PAIN AND AWARENESS
Now it is perfectly true that receiving sensory
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information and reacting to it, which all animals 
unquestionably do, is not the same as having conscious 
experience. We ourselves can be aware of our surroundings 
without being consciously aware, as is evident from the 
"cocktail party effect", when we suddenly hear our name 
mentioned in a conversation far away that we were not 
consciously listening to at all, or when a mother is 
awakened "selectively" by her child's crying (1).
Descartes notoriously suggested that animals were not 
consciously aware at all, but were just automata. Not 
having things like the self-adjusting missiles of today to 
point to, he drew comparisons with hydraulically powered 
moving statues (for which there was a fashion at 
Versailles, and which particularly
fascinated him (2)). There is enormous interest today in 
the parallels between brains and computers, and in what 
light computers can shed on the workings of the nervous 
system. The question has even been raised whether a 
computer could feel pain, and if not, exactly why not
(3). The special significance of this is that pain is an 
essentially conscious experience (4). Perhaps one can hear 
or see unconsciously, but I do not think that one can feel 
pain unconsciously. So, if we grant that animals feel 
pain, then we have granted them at least one kind of 
conscious experience. A sinister aspect of Descartes' 
theory (which may only have been a hypothesis as far as he 
was concerned) was that it served morally to authorise 
vivisection: animals could feel no pain if they were only
65
machines (5). The theory hovered in the background of 
biological research for centuries, not least in 19th 
century France where the "School of Paris" treated animals 
with unbelievable barbarity (see chapter 6 below) (6). 
Whether or not any of the French 19th century researchers 
genuinely held the cartesian belief about animals' 
inability to feel pain, British biologists certainly 
accepted that animals could feel it, and probably as 
intensely as humans (7). A later Behaviourist attitude has 
encouraged researchers to write scientific reports in 
language supposedly "objective" and non-committal on the 
question of animals' actually feeling pain, though, it 
seems to me, some scientists have clearly never doubted 
that, for example, rats, or even ants, could feel pain
(8). Besides, it seems odd for, say, a research 
psychologist to condition his animals by "painful" stimuli 
(sometimes in the course of actually studying pain) and 
yet still maintain that they are not actually being hurt
(9) . In any case, it has, within the last decade (and no 
doubt partly thanks to the publication of Griffin's book, 
The Question of Animal Awareness) become acceptable and 
even fashionable for researchers to accept that animals do 
have conscious experience (including that of pain); there 
has been considerable interest in cognitive processes for 
much longer (10).
There are many puzzling aspects of pain. Pain 
thresholds themselves seem to vary culturally; the very 
experience of pain may depend on an environment in early
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life which provides the right experience; it is even 
possible apparently to feel (following a lobotomy 
operation) pain and not mind it (11). One of the most 
interesting aspects is that the body appears to have its 
own ways of controlling pain by, among other methods, the 
production of natural opiates or pain-killers, called 
endorphins; and it is thanks to these, no doubt, that both 
humans and animals probably do not feel pain in the short 
term in some cases of serious injury. The biological 
advantage of this is to maximise chances of escape (12). 
Some have suggested that to feel pain requires being able 
to conceptualise it, but to me it is very striking how far 
the occurrence of pain seems to be a specific biological 
device preventing self-injury. Evidence is provided by 
those unfortunate people who lack (somehow) the 
pain-causing mechanism, and whose inability to feel pain 
makes them dangerously prone to serious injury (13). While 
I agree with Stephen Clark that we should by no means be 
concerned about other animals exclusively because of their 
liability to experience physical pain, and appreciate his 
emphasis on pain's not necessarily having any connection 
with sensations, it seems to me that severe physical pain 
remains a rather specific and very terrible experience 
(with a biological role) which can occur or not occur. The 
fact that it can occur is at least an additional reason, 
even if it ought to be superfluous as a motivation, why we 
should treat all creatures humanely (14). At any rate, 
whatever problems there are with pain apply equally to
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humans and to animals. There seems not the slightest 
justifiable reason for supposing that animals can not feel 
pain; and veterinarians have clearly never doubted it, as 
in a vet's comment (more than fifty years ago) about the 
importance, in trimming a dog's claws, of not cutting too 
close to the quick because of the danger of causing "a 
great deal of pain" (15).
The certainty, which I think it is, of other 
animals' experience of pain, seems itself a reason for 
attributing to them, as commonsense would, a whole range 
of other conscious experience also. Another major reason 
for imputing sense experience in general to animals is 
that such awareness, if not biologically useful, would not 
have evolved; it clearly is useful to us, even for helping 
us with such basic problems of living as the need to avoid 
bumping into objects. But as such a need is obviously 
shared by other animals, a human monopoly on conscious 
awareness seems rather unlikely. Presumably animals, 
including ourselves, have the advantage, as a result of 
the fact that their sense receptors and brains do not 
operate merely like the photoelectric cells of an 
automatically focussing camera or like a thermostat, of 
being able to adjust to "unexpected" problems in their 
environment, to choose ways of solving them (16). In a 
normal situation calling for no decisions our "automatic 
pilot" will suffice. If a problem occurs a decision can 
only be made because we are conscious. Even though a 
decision (eg to change our course when crossing the road
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to avoid a car) may be made instantly, and without 
conscious consideration, it seems to me still to be our 
conscious mind which does it, or rather ourselves who are 
able to because of being conscious. I would think 
decisions such as these - adjustments to the situation - 
can be made equally by higher animals through their 
possession of consciousness. It is only because animals 
have a degree of freedom to act (contrasted for example 
with plants) that, biologically speaking, they require to 
be motivated. What Bentham went too far in regarding as 
directing all human activities, "the two sovereign 
masters, pain and pleasure", obviously do play a 
considerable part in motivating us, and surely in 
motivating animals (17). The cat seeks food because she is 
hungry - she has a feeling of discomfort of a particular 
kind which presumably she learns disappears when food is 
obtained. Such motivation is only possible if animals have 
awareness.
Another argument for supposing animals to have 
awareness is the similarity of their sense organs and 
nervous systems to our own; we know that in ourselves 
events in these are closely connected with, and appear to 
be essential for, the occurrence of actual conscious 
experience; so it seems likely that the operation of the 
animals' organs should be similarly connected on occasion 
with conscious experience. Voltaire put this argument 
vividly^ and ironically the same argument essentially is 
used by Descartes, who only seems to be expressing doubt
69
that animals — and mainly lower animals such as "worms and 
flies and caterpillars" at that - could think, not that 
they could feel (18). I think that new anatomical and 
Physiological knowledge - of A-delta and C-fibres, of the 
reticular formation and the limbic system, for example - 
make Voltaire's argument still stronger (19).
The argument for animals' having sense experience 
because they have similar sense organs and nervous systems 
to ourselves is similar to the argument from their 
behaviour's being similar: animals seem to be acting as if 
they are having sensory experiences as we do, avoiding 
objects etc; so presumably they are having such 
experiences. The argument, at least as far as the 
comparison of sense organs and nervous systems goes, 
suggests that we have less and less reason to think 
animals have sense experience, the further down the 
evolutionary scale they are, and the less complex their 
nervous systems.
Interestingly however, it seems not out of the 
question to attribute awareness even to protozoans. After 
all, a protozoan consists of the one basic unit of which 
nervous systems are constructed. H.S. Jennings' view was 
that Amoeba and Paramecium from their behaviour look as 
conscious as any larger animals (20). The protozoan 
ciliate Stentor may not show conscious awareness but it 
shows behaviour which is "highly flexible and unmistakably 
adaptive to... circumstances" (21). But it is important to 
stress that, while we have no good reason to be certain
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that protozoans, say, do not have sensory experience, we 
similarly cannot he certain that they do, whereas we do 
have every reason to be certain that higher animals - 
mammals, birds and other vertebrates - have sensory 
experience comparable with our own.
It seems to me that we do ourselves have experience 
of different levels of awareness. We know what it is to be 
unconscious as in dreamless sleep; we know the experience 
of waking up, when we pass through different levels of 
consciousness (22), and thus can in some degree appreciate 
how there could be a continuum of possible degrees of 
awareness up the phylogenetic ladder.
Awareness, or at least perception, is to a great 
extent an active process in which the part played by the 
mind - e.g. our understanding and interest - affects what 
we are aware of, what we perceive (23). If animals at 
different levels on the evolutionary scale have different 
levels of awareness, this will not depend only on the 
quality of the sense organ; it will also depend on the 
quality of the mind of the organism. Thus we, even where 
our eyes, say, are not better than a bird's (and in some 
cases they are much less powerful), may see far more when 
we look at some object because of its significance for us.
However, just as to see the evolutionary scale as a 
linear progression is only partly true, and while, running 
though the evolutionary scale, there is probably a 
gradually increasing degree of awareness, this is only 
part of the picture. Different kinds of animals will have
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many different kinds of awareness, not superior or* 
Inferior necessarily to each other (24). Differences 
arising from varied interests are in addition to 
'those arising from actual differences in the sense
organs: owls and bees do not see what we see as red; but 
bees and butterflies are stimulated by ultra-violet, so 
see more in many flowers than we do, and so on. Part of 
our ability to see as we do apparently depends on the fact 
our eyeball has a ceaseless tremor, which a frog's eye 
does not (25).
In one sense, we all occupy separate worlds of 
experience, or, as it has been put, each of us is at the 
centre of his own sensory universe. This picture of J. von 
Uexkuhl's of each animal living in its own specific world 
is something like that of Sprigge's of human beings as 
"centres of consciousness" (26). The picture seems useful 
in representing, especially with other animals, though 
with other people also, how their experience may be very 
different from our own; it also emphasises how there seems 
no good reason for not regarding each individual human or 
animal as of comparable importance, being the centre of 
his universe of experience. It is also true that we do not 
in every way occupy private worlds; we do communicate, do 
share each others' experiences (27). But it does bring 
home how we have another reason for respecting animals 
besides recognising that they have sensory experience like 
ourselves: the fact that they have sensory experience 
unlike ours. That we do not understand them, that they are
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"other", seems also a natural reason for not regarding 
ourselves as having any right to treat them just as we 
like (28).
Recognising how different the experience of different 
animals is from our own is likely to encourage us to 
respect them. The attitudes of novelists and poets who 
have tried to construct imaginatively the worlds of 
nonhuman animals show this, I think. The act of 
imagination and of sympathy with the animal needed to do 
this convincingly seems to go naturally hand in hand with 
an attitude of respect for the animal concerned. I suggest 
too it may not be so difficult to see into the world of a 
different kind of organism as Nagel for example feels 
(29) .
4.2 FEELINGS AND PLEASURES
4.2.1 FEELINGS 
To anyone who has ever taken his dog for a walk and 
perhaps thrown sticks for him to retrieve, it must seem 
rather ludicrous to seek to establish that animals have 
feelings. To throw the sticks implies recognition that the 
dog likes the game and wishes you to go on throwing them. 
Huizinga remarks that animals "play, so they must be more 
than merely mechanical things" (30). There is no doubt 
more to learn about the significance of the gestures the
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dog makes even on such familiar occasions as this. But for 
the ethologist (for example) to approach such behaviour as 
if he had no prior knowledge but was seeking by science to 
find out not only whether the dog was showing feelings but 
whether he could have feelings to show, would be almost 
like a psychologist's seeking to learn from his science 
whether his fellow psychologists were feeling creatures 
like himself rather than hominoid automata. However while 
we surely have prescientific knowledge, as Sprigge has 
called it, that dogs have feelings, we presumably have no 
such knowledge about snails, or even octopuses. It is not 
an open question, I suggest, that dogs have feelings, but 
it is whether snails do (31).
To appeal to common experience to assert that dogs 
have feelings should not imply that dog-lovers can be 
relied on in all their beliefs about the emotional or 
intellectual capacities of their animals. Psychologists 
have reason not to base their theories on anecdotes; 
people can get carried away and often are, imagining for 
example that dogs can understand our language virtually as 
we do. But we have the word "play", the concept, and we 
can apply it. It is not clear that we would be closer to 
reality if we avoided the term and tried only to use terms 
describing physical movements (32) . We do not see merely 
such movements; we see gestures and actions. To say the 
dog's tail moved sideways (or in some precisely described 
manner) rather than "the dog wagged his tail" would hardly 
be more accurate; it would be less so. We can see the dog
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wagging his tail; true, we can merely describe the 
physical movements involved if we choose to, but this is 
something different from the tail wagging. We are 
interpreting in saying "the dog wagged his tail", but then 
we are interpreting in using the word "tail". Come to 
that, we are interpreting in using the word "dog". And 
dogs are animals which (among other things) wag their 
tails. We cannot use language without interpreting. It is 
no Aunt Sally I am here arguing against. For example, 
Rachels quotes the words of a psychologist concerned in an 
experiment into the capacity of monkeys to show sympathy 
with their fellows. Despite the subject of the experiment, 
the language of the experimenter seems intended to cut out 
any implication that animals have feelings, and an inner 
life (33). But are there not scientific reasons for 
expecting that dogs will be in this respect as in so many 
others similar to man? Humans and dogs are both mammals, 
intelligent, social and capable of being partners (34). 
Given all this, is not the onus on whoever wishes to 
disprove that dogs have feelings rather than the other way 
round?
Still, it may be useful methodologically to give a 
precisely observable meaning to terms referring to 
feelings — e.g. by "pleased" to mean "jumping up on its 
hind legs, and likely to go through the door before us 
when we open it". We can then use the expression and avoid 
begging any conceivably open questions about the animal s 
inner life. But if it is useful scientifically to do this.
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it is precisely equally the case in psychological study of 
humans. Such an approach would obviously not in the case 
of humans imply that actually humans had no "inner 
experience , and there is no reason why the use of such an 
approach should imply this any more in the case of 
animals.
Can we with equal confidence state that animals have 
emotions as that they have feelings? There is a long 
tradition in human thought, stemming from Plato's Academy, 
that emotions have a cognitive content which 
differentiates them from, say, "bodily sensations and 
bodily drives", the assumption being that only man can 
think (35) . But a cow separated from her calf shows 
distress. It is because she believes her calf to be 
separated that she expresses the emotion. This seems a 
straightforward description of a situation familiar to 
farmers and veterinarians, although the view that a 
nonhuman animal can be properly said to have beliefs has 
been challenged (36) . I do not necessarily wish to imply 
that animals' emotions are the same as humans' emotions, 
but I do think they are similar enough for us properly to 
use the same word of both and in the same sense. There is 
no sharp dividing line (37). The most morally creditable 
behaviour of humans usually stems from emotion - 
self-sacrifice, or extreme effort on behalf of another, 
and so on. It is proverbial that some animal mothers will 
take any risk to protect their young. They do not think 
about it", no doubt. But we do not withhold credit from a
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human hero because he "didn't think about it". I doubt if 
heroic acts ever are produced other than out of emotion.
An example of an animal apparently behaving morally in the 
attempted protection of a human infant is given by Reeve 
(38) .
4.2.2 PLEASURE
Even where it is granted that animals can feel and 
perhaps have emotions, and where especially it is granted 
that they can feel pain and suffer in other ways too, 
there is often a reluctance to grant them an equal ability 
to experience pleasure (39) . But the mere demands of 
symmetry suggest that pleasure is equally likely to occur, 
and likely to be as important, as is suffering. It would 
be surprising if animals were like us in the one respect 
and not the other. I suspect that in fact an animal's 
pleasure can probably be very similar to ours, like a 
horse's enjoying being able to see better as a result of 
the provision of spectacles, as well as rather different, 
like a hyaena rolling in, "...ecstasy of ecstasies, her 
own or her companion's vomit" (40).
The most important thing is that we should not 
underrate the importance of animals' pleasures. I think it 
is worth providing a list of pleasurable experiences or 
sources of pleasure which humans and at least "higher 
nonhuman animals probably share:
(i) Pleasures of feeding, especially when previously
hungry.
(ii) Urination & defaecation.
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(iii) Pleasures such as sunbathing of simply enjoying the 
sun on a hot day (which obviously applies to cats and 
dogs, and apparently can apply to a hare (41)); plunging 
into water; rolling in mud (engaged in by, among others, 
dogs, deer, and Barbary sheep); sliding down banks (such 
as otters and badgers go in for (42)) .
(iv) Love making and sex (the physical side of erotic 
love being even for humans a very important part of it) .
(v) Companionship, the consoling nature of mates and 
close "friends", "snuggling u p ", mutual grooming, 
stroking, etc.
(vi) Pleasures of being dominant, receiving "obeisance" 
from inferiors, fighting for this position and winning it, 
but also (perhaps) pleasures of being "properly" 
subservient, i.e. obeying the normal rules involved in 
"knowing one's place" (purposely here seen in comparable 
terms to those of a human servant because this can have 
satisfactions.)
(vii) Playing (43), which could well include some of the
activities in (iii) above.
(viii) Parental/motherly satisfaction of having young and 
caring for them.
(ix) Reciprocal satisfactions of young in relation to
mother (or father).
(x) Comforts, security of having a home, a home-base, a
territory, etc.
(xi) Pleasures of hunting, exploring, having a sense of 
purpose, working and hunting together (as in the case of
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dogs for example) , catching food. (Doers also enjoy just 
meeting each other.)
The purely physical pleasures (If such there are) in 
the above list are not replaced by the more sophisticated, 
"intellectual" pleasures available only to humans, so I do 
not think Frey is justified in dismissing the pleasures 
and interests of, eg, a chicken, as if our important 
pleasures were utterly different; these physical pleasures 
are very important to us too; indeed, to some extent they 
are probably desirable, if not essential, for good health 
(44) .
Perhaps our enjoyment of anything depends on change, 
on its not going on too long. No doubt a cheetah, if it 
does not enjoy the chase, at least enjoys relaxing 
afterwards, and especially, being hungry, enjoys being 
able to feed. It seems likely an Emperor penguin 
particularly enjoys the feed of fish brought by his mate 
after a three month privation (45). It obviously is 
biologically useful that certain natural functions - 
breathing, feeding, urinating, defaecating, above all 
mating — should be pleasurable. It seems to me significant 
that the unpleasant feeling of hunger is not an automatic 
consequence of needing food: it returns at intervals; and 
will disappear (as will feelings of tiredness) if 
something important occurs, without resulting injury 
(unless the delay is extreme). Hunger feelings are devices 
encouraging one to satisfy biological needs in a regular 
way, this being presumably more efficient than making the
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fee 1 ing of hunger directly related to or identical with 
the need for food. Mild suffering, or what we ought to be 
able to call unpleasure", is equally biologically useful. 
If running very hard for a long time did not become 
unpleasant, an antelope or cheetah might (because of the 
build up of an "oxygen debt", an excess of lactic acid and 
so on) exhaust itself. The sensation we call "getting out 
of breath" has a function as getting hungry does. In 
general the capacity to find something pleasant or 
unpleasant is only likely to evolve if it is useful. This 
presumably applies to us and to other animals in exactly 
the same way.
The experience of boredom is similarly useful.If our 
pleasure in an activity did not diminish, we would be
likely to continue doing it indefinitely. This is
precisely what a rat with its "pleasure centre" stimulated 
continually does (46) . Here the pleasure would be
unabating, and disastrously for the rat so far as carrying
out the normal necessities of life is concerned. If 
boredom is, as it were, a biological device which ensures 
that we do not spend too long doing one thing just because 
we enjoy it, its occurrence in (some) animals as in man 
seems likely. The fact the rat has a "pleasure-centre" 
also indicates that pleasure is a factor in its life.
If all animals lacked any capacity for enjoyment — as 
well as for suffering — we would be faced with a 
mysterious biological discontinuity (47): it would be a 
puzzle how such a capacity could have managed to evolve in 
ourseIves.
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4.3 INDIVIDUALITY AND PERSONALITY
Although Descartes viewed animals as automata (see 4.1 
above) , he also spoke of training animals, and of their 
differing abilities to be trained (48) . He was recognising 
how unlike machines they are; that they are, in fact, 
individuals. The earliest (perhaps) of all novels, Homer's 
Odyssey, recognises the individuality of Odysseus' dog 
Argus, not least in the dog's very ability to recognise 
his master as an individual (in this case after years of 
absence) (49) . Many will know how a dog or cat's death can 
be a real bereavement: one is aware of the loss of a 
particular individual, in fact of a person (50). A 
domestic dog can so very obviously depend on his humans' 
company for his happiness (the word seems appropriate) , 
that it seems far from fantastic to suppose a dog can 
suffer considerably - even though he no doubt can not 
conceptualise that suffering - from the loss (i.e. the 
permanent disappearance) of a human he knows well.
Perhaps, especially in the wild state, he could suffer 
equally from the loss of another dog.
Dogs and cats, of course, we happen to know well. 
Man's relation to them is a remarkable phenomenon, though 
there can be a similar closeness between man and other 
domestic animals such as horses. But I suggest there is 
also every reason to suppose that it would be possible to 
have similar personal relationships with other similar 
mammals, and indeed birds. Numerous accounts of various
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people s friendships with lions, bears, mongooses, otters, 
and so on testify to this (51) . Howard got to know 
various birds; she came to recognise individuals and even, 
it seems, distinct personalities (52). She shows how the 
contact and communication that we all know can be 
established with a dog is not unique to dogs, or their 
relatives, or even mammals; something similar can happen 
with birds. Jane Goodall and Hugo van Lawick discuss how 
the individuality we are familiar with in domesticated 
animals exists just as much in wild ones (53).
While we know that the human brain is particularly 
well-developed in certain respects, and it seems 
reasonable to presume that, partly because of this, we are 
able to form (so far as we know) deeper and longer-lasting 
personal relationships than most other animals, we should 
appreciate the extent to which some other animals can also 
form such relationships. These in some cases, such as the 
relationship Goodall noted between the chimpanzee Flo and 
her son Flint, can parallel human relationships to a 
startling degree (54).
Morton Boyd once recalled the attitude of a 
distinguished zoologist, the late Fraser Darling, towards 
grey seals and red deer: how he had thought of them in 
many ways as he thought of people, and this had helped him 
in his study of them. Books such as Howard's also make us 
aware how much we are similar to other animals, how much 
that we know as characteristic of ourselves is in fact 
characteristic of us because we are animals, not because
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we are different from other mammals (or even from birds) 
As Lock ley remarks, after reviewing the "marital" 
relationships of rabbits and the buck's partly tolerated 
"extra-marital relationships", "Rabbits are so human. Or 
is it the other way round - humans are so rabbit?" (55)
4.4 LANGUAGE AND RATIONALITY
It has long been assumed that humans are rational in a 
way in which animals are not, and that this rationality 
depends on humans' equally unique possession of language. 
Hamlet, for example, bemoaning his mother's too hasty 
marriage with his uncle following his father's death, 
says: A beast that wants discourse of reason / Would have 
mourned longer (56) . I want to suggest that human 
language, although syntactically and semantically unique, 
is in two other ways comparable with animal communication, 
and that rationality, understood in three different 
senses, is not unique to humans.
4.4.1 LANGUAGE
That human language can be used to communicate with 
(some) animals is a matter of common experience. Humans 
talk to their dogs, cats and other companion animals. 
Bartlett of London Zoo (see chapter 2) remarked on the 
extraordinary power of speech in taming wild animals (57) .
It might be commented that in such cases it is not
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language as such which is being used, but merely the tone 
of voice, pitch and other such extra— 1 ingual devices. It 
is no doubt the case that meaningless arrangements of 
words would be just as effective in speaking to an animal, 
and the reason we customarily make statements to our pets 
which, once we think about it, we accept they cannot 
possibly understand is that it is actually easier to speak 
sense than to utter meaningless sounds. But it is arguable 
that we are still communicating with them by language 
(non-verbal ly but not extra-lingual ly) because our 
normal inter-human use of spoken language includes, or is 
supplemented by, not only intonations which are not 
indicated in written language but other devices such as 
changes of pitch and volume (58) . It is also supplemented 
by facial expressions, gestures of the hands and body, and 
so on. Now these pitch changes, gestures, and so on, are 
presumably important in human communication: they are 
something we all engage in to varying degrees. Perhaps 
they do not signal factual information but rather express 
feelings, and reflect, or even play a part in bringing 
about, various social relations. But presumably it is 
important that we communicate such things.
It is hardly insignificant that at least certain 
accessories of language should serve so effectively for 
communication with animals. Clever Hans, the horse whose 
apparent ability to add successfully was eventually 
demonstrated to be instead an ability to pick up signals 
from his master of which the latter himself was unawaie,
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was clearly a remarkable animal. Similarly Washoe and 
other linguistically instructed apes may be interpreting 
human gestures or other signals on occasion rather than 
understanding the meaning of statements directly; but if 
so they are still demonstrating their ability to 
understand our communications, even though sub-verbal or 
extra-verbal communications, and also understanding by a 
method we use also, though possibly not as well as they do 
(59) . In using the various signals by which we supplement 
our spoken verbal language, we are using, so it seems to 
me, a system of communication common in some degree to 
ourselves and our fellow primates, as well as, to a lesser 
degree, to other mammals also, and thus a system which we 
have presumably been using since before we were human.
Our verbal language on the other hand seems 
enormously different from the means of communication of 
any other animals known to us, but it would be surprising 
if it had not evolved from elements of communication 
common to some other animals, and if there were nothing in 
the slightest degree similar to be found today in other
animals. Many animals are sensitive to and, it would seem,
can learn the meaning of individual words. For example, a
dog can learn a considerable vocabulary of commands and
not only commands. So animals' sensitivity to sounds is 
not only a sensitivity to pitch and tone and the like but 
to sounds differing from each other in the way our spoken 
words differ. So here there is a raw material of spoken 
language with regard to hearing. But we can go further,
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for some primates have calls with distinct meanings, and 
calls which are not innate, for example three warning 
calls made by vervet monkeys identifying three different 
kinds of predator (60) . Young vervets can use the calls 
wrongly and need to be corrected. There seems to be here a 
proto 1anguage, and one with several features common to 
human language (61).
There is however no combination of meaningful sounds 
into complex meaningful statements. The only nonhuman 
candidates for language users in the sense of utterers of 
words combined, however elementarily, grammatically and 
meaningfully are Washoe and other apes who have been 
taught ameslan or other human symbolic though nonspoken 
languages. But that there is some potential ability for 
such combination seems indicated by the at least partial 
success of some of the ape language work (62) .
Of course human language remains an extraordinary and 
unparalleled development, but not one I think entirely 
unique. Somehow humans achieved this extraordinary 
breakthrough, but one can see a little of the raw elements 
on which natural selection worked to produce it, and can 
make informed guesses as to aspects of the prehuman 
situation which may have helped to ensure that language 
developed in humans or other human species alone and not 
in other primates (or other mammals) . It may have been a 
lucky anatomical change allowing us to make a wider range 
of throat sounds than chimpanzees can produce; it may have 
been the dscovery of fire enabling us to function in
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darkness but in a situation which conveyed enormous 
advantage on any improvement in precise communication by 
sound; it may have been an urgent need to communicate 
arising from our predatory, social way of life in open or 
semi-open country (63) . What matters here is that some 
events caused humans to develop language where other 
primates did not, but it was not a logical necessity that 
human ancestors should develop it any more than it was a 
logical necessity that other primates or other mammals 
should not.
4.4.2 RATIONALITY
I suggest three possible senses of “rationality". These 
three kinds, as I see them, of rationality I shall then 
consider in relation to humans and other animals, though I 
shall spend most time on the second.
(i) the ability to think;
(ii) deciding, by reasoning, how to occupy oneself;
(iii) acting sensibly and morally;
(i) Thinking in the sense of reasoning has to an 
enormous extent been made possible by language. Thinking 
in the sense of supposing something to be the case has 
also been enormously extended by language, not least 
because we are able to refer to things of all kinds, 
whether or not present to our senses, though, as I have 
said above, I think a cow or a dog can still think such 
and such is the case, to however limited an extent (64) .
Most reasoning requires referring to particular 
things more or less precisely, which requires the prior
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formation of the necessary concepts, and making statements 
about those things, and language seems essential for this. 
It is difficult to imagine reasoning occurring without 
language but it must do so, and has been, I think, 
demonstrated to in apes, and in human infants, and perhaps 
in other mammals, other vertebrates and also cephalopods 
(65) . Language evolved (probably) as a device aiding 
communication between proto-humans; it may have been as a 
"spin-off" that it enormously increased the possibilities 
of thinking, leading to vast developments of human culture 
and society (66).
(ii) Reasoning or thinking logically does not motivate 
us or itself enable us to choose what to do. Motivation 
and choice are a matter of what we want to do, what our 
tastes and inclinations are. A large part of these is 
likely to be genetic. We cannot choose our tastes, what we 
enjoy, or what we are good at. Still, is not what we 
enjoy, what we spend our time in, how we order our lives, 
a special human concern, and quite different from anything 
non-human animals go in for? I suggest it is not to the 
extent we assume. I will take just two examples, the arts 
and social relations.
The performer - actor, comedian, indeed any public 
speaker — must get his audience's attention, and this is 
like asserting a kind of dominance; he will probably use 
methods which may be similar to those of other primates, 
but which in any case are probably partly under genetic 
control in humans, and are therefore part of human nature
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(67) . Genes making possible such actions ere part of the 
human gene-pool. The similarity of a human leader's 
performance (Mrs Thatcher or Mr Kinnock) to that of a 
performer as such is striking. Both face similar tasks, 
and are aided by similar "back-up".
There is a dual aspect to a performance in that "we", 
the audience, respond (or fail to). Our tendency to 
respond, if the right "chords" are struck by the 
performer, seems to me equally part of our nature, and 
akin to a readiness to respond to dominant individuals in 
other social species.
Pretending, make-believe, is something young children 
go in for; they do not need to be taught it (at least by 
an adult) or shown the point of it. So the central 
convention of drama - that someone stands up on a stage 
and pretends to be someone else - would be perfectly 
comprehensible to a young child. So at least ability to, 
and tendency to, pretend seem likely to be partly under 
genetic control and widespread in the human genepool, or, 
to put it another way, to be part of human nature. 
Pretending is something certain animals can do. Many 
primates have a "playface"; many other mammals (at least) 
as well as primates, can play: they thus can understand in 
a practical way the difference between doing something in 
fun" and doing it "for real" (68). Furthermore many 
animals, dogs obviously, can play with humans. They can 
become excited as a result of gestures or words of ours. 
They can pretend to be fierce, or to be hunting. A monkey
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at Bruton Street was tethered to a ring on a pole, and 
used to sit at the top, pretending not to to be paying 
attention, and then would grab the hat of an unsuspecting 
passer by (69) . Hediger records a chimpanzee pretending 
similarly, and highly convincingly (70). These are also 
examples of playing, and of showing interest in another's 
reactions. The famous elephant Jumbo on the voyage to 
America picked up a sailor's clean washing and dirtied it 
(71) . Elephants at London Zoo giving rides would grab 
by-standers' bags or umbrellas and, it seems clear, 
pretend to be about to eat them, and an elephant at 
Glasgow will pretend to her keeper that she is about to 
eat (say) a crisp packet (72) . These last two seem to me 
not only examples of an animal joking, pretending, and 
playing, but actually performing (the London Zoo example 
particularly) . An example of Hearne's of a dog at a show 
apparently purposely disobeying orders seems also an 
example of performing - of the animal's being aware of the 
audience, and of that audience's response (73). This is 
not so surprising, perhaps, in view of the extraordinary 
ability of the horse Clever Hans to response to an almost 
imperceptible gesture by his handler (74) . Perhaps it is 
not so surprising either that an animal should be 
interested in the reactions of onlookers. The use of 
bluff, again an example of pretending, by animals is 
almost fundamental, I would think, as, for example, by an 
elephant pretending to charge. Why should not this be 
conscious? A dog, as I've said, can distinguish playing
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and. not playing. It can also distinguish a voluntary and 
involuntary action, as when one strikes a dog 
unintentionally, and the dog, initially reacting as to a 
punishment, responds to reassurance that the blow was not 
intentional.
What of music or dancing? First the musician, and 
certainly the dancer, is a performer, and so certain 
points above apply; i.e., he needs to get attention. 
Nureyev, in an appreciation of the late Fred Astaire, 
wrote of the almost "hypnotising" effect of Astaire's 
dancing (75) . In addition, note how dancing and musical 
ritual probably go back a long way in man's past - they 
are not in essence a product of our recent culture, anyway 
- and the fact that there are indications of chimpanzees 
engaging in something like dancing, periods of excitement 
anyway (76) . Perhaps human dancing, music and ritual have 
their origins in pre-human behaviour.
What of visual arts? Morris seemed to show there was 
an embryonic aesthetic sense in apes, at least akin to a 
two year old child's visual appreciation (77). Hardy has 
emphasised how flower coloration and cryptic camouflage 
are actually selected by other animals' perceptions and 
responses — which seems to tell us something of how they 
see, though I do not suggest we are here talking of an 
even embryonic aesthetic sense (78) . There is also a 
remarkable account of a chimpanzee seemingly showing
wonder at a waterfall (79) .
To take a rather sinister aspect of social relations,
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parades, especially when they include displays of 
goose-stepping, are presumably a demonstration of 
dominance and of power. Perhaps goose-stepping looks 
frightening because, being difficult to do, it 
dramatically demonstrates troops' fitness and therefore 
effectiveness. But I am told that vultures "goose-step" in 
approaching a kill - presumably this can frighten off 
predators - and Hediger notes its occurrence in deer (80) . 
That humans, when they goose-step, are probably doing 
something explainable in terms of human nature itself 
seems to me indicated by such ritual's primacy over mere 
new political systems like communism, as illustrated by 
the fact (as I am informed) that Moscow ceremonial troops 
still goose-step according to the best military 
traditions, which happen to be Prussian (81). I imagine 
this is a variation on dancing, whose long ancestry I have 
already suggested. At an individual human level, a 
possible fight between two individual males is usually 
preceded by, and often averted by, a show of strength, 
and an attempt to dominate (82) . In human peacable 
relations, we still have, I think, almost unavoidable 
dominance and submissiveness being shown, not sinisterly, 
almost as a necessary oiling to social relations, which I 
will look at further in chapter 6.
So here is one vast sphere of human activity — the 
arts — which is enormously developed from anything 
happening in animals, but by no means wholly different 
from what animals do; and another even more fundamental,
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social relations, which basically are probably a matter of 
animal behaviour, that is, of human animal behaviour. We 
are not guided here by anything to do with reasoning. It 
is not our rational nature, in a sense distinct from 
animal nature, that is guiding us.
(iii) I have not been concerned so far with praising 
or blaming. But I think we speak of rational behaviour in 
a third sense, behaviour that is both sensible and morally 
creditable. It is almost proverbial that human language 
and mental capacity have enabled man not only, on 
occasion, to soar to heights far beyond the achievement of 
any nonhuman animal but also, only too frequently, to sink 
to depths equally far below. As Gulliver's houyhnhnm 
master commented, after hearing an account of the horrors 
of European war, "when a creature pretending to Reason 
could be capable of such enormities, he dreaded lest the 
corruption of that faculty might be worse than brutality 
itself" (83).
So rationality in none of these three possible senses 
marks, I suggest, any absolute distinction between 
ourselves and other animals. And do not Hamlet's words 
suggest the lack of any such distinction? A beast would 
have mourned longer": would have displayed more feeling; 
would have behaved more creditably.
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Chapter 5 
ANIMAL RIGHTS
I want in this chapter to consider how far animals can 
reasonably be regarded as having rights, especially rights 
which we may be trespassing upon in keeping animals or in 
capturing them in the first place. I shall start not with 
questions about animals' moral or natural rights, but on 
the firmer ground of their legal rights. Let me say at 
once that I do not consider a great deal hangs on the use 
of the term "right (s)". I see the term as usefully 
encapsulating the belief that an animal (or human) should 
not be treated in a particular way, that "its" interests 
should be respected as far as possible. Stone has 
suggested that the granting of legal rights to natural 
objects such as rivers would be far from incoherent so far 
as legal theory is concerned, and would have certain 
distinct advantages (1).
5.1 LEGAL RIGHTS
I want here first to establish what is I think 
unquestionably the case, that certain captive animals do 
have rights under British law; and secondly to argue that 
wild animals in Britain also in some small degree already 
have legal rights, and that the law as it is provides good 
reason for its being extended to grant wild animals more
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specific legal rights.
If I starve or otherwise mistreat my own dog I can be 
prosecuted and found guilty of a criminal offence. This 
surely shows that the dog has a legal right to be treated 
properly for its own sake, rather than merely as my 
property. I think this is so even though legal protection 
often has been a matter of protection as property only, 
and I understand it is still the case, for example, that a 
veterinarian's legal obligation to treat an animal whose 
owner asks him to is an obligation to the owner, not the 
animal, and refusal, if pursued legally, would mean a 
civil proceeding for the monetary loss arising from the 
animal's not being treated (2). It seems that in America a 
dog still has protection only as the owner's property 
(3) .
Other captive animals also are protected like dogs 
(in English law) under the Protection of Animals Act 1911. 
It is surely uncontroversial to see this Act as 
conferring protection on an animal in its own right, 
rather than as somebody's property. So again it seems to 
me that a captive animal has a legal right, if it belongs 
to you, to be fed and provided with at least the minimum 
necessities of life, and not otherwise cruelly treated.
But an example of how this protection doesn't extend to 
wild animals is a case in "the High Court last year when 
it was ruled that a man who beat a hedgehog to death had 
not committed any criminal offence because the animal was 
not ’captive'" (4).
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Most British wild birds and several wild mammals, 
reptiles and amphibians are now protected on conservation 
grounds (5) , but what I want to show is that there is some 
protection for wild animals on welfare grounds and that 
there should, by implication of that protection already 
existing, be some more.
First, several acts contain some protection on 
welfare grounds, e.g. a 1962 act restricting the use of 
poison to "small ground vermin", but specially regulating 
the use of phosphorus, red squill and strychnine, 
presumably with an implied recognition that even mice and 
rats are not to be controlled by just any means, or at 
least that a painful means of controlling them is 
regrettable (6) . Thus there is implicit recognition by the 
Law that at least certain wild animals have a right not to 
be cruelly treated, at least without some exceptional 
reason, which one would think did not include human 
pleasure. For this, the defence of the sadist, is 
controlled by the 1911 Act, but only it seems, in view of 
the hedgehog case mentioned above, for captive (and
domestic) animals.
Secondly, a dog has, I suggest, its rights on two 
grounds: 1) our responsibility towards it arising from our 
having bought that dog or made a pet of it; 2) the fact 
that it is an animal with interests such as that of 
needing food, etc. Were it an inanimate object, or even a 
Plant, our having bought it or taken it into our house and 
made a "pet" of it would not have resulted in our having a
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legal responsibility for it. I, as an individual, can 
surely hardly recognise my own responsibility to the dog 
without appreciating that at least a necessary part of my 
obligation arises from the dog's nature as a living 
animal, a nature shared in many important respects by all 
similar animals, all carnivora say or even all mammals 
perhaps, including all wild carnivores, or perhaps wild 
mammals. The position is of course exactly parallel to 
that with regard to a person's responsibility for his own 
child, but it would be odd to recognise that 
responsibility and yet feel no, albeit considerably 
diminished, responsibility towards other children: for 
example, at least to refrain from injuring them, or to 
attempt their rescue if drowning.
Thirdly, as a captive animal has rights but a wild 
one does not, a wild animal must acquire rights at the 
moment when it is captured (perhaps with the intention of 
keeping it, as it appears that temporary capture, again 
from the case of the hedgehog, is not enough to confer 
legal protection). Acquiring rights at the moment of 
capture does seem a little ludicrous, for the same reason 
perhaps as it would be ludicrous to feel responsibility 
for one's own dog but a complete absence of responsibility 
— e.g. even to refrain from wantonly injuring it — towards 
other dogs or similar animals. If the animal's nature is 
such as to make it appropriate for it to have rights once 
captured, how can its nature not make it appropriate for 
it to have some, if lesser or fewer, rights in a free
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state? (It could, be objected that the wild-living- animal 
can not have any rights because, if it had, we would be 
under some obligation to protect it from predators. I look 
at this objection below (in 5.2.2) , but will say now that 
I think it is easy to distinguish between death from a 
nonhuman predator (or indeed human predator) who actually 
requires to kill for food, and death or injury caused by a 
human when it is not a matter of important food or 
self-defence: such killing or injuring would seem to be 
excluded by my line of reasoning above.)
I think actually it is clear enough why the 
protection conferred by the 1911 Act is not simply 
extended as would seem logical and humane to wild animals. 
It is because so-called "country sports" would then be 
endangered. This was stated clearly in a Commons reply by 
Douglas Hogg (in March 1987) (7). Hence the absurdity that
brutal treatment of a wild hedgehog is not illegal.
Fourthly, if the captive animal has a right to be 
cared for properly, then it must be assumed that it is 
possible for it to be properly cared for. (Or perhaps more 
strictly, there can only be a legal obligation upon me to 
care properly for my dog on the assumption that there is a 
proper and possible way of caring for it.) But suppose it 
is a kind of animal which it may not be possible for 
anyone to keep adequately - such as a blue whale - or an 
animal which it is at least arguable that no-one is able 
to keep adequately - such as a killer whale.
In such a case, surely the right of the animal to be
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kept properly must Include a right not to be kept at all, 
in fact not to be captured. But if certain animals have a 
right not to be captured, it seems rather nonsensical for 
that right not to belong to those animals when in the wild 
state.
Fifthly, there has been since 1976 an act in Britain 
restricting the keeping of dangerous wild animals by 
private individuals (8). Animals listed can be legally 
kept only with a local authority licence, which will not 
be granted unless there is evidence that the person 
concerned can keep the animal in conditions which not only 
protect the public but also protect the interests of the 
animal. Animals can only be covered by the Act on the 
grounds of being dangerous, but there would be clear 
grounds either for the Act's being extended to allow the 
inclusion of animals on welfare grounds alone or for the 
passing of another act with similar restrictions but on 
grounds of animal welfare alone. Such is brought out very 
clearly in a House of Commons debate in which an 
unsuccessful attempt was made to have all New World 
monkeys (often used by street photographers) added to the 
list in the Act; the reply from the minister concerned was 
that after consultation with the appropriate bodies he had 
decided to include all these monkeys except marmosets, 
which could bite like the others but had smaller lower 
canines so that their bite was less severe; i.e., because 
of the Act's being concerned specifically with dangerous 
wild animals, marmosets were excluded although there was a
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strong welfare case for their being protected as in effect 
the other New World monkeys now are. The M.P. who was 
asking for them all to be included was in fact doing so 
partly on welfare grounds, following complaints from 
people in Bournemouth and elsewhere who had seen the 
appalling ways in which these animals were often 
restricted by their owners (9) .
So there is legal protection of captive animals, and 
protection which I think amounts to, and can be well 
expressed as, the granting to them of certain rights to be 
cared for and not ill-treated. And I think there is some 
legal protection (which again could well be seen in terms 
of rights) of wild animals, and some considerable 
inconsistency in the law as it stands in that the degree 
of protection for wild animals is as limited as it is.
5.2 MORAL RIGHTS
5.2.1 ESTABLISHING MORAL RIGHTS
The existence of certain moral rights of animals seems 
to me to follow from their legal rights. I have, I think, 
established that dogs have a right not (say) to be 
starved. This is embodied in the law. And furthermore, 
most people, I think, would approve of its being embodied 
in the law; they would think this right and proper. It is 
quite easy to imagine some legal right which would not 
have general support: perhaps the one-time right of 
clerics to receive tithes. We can distinguish, that is, 
between legal rights which would be generally supported
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and those which would not. We have, as it were, a 
(non-literal) "court of appeal" beyond the legal right 
itself (10) . And this is nearly all I mean by the 
existence of animal (or human) rights other than legal 
rights. Only I want to add that I mean by, say, a dog's 
moral right not to be starved (which as it were supports 
the legal right) not only that most people, if they had 
the matter carefully explained to them, would agree that 
it is wrong to starve one's dog, and that we would be 
justified in blaming anyone who did so, but also that I 
think the "most people" I am referring to are right to 
take this view,* i.e., it is not, in my opinion, a merely 
arbitrary matter. I think that dogs have a right in (say) 
Iran also not to be starved by their owners, whatever the 
majority opinion there, as well as whatever the legal 
situation, happens to be. But I will leave aside the 
question of the objectivity or otherwise of such 
judgements, and stay with the claim that X's having a 
moral right to be treated in fashion Y means the same 
(for humans or animals) as"X ought to be treated in 
fashion Y, and if Z treats X differently, we are justified
in blaming Z for this."__
I shall attempt to establish three particular moral 
rights of animals, and will do this simply by seeking to 
demonstrate that we are inconsistent if we do not 
recognise such rights in view of similar rights which we 
would undoubtedly grant (I think) to humans. I take note 
of Hare's unease about the readiness with which the status
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of human rights may easily be damaged by multiplying their 
number without real justification. Possibly his warning is 
even more applicable to animal rights (11). But still I 
think we ought to grant that certain kinds of animals, 
including their wild conspecifics, should not be hurt,
killed, or prevented from living their natural lives
without at the least serious justification.
5.2.2 RIGHT NOT TO BE HURT
I am inclined to take for granted that we all accept that 
animals ought not to be hurt without at least very serious 
reason. To think all (nonhuman) animals unable to feel 
pain is really an option no longer open if it ever was: we 
have seen in the last chapter several reasons for this. 
Some researchers and sportsmen may regard the lives of 
certain animals as expendable; so in general do 
non-vegetarians. But I imagine that very few, if any, 
would regard the causing of animal pain, or other 
suffering, as other than very regrettable and to be 
avoided as far as possible. Frey, while he grants we 
should not be cruel to animals, is one philosopher who 
regards animals as incapable of bearing rights, or even 
having interests. He argues against Singer's position 
which is that the ability to feel pain is a necessary 
prerequisite for having interests, and that therefore 
those animals which can feel pain have interests (12) .
Frey gives examples to demonstrate that humans who do not 
feel pain still have interests, so that the ability to 
feel pain is inessential to the possession of interests.
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Frey is correct In arguing that the ability to feel pain 
is not necessary, but I think wrong in arguing that that 
ability is not sufficient, for the having of interests. He 
goes so far as to suggest we have no reason or that 
Christians have no reason (in terms of their beliefs) for 
regarding pain as an intrinsic evil (13) . Of course pain 
has a biological function, so that it would seem 
unreasonable to call it an "intrinsic evil". But the 
causing of pain to others is quite a different matter, and 
Frey seems to be confusing the two. When he says that 
"sin" (such as blasphemy) is not to be committed merely in 
order to avoid inflicting pain, either upon oneself "or 
others", he is surely wrong in terms of the Christian 
orthodoxy he is referring to (14) . Is it not orthodox to 
regard the text "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God and thy 
neighbour as thyself" as basic to Christian ethics? To 
inflict pain on others is in itself obviously to disobey 
this commandment (though there may be justifications in 
particular cases). Frey's view here seems in its oddness 
second only to the view he quotes of Geach that "the pains 
of animals cannot morally be attributed to God, since 
sympathy with these pains cannot be a virtue to a nature, 
the Divine Nature, which is in no wise animal" (15) .
Geach's view that animal pain is of no consequence to God 
Presumably implies that it neither should or need be of 
consequence to us either; Kolakowski's comment that a god 
who is simply indifferent [to human or animal suffering] 
cannot be the loving God of Christians" seems wholly
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appropriate (16).
Frey refers to the ‘Very prominent view of intrinsic 
value" (a view he does not himself hold) as not something 
to be argued for but rather just recognised (17) . Unlike 
Frey, I think that pain as something to be avoided if 
possible, especially to avoid inflicting on others (human 
or nonhuman) if possible, is precisely something that just 
has to be recognised, that does not need to be argued for. 
Gray and another scientist mentioned by Clark claim there 
is no evidence of animal pain, but this is a different 
position to hold and, as I have just said, I think worth 
no more consideration (18) . White who has gone so far in 
the course of defending his experiments in the maintaining 
alive of disembodied monkey brains as to state that "the 
inclusion of lower animals in our ethical system is 
philosophically meaningless and operationally impossible" 
also assures us that his "brain model" can feel no pain, 
presumably with the implication both that monkeys can feel 
pain normally and that it would matter if the isolated 
brain could (19).
5.2.3 RIGHT TO LIFE
This may seem much more difficult to establish than the 
right not to be hurt. The latter is, as we have seen, 
embodied in English law, at least for captive animals; 
there is, so far as I know, no legal right, except as 
somebody's property, not to be killed. But there are two
Points, anyway, I would make:
1) While some biologists of various varieties regard
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kl 11 Ing 31113.1161" animals volss and. other small rodents, 
for example - as of no consequence, provided the death is 
a humane one, this is not the case with animals like 
gorillas or elephants. I remember an announcement made at 
a conservation conference about a recent outburst of 
killing of gorillas for trophies: the concern expressed by 
the zoologist giving the information was close to the 
concern one would express about a series of human murders. 
Those involved in, for example, the culling of elephants 
tend to regard such an operation as a sickening duty, 
though sometimes a necessary one (20) .
I think it is difficult to see why the life of a wild 
gorilla should be of obviously less consequence than the 
life of a human. It seems only reasonable to feel that 
killing one for no good reason is second only to murder.
Of course I express here a western sentiment with which 
many, perhaps in other cultures or just struggling to 
exist themselves, would not concur, as Attenborough found 
(in the 1950's) in Borneo. After the filming of an orang, 
one of the Dyaks who had helped the film crew asked if 
they were finished and then shot the animal:
' “Why? Why?" I said in fury, for to shoot such a human 
creature seemed to amount almost to murder.
The Dyak was dumbfounded.
“But he no good! He eat my banana and steal my rice. I 
shoot. "
There was nothing I could say. It was the Dyaks who had 
to wrest their livelihood from the forest, not I" (21) .
To anyone who does not understand how Attenborough felt 
it is difficult to know what to say. But of most people 
(likely to concern themselves with such matters at all)
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who would feel, like Attenborough, that this killing was 
almost murder, one can ask why we should not feel this 
about our more distant relations, the other mammals, at 
least perhaps those which, in a domesticated state like 
dogs or horses, we would feel a sympathy with. The orang 
has his life to lead, which presumably gives him various 
satisfactions and in any case, as others have said, it is 
all he has: so why should we deprive him of it, or regard 
ourselves as having any right to do so? And why should we 
not feel the same with regard to at least other 
vertebrates and cephalopods (which happen to be remarkably 
intelligent invertebrates) and, so far as is practicable, 
act accordingly?
2) If we do not grant a certain positive value to the 
life of an orang or any other animal (22), but do grant, 
as I would assume that almost everyone does, that animal 
suffering is in itself regrettable, then the logically 
humane course to take would be humanely to exterminate as 
many animals as possible to end their suffering (as noted 
by Godlovitch (23)). This absurd conclusion does seem to 
force upon us the rather obvious supposition that animals 
ought to be allowed to live their lives as we wish, in 
most cases, to live ours without being killed for anyone 
else's pleasure or whim.
5.2.4 RIGHT TO AUTONOMY
I understand by autonomy being in control of one's own 
life, living it as one wishes to live it without 
interference. Literally it would mean, presumably, making
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one's own laws, which nobody does in as much as we are all 
born into a culture, a social system, indeed a state with 
laws we are subject to, not of our making, and there is a 
limited amount we can do about it. Still less, presumably, 
can an animal "make its own laws", decide how it is going 
to live its life, or even make long term plans. Still, it 
is meaningful to speak of an animal's freedom, even if we 
just mean by this its being left alone to live its natural 
life (as I discussed in 3.2). Most of us would accept that 
people ought to be left alone, as far as possible, to live 
the lives they choose; they ought not to be unduly 
interfered with by their fellow men, or by the state, 
provided that they themselves do not need to be restrained 
from injuring others (24). I think it is a perfectly 
proper attitude to feel the same about animals. We saw 
nothing in chapter 4 to suggest that living its own life 
is not as important to an animal as living our individual 
lives is to each of us.
Some have claimed that animals have been put at our 
service by God, that we have been given dominion (in the 
sense of a bullying domination) over them. This seems to 
me a buttressing of our selfishness by religious claims 
which must require not only that we accept God's existence 
but that we know his intentions with regard to us. Can 
such a claim, even to a Christian believer, be taken any 
more seriously than the assumption, made by some in the 
Falklands War, that God was on our side, a claim which 
would obviously strike the Argentinians as ludicrous
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whatever its appeal to some of the British? One still 
sometimes finds the assumption that animals do not share 
similar rights to ours to living their own natural lives 
(25) .
One reason for feeling that we have no more special 
right to live our lives than other animals have to live 
theirs is simply that we had no choice in being born, and 
no choice in being born human rather than as members of 
some other species. To some this may seem a ludicrous or 
meaningless thought, but to be transformed into some other 
animal has long been a perfectly meaningful theme of 
literature (as in Ovid, Apuleius, Beauty and the Beast, 
Kafka's Metamorphosis, even Ionesco's Rhinoceros). The 
logical difficulties of such a possibility are not my 
concern here. I think any pet owner may sometimes be 
struck by the thought: "My dog did not choose to be a dog, 
just as I did not choose to be a human. It just happened." 
We "wake u p " in the situation of being a certain kind of 
creature (26). We find we have certain needs; a dog finds 
itself with other needs (some of them not very different, 
as I have tried to suggest in the last chapter). This 
seems to me a good reason for having a respect for other 
animals' ways of life.
I think, at least, it is civilised and decent to feel 
a respect for other creatures' lives; to feel they ought 
to be left alone to lead them. So how can I possibly seek 
to justify capturing other animals and confining them in 
zoos? It is, I think, particularly difficult to justify
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the capturing, which I will look at in chapter 17. But I 
do not think respect for animals' autonomy needs to place 
upon us an absolute ban on our ever keeping therm It 
should make us hesitate to do so, and refrain unless we 
have serious intentions and are in a position to keep them 
adequately. What is involved in this I will be looking at 
in chapters 9 and 10. I am emphasising the importance of 
being responsible and serious. This is something close to 
our experience, especially with regard to other animals or 
to our fellow humans. One should not, for example, open an 
advice bureau unless one is confident, and has good reason 
to be confident, that one can give good advice. We would 
advise a child, I hope, that he should certainly not 
collect and keep living creatures from the sea shore 
unless he were able to set up a proper aquarium for them. 
Perhaps we should tell him not to take any living thing at 
all; but at least there is a great difference between 
taking them carelessly and thoughtlessly and taking them 
in a responsible way.
To those who would say that animals should not be 
interfered with at all, I could reply that the reality is 
that we will sometimes have to interfere, or at least that 
it will be in the best interests of an animal for us to 
interfere. But I grant that zoo animals are not normally 
taken for essential reasons, or to rescue them.
I would also say: recognise just how far it goes if 
you are seriously proposing that the respect for an 
animal's autonomy should be absolute. With the possible
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exceptions of cats and dogs, it is surely so that none of 
our domesticated animals chose to be domesticated. So it 
was an invasion of their autonomy for this to happen; why 
does it not remain an invasion of their autonomy for us to 
continue to keep them? Two possible reasons suggest 
themselves: one is that it is different with later 
generations, just because it was (some time in the past) 
their ancestors, not they themselves, who were 
domesticated. But if this point applies, it would apply to 
animals in zoos who have been born into captivity, which 
is true of a great many such animals now.
The other is that domesticated animals have been 
changed so that they accept their state, or so that they 
could not now be humanely released because they would not 
survive as wild animals. This may be so, but, as I shall 
try to show in chapter 8, I do not think the situations of 
domesticated animals and animals in zoos are so different; 
what differences there are are merely of degree, and not 
in any case very large.
I would say that many domesticated animals give 
indications that they accept their lot, that they are in a 
state of wellbeing, and surely this shows that it cannot 
always be wrong for us to invade another animal's autonomy 
(which, in essence, we are doing all the time with a 
domesticated animal).
An absolute application of the right to autonomy 
would also make improper any training of any animal. But 
can we seriously think this is so? Is it not obvious that,
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for example, guide dogs for the blind, or other working 
dogs, get satisfaction from carrying out their tasks? Is 
not this our experience with any trained dog - and any dog 
needs to be trained in some degree, even though most are 
not trained to the amazing extent possible with a skilled 
trainer (27). Such training is an invasion, strictly, of 
autonomy. If we accept this with dogs, how can we 
consistently object to it wholly with all other animals? 
Dogs, though remarkable, are not unique in all respects. 
But once we grant that in some cases the right to autonomy 
can be acceptably broken, that the animal is indicating it 
is happy for us to interfere with it in certain ways, I 
would reply that I think it is possible for this to be so 
with relatively wild animals also. I think they can give 
indications of wellbeing, and acceptance of our 
interference with their lives. This will be part of my 
concern in chapters 9 and 10.
But unless we can show that we are providing an 
adequate substitute for the animal's wild life, for its 
natural habitat and so on, we should not interfere - I 
think there is a presumption against the rightness of so 
interfering unless we can show in any particular case that 
it is all right (28). I certainly would agree that there 
is no automatic right of ours to keep an animal in 
captivity to suit our purposes, whether for entertainment 
or education (29). We do have to justify any particular 
case by showing that the animal is in a state of wellbeing 
or may reasonably be presumed to be in such. As I think,
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we can do this by the application of the criteria I 
examine in chapter 9.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that it is 
accepted that a particular animal is in a state of 
wellbeing in captivity; grant, that is, that it is happy. 
Are we still infringing its right to autonomy in having it 
anyway, or in having captured either it or its ancestors? 
This is a view expressed with regard to humans by Boswell 
when supporting the claimed defence of the slave-traders 
that they were rescuing the negroes they captured from an 
unhappy state of life in Africa, a state in comparison 
with which that of being a slave was comparatively benign. 
Boswell's sympathies (unlike Dr Johnson's) were with the 
slave-traders, but he did have doubts: "...we have no 
right to make people happy against their will" (30) . I am 
not sure that, even if this applies to humans, it is 
reasonable to apply it to animals. At any rate, we can say 
that if we are making the animal happy in captivity then 
we are offending against its right to autonomy to a much 
lesser extent than if we are not. No doubt we should not 
go around trying to make other humans, or animals, 
forcibly happy; but it is better to do that than to go 
round making them forcibly miserable.
One important point is that the animal is much 
likelier, as it happens, to be happy in the wild, living 
its natural life. So it is better, as a rule of thumb, to 
respect that likelihood (which we could phrase as our 
having "no right to make anyone happy against their
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will"). In fact to me "happy", unlike "content", suggests 
"in a state of real and lasting wellbeing which it would 
make little sense to speak of the being concerned as not 
wanting". We can hardly meaningfully not want to be happy, 
or at least hardly want to be unhappy, though we can say 
as a joke "he's happiest being unhappy". It is perhaps 
part of the concept of happiness that you want it. John 
Benson suggests we would not choose happiness if it 
involved our being (say) drugged so that we would cease to 
be concerned by whatever worries us at present. But I do 
not think I would use "happy" for such a state; "content" 
perhaps (31).
Chaucer (see 1.1) was not concerned with what one 
might call a "metaphysical" right of the bird to be free, 
even if thus unhappy. He simply says the bird would be 
happier in the forest, even though that environment does 
not appeal to us, and that the evidence for this, or at 
least for the bird's dissatisfaction with life in the cage 
is that, given the opportunity, it will escape from its 
present situation. If we can provide conditions it would 
not escape from, even given the opportunity, then perhaps 
all is well: the bird is registering satisfaction with its 
situation. I shall consider not trying to escape as a 
partial indicator of wellbeing in 9.5 below.
I also think that an assessment by us of the 
advantages and drawbacks of living in the wild is of some 
relevance. The slave-trade and slavery were in fact vile, 
and life on the west African coast in fact quite decent.
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But It could have been different (32). This is not to say 
that having slaves, or taking slaves, would then have been 
justified, but it certainly would have been a much lesser 
moral offence (33) . An attempted assessment (of the 
quality of animal life in the wild) would not (whatever 
its findings) provide any justification for keeping an 
animal in poor captive conditions, and it is true that 
conditions in the wild are not our responsibility. But it 
could alter our assessment of what we were doing to the 
animal in keeping it in captivity. I shall attempt to 
compare wild and captive conditions in chapter 7.
At least recognising the animal's right to autonomy 
is a challenge to us; it puts an obligation on us to 
provide good conditions.
5.3 A NOTE ON UTILITARIANISM
I say little of utilitarianism in my argument, preferring 
on the whole the language of rights. This is partly 
because the latter makes clear that we should be concerned 
about each individual animal or human in a way in which 
utilitarianism sometimes seems not to, though it is 
important to recognise that utilitarianism can provide a 
powerful moral framework for showing how unjust our 
treatment of animals is, as in Singer's Animal 
Liberation (34).
It seems to me that a kind of debased utilitarian 
reasoning is perhaps being attributed to zoos in a 
statement I came across recently (35). This was that, 
"Accepting that animals are deprived of their natural
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environment, zoos now argue that the suffering of a few Is 
worthwhile for the greater good of conservation" (A). The 
anonymous author then objects to this argument on the 
grounds that zoos, "by taking massive numbers of wildlife 
from their homes in the past and the present, have 
endangered many species; perhaps causing the extinctions 
of a few" (on which see my comments in chapters 2 and 13) , 
and can at best help to save only a very few species, at a 
large cost (which reasonable points I attempt to deal with 
in chapter 13). I do not think that any zoo spokesman 
would assent to statement A, but in any case I want to 
make clear that I do not advocate such a view myself. I 
suppose a defence of statement A could be attempted on the 
following lines. First, we observe that the total of human 
happiness (or perhaps general wellbeing) would be 
maintained by preventing the extinction of, say, the 
cheetah species. We could include in the total of 
happiness (or wellbeing) not only that of humans but that 
of the surviving cheetahs (and of future cheetahs) as 
we 11. Then we argue:
i) the right course of action is what produces the 
highest total of happiness;
ii) there are only a few cheetahs in zoos, but those 
there are are helping to save the whole species, and thus 
produce a high (partly future) total of happiness;
iii) their own small ration of happiness, or rather of 
suffering (for animals suffer in zoos, the leaflet says), 
is small by comparison to the total happiness, and
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therefore justified.
This argument is to me unsatisfactory because it 
unjustly dismisses the claims of certain individual 
cheetahs - those in zoos - for proper treatment. Obviously 
their wellbeing, their happiness, is as important as that 
of any other cheetahs, and, unless at least the interests 
of the two parties clash unavoidably, as the wellbeing of 
humans too. We cannot waive certain individuals' claims in 
favour of some other individuals' wellbeing, as if the 
latter made up for the former's suffering. And therefore, 
as I stated in 1.3, I think that the major justification 
for zoos must be the claim that their animals are in a 
state of wellbeing (9a in my list of possible "defences" 
in 1.3). We might still think that the causing of some 
privation to certain animals was justifiable if there were 
great benefits to others, especially members of the same 
species. But I think there would be severe limits to the 
extent to which we could properly act against the 
interests of the individuals concerned.
It is true that zoos sometimes have to cull, even 
though I would hope regretfully. But this is not a matter 
of causing avoidable suffering, but humane death; this is 
still indeed regrettable, but much less so than 
substantial suffering (36). I shall look further at the 
question of culling in chapter 13. I will just add now 
that it is actually difficult to show humane killing to be 
wrong on utilitarian principles, because although the 
death lessens the total of happiness it also decreases the
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relevant population by one. Singer suggested humane 
killing of an animal without self-consciousness was 
"counterbalanced by bringing into existence a similar 
being which will lead an equally happy life". This highly 
counter-intuitive suggestion has been criticised by 
Lockwood (37) .
I have emphasised that the conservational argument 
for zoos should not be seen as involving a) that animals 
suffer in zoos, and b) that this suffering is justified in 
the higher cause of conservation. Still worse, I think, 
would be to justify any zoo occupants' suffering by the 
gains in human visitors' happiness. The unjustness of this 
would be magnified by the comparative unimportance of the 
human visitors' gains. I do not in fact think what 
visitors to zoos can gain is unimportant, as I shall try 
to show in chapters 15 and 16, but I do not think, as I 
have already made clear, that it is important enough to 
justify causing suffering to the animals concerned. Their 
wellbeing is paramount, and how we should endeavour to 
assess it and do our best to ensure it, I shall look at in 
chapters 9 and 10.
5.4 OBJECTIONS TO ANIMAL RIGHTS
I must now consider some possible objections to the view 
that we should regard any animals as having rights.
5.4.1 CLAIMING RIGHTS
McCloskey has argued that no animal can have legal 
rights because a possessor of such rights has to be able
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to claim them. I think dogs and even more cats, possibly, 
can be extremely good at, in effect, claiming their right 
to be fed, but it is true that they do not consult 
solicitors or complain to the local council. However, as 
Stone makes clear, corporations, infants, incompetents, 
etc are not prevented from claiming by being unable to 
speak, because they are represented by lawyers (38); I 
note that recent court rulings about the sterilisation of 
a mentally retarded girl "were challenged by the Official 
Solicitor . . . acting as her legal guardian" (39) . There 
seems no reason why it should be impossible for a lawyer 
to make a claim on behalf of a nonhuman animal.
5.4.2. PROTECTION FROM PREDATORS
Ritchie argued that if animals had rights, we would have 
to protect prey from predators (40) . Rachels mentions a 
reply by Plamenatz, the suggestion that animals perhaps do 
not have rights against their natural predators because 
the latter are not rational (and could not appreciate such 
things) but still do against us, who are rational beings 
(41) . I agree with Rachels' comment that perhaps one 
animal can in some cases have rights against another. It 
seemed to me a dog and cat of ours normally quite clearly 
respected each others' rights to the contents of their 
respective food dishes. But in any case it is not a matter 
of predators' being rational or nonrational, moral, 
immoral or amoral. They just have to catch their prey to 
live (as I observed in 3.1) . It seems hard to regard it as 
any kind of moral failing in a wolf not to put the rights
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of mice to survive before his own right to do so (42) .
It is true that there could be an obligation on us, 
unlike wolves or cats, not to kill other animals for food. 
But this is not simply because of our being rational 
beings, but because, being rational (in as much as we 
are), we can appreciate how little most of us need to eat 
meat as much as we do, that there would be more food 
available for the starving millions if we did not eat 
meat, and also that, not being necessarily carnivorous 
like a cat, it seems selfish for us to kill other sentient 
beings unnecessarily (43).
In some human situations it is probably necessary to 
eat meat, but furthermore it might have been the case 
that we all had to. Suppose we had happened to evolve in 
such a way that we could not live without meat, even 
without eating the meat of a near-human animal such as the 
chimpanzee (44) . If this had been so, then we should still 
have recognised the unfortunate side of having to kill 
chimpanzees; the moral thing to do would have been to kill 
them with regret, with a determination to kill as few and 
as humanely as possible, and to stop doing so completely 
if it ever became possible. It was a situation very like 
this in the early 1950's when chimpanzees were used in the 
preparation of polio vaccine (45) . I do not say that this 
use of chimpanzees was necessarily justified or right, but 
I do think a reasonable case could be made for it on 
grounds of virtual human necessity, however regrettable. 
(The present use of chimpanzees for AIDS research poses a
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very similar moral problem.) It is important to see that 
rights can conflict, as Stone makes clear (46). Where this
happens we just have to make the best decision we can in
the light, as far as we can manage, of all relevant
considerations.
5.4.3 OWNING PROPERTY
McCloskey claims that animals' inability to own property 
prevents their having rights (47). I would agree with 
Rachels' reply, and with Clark's, that animals do seem 
able to possess property (48); Locke's view, that animals 
have a right to the fruits of their own labour, has much 
to be said for it (49). It seems to me to apply to humans. 
I do think that if you have worked on something, and also 
indeed have ability, etc to appreciate it or use it 
properly, this does give you (in some degree) a right to 
it over against someone who has not put anything into it, 
or is incapable of appreciating or using it. ("It" here 
could be almost anything from fine wine to cricket 
grounds, from violins to the Amazon forest: see my 
discussion of conservation and stewardship in chapter 11).
I do not see why we should not feel the same about animals 
and what they need, or even, possibly, appreciate. If a 
dog with a bone does not regard himself as owning it, and 
can not be regarded as laying claim to it, then I am not 
sure what would amount to a claim. Perhaps horses would 
not guard their rugs (an example of McCloskey's), but 
taking bones from dogs is not usually to be recommended 
even with dogs you are friends with. Similarly it seems
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quite likely that leopards put their kills up trees in 
order to make it more difficult for other predators to 
take them.
5.4.4 RECIPROCATING OBLIGATIONS
It may be argued that animals can only have rights if 
they are capable of respecting the claims of others (50).
I agree with Rachels that as severely retarded humans are 
not regarded (quite properly) as having no rights because 
they are unable to respect other people's, there seems no 
reason why animals should be dispossessed of the ability 
to have rights even if it is the case that they in no way 
make contracts with us or with each other. But I wonder if 
they do not. I recall accounts of predators such as foxes 
refraining from molesting rabbit residents in the same 
burrow, almost as if they respected the rights of their 
neighbours; similar behaviour is not unknown at East 
African waterholes. But also, I think a nonhuman animal 
can regard himself as under an obligation to us, as with 
a tame dog who protects us, e.g. in the tragic story of 
the faithful dog killed in error by his master before he 
had realised that it was a wolf, not his own dog, who had 
killed his child, and that the dog had bravely tackled the 
wolf, or in a recent newspaper account of a dog losing his 
life in an attempt to rescue a child from a burning house 
(51). Even the unsentimental French awarded some of the 
carrier pigeons used at the Battle of the Somme with the 
Croix de Guerre (52). I think a dog's demonstration of 
affection and obligation towards us could reasonably
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Increase our own sense of obligation towards him, so that 
there is almost an implicit contract between dog and 
human.
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Chapter 6 
CRUELTY AND DOMINATION
It has been claimed that the primary motivation behind 
zoos is "our need to dominate" (1) and that the sight of 
animals in zoos, at least that of a solitary gorilla or 
"the large carnivores", conveys "first and foremost just 
one message, and it is about power. [These sights] 
proclaim that we men are strong enough to keep our enemies 
in cages" (2). I think these assertions are very likely 
partially true, but only partially. I shall try in this 
chapter to establish the truth of the three following 
assertions:
i) that the urge to dominate, to have, and show that one 
has, power over others, is (to put it of course rather 
vaguely) an important part of human nature;
ii) that this urge very likely does in some cases lie 
behind the capture of animals and behind the keeping of 
them in captivity;
iii) but that to regard this urge as the major motivation 
of all wild animal keeping is a great and misleading 
exaggeration.
I wish also to consider cruelty, which I think is 
related to domination. It has often been claimed that 
certain cases of animal keeping are cruel. I accept that
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some animal keeping can be cruel, and I do not think 
anyone concerned with zoos or perhaps the keeping of 
animals in any institution would dispute this. What I seek 
to establish here is:
iv) that human nature (again to put this vaguely) has a 
tendency towards cruelty;
v) that this tendency is related to (many) humans' urge 
to dominate;
vi) that this tendency can express itself in the 
capturing and keeping of animals;
vii) but that to regard all animal keeping or even all 
wild animal keeping as cruel, still less as all motivated 
by cruelty, is a great and misleading exaggeration.
I shall start by considering cruelty. There is a 
slight ambiguity in the term. It can mean, roughly, any of 
the following:
a) Causing substantial suffering to another unnecessarily 
and unjustifiably.
b) Causing substantial suffering to another unnecessarily 
and unjustifiably, and taking pleasure in so doing.
c) Causing substantial suffering to another necessarily 
or justifiably.
I shall use it to mean either a) or b); it will in fact 
be part of my thesis that b) often is the correct meaning 
(though of course difficult to establish, in that we 
cannot be certain of someone's motivation); I shall leave 
aside c), merely noting that we do sometimes use "cruelty" 
in this sense, as in the expression "cruel to be kind", or
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perhaps to describe a painful treatment which a doctor 
sometimes has to prescribe in the interests of his 
patient.
It is impossible to dispute, I think, that much 
cruelty in sense a) or b) has been practised throughout 
history and still today. Perhaps the most despicable form 
of cruelty is the torturing of other humans. This became 
commonplace again in Europe in this century after 
virtually disappearing in recent centuries (3). The 
intentional causing of pain to other humans is on occasion 
such as to be beyond belief (4). So also is the causing of 
pain to other animals, as in the vivisections (last 
century) performed without anaesthetic by such biologists 
as the great French physiologist Bernard, his predecessor 
Magendie, and Charles Bell (in the course of establishing 
the course of the spinal roots in the nervous system in 
mammals), in much research and product testing in more 
recent times, also in various forms of hunting and 
trapping, and in apparently gratuitous hurting of animals
(5). Examples of obvious cruelty in animal keeping in 
recent times are given by Batten and by Jordan and Ormrod
(6) .
Now one thing that is strange about all this cruelty 
is that it seems so foreign to the nature of most of us. 
Most of us do not go about hurting each other, or not at 
least wantonly. More than that, many of us probably cannot 
even imagine being able to hurt another being, still less 
actually wanting to do so, in the ways briefly referred to
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above. Victor Sylvester reported the horror he experienced 
at being forced to form part of a firing squad in the 
First World War (7). Many of us, as we say, "could not 
hurt a fly", though there is experimental evidence that 
ordinary people under the orders or directions of an 
apparent "expert" or scientist will cause extreme pain to 
others (8). But I imagine that, just as members of other 
species do not go around normally injuring (or killing) 
each other (and it seems likely that they must be normally 
inhibited for evolutionary reasons from doing so) , so must 
humans be normally inhibited from hurting (and killing) 
each other; we are at least capable of being moved by 
pleas for consideration, which is part of being a social 
animal (9).
An interesting question thus arises about cruelty, or 
rather about violence (10) which, like most people no 
doubt, I regard as sometimes justified and as not then 
cruelty (this being, I think, the term's normal usage). 
When we are violent, are we enabled to be so by some 
ability to "switch off" our normal inhibition? Are we that 
is, as it were, "desensitised"? Or do we experience a 
positive enjoyment of what we are doing? Clearly some 
people, whom we call sadists, do enjoy being cruel (11). 
What I wonder is whether most of us, when we are required 
to do some violent act, succeed in what would otherwise be 
impossible by finding a pleasure in it. Mere switching off 
seems not enough to explain how ordinary, decent people 
can bring themselves to bayonet enemies; one of the expert
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witnesses at the 1875 Royal Commission of Inquiry into 
Experiments on Animals (George Rolleston, Professor of 
Physiology at Oxford) quoted approvingly words of Kingsley 
about "the sleeping devil" awakened by gladiatorial 
slaughter, and recounted soldiers' accounts of how "the 
sight of blood upon the gauntlet 'wakes all the devil up 
in them'" (12) . Perhaps even surgeons need a touch of 
sadism to do their work (13). (Rolleston also mentioned 
the effect of just getting used to pain-causing, etc, 
which is very important to remember.)
I am here considering how people are able to perform 
positive acts of violence (sometimes for the highest 
motives, as with a surgeon) ,* in such situations they must 
be aware of what they are doing. Many acts of cruelty are 
perpetrated by people who probably ignore what they are 
responsible for because they do not see it, and they can 
forget it (14). We do seem to have a great ability to 
forget what is inconvenient to us, and another ability, in 
some ways creditable, that of being unwilling to accept 
the reality of something unpleasant if we do not wish to 
believe it - normally this would apply to something we are 
not actually seeing, but sometimes we may just not pay 
attention to the clear evidence of our senses — and 
especially if it involves accepting something unpalatable 
about someone we know or respect.
Another way in which we are enabled to commit actual 
violence, or simply be unmoved by cruelty of some kind, is 
by "compartmentalising", by which I mean simply
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classifying people, or animals, into different slots, 
either those who matter and those who do not, or those 
whom we like and those whom we do not, and, especially 
those who belong to our group and those who belong to the 
"others", the enemy, the other camp (15). (Terrible as it 
is to kill or hurt those of another group, it is even 
worse to treat thus members of your own (16) .)
I think probably that cruel acts of animal keeping 
are mainly a matter of neglect, of people ignoring what 
they should be attending to. As an example of how 
inappropriate I think it is to dismiss all animal keeping 
whatever (or even all wild animal keeping) as cruel, I
would draw a contrast with hunting. A book on aquarium
keeping issues the warning that, if one has to catch up a 
fish, one must, above all, avoid "chasing" it round the
tank because of the stress this causes to the fish. If
this advice is correct, then pursuing a stag or a fox must 
be a process of extended stress-causing and thus cruel.
But the whole point of the advice to the fish-keeper is to 
get him to avoid unwitting cruelty; Roots gives similar 
advice about avoiding stressing birds if they have to be 
held (17). I accept that avoiding causing stress is not 
everything; keeping birds or fish may in itself be cruel 
(though I hope that chapters 9 and 10 will amount to an 
extended demonstration of how this need not be the case, 
and never should be). But at least it should be obvious 
that we are in a different world from that where obvious 
cruelty is being performed; proper animal keeping should
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Involve the greatest consideration for the animals 
concerned. Examples of animal keeping such as -
"The bear in an indoor cage four metres by three; the 
solitary monkey chained within its concrete pen; birds so 
confined that flight is impossible; the jungle cat 
crouching in the doorway of its wooden box inside its tiny 
concrete cage" -
clearly merit full condemnation. One point of my brief 
discussion of cruelty has been to emphasise how humans can 
be cruel, and the possibility of this with regard to 
animals as well as other humans, needs to be rigorously 
guarded against. This is why there is a need for 
legislation to control animal keeping, for inspections, 
and a place for welfare organisations with a special 
interest in zoos, nobody being infallible (18).
I have already said that I think cruelty is related 
to domination or power seeking. Unlike cruelty however, I 
think that the urge to dominate is in itself probably an 
essential part of human nature. I do not mean by this, 
obviously, that all humans wish to, still less can, 
dominate others (though perhaps we all dominate someone 
or, failing that, the dog (19)). I do think that some 
people as a result of their genetic inheritance have a 
greater or lesser degree of both ability and desire to 
dominate others. Genes controlling dominance are part of 
the human gene pool. I think, in other words, that in some 
degree leaders are born, not made, and I also think that 
to some extent leaders are necessary. A trivial example I 
have mentioned before would be the observation that, when
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two people go for a walk, one probably decides where they 
should go and the other falls in with this. It is, I 
think, common experience, and an obvious lesson of 
history, that strong leaders are often a good thing, and 
at least appreciated by those they lead. People like 
having strong, or just obvious, leaders. To believe that 
human dominance (i.e. of one human over others) is partly 
genetic is to believe that it is part of human nature, 
that it is not a product of human culture (or not of 
culture alone). It does in fact seem to me that we are, in 
a general sense, hierarchical animals (20). We take easily 
to being arranged, culturally, in hierarchies, I suspect, 
because we tend that way genetically to start with. Of 
course all our positions of authority are cultural 
phenomena but, to a great extent, it is people's genetic 
makeup that renders them effective or not in those posts. 
It seems to me, too, that our being hierarchical is 
something that links us to many other mammals like 
chimpanzees, dogs and elephants. I am not suggesting that 
we have rigid peck orders (and many other species do not 
have them either). Other animal leaders have to assert 
themselves to win power and may fail to do so. I think 
that the roles of being dominant and being submissive in 
relation to fellow humans are inherited from our mammalian
ancestry. I stress this because I think that it is our own
animal nature that enables us to fulfil a dominant role
with regard to an animal of a different species.
However, whether or not this is so, it is obvious
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that humans do go In for leaders. What connection has 
domination by a leader to do with cruelty? Surely an 
obvious factual one. A great deal of cruelty is 
perpetrated in the process of asserting political power by 
totalitarian leaders (21) . Perhaps we need leaders just 
as, as I have suggested, any human institution, even the 
local bridge club, is likely to. But why are they so 
anxious (some of them) to exert power, and even when many 
of those controlled are so bullied, so silenced, that they 
canot even express free appreciation of their leaders? The 
urge for power seems to need some explanation within man's 
psyche - or his genome. But anyway, this urge to exert the 
utmost control over others leads to the infliction of a 
great many cruelties. So here at least domination results 
in cruelty, as also in religious persecution in Britain 
and western Europe in the past, and elsewhere in the 
world, including Eastern Europe, today. So, as we know 
that cruelty often is perpetrated in the course of 
political domination, it seems quite likely that it will 
sometimes be perpetrated in the course of the more minor 
domination that is almost bound to occur, I think, 
throughout human society. (Hence, of course, the bullying 
in schools which we all know of; this was particularly bad 
in the old public schools, but of course it can happen in 
any.) So I am inclined to see cruelty as an extension of 
dominating, an excessive and of course I hope avoidable 
extension. People can enjoy dominating; they can also 
enjoy cruelty. And one can only be cruel to someone (human
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or animal) that one has in one's power, that one is in a 
position of domination over. Cruelty can show our 
dominance. I would also add that not only dominance but 
submissiveness too can be satisfying to us, whereas no 
normal person is going to enjoy being the victim of 
cruelty. So domination does not necessarily involve 
cruelty. I think also a need to dominate to some degree is 
perhaps an essential in almost any achievement. It is like 
the need to be selfish in some degree to get anything
done. No doubt this is connected with what I think is a
certain necessary ruthlesness in public life. I think 
sometimes a sort of Machiavellian approach is forced on 
any of us. Machiavelli was, above all, a pragmatist, and 
we have all to be this to some extent (22).
Now there is a dominating streak in the keeping, and
still more in the catching of, wild animals. The first 
elephants to appear at Rome were in a triumph (see chapter 
2 above) ; they were (or at least were presumably thought 
of as) defeated enemies. I have already mentioned (in 3.1, 
on Wildness) the way of thinking in which wild animals 
have been thought of as needing taming or subduing. This 
clearly goes hand in hand with the attitude of regarding 
primitive peoples as similarly needing subduing and 
civilising: precisely the spirit of imperialism. Again, 
the success of empire is well demonstrated by bringing 
home the spoils, which may include subject people 
themselves, and subject animals. This is one element of 
meaning in the very word "captive" as we saw in the
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section on Captivity in 3.3. It is perhaps no coincidence 
that the great days of the London Zoo coincided with those 
of empire. At least the far-flung realm could both bring 
impressive beasts from afar and, by so doing, emphasise 
its own extent, as had equally been true of Rome (though 
Rome's treatment of its animals was of course appalling 
where the London Zoo was by intention humane and 
scientific, however imperfect by today's standards). 
Certainly the spirit of empire is arrogant, though some 
empires (including, one hopes, the British one) bring some 
good to their subject peoples (and as the Roman Empire 
did, it would generally be agreed, I think).
And so perhaps also the "message" Mary Midgley speaks 
of (see above) as being conveyed by Guy the gorilla and 
large carnivores can be there: "How powerful we are; we 
can keep these animals captive." But one limitation in the 
extent of that message is at once suggested by the animals 
Midgley selects: gorillas and (say) lions and tigers.
These are large and powerful and (traditionally, anyway) 
fierce. So indeed by keeping them we may be boasting of 
our power. And of course it is no coincidence that lions 
and tigers, and elephants, were the kind of animals 
especially prized by past rulers (as we saw in chapter 2). 
But then merely having them as status symbols, if they are 
well looked after, is surely fairly innocent; as innocent 
as the activity of the man who keeps an alsatian as 
(partly) a status symbol, but also looks after it 
properly. To be a status symbol if it is cared for no more
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harms the animal than a Rolls-Royce Is harmed by being a 
status symbol. (See my comment on status symbols In 
chapter 16.) But I think of a photograph of a bear being 
presented to the President of Israel in Switzerland. This 
animal was clearly no more being valued as a symbol of 
human domination than was a bear at Whipsnade which C.S. 
Lewis obviously appreciated (23) . I do not say bears ought 
necessarily to be given as state presents, or even 
necessarily kept at all. But to say that bears when they 
are seen in zoos are primarily conveying merely a message 
about human power is ludicrous. They may be demonstrating 
a false human enjoyment of what we like to regard as 
cuddliness; they may be demonstrating a misjudged keeping 
of animals which should not be kept. But they are not 
merely being appreciated as real or symbolic victims of 
human power, no more than are the biffalo-buffalo-bison 
and the great big bear with wings of A.A. Milne's verses 
"At the Zoo". And what I am denying about bears is even 
less likely to be true of rabbits or lemurs or bushbabies 
or camels or a host of other animals to be seen in zoos. 
And again, to say that the power message is the 
predominant one in the sight of gorillas at Jersey or 
Howletts, or tigers at Whipsnade or even (I suggest) 
Glasgow just does not ring true, mainly because these 
animals are obviously being cared for; they are not being 
treated as "captives". No doubt Mary Midgley sees the 
bars surounding the gorillas or lions, and perhaps other 
prison— like conditions, as partly conveying the power
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message, plus the identity of the actual animal confined. 
She may be right in suggesting that it is an assumption 
that such animals are subject to us, that we have a right 
to dominate them and keep them captive, that makes us 
regard such exhibits as acceptable. This is a tendency in 
the term "wild" I have already noted (with help from Mrs 
Midgley's own writings). If so, I agree with her that we 
must root out such assumptions from our thinking, just as 
we must root out, I would agree also, our practise of 
keeping gorillas, lions or any other animals in "cages", 
if by this we mean enclosures of a prison-like nature 
which do not cater for their needs. As I have said before, 
bars themselves are not necessarily a harmful feature of 
an enclosure, but they can go hand in hand with properly 
objectionable features such as concrete floors, 
barrenness, a minimum of cage furniture, etc. If Midgley 
replies that I deceive myself in supposing that any 
enclosure, call it what we may, can cater adequately for 
the needs of a gorilla or a lion, then my answer is 
contained in chapters 9 and 10. I say "Let us judge each 
case on its merits; let us try to avoid preconceptions." 
Some animals may well be entirely unsuitable for keeping; 
if so, of course we should not keep them. But it really 
does not seem to be the case that all wild animals are 
unable to be kept satisfactorily (from their point of 
view, not just ours) in captivity.
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If the gorilla Is primarily showing our dominance, 
then are budgerigars doing this also? And even when they 
are kept by a champion shotputter, Geoff Capes, who would 
not seem to need to demonstrate his dominance and power as 
a human primate? (Mr Capes commented about his interest:
"...it’s the absolute opposite of what I do in my own 
sport in terms of aggressiveness. You can't be noisy and 
loud with budgerigars..." (24))
And if not, then this shows that, while Midgley's point 
may be true of certain impressive beasts, it is by no 
means true of all the animals that people keep. And I am 
sure that, different as the roles of zoos are today in 
many ways from private keepers, especially the members of 
the various "fancies", there is no absolute difference 
between them in their major motivation for keeping animals 
- the basic attraction and interest of doing so.
There is however an important point about domination 
that needs to be sorted out. I have disputed Midgley's 
judgement that animals kept in zoos are primarily 
demonstrating human domination. But at the same time I do 
not at all dispute that human domination plays a large 
part in the management of various animals, such as dogs. I 
do not think that to dominate a dog, as must be done for 
successful training, even for survival (25), is improper 
or unjust, and this is so because the dog clearly 
flourishes in a regime in which he is "dominated , kept in 
order, like children in school, which I think many 
psychologists as well as teachers and the children
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themselves will explain they prefer; they want to be 
controlled (26). In my opinion (as discussed later), an 
elephant keeper has to dominate his elephant, though in an 
acceptable way, a way which goes hand in hand with a 
personal relationship with the animal, in order to control 
her; and this is something equally true of elephant 
keepers since ancient times, and in India and the east as 
here. (This is why it was significant that the "mahouts 
passed into the Roman service"; see chapter 2 above. Only 
their own mahouts would be able to control the elephants, 
Romans or no Romans.) Similarly with big cats such a 
relationship is possible. (Of course it can develop into 
the circus trainer relationship but the rights and wrongs 
of this are not my concern here.) Of course this 
man-to-man, or rather man-to-animal, domination can be 
taken too far; but this, which is a psychological 
relationship, is something quite distinct from the sort of 
domination Midgley is speaking of. It is an essential part 
of the management of certain animals; and it is closely 
akin to our dealings with other humans; and (I would 
maintain) we are enabled to do it because of our own 
primate nature, which includes a tendency towards 
domination (and submission) within it.
My last point concerns the fact that domination is 
indeed something which we must control; it must not go to 
the length of becoming bullying. It is because domination 
is a feature of human nature that we must keep a check on 
it; we must beware of letting it get out of hand, with
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humans or other animals. But there Is no reason to regard 
this tendency towards an improper domination as the 
exclusive preserve of animal keepers (and established 
rulers). It is common experience that an excessive 
domination, even developing sometimes into the use of 
appalling cruelty, is a feature of reformers, of 
idealists. So much is obvious from a reading of Darkness 
at Noon. Communist states are intended to achieve a new 
fairness and justice; but somehow they become police 
states. It is also obvious enough that the fine cause of 
animal liberation can become a fanatical and even violent 
movement. It can attack very improper targets, as in the 
release of animals from Palacerigg, a country park near 
Glasgow built up by a leading Scottish naturalist, David 
Stephen. Far be it from me to suggest one should therefore 
avoid trying to reform, and it is indeed clear that the 
organisation Zoo Check, for example, is entirely peaceful 
and law-abiding. And yet, there is still a danger, not of 
course in trying to reform, but in being prepared to 
over—state one's case, to brand one's opponents as 
villains, to use publicity uncritically, to twist the 
truth subtly to suit oneself. Shakespeare was well aware 
of the forces which could be released by a skilful piece 
of mob oratory, and how those forces could be 
uncontrollable, could attack the wrong target. He 
indicates this in some words of Antony after his "Friends, 
Romans, countrymen" speech following Caesar's 
assassination in Julius Caesar. Antony, once the mob has
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been aroused and Is away, comments:
Now let it work: Mischief, thou art afoot,
Take thou what course thou wilt.
And Shakespeare at once shows us the mischief doing just 
that: it attacks the innocent poet Cinna, who has the 
misfortune to have the same name as one of the 
conspirators, and to be stumbled upon by the mob. The 
attack on Palacerigg seems to me in a way comparable; 
perhaps this too was a case of mistaken identity (by 
over-zealous reformers). And though no humans were killed, 
"two sheep and a fox were killed by a wolf released by the 
raiders", ironically in that the group claiming 
responsibility called itself the "Animal Liberation Army" 
(27) . I think reformers need to be as aware of the dangers 
of excessive, improper domination, and even cruelty, as, 
for their part, must those who keep animals. The reformers 
need to realise that they are not oracles of all wisdom, 
and that it is only too easy to sweep away what is good 
along with what is bad (28).
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Chapter 7
THE WILD VERSUS CAPTIVITY
I want now to attempt the assessment of the advantages and 
drawbacks of living in the wild that I spoke of in 5.2.4 
(p 118). I will be mainly considering conditions of life 
in the wild though I will also, especially in 7.2
(Health), say a good deal about captive conditions in
comparison with those of the wild. I shall have in mind 
certain claims often made in defence of zoos, and at least
one particular claim made against them. The claims
defending zoos are that animals in reputable zoos (at 
least) are better off than in the wild for such reasons as 
the following:
(i) They often live far longer.
This claim I shall examine in 7.1, where I shall consider 
too the matter of violent death in the wild.
(ii) They are healthier, not least because of 
veterinary care (1).
This claim I shall consider in 7.2, where I shall perhaps 
seem to be weighting the case unduly against zoos. In fact 
I naturally regard the provision of veterinary care and 
indeed protection from the pressures of the wild as clear 
advantages of good captivity, but at the same time I think 
it is over-simplified to express this as a clear statement
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that captive animals are healthier than wild ones; and I 
try to make clear some of the complexities of the 
situation.
(iii) They do not go short of food; indeed they are 
saved the trouble of seeking it.
(iv) They are not exposed to predators or the 
elements, or other pressures of a natural life such as 
being bullied by conspecifics (2).
Claim (iii), and in some degree claim (iv), I shall look 
at in 7.3, where I will try to expound what I think is 
the clearest advantage of the wild, the fact that life 
there is likely to be purposeful and meaningful; this 
fact I think poses a considerable challenge to zoos to 
find ways of compensating for the absence of an important 
aspect of wild living.
A claim sometimes made against zoos is that wild 
animals are so closely adapted to life in the wild that 
their captivity can not be morally justified and is also 
pointless because keeping them captive effectively alters 
them so much that they even cease to be "representative of 
their species" (3).
This last claim I shall examine in 7.4.
7.1 LENGTH OF LIFE AND VIOLENT DEATH
So far as poor captivity, e.g. a bird's in a cramped 
cage, is concerned, Chaucer's statement of the bird's 
likely preferences (see p 6) could hardly be bettered. But 
there is at least one important aspect of life in the wild
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which Chaucer omitted, unlike Wyatt in these lines, rather 
more than a hundred years later:
Like as the bird in the cage enclosed,
The door unsparred and the hawk without,
'Twixt death and prison piteously oppressed,
Whether for to choose standeth in doubt... (4)
Hawks are just one example of the dangers that face, for 
example, robins, who normally live in the wild a mere 
tenth of their potential life span and have, any year, 
only a 50% chance of surviving to the next (5) . Thus it is 
indeed only too true that captive animals often live 
longer than wild ones; for many animals it must be true 
that only with man's protection have they any chance of 
dying of (as we say) old age. Suppose we consider, instead 
of Chaucer's no doubt miserably confined bird, a 
budgerigar who is allowed out frequently to fly about the 
house and who enjoys a good relationship with his owner 
(or one in a roomy aviary at a zoo) . If the actuary's 
tables for wild-living budgerigars are anything like those 
for robins, then such a well cared for budgerigar seems to 
have a good bargain in terms of total pleasure or 
satisfaction from living. I doubt in fact if the risks 
throughout life for large mammals like lions or 
chimpanzees are anything like as high as for small birds 
or small mammals such as rodents, but there will still be 
for lions and chimpanzees, I think, a very high death rate 
in early years (as there was, of course, with humans until 
the protection offered by modern medicine) . About 20% of 
lion cubs survive in the wild, I recall, to maturity, most
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cubs dying of starvation. Once past the vulnerable age a 
lion s or chimpanzee's survival chances presumably greatly 
increase, and this is what one would expect from the mere 
fact that it is worthwhile carrying out on such animals 
field studies which involve identifying and observing 
individuals: this would hardly be worth doing were such 
individuals continually dying off. Clearly too the 
chimpanzee Flo (whom I mentioned in 4.3) died of old age 
(6) .
It must still be true, however, in view of the high 
early loss even of animals which are fairly safe once they 
are mature, that a great many animals in zoos would, if 
they had lived in the wild instead, have died young. I 
have yet to discuss the extent to which life in captivity 
can be a satisfactory one for the animal concerned, but 
if, at this stage, I simply assume that in some cases it 
is, it seems to me that, in such cases, the comment on 
their captivity "It seems sad" (12b in my list of 
objections to zoos in 1.2, page 12) is inappropriate. For 
if the animal is living a reasonably enjoyable life (which 
I am assuming it is), and if it would have been living no 
life at all were it not in capivity (which is often the 
case), there seems nothing to be sad about.
David Jones has recently provided a vivid and almost 
awesome account of the dangers both natural and manmade 
faced by wild— living animals (7). Correctly, I think, he 
stresses how natural events — "predation, disease, 
injuries, starvation" — are "all part of a natural drama ,
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but none the less threatening' to the individual for all 
that. We know, from the mere fact (an aspect of natural 
selection) that all animals (like other organisms) have a 
much higher rate of increase than is necessary merely to 
replenish their numbers, that most of those born must be 
dying early from some cause, else population levels would 
not be remaining as constant as, except for humans and 
rodents, they normally do (8). This point I will return to 
in 7.4, but I mention it here to stress how we still, 
whenever we come across an actual injured wild animal, or 
a dead one, tend to feel sympathy and regret, even if we 
comment to ourselves that there is really no point in 
regret because such injuries and deaths are natural and 
essential. We are recognising that injury and death, 
however necessary, indeed essential, biologically, are 
still misfortunes and often causes of suffering to the 
animals concerned.
Perhaps many animals can suffer mentally from the 
deaths of their fellows more than we realise. I commented 
in 4.3 on how a dog can obviously feel the loss of a 
human, so is he not likely to be able to feel similarly 
sometimes the loss of another dog? It seems to me that our 
own sense of loss at the death of an animal we know well, 
such as a dog, is partly an experience an animal could 
easily feel. For what we probably miss is the presence of 
a familiar creature that greets us on our return, makes 
various familiar sounds, and so on. An animal could surely 
perfectly well miss another animal in this way: could
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simply be aware, as It were, of the absence of a 
comforting “presence" that had been there previously. 
Behaviour is sometimes observed in birds that looks like 
an expression of mourning; as we know that swallow mates, 
for example, choose each other, and thus obviously know 
each other as individuals, it seems likely, rather than 
the opposite, that they will experience some sense of loss 
on each other's death (9). If so, then life in the wild is 
likely to include a good deal of suffering, even if very 
short-lived compared to its occurrence in humans, at the 
loss of mates or other familiar conspecif ics. I see no 
reason for assuming that this could only occur with such 
animals as elephants or gorillas.
Of course it is not the case that all animals in zoos
live to old age or even, sadly, that they can all be 
allowed to. As the breeding of captive animals improves 
and approaches the rate of increase in the wild, it is 
clear that either birth control or the killing of surplus 
animals is likely to be necessary (10). In as much as I am 
right to suppose a likelihood that animals' suffering from 
the loss of (for example) partners is widespread, this is 
an additional reason for avoiding killing captive animals 
as far as possible. But at least if any animal has to be 
killed in a zoo it will be a humane death. For death in 
the wild can be a source of suffering, and more certainly
so, in other ways (for I accept that I am speculating a
good deal in the previous paragraph). Death can be itself 
violent, or it can be a slow death, as from injury or
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disease. The latter I will leave until 7.2, but I will 
consider violent death briefly now — the "hawk without" 
in Wyatt's words.
For me, knowledge of the operation of natural 
selection, and indeed simply of predators' need for food, 
makes me no less shocked by the reality, when I 
occasionally meet it, of nature red in tooth and claw. A 
mouse caught, still less played with, by a cat is not a 
pleasant sight, and a wild cheetah (for example) will 
provide her cubs with a living, injured young gazelle to 
practise hunting on (11) . The sight of a frog struggling 
in the beak of a hen (I still remember vividly seeing this 
25 years ago) shocks me. I understand how a thought of 
newly hatched turtles devoured by seabirds before they 
even reach the sea could seem (as in Tennessee Williams' 
play Suddenly Last Summer, I recall) a vision of a cruel 
God. The horror of violent death is caught by Stubbs' 
painting of a horse in the moment of attack by a lion, its 
head turned with a look of absolute terror (12) . Now, it 
may be that this is to get things out of proportion, to 
allow certain violent incidents to occupy the whole of our 
field of vision so that we think they make u p the major 
part of reality, of what happens in animals' daily lives, 
when in fact this can not be the case. The terrified horse 
would only be in this state a minute or two. It might have 
had frightening near—escapes before, but could not have 
been caught in the way it had this time else it would not 
have lived to be caught again. Most of its life is likely
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to have had an even tenor (13). The violent contrast 
between the horror and the usual quality of its life may 
be what upsets us so much. The newly hatched turtles that 
are caught must suffer very briefly and presumably know 
little of it. Perhaps any sadness we feel should be more 
because they are so many lost potential lives than because 
of the suffering involved in their deaths, and doubtless 
our feeling should in any case be tempered by recognition 
of the virtual biological impossibility of their all 
surviving. It is also likely that in many cases of violent 
death, such as a wildebeeste eaten alive by hyaenas, the 
victim may feel no pain because of the action of 
endorphins or some similar mechanism. This accords with 
much human experience of serious injury in the heat of 
battle or the like causing no pain till later (14). But on 
the other hand there is no reason to doubt the occurrence 
of extreme stress in, for example, the catching of a mouse
by a cat, or, still more, in its being played with by the
cat, or in many incidents when animals are clearly
struggling desperately to escape from predators.
So I think that the fact an animal in a zoo is 
protected from the violence and other dangers of natural 
life is not an aspect of captivity to be scorned. Jones 
correctly emphasises how many of the "challenges" of the 
wild "would not usually be tolerated in a captive 
situation" (15) . We are in some degree conferring on our 
captive animals the protection from violent death and from 
disease which civilisation has (to some extent) conferred
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on ourselves. On the other hand, captive animals have not 
(usually) asked to be rescued and the protection we 
offer can not compensate for a life of dullness and 
boredom. The ‘'purposefulness" of life in the wild I shall 
look at in 7.3, but I will say now that if we can 
successfully compensate for the loss of this aspect of 
wild living (and it is mainly, perhaps, a problem with the 
more exploratory, opportunist animals, as we will see in 
chapters 9 and 10) , then the captive animal has by no 
means a bad bargain.
7.2 A COMPARISON OF HEALTH IN THE WILD AND IN CAPTIVITY
7.2.1 Wild animals develop all kinds of infections. They 
can be parasitised, can become injured, or can be attacked 
by marauding insects. They can look very much worse for 
wear compared to their protected, medically attended 
cousins in captivity. Smith remarks that an apparently 
typical wild lion with its "fur in a mess", and with 
wounds and problems with flies, looked so much worse than 
a safari park one that it would, in captivity, have been 
disposed of as an embarrassment (16) .
However, while wild animals can have considerable 
health problems, they can perfectly well cope with many of 
their infections (17). And serious ill-health is normally 
not found among wild animals because a seriously unhealthy 
animal is soon a dead one. Animals either manage to cope 
with, say, parasites or they fail utterly - i.e. die. The 
middle course open to humans and well cared for captive
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animals is not open to them.
Still, mild states of ill-health can cause 
discomfort without causing- death. A successful parasite in 
biological terms is one that does not kill its host - but 
it may cause discomfort. Here the captive animal is 
clearly better off in that medical aid easing minor 
suffering should be available.
7.2.2 On the other hand, captive animals, healthwise, 
are not wholly gainers by their captivity. The captive 
state can protect them medically, but it can also expose 
them to infections they would have escaped in the wild. 
First, the process of capture and transport is likely to 
be stressful to a degree which makes the animal concerned 
more liable to serious parasitic infection (18) . When 
Hindle remarks that "A large proportion of all newly 
arrived animals at the London Zoo are infected with 
various parasites which are gradually eliminated as a 
result of treatment and absence of re-infection" (19), 
what he is saying is no doubt wholly true. But it could 
easily be the case (and these words were written over 
thirty years ago) that many of the infections, or their 
intensity, are partly or wholly due to the stress of 
capture and transport, so that the human care very 
creditably given to curing them is partly necessary merely 
to put right the damage caused by man.
Secondly, conditions in zoos can greatly aid the 
spread of parasites, or else necessitate the provision of 
a dull, sterile environment in order to restrict their
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spread. Ungulates kept in small paddocks are very prone to 
this; so are cats kept in other than very large 
enclosures. Sadly, they may therefore require concrete or 
tiles, which are easily washed and sterilized, but with 
(when so washed) the loss of familiar and perhaps 
carefully deposited smells. It is important to note that, 
whether or not it is necessary in particular captive 
conditions, a lower than natural level of internal 
parasites such as nematodes is not a kind of super-health, 
i.e. is itself no advantage (20). Primates, because of 
their nomadic habits in the wild, lack the tidy, sanitary 
tendency of, for example, many carnivores, which deposit 
their droppings in regular spots away from their “living 
area". So in captivity it is often considered advisable to 
provide primates with regrettably hygienic conditions. 
(Medieval kings, true primates, needed their numerous 
palaces because of the deficiency of the sanitary 
arrangements (21).)
Thirdly, an animal can be exposed in a zoo to 
infection it would not face in the wild (22). The 
antarctic— 1iving species of penguin live naturally in a 
highly aseptic climate. In zoos they are susceptible to 
the fungus—caused aspergillosis, and often die. Primates, 
especially apes, are liable to be infected by humans with 
diseases which may or may not be natural to them in the 
wi Id; tuberculosis, measles, respiratory diseases in 
general. Usually the danger is greatest just after 
importation, presumably in most cases after capture in the
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wiId (23).
Fourthly, disease or injury can arise from zoo 
conditions, like teeth being broken and caries developing 
from the biting of bars. Rhinoceroses can rub their horns 
against unsuitable objects. Caries can also develop from 
the eating of the wrong food, as. was common in the past 
when public feeding was allowed, with bears and elephants 
as well as primates, and even rhinoceroses (24).
Probably too (it has been suggested to me), zoo 
medicine is still somewhat haphazard, because there is no 
great economic pressure to develop, say, specific 
pharmaceutical preparations, and because indeed of the 
wide range of species. So treatments are likely sometimes 
to be somewhat experimental, though zoo animals can no 
doubt also benefit from the special attention they 
receive thanks to the academic interest of the problems 
they pose (25).
7.2.3 We tend, I think, to use the term "health" in two 
different though related senses. There is what we may call 
healthl, which is the opposite of being ill (as in the 
prayer book phrase "in sickness and in health") . And there 
is health2, to possess which is to have the ability to 
cope with infection, the ability to remain in or keep 
returning to a state of healthl whatever infections etc 
occur. Probably we would use the adjective healthy more 
in the second sense: we would not say "Are you still ill 
or are you now healthy?" We recognise that you do not 
necessarily cease to be healthy by being ill, provided
162
that the latter Is a temporary thing, something you are 
demonstrating youF ability to cope with. PFesident Reagan, 
in hospital afteF the attempt on his life, was no longeF 
in a state of healthl - he was seFiously injured - but by 
the way he was coping with his injury was demonstrating 
he possessed health2 (26) .
Now if we are thinking of healthl, and especially if 
we are thinking of the relatively minor disturbances which 
can remove it, then well cared for zoo animals may indeed 
be healthier: they have veterinary care to restore them 
quickly to a state of health, and in any case they are 
protected to a great extent from the situations which are 
going to cause injuries. But it is only healthl here which 
we can be sure they possess - most of the time. They may 
possess health2 but their artificially protected situation 
prevents our judging this. We would, I think, regard the 
man who remains well without aid from his doctor as 
healthier than the man who remains well but only through 
frequent medical dosing. A set of teeth with no fillings 
and not requiring any would rate as a healthier set than 
those of a man with many fillings, even though the latter 
set, cared for efficiently by the dentist, is healthier 
than the set requiring fillings but not receiving the 
appropriate treatment. The man who remains well not only 
without medical aid but through difficult physical 
situations — physically or mentally demanding — would be 
rated healthier again. And indeed he does not need to 
remain "in perfect health" to be judged, as we might say,
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basically healthy, healthy in the important sense much 
more than the man who suffers not a scratch but only 
because he never faces the situations the other man can 
cope with. Now the wild lion as described by Smith with 
its "fur in a mess", etc is in the situation of the man 
who faces demanding situations, the arctic explorer 
perhaps, or the active sportsman. If we rule these last to 
be unhealthy because of their "scratches", or even more 
serious injuries, then we are judging by externals, by 
trivialities even. Similarly if we rule the wild lion to 
be unhealthy compared to the artificially protected safari 
park lion.
Qualifications are needed. One is that few if any 
situations are wholly safe or protected. Animals die 
prematurely in captivity: we saw above certain special 
threats facing them which would not do so in the wild. 
Veterinary care cannot guarantee a captive animal's 
survival, much less its remaining in "Al condition". A 
captive animal remaining in good health (i.e. healthl) 
most of the time is demonstrating some degree of health2, 
no doubt. But it is demonstrating nothing like the degree 
of health2 that it would be in the wild. (This is assuming 
good captivity. The opposite would be true in bad captive 
conditions or in bad conditions of transport.)
Health2 is fairly close perhaps to "fitness as we 
would ordinarily use the word. The captive lion may be 
healthy; it is obviously not as fit as a wild lion. The 
captive animal must almost certainly be obtaining less
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exercise than Its wild conspecific; it must be less "in 
training". We can speak of an animal being fitted to a 
particular environment in a sense which has nothing to do 
with exercise, but at the same time it happens to be the 
case that the fitness of a great many animals - certainly 
most of the mammals traditionally kept in zoos - includes 
"fitness" in the health or athletic sense. It seems 
unconvincing to argue that a captive gazelle or lion 
lacking surely undoubtedly the fitness in this sense of 
its wild conspecific could be said to be healthier (27).
It could be happier; it could be relatively very healthy. 
But healthier, surely not.
7.2.4 One way in which the captive antelope if not the 
lion could well be happier is in its freedom from 
stressful situations. But this again surely does not make 
the captive animal healthier than the wild one, in that a 
mild degree of "physiological stress" is a set of 
physiological events in the animal which enable it to cope 
with the difficult situations which occur in its natural 
life. The animal demonstrates, by such physiological 
changes as the release of ACTH and the consequent 
increased output of hydrocortisone etc, and the other 
events which (with great variations in different animals) 
make up the second stage of Selye's General Adaptation 
Syndrome, that its health is good (28) . On the other hand, 
the events of the third stage do seem to be mainly 
detrimental: a well looked after captive animal is no 
doubt healthier as well as luckier in as much as it
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escapes this condition of extreme stress which will occur 
sometimes in the wild. (It can also occur in captivity 
(29) .) Extreme stress in fact involves a general breakdown 
of health. But the fact remains that having no cause to 
show the milder earlier reactions of "physiological 
stress" hardly qualifies the captive animal to be regarded 
as healthier than its wild counterpart, though it is 
arguable that it may be happier without this milder stress 
too. Dawkins makes the point that "some lesser stress 
symptoms ... may be an indication of well-being", and 
mentions some evidence that "the physical health of 
animals which show some signs of the GAS can, in some 
cases, be shown to be better than that of animals which 
show no sign of it" (30) . This is perhaps only to be 
expected with animals, being the case with ourselves: 
human "fitness" in the normal "health" sense includes the 
ability to respond to at least mildly stressful situations 
- such as occur of course in sport - and such responding 
involves the hormone releases etc of physiological stress 
as much as it involves, say, actual muscular contractions.
7.2.5 We might define health in the way the World 
Health Organisation did in its constitution: "...health is 
a state of complete physical, mental, and social 
well-being and not merely the absence of disease or 
infirmity" (31) . We might well feel, with humans, that a 
full definition of good health includes "leading a full 
life" or "leading a normal life". If we would, then a 
similar definition should be appropriate for any
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particular kind of animal, in which case the captive 
animal, obviously necessarily not leading a normal, i.e. 
natural, life, would be by definition less than healthy in 
the fullest sense. This I would see as a challenge to us 
to provide the animal with a kind of captivity which 
approaches or substitutes for its natural life to the 
greatest degree we can manage. I do not think this by any 
means a hopeless proposition, as we will see in chapters 9 
and 10.
7.2.6 Sometimes we apply the term "healthy" not to an 
individual organism but to its environment. Sometimes too 
we speak of the health of a community rather than of an 
individual (and of course there is community medicine and 
social medicine) (32). The health of the community could 
reasonably be seen as the sum of the respective healths of 
the community's constituent individuals. However it seems 
clear, aware as we are today of the problems of 
over—population, that the health of the human population 
viewed as a whole is far from being the same thing as the 
health of all the world’s individual humans. For the 
death early in life, as a result it could be said of 
ill-health, of large numbers of humans is a factor which 
has helped to keep many primitive human communities at a 
fairly steady population level. Now, of course, the 
population of certain "third world" countries, for example 
several African states, is increasing partly because of 
the much higher rate of survival - the greater health, in 
fact — of babies and young children thanks to improved
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medicine. Fiennes speaks of the "ancient evolutionary 
significance" of disease, its "value in controlling 
population numbers and in maintaining the stamina of the 
species" (33). We can perhaps say that the health of a 
community, or its general well-being, depends on its 
numbers not increasing to "an extent where food supplies 
become inadequate, where there is insufficient cover for 
concealment and protection, or there are not enough places 
in which to produce and rear the young" (34). Disease is 
at least one factor which helps to prevent such happening: 
unhealthy individuals do not survive. In captivity on the 
other hand veterinary care in particular can to some 
extent ensure the survival of relatively unhealthy 
individuals, so that the general health of the population 
deteriorates (35) . Thus if, as we legitimately can, we 
choose to consider the health of the species as contrasted 
with the health of its individuals, then it is even less 
likely than when we are speaking of the health of 
individuals as such that we can make a justifiable 
"blanket" judgement that the health of animals in zoos is 
better than that of their wild fellows. Still, when we say 
this, we are also emphasising the extent to which captive 
animals are free from the pressures, including a high 
chance of being struck by fatal disease, which they would 
be subject to in the wild.
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7.3 FOOD, PLEASURE AND PURPOSE
To be provided with food, even the best food. Is a mixed 
blessing (36). It is a gain not to go short or starve, as 
many animals in the wild do (37). But as food seeking 
undeniably makes u p  much of an animal's life - and to a 
great extent its very method of obtaining food will have 
"formed" it anatomically, physiologically, and 
behaviourally - to have food provided may mean being left 
with little occupation or motivation. The animal may thus 
be deprived of a main purpose in existence or rather, 
perhaps, of likely opportunities to engage in activities 
whose performance would in the wild produce or be 
accompanied by, psychologically, a sense of 
purposefulness. This is probably not much of a problem for 
herbivores such as ungulates, who would spend much time in 
the wild merely eating, and can continue to do so in 
captivity, and, in addition, being in most cases highly 
social animals will be occupied by their social relations 
as in the wild. Such obvious opportunists as bears and 
dogs are likely to come off worst (38) .
With predators in captivity, we must surely to some 
extent be depriving them of a source of pleasure or 
satisfaction, despite what seems to be often a reluctance 
to grant this. This is not to say that they necessarily 
"experience" any "deprivation"; I am only claiming that 
they are failing to have an experience which, if they did, 
would give them satisfaction (39). Is not the extent to 
which humans who go hunting enjoy it at least prirna facie
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evidence for nonhuman predators' enjoying hunting too? 
Perhaps hunting for survival rather than sport is less 
enjoyable, being serious. But recreational hunting such as 
fox hunting is taken very seriously, voluntarily, 
presumably with increase of or at least no diminution to 
the pleasure, which rather suggests that hunting genuinely 
in earnest will similarly be pleasurable (40). It hardly 
needs arguing that cats enjoy hunting and catching mice. 
Apart from domestic cats' notorious taste for playing with 
their victims, the fact that cats, especially kittens and 
cubs, play at hunting - e.g. leaping on each other rather 
as a cat pounces on prey - suggests this. It is likely 
that a cat enjoys actual hunting as much as, perhaps more 
than, play hunting.
However, apart from the pleasure or satisfaction a 
predator gets from the actual killing and its immediate 
preliminaries, I suggest that, as with a human hunt, 
the whole operation of seeking food, the animal's 
appetitive behaviour, as we call it, is likely to be 
pleasurable or satisfying through producing the sense of 
purposefulness I mentioned above. And quite apart from 
predators in particular, any animal, in as much as it 
engages in any of the "important business of life" — e.g. 
hunting, feeding, nest building, mating and reproductive 
behaviour, the establishing and maintaining of social 
relations — is probably experiencing a sense of purpose, 
and is likely to be reasonably well off. I am concerned 
here with its subjective state, and I think this having a
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sense of purpose Is probably the most important "feeling" 
to have. It seems, in short, more than likely that wild 
animals get satisfaction from many of the things they have 
to do in the course of living.
I do not think the term "sense of purpose" is 
anthropomorphic. It is, for example, upsetting to a dog if 
you tell him he is coming for a walk, then stop after two 
paces and tell him he is not. This is worse than not 
suggesting a walk in the first place. If you went on doing 
this, chopping and changing, you would probably upset him 
considerably. This suggests roughly what I mean by saying 
an animal needs a sense of purpose. It is almost a logical 
necessity of being an animal at all that certain tasks are 
incompatible: so something goes wrong if you try and do 
two at once, or can not make up your mind which to do. The 
fact that, if you are going to do something (and animals 
have to to do things to survive, to be animals at all), it 
is necessary to start it and go on with it, and not keep 
switching to different things, is not a necessary 
requirement for people as such, but for animals. The 
feeling of frustration that we get if we fail to complete 
some task we have started can be (like pain, pleasure and 
boredom) biologically useful: it helps to dissuade us from 
constantly starting and stopping. Surely there are grounds 
here for thinking it likely that animals are going to feel 
the same kinds of frustration as we do — e.g. if a lion 
has got a meal to eat, but keeps being disturbed by 
hyaenas. The possibility of this sort of problem seems to
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me a basic necessity of being an animal. And to have 
everything going well, or reasonably well, seems likely to 
be a source of satisfaction to other animals as much as to 
us .
Something else which seems likely to be very 
important to an animal is a sense of security, a sense of 
belonging, which could perhaps go with a sense of purpose. 
There are various indications that some animals do need 
this: the Harlows' (very inhumane) experiments showing how 
infant monkeys need a source of security, a source of
confidence (41). Dogs can show their general sense of
unease, of not being relaxed, by their failure to groom 
themselves. Of course this sense of security, and indeed 
many of the other pleasures that I listed in 4.2.2 (p 76 
ff) , an animal should be able to enjoy in good captivity.
Now obviously in the wild there are all sorts of
discomforts, problems and very real dangers. I have
referred to several already: parasites, bites from horse 
flies, problems of finding food, the unpleasantness of 
sometimes going without or actually starving, the strain 
of only just escaping sometimes from a predator, the 
likely sense of loss (I have suggested in 7.1) from the 
deaths of familiar conspecif ics. But we have our problems 
too and for most of us, most of the time, they are not 
overwhelming. What often prevents nervous breakdown is a 
sense of purpose and a sense of security. Given these, we 
can often cope with many problems including hard work. Of 
course it makes a difference what human society we are
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speaking of. At the end of 7.1 I noted how civilisation 
protects us from many dangers, but there are glaring 
exceptions such as war. Yet although war is a cause of 
appalling suffering, it seems that the suicide rate tends 
to go down in wartime, presumably because people tend to 
have more of a sense of purpose, and perhaps of 
comradeship and of belonging, and these more than 
compensate for the presence of extra hardships in 
preventing extreme depression. Someone might retort that 
people are no happier in a war; they are merely too busy 
to worry about not being happy. Pehaps this is so, but 
whether or not we would count it as happiness, at least it 
is true that a state of non-depression, a state far from 
that extreme depression which could lead to suicide, is 
likely to accompany the state of being very busy: having 
things to get on with.
The discomforts and still more the dangers of the 
wild are very real, and many animals succumb to those 
dangers very early in their lives, as we have seen. But in 
as much as any individual survives at all, what is 
important to it, I suggest, is to have plenty to get on 
with, which I think wild animals obviously normally do, 
and this is much of what I mean by "having a sense of 
purpose", and to have a sense of security and where 
appropriate companionship — to have a home base and proper 
relations with one's nearby conspecifics in the case of a 
social animal. Dawkins mentions experimental findings that 
sheep are stressed by situations such as being put in a
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truck or chased by a dog but nothing like as much as they 
are stressed by simply being separated from the rest of 
the flock (42). This seems to bear out what I am 
suggesting.
And as I emphasised in 4.2, life in the wild is often 
not all "business", essential activities for survival, 
compensated for only by a sense of purpose such as I have 
been proposing. There are also plenty of reports of 
animals enjoying themselves in a "direct way".
So in brief, I suggest that to give the provision of 
regular food and safety from predators and other dangers, 
not to mention discomforts, as advantages, pure and 
simple, of captivity over against life in the wild is to 
leave out certain related disadvantages which go hand in 
hand with such advantages: the loss, in particular, of 
purposeful living.
It is perhaps a tacit admission that wild life must be 
reasonably pleasant that no-one (not even those who feel 
they have a right to capture any animals they wish to, or 
need to) would suggest it was cruel or unkind not to 
capture any animal, to leave it in the wild (except in 
cases of certain injured or abandoned individuals). It 
seems to be agreed that we are not injuring animals by 
merely leaving them alone (43). But then again, it is 
perhaps more a matter of recognising that at least normal 
natural pressures on wild animals are not our 
responsibility, that we indeed have a responsibility to 
avoid interfering if possible with natural ecosystems, and
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also that we are distanced anyway by necessity from most 
wild animals — we do not know them as individuals, and are 
therefore just not going to be, in the scheme of things, 
very concerned about them (44) .
However, although I think that it will not do, in 
view of these various considerations, to regard captivity 
as acceptable simply because it is likely to be pleasanter 
than the wild (45), I also think, as I shall try to show 
in the next section and the three following chapters, that 
we have many indications that some animals can be in a 
state of wellbeing in captivity. I think that in many 
cases it is possible to provide conditions of captivity 
which to a great extent compensate for the loss of the 
positive side of wild existence. But we need to recognise 
that positive side to realise our responsibility to 
provide suitably enriched captive conditions.
7.4 EVOLUTION AND ADAPTATION
Presumably all animals are adapted to life in their
natural habitats (the "wild"). From this we might presume:
a) that they are well off there;
b) that they are not likely to be well off in
captivity;
or even c) that it is virtually impossible for them to
be well off in captivity.
Point c) is frequently claimed (46) , but I think with 
regard to many animals it is, for biological reasons.
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mistaken, which I will now try to show. To do this, I want 
to look more closely at the indeed indisputable fact, that 
wild animals are adapted to their environment, and 
consider whether a) and b) or c) do in fact follow from 
it.
Animals' adaptations are indeed most striking, and 
are the product, at least in some cases, of millions of 
years of natural selection. However, the characteristics 
of animals - their sense organs, body coverings, 
communication systems, etc - are by no means entirely the 
product of the habitat or the environment (47). Animals' 
characteristics all have their present form as a result of 
alterations made to appropriate features of the animals’ 
ancestors, alterations which, as a result of natural 
selection, have occurred so as to make those features fit 
the environment, or fit a changed environment, more 
closely. The alterations which have produced the present 
adaptations could only be made (by natural selection) on 
the features which happened to be available. Thus in a 
way, all the various adaptations of animals - anatomical, 
physiological, even behavioural - are makeshift 
arrangements, though often "inspired" makeshift showing, 
as it were, the utmost "ingenuity". A few "large-scale" 
vertebrate examples which come to mind are gill arches 
converted to jaw bones, jaw-supporting bones converted to 
ear ossicles, fins converted to legs, inner ears developed 
probably from something like a lateral line system, and so 
on. Animals are not perfectly adapted; they are, so to
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speak, never designed from first principles, but ratber 
themselves "adaptations", in the sense of "adaptive 
alterations , of what went before (48) , an aspect of the 
extent to which "nature [is] prodigal in variation, but 
niggardly in innovation" (49). One human example of 
imperfect adaptation is the tendency to suffer arthritis 
around the area of the hip bones, probably partly a result 
of a four-legged "horizontal" animal's having been 
converted into a "vertical" two-legged one. Again, it 
is not a perfect arrangement to have the respiratory 
pathway to the lungs overlapping with the food pathway; 
but this is because we are a gill-breathing animal 
converted to a lung breathing one, the lungs starting as 
extensions of the food pathway. De Beer gives an example 
of a way in which "physiological adaptation to 
viviparity... [has] not become co-adapted to the 
immunological mechanism", hence the risk of haemolytic 
disease in the offspring of a Rhesus-positive father and a 
Rhesus-negative mother. Examples could be almost literally 
endless. As de Beer emphasises, animals can not be 
perfectly adapted, for if they were, evolution, which is 
essentially the improvement of adaptations, could not 
occur (50) . In some cases certain species, as a result of 
environmental changes they fail to adjust to, are in 
varying degrees ill-adapted (51).
Furthermore, all individuals of any particular 
species differ slightly, having slightly different sets of 
genes, so that they are not equally adapted, even though
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to a great extent they are all Inheritors of millions of 
years of natural selection. Even if one could identify a 
pair of animals almost perfectly adapted to their 
environment, their young would not he to the same extent, 
or to the same extent as each other, for all get dealt a 
slightly different genetic "hand".
As evolution is a matter of the differential passing 
on of genes, so that different genes gradually become more 
widespread through the gene pool of any particular 
species, as a result of the individuals carrying them 
being slightly more successful in reproducing, the welfare 
of individual animals is hardly going to be benefited by 
evolution except in as much as genes aiding welfare also 
enable the animals carrying them to reproduce 
successfully, which also includes surviving long enough to 
reproduce. There seems no way in which the welfare of 
animals past breeding age can be selected for, except 
where their welfare assists younger relatives of theirs to 
reproduce. However, as animals cannot live efficiently, 
presumably, and cannot reproduce efficiently if they find 
life too difficult - if they get too disturbed, or too 
miserable, or are hurt too much - there will be selection 
of characteristics producing some degree of wellbeing, 
perhaps some degree of happiness (52). (See my discussion 
of pleasure in chapter 4 and in previous section of this 
chapter.)
There must be some "survival of the fittest".
Although even a small reproductive advantage conferred by
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a gene Is enough to ensure Its selection - I.e. its 
gradual spread through the gene pool - It seems likely 
that many individuals of any species die young, in some 
cases this being part of natural selection (i.e. where the 
death is due to some genetically inherited disadvantageous 
feature in an animal compared to its conspecifics). So 
while the so-called struggle for survival is in many ways 
a peaceful struggle (53), hardly suggesting nature red in 
tooth and claw, it still does involve a great many animals 
dying long before their potential life span, and by no 
means entirely without suffering (as we saw in 7.1 and 
7.2) .
Animals (perhaps certain more adventurous or 
exploratory individuals of a species) will sometimes move 
into new habitats, or may adopt some new behaviour. This 
may be a substantial factor in evolution (54). In the new 
habitat or the new niche, selection will operate to 
improve adaptation to it, but this will be a slow process, 
and the development will be occurring in a population, not 
in any single individuals. Some or all individuals may 
well be rather ill-adapted in the early stages of moving 
into a new habitat or a new niche, as in the situation of 
an environmental change which forces upon a population a 
need to adapt, if it has enough genetic adaptability; 
failure to adapt in such circumstances is likely of course 
to result in extinction (55). A possible human example of 
failure fully to adapt following a move into a new kind of 
habitat could be the condition in eskimos known as "frozen
179
lung". That Is, although eskimos are adapted to their 
difficult environment in various anatomical and other 
respects (for example their short, squat body shape, with 
a relatively small surface area for heat loss), they are 
far from perfectly adapted to the intense cold, and can 
suffer as a result. Tigers may have moved fairly recently 
into tropical regions, and be as yet inadequately enough 
adapted to them to suffer discomfort from the heat.
Animals, perhaps partly because they are all 
(including humans) "previous models" "updated" with 
numerous adaptations, have varying degrees of 
adaptability. Some move readily into new environments 
created by man (like cities); others can not adapt so 
easily. Here I am thinking mainly not of genetic 
adaptability, but of cultural or behavioural (or 
physiological) adaptability, an animal's ability to adjust 
to changed circumstances within its own lifetime. Some 
become tame easily, some can be trained easily, others 
not. Some can change their habits easily, e.g. switch to 
different kinds of food (of course, within limits); some 
(like koalas) cannot.
Sometimes an animal which moves into association with 
man is moving into a new niche evolutionari ly, as with 
sheep and dogs. True, our domesticated sheep and dogs are 
to a great extent the products of artificial selection.
But in another sense this is a natural process, in that 
man himself is a part of nature, and that what he does in 
selecting certain characters and as a result increasing
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greatly the numbers of certain genes can he seen as a way 
in which those genes are manipulating him (not of course 
in any sense consciously or voluntarily). If we measure 
evolutionary success in terms of numhers of individuals of 
a particular species, as we well may, then we can see dogs 
as enormously successful where their wild conspecifics are 
failing (56). This does not mean that domestication is 
necessarily morally right; we might well object to certain 
examples of it (57), and some may object to it all on 
moral grounds (58). But it cannot, I think, he regarded 
sensibly as "biologically" wrong, and we might regard it 
as biologically very successful, of course depending on 
how we decide to measure biological success.
Therefore, although it is true that animals are 
adapted to their natural habitats, and to their ways of 
life therein, and although it is likely that if we take 
them out of their natural habitats and keep them in 
captivity they are likely to have much less of what they 
need for wellbeing, this is far from being an absolute 
rule. It is unlikely that any animals require all the 
features of their habitats. Some may be vital; all hardly 
can be, if only because all animals are likely to be 
somewhat adaptable. (Otherwise they are extremely 
dependent on an unchanging environment. This probably does 
apply to some animals in the sea, which is very 
unchanging.) Consider, for example, the Woolly Monkey 
Sanctuary (see chapter 2, p 39) . In some ways it provides 
natural conditions, in that there are facilities for the
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f01 mlng of proper social groups, and the occurrence of 
much social behaviour1, even though there is no attempt to 
recreate the conditions of the Amazon forest (59).
I do not suggest we should regard ourselves as having 
carte blanche to collect or capture any animals we like.
As a working rule, we should assume an animal is well off 
in the wild, is best off there, and is likely to be much 
less well off, even very badly off, in captivity. But this 
does not mean we know that such applies to every case. It 
is quite possible that some animals can be kept quite well 
or very well in captivity; and we can only really judge, 
not by categorical statements (60), but by various 
evidence and approaches such as I attempt to outline in 
Chapter 9.
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Chapter 8 
WILD AND DOMESTIC ANIMALS
Jamieson remarks that there Is a moral presumption 
against keeping wild animals in captivity, and is far from 
alone in implying that the keeping of wild animals is 
inappropriate or immoral in a way that keeping 
domesticated animals is not (1) . I want to examine the 
distinction between wild and domesticated animals, and to 
try to show that the distinction is much less real than 
often imagined, and the two categories less absolute than 
often assumed. In as much as wild and domesticated animals 
are different, we should think of them as on a continuum, 
with zoo animals somewhere in between, no doubt fairly 
near the wild end of the continuum. But in the cases of 
some species the distinction seems hardly appropriate at 
all.
Very few animals (about fifteen or so) would usually 
be regarded as having been successfully fully 
domesticated (2) . Those that have been, I suggest, were 
pretty well suitable from the start, and have therefore 
probably been changed very little in essentials by the 
process of domestication: they did not need to be, because 
they were suitable to start with, and if they had not 
been, they could not have been domesticated in the first
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place. I think there Is a good deal of evidence to support 
this. Sheep were suitable, it seems, because, unlike deer 
and antelopes, they were not territorial and had a single 
leader, as well as being mountain-living and in connection 
with this not very fast running and not very nervous of 
predators (3). Reindeer, exceptionally among deer, could 
be domesticated because of their tendency to form large 
herds and their not being territorial (4) . Domestic pigs 
have been found by Wood-Gush and Stolba to retain an 
astonishing number of their natural behaviour patterns 
(see 9.3 below). Poultry similarly, I suspect, have 
retained a great deal of the natural behaviour of Indian 
jungle fowl, such as dust-bathing. Kiley-Worthington has 
stressed how much of the mother-young relationships in, 
for example, horses and cattle is fairly unchanged from 
the wild state (5) . The way sheepdogs manage sheep seems 
closely related to the way wolves would "manage" caribou 
(6) . The European hamster has never been domesticated 
because it is just too "unfriendly"; one family of Golden 
hamsters was dug up in Syria, turned out to be (I presume) 
tame or readily tameable, and as a result there is now a 
vast captive population of pet and laboratory Golden 
hamsters descended from that one family. (According to 
Dembeck, they were rediscovered following a reference in 
"ancient chronicles" about a "kind of Syrian mouse kept 
by children in ancient Assyria and Anatolia; if it is 
correct, this intriguing account fits my case well (7) .) 
The European wildcat seems highly untameable (much less so
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than a cheetah or even perhaps a lion), and thus seems 
unlikely to be the ancestor of the domestic cat, much of 
whose character I would have assumed to have been already 
there in the wild ancestor and not to be the result of 
selective breeding (8). However I admit to my case being a 
little shaken by the fact that the European wildcat 
(Felis silvestris) is now regarded as the same species 
(though previously believed not to be) as the African and 
Arabian wildcat (formerly called Fe1 is libyca). but 
the two are at the extreme ends of a cline (9) . However 
the "southern form" of the species is still regarded as 
the likely ancestor of the domestic cat, and I imagine 
that selection has for some reason kept the European 
population fiercer than the other. The European wildcat in 
fact can be tamed if taken as a very young kitten, and of 
course it can interbreed with the domestic cat (10) . So in 
some degree domesticated animals are particular wild 
animals which were suitable to be kept by man, and are 
still much as they always were.
Some wild animals, i.e. other than those few which 
have been domesticated, are in fact capable of having a 
relationship with man while still clearly being a wild 
animal. I suggest as examples some of the gorillas studied 
by Dian Fossey, chimpanzees studies by Jane Goodall, 
cheetahs as referred to in a Natural History Programme, 
Radio 4, lions and even a leopard successfully released by 
Joy Adamson, tigers at Howletts and Woolly monkeys at 
Williams' sanctuary (11).
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Animals In zoos are only relatively wild. Helen 
Spurway believes it is impossible to breed a genuinely 
wild animal in artificial conditions (12). She stresses 
how genetic changes must occur, how natural selection is 
still operating, or at least an unintended artificial 
selection. I think she is perhaps over-stressing the 
genetic change. As I said above, I think the extent to 
which even long artificially selected animals remain 
behaviourally unchanged is remarkable. But clearly she is 
right that there can not be any strictly wild animals in 
captivity. Animals in zoos have either been bred in 
captivity, or have been taken from the wild. In the latter 
case, the situation is never really satisfactory until an 
^  animal has settled down, become adjusted to having people 
near, so that it is fairly relaxed, probably fairly tame, 
and feeding properly, etc (13) . (If it breeds, this is 
still better as a sign of its having settled down.) So 
although this is not a genetic change as such, it is a 
first stage of domestication. It was as much as elephants 
and cheetahs ever had in long centuries of 
semi-domestication.
This is genetically "connected", in as much as:
a) the animal would not be there if it had not the
* ' right genetic makeup for being able to adjust or adapt to 
captive conditions (others will have died earlier, perhaps 
because of the stress of people being near, etc);
b) the animal may breed: if it does, then one will be 
selecting, unavoidably to some extent, for animals that
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can adapt to captivity. And this clearly will be a step 
towards domestication. So when animals are born in 
captivity, which we all regard as the most satisfactory 
situation in captivity, they are slightly domesticated. At 
the same time, zoos are right to try to alter them as 
little as possible. They should not be selectively 
breeding, and this is an ideal still, to some extent, to 
be realised in the future (see chapter 13, Zoos and 
Conservation) . At the same time again, even though the 
animals are slightly domesticated, there is no reason why 
it should necessarily be impossible in the future in any 
specific case to reintroduce them, provided this is 
tackled carefully. For example, plenty of even 
domesticated animals have gone feral. It depends on the 
individual. But it is all the more likely that an animal 
which has not been selectively bred seriously should be 
able to go back to the wild, provided a) if it is a 
carnivore, it is given opportunity to practise killing, 
and perhaps hunting (which I will discuss in chaper 13); 
and b) provided life in captivity has not been too dull, 
producing dull animals such as, for example, Mountfort 
thinks that zoo tigers tend to be (14) . I think he is 
. overstating his point here, but I would agree that dogs 
and cats can get, though domesticated, in some ways a more 
natural life than many zoo animals do: e.g. cats exploring 
freely, catching birds sometimes, etc. And this is 
something that zoos must pay attention to, i.e. endeavour 
to enrich captive environments (as we will see in chapters
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9 and 10).
Now If It acceptable to keep "fully" domesticated 
animals in captivity, why is it wrong to keep slightly 
domesticated animals in captivity? Of course, one can say 
that much captivity of domesticated animals is wrong, e.g. 
the keeping of poultry and pigs in intensive systems, and 
I would entirely agree. But then these conditions are 
such as no zoo should even contemplate; and as I have 
said, hens and pigs show most of their natural behaviour 
patterns given the opportunity (15) .
One might say, too, that only really "free" or 
"interesting" keeping of domesticated animals is 
acceptable, such as that of cats and dogs, or horses, or 
cows perhaps in fields. I would agree, again, to some 
extent that (as we will see in Chapters 9 and 10) what 
zoos have to do is get as near as they can to providing 
comparably good conditions. I write here of "keeping" cats 
and dogs rather than their "captivity", for, as Stephen 
Clark has pointed out to me, one can hardly call, say, a 
cat in a household with a cat-door "captive". I think cats 
probably the most independent of all domestic animals, and 
that indeed their relation with us is symbiotic. But what 
I am arguing against here is the validity of the 
assumption that keeping "wild animals" captive is 
particularly objectionable as distinct from animals in 
general.
It is true that zoo animals have not (or should not 
have) become genetically adapted to captivity as, in some
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degree, domest icated animals have. Bu.t a) as I have been 
showing, domesticated animals are much less changed than 
we might think (and certainly than, for example, Callicott 
appreciates (16)); b) this is something zoos must take 
, acount of — it is a challenge to them to provide suitable 
conditions given that their animals are not very different 
from their wild conspecifics.
And I would also say (in reply to my own question 
above about keepng slightly domesticated animals) that we 
should go by various criteria, as we will see in chapter
9. We should not beg the question by assuming that it is 
not possible to keep our relatively wild animals. We 
should regard it as an open question, and look at how we 
can decide whether they are well enough off, and what 
conditions they require; and then (if we are working in 
zoos) it is up to us to do our utmost to provide the right 
conditions and, should this be impracticable or 
impossible, to avoid (somehow) keeping the animals.
I appreciate that I may seem to be trying to have it 
both ways — to say that animals in zoos are not wild and 
therefore it is aceptable to keep them; and that they are 
wild, and that therefore it is very useful 
conservational ly, educationally, and so on, to keep them. 
But I think this is the situation, even if it is something 
of a tightrope to walk. There is no hard and fast line 
between wild and domesticated animals, and many examples 
of animals in a s e m i —domesticated state which show this, 
which are in some relationship with humans, such as feral
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pigeons, robins and many wild birds, storks in Holland 
(where captive bred birds have been successfully 
released), and so on.
I do not want to imply that wild animals do not also 
have distinctive qualities — most obviously, in many 
*  cases, an enormous alertness and readiness to flee 
quickly, which one only needs to try catching a house 
mouse as opposed to a pet one to appreciate. But I think 
my general point stands: that it is much too simple to 
dismiss the keeping of wild animals as something quite 
obviously objectionable in a way which is not applicable 
to domesticated animals (17).
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suggested to me that:
domestic - (1) likely to stick around human households:;
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He asks whether these factors do not make a distinctive 
moral difference, in that relatively wild animals do not 
like to stick around, do not form social bonds and do siiot
willingly depend on humans.
I would reply, concerning hamsters, that Bowman -or., 
cit., pp 26, 40-41) clearly regards laboratory raos as
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domesticated. He gives as the distinction "usually made 
between domestication and taming.. that the former 
includes control of the reproductive phase of the life 
cycle and selection of parents while taming does not" (op. 
cit., p 26).
My general point would be that "domestication" covers 
a range of cases. Hamsters do not form social bonds with 
humans to the extent that dogs do - neither are they 
social themselves, which dogs are. But the fact they can 
be~kept easily as pets, and especially that they readily 
breed in captivity, makes them "domesticated animals" 
certainly by contrast with European hamsters. (Russian 
hamsters, now available as pets, are social.) I have not 
been in this chapter concerned to defend the keeping of, 
e.g., hamsters against someone who regarded it as immoral, 
I have only been concerned to make the point that, if you 
regard keeping Golden hamsters as morally acceptable (as 
most people would) and also object to all keeping of 
relatively wild animals as immoral, you are making a far 
from clearly justifiable distinction between wiId and 
domesticated animals, in particular because Golden 
hamsters, when first discovered as wild animals, turned 
out to be virtually tame from the start - 
"pre-domesticated" one might almost say - and in this 
respect are probably not wholly unlike several of the 
animals often kept in zoos which also, even sometimes when 
born in the wild, can adjust very readily to captivity.
My examples of Dian Fossey1s work (see note 11 
above), and of John Aspinal11s contact with his gorillas, 
were precisely to try to illustrate how some kind of bond 
can be forged between a human and a totally or virtually 
totally wild animal. Again I would say that a great many 
wild or virtually wild animals do choose to stick around 
human habitations (garden birds, foxes, storks, baboons at 
Treetops, etc), and similarly that many would probably 
accept human support (as wild birds do, of course) if it 
were offered. This is not to say that it is necessarily 
desirable for it to be offered, or that there may not be 
strong reasons against attempts to forge close 
relationships with wild animals. If though one says that 
one can not do the latter because this process itself 
alters them from being wild animals, then this is close to 
playing with words. I would say that the three tendencies 
of domestic animals that Professor Clark notes above do in 
general mark distinctions between wild and domestic 
animals, but that such tendencies are far from marking 
absolute distinctions, that they can sometimes be shown by 
animals that are virtually wiId.
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Chapter 9 
CRITERIA FOR WELLBEING
INTRODUCTORY
I want In this chapter to examine various criteria by 
which the wellbeing of animals in zoos - and anywhere else 
too - may be judged. In the next chapter, I shall examine 
the keeping of various animals in zoos in the light of the 
criteria. All I am seeking to establish in this chapter 
is :
a) That animals in captivity may be well off; may 
even be better off in some individual cases than in the 
wild, though this is not very likely; and that it is 
reasonable for us to regard their degree of wellbeing as 
something to be established by the application of the 
various criteria, rather than by the assumption that they 
must be badly off just because of being in captivity.
b) That the criteria do present difficulties, which I 
hope to elucidate a little, but that used in conjunction 
they are likely to be a fairly reliable guide.
c) That natural behaviour has a strong claim to be 
the pre-eminent criterion, despite the difficulties of 
specifying exactly what we mean here by "natural".
The criteria are to help us:
i) in deciding what conditions we should provide;
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Ii) In judging how well off the animals are, and this 
itself covers two things:
1) how suitable the conditions are;
2) the degree of wellbeing of the animals themselves.
(You could, that is, have an animal in excellent
conditions, but where there was still something wrong with 
the animal, for "personal reasons" as it were: e.g. a 
health problem or other inadequacy of genetic origin, not 
traceable to the conditions. Or you might have, as with 
humans, an animal which did not fit into theoretically 
ideal conditions because of individual differences not 
amounting to ill health. Animals vary as much as humans as 
we have seen.)
iii) in deciding what kinds of animals we should or 
should not keep. This is perhaps the most important of the 
three decisions the criteria guide us in making.
The criteria considered will be:
1) Health;
2) Breeding;
3) Natural behaviour;
4) Abnormal behaviour;
5) Direct indications;
6) General or theoretical appraisal of wellbeing.
Of course the arrangement of these criteria is to some
extent arbitrary. They are fairly close in essence, I 
would say, to Dawkins' criteria for her somewhat different 
purpose in Animal Suffering (1) . The main difference is 
my determined stress on, if any of them is pre-eminent,
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natural behaviour, and I will discuss this further in due 
course.
9.1 HEALTH
Our zoo animals should receive proper veterinary 
attention: we owe responsibility to the animals we keep to 
look after them as best we can. Ill-health, injuries, etc 
are unpleasant for us, and we have no reason to suppose 
this is not so for animals also. This is a "plus" for 
animals in zoos.- a) they would get no veterinary care in 
the wild; b) animals do not always get it in, for example, 
farming establishments - e.g. the situation where an 
animal is soon going to die anyway so that there is no 
economic point in giving it veterinary help; or the 
situation of hens in intensive husbandry systems (2) . At 
least the animals in zoos are normally known as 
individuals in some degree, and are checked every day for 
signs of ill-health. If their physical health is good, 
this is a sign of conditions being at least fairly good.
It is an indication of general wellbeing, in some degree 
even of mental health; an indicator that an animal is not 
experiencing much ill effect from its captive situation.
Length of life is obviously relevant; occasional 
individuals no doubt will die early however good the 
conditions. But in general as the zoo situation is free 
from the dangers of wild life - predators, possibility of 
starvation, drought, etc — then animals ought to live out 
pretty well their potential life spans. I am not here
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thinking necessarily of the question of putting down an 
animal before the end of its natural life; there could be 
a case for this for the animal's own sake, and certainly 
there would be were it seriously ill. (I would say the 
same in principle for humans (3).) This is a matter of 
opinion to some extent (and in any case as far as zoos 
are concerned it is often going to be decided out of 
necessity on other grounds - see discussion in chapter 
13) . But if animals of a particular species have 
generally short lives in captivity, or certain kinds of 
captivity, then this is an indication that something is 
not right - so this would be an "indictment" under the 
health criterion.
We should not be too carried away by an 
"over-clinical" stress on hygiene, or freedom from 
parasites, etc. We have seen how some animals can be 
provided with hygienic conditions which are dull and 
sterile. It is bad if our keeping them in good health 
requires such a cost. To some extent these things go in 
fashions: there seems to have been a stress in the 1960's 
on the need for great hygiene and the danger of infection. 
This was one reason why chimpanzees tended to be kept only 
in pairs (4) . Today it is recognised, I think, that it is 
better to have chimpanzees in a group even at a higher 
risk of infection. Animals should not have to live 
"sterile" lives for the sake of their health (which would 
be to make their mental health "pay for" their physical 
health) . But we must be responsible - we must indeed
200
consider the animals' interests: hard standing may be very 
good for horses, because of hoof wear as well as helping 
to avoid parasite build-up . They should not be kept on 
grass just to please the public (5) . But presumably they 
ought to be on grass sometimes.
Mental health is likely to include the living of a 
satisfying life: this connects with the natural behaviour 
criterion. The veterinarian can also go by various 
indications: he can probably recognise a "happy" dog, a 
well adjusted dog, and other animals similarly. I think it 
is true that vets are much more concerned now with all 
aspects of animals' wellbeing, not just their physical 
health in a narrow sense.
We do not want an animal to be unduly stressed; this 
will of course affect it physically. But I say "unduly" 
because, as we saw in chapter 7 on Health, while serious 
stress is certainly detrimental, an occasional mild stress 
is quite good for health; also, the ability to show a mild 
stress reaction is itself part of health. I presume 
racehorses and some working dogs (such as police dogs) in 
the course of their lives will be mildly stressed, or even 
quite seriously stressed (for limited periods of time, one 
hopes) . This is hardly going to be, or hardly should be 
regarded as, injurious to their health. I do not know what 
exactly we can do for zoo animals in this regard, but we 
should give this matter our attention.
Stress of course can be measured physiologically, and 
physiological indications could well be regarded as
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another important criterion of wellbeing, as Dawkins gives 
them as a criterion of suffering (6) . I would, rather 
include them as a supplement to health, in regard to zoo 
animals, because zoos, I think properly, tend to avoid 
interference of a "laboratory" kind with their animals as 
much as possible, though anaesthetising, often by dart gun 
or blowpipe, by a veterinarian is sometimes necessary. But 
such physiological evidence as a rise in the heart beat, 
or a build-up of adrenalin, would be very useful and 
important. An example given by Duncan of heart monitoring 
of two different breeds of hen artificially stressed with 
an inflated balloon showed that one breed was more upset 
than one would have thought from behavioural indications 
alone (7) . Some individual humans can be much more upset 
than they show, at least to somebody who does not know 
them well. A means of monitoring a rise in the heart beat 
or blood pressure would obviously be a useful aid to the 
diagnosis of such conditions. Tame, harmless snakes are 
favourite animals for zoo educators to allow children or 
others to touch, and such experiences I think can be very 
valuable (for the humans concerned), without being 
detrimental to the snake. But one should not be doing it 
unless the snake too, as far as we can judge, is enjoying 
the experience, or at least is not seriously upset by it. 
There is evidence that snakes can be upset by a long 
period of handling, and this is very much to be guarded 
against.
Obviously much here could be discussed further,
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including how one defines health, but I have already 
considered the matter in some degree in 7.2. I do think 
that physical health as such is a good criterion of an 
animal's wellbeing, and I think this is unlikely to be 
controversial. It is one important indicator to be used in 
conjunction with the other indicators I look at below, 
with some of which, such as natural and abnormal 
behaviour, it indeed overlaps.
Of course to judge an animal's health accurately will 
require the fullest knowledge of that animal's biology, 
natural behaviour, natural way of life and environment, 
that we can manage. But this should be obvious from my 
previous discussion of health.
9.2 BREEDING
Breeding of animals in zoos is desirable because of the 
importance:
a) of zoos' being at least self-supporting;
b) of their being able to assist conservation.
There may be an excess in captivity, or in the wild, of a 
particular species so that we may not wish to breed from 
it; or we may not wish to breed from certain individuals 
because they "are poor specimens, or because they have 
already been bred from enough for the health of the 
captive gene-pool. But this is a recognition of the need 
in some cases to stop breeding. Naturally we ought to have 
reached the stage where we are able to breed a captive
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species if necessary.
9.2.1 But my present questions are: how far does the 
fact an animal breeds inform us, or our desire to 
encourage it to breed dictate to us, what the animal's 
conditions should be? And how far does an animal's 
breeding indicate that it is in a state of wellbeing?
Hediger speaks of breeding as, in his opinion, the "only 
one criterion for suitable biological conditions", even 
suggesting it is like "arithmetical proof to the 
mathematician" (8) . This is surely to weight breeding as a
criterion too highly, but it still is very important, for
the following reasons. (I shall then look at some problems 
with it.)
1. Breeding is an important, a central, part of natural 
behaviour, part of the "full life" of an animal (though 
not all animals would breed in the wild).
2. It can be very difficult to get "wild" animals to 
breed in captivity. Domestic animals presumably became 
domesticated partly because of their readiness to breed in 
captivity or close to man, but very few animals ever have 
been domesticated. With an animal that has not, by
selective breeding, been adapted to life in captivity (9)
one is most likely to achieve success (if it does not 
breed readily) by study of its breeding in the wild, and 
by varying the captive conditions as seems appropriate or 
promising. Thus one is here either providing conditions 
like the wild, or else an effective substitute for the
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wild.
3. Many animals can be easily put off - e.g. killing 
their young if disturbed or upset — so their successful 
breeding does seem an indication that at least the 
parents are relaxed (10) .
4. Successful breeding is some indication that the 
animals concerned are not deleteriously inbred.
9.2.2 I will now list and briefly consider some problems 
with breeding as a criterion:
1. Breeding as a criterion is hardly applicable to 
domestic animals, because: a) it is likely that an 
initial readiness to breed in close proximity to man was 
one condition leading to their domestication in the first 
place; and b) because they will have been selectively 
bred to breed well in captivity. I think of a newspaper 
article on the scandal of “puppy farms": bitches breed 
very readily even in bad conditions. Guinea-pigs, gerbiis 
and so on, even though only recently domesticated, and to 
a much lesser degree, still no doubt have become 
domesticated partly because they do breed so readily.
Again some domestic animals such as pigs and poultry not 
only survive but breed in what can only be called 
horrifying conditions (11). A sort of “forced breeding" 
can be practised with domesticated animals; its occurrence 
is the very opposite of any indication of their conditions 
being good. Now we could be selectively breeding (i.e. 
unwittingly) our relatively wild zoo animals for
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breeding in captivity (12) so perhaps this point about 
domesticated animals could apply in some cases to zoo 
animals.
2. Some animals breed in apparently bad conditions, e.g. 
lions in "rabbit hutches" (13). Hediger gives example of
lions and certain other mammals, such as an anteater, in
small "menagerie-type" cages, and also birds of prey in
cages they cannot fly in (14). Williams speaks of Rhesus
monkeys which breed readily at London zoo as being 
comparable in this to the Victorian working class in their 
ability to breed in slum-type conditions (15). I suppose 
with the lions they must at least be relaxed to be 
breeding, so their conditions must be good to that extent.
3. Breeding could actually be a response to bad 
conditions (as in some protozoans) . Presumably the 
proverbial high human birth rate in slums can be seen as a 
response to such conditions, or more directly to any 
combination of despair, boredom or ignorance. It does 
show that even slum conditions are not as bad as they 
might be; they are not "rock bottom". Given poor enough 
conditions, as for the poor in some parts of Europe in the 
seventeenth century, partly as a result of a deteriorating 
climate, human breeding falls off (16). We could be 
selectively breeding (unwittingly) for breeding in bad 
conditions: presumably the animals concerned would have to 
be good captive breeders to start with, as lions seem to 
be, and perhaps Rhesus monkeys (in view of Williams' 
comment above).
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However the situation with animals is more 
complicated still. It may be, for example, with caracals 
that they come into oestrus as a result of poor conditions 
suddenly followed by an improvement, as in the desert: 
i.e., a rather poor diet suddenly improved. Again the 
female may come into oestrus very quickly again if her 
young cubs are taken away, even while she is still 
lactating. Thus a high breeding rate would hardly in this 
instance demonstrate good conditions. With ring-tailed 
lemurs, on the other hand, there is evidence that an 
improved diet increases the chance of male young being 
born (males presumably being, as it were, a comparative 
luxury to dispense with in lean times). Similarly, with 
Grevy's zebras, it seems that the better the condition of 
the female, the more likely she is to have male young: a 
way in which the zebras respond to better or poorer 
conditions; a female has a much higher chance of mating 
and breeding than a male, so in poor conditions it is 
better just to have female young, which still stand a fair 
chance of breeding. Another domesticated animal example 
illustrates how a high rate of breeding does not 
necessarily indicate good, or at least natural, 
conditions: if sheep are left on a hillside, a ram will 
mate with only a few ewes; but brought down to an 
enclosure, he may mate with many more (17) .
4. Breeding in captivity could even (so it has been 
suggested) just be out of boredom. Certainly masturbation 
can be, and perhaps mating, but it seems unlikely that
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successful breeding I.e. the whole cycle of courtship, 
mating, birth, perhaps nest building, and rearing of young 
- could be, firstly because so many animals are highly 
"fussy" about the right conditions for successful 
breeding, and secondly because breeding, as a centrally 
important occurrence in animals' lives, and likely, for 
reasons of natural selection, to be highly satisfying, can 
hardly be seen itself as a response to boredom.
5. Breeding in captivity sometimes only occurs with 
"artificial" assistance from us. I think we can 
distinguish between artificial and "natural" breeding.
Only natural breeding will do as a criterion of good 
conditions, though artificial breeding may still be 
conservationally desirable.
6. A problem, but rather with the public function of a 
zoo rather than with the application of breeding as 
criterion, is that many animals breed much better away 
from the public. Obviously it is up to zoo personnel to 
ensure that breeding animals are not disturbed by the 
public, as they should try to prevent any animals being. 
Another problem is the preference of some animals for 
"non—natural" conditions for breeding over natural ones. 
But this I will look at in the next chapter.
7. One may get more breeding as a result of 
interference with the natural grouping. Capuchins are 
highly social, but if you keep them in pairs you may have 
those various pairs breeding successfully, while if you 
have them in a more natural large group you may find that
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only, say, a dominant pair breeds. Certainly it has been 
found with marmosets that, in the wild or in captivity, a 
single dominant female breeds, suppressing the ovarian 
cycles of her subordinates by her aggressive behaviour 
(18) . So here breeding by only one female in a group as 
opposed to breeding by more of them is a direct indication 
of natural social conditions and presumably good 
conditions, if we assume conditions are better the more 
they approach those natural to the species. We might 
perhaps feel this was an exceptional case where women's 
lib (though it would be "lib" from the influence of the 
dominant female) could well be extended to marmosets. At 
any rate, while breeding by the dominant female would here 
be a criterion of natural or good conditions, breeding by 
the other females would not be: it would indicate we were 
keeping them in unnatural groups, i.e. separate pairs. I 
understand it^could be similar with a very different 
species, alpacas: i.e., kept in a presumably natural herd, 
only one or two young a year will be produced; kept, less 
naturally, in pairs, the breeding would greatly increase. 
It may be that a similar situation would apply with 
porcupines.
The point, I think, shown by these examples is that 
degree of breeding by itself is not a reliable criterion 
of good conditions; it is breeding as it would occur in 
the wild. We may well object to an excess of captive 
breeding, as we would to the way in which some domestic 
animals are forced to breed, e.g. bitches on "puppy
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farms". This is not to say that it may not be acceptable, 
or even highly desirable, most obviously on conservation 
grounds, to increase what would be the natural rate of 
breeding. But such a policy should be applied with some 
caution, and its success should certainly not be claimed 
as a definitive demonstration of the suitability of the 
conditions.
But, despite this qualification and the other 
problems with breeding that I have mentioned, breeding 
remains as a major criterion of good conditions in 
captivity, to be used alongside the other criteria.
9.3 NATURAL BEHAVIOUR
9.3.1 NATURAL BEHAVIOUR AS A CRITERION
I see an animal's natural behaviour as a criterion of its 
wellbeing, and perhaps the pre-eminent one. This is not to 
say that the occurrence of any particular behaviour 
patterns proves the animal's wellbeing, still less that 
the absence of any particular behaviour proves it is 
suffering or deprived. Rather, the occurrence of a 
behaviour pattern is an indicator of wellbeing and could 
be, as it were, awarded an appropriate score. The 
non-occurrence of a behaviour pattern should probably 
score zero rather than a negative figure. How much natural 
behaviour is needed for a judgement that the captive 
conditions are fully satisfactory? In theory, the animal's 
full behavioural repertoire; in practise, the more the 
better. No captive conditions are going to be perfect;
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perhaps perfection is unattainable, being a theoretical 
state not even attained in the wild. Not all natural 
behaviour is necessarily desirable; whether a lack of 
opportunity to react as to a predator and to suffer the 
accompanying stress are drawbacks or advantages of 
captivity is debatable (19). But with the possible 
exception of this, all the animal's behavioural repertoire 
is highly desirable. One could usefully sum the marks 
awarded for different kinds or categories of behaviour 
(which I shall consider below). While a total score would 
be unattainable, a high mark could be looked for; a low 
score would be disturbing, certainly unless compensated 
for with very strong indications under other criteria of 
the animal's wellbeing.
There may be various reasons why particular behaviour 
is not shown, but one of them should not be that it is 
physically, or even psychologically, impossible for the 
animal to perform that behaviour in the conditions 
provided. Individual animals vary and are temperamental. 
Perhaps our "marking system" should give credit (say, one 
mark) for an animal's conditions allowing certain 
behaviour, and another mark for the animal's actually 
performing that behaviour. But of course the provision (of 
water, say, for swimming or branches for climbing) may be 
minimal, or good or excellent. So the marking system would 
require a good deal of detailed working out. But it would 
provide a useful aid to comparison between and assessment 
of different enclosures and captive arrangements.
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9.3.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF NATURAL BEHAVIOUR 
But why should display of its natural behaviour be a 
criterion of a captive animal's wellbeing or otherwise? 
(Natural behaviour is very desirable in a zoo because of 
the enormously increased interest thereby provided for 
human observers, but this is not the point here.)
There are I think several reasons, but the main one 
perhaps is that we are aware that humans have various 
natural needs and can hardly dispute that certain animals 
we know well have various natural needs also (20).
Solitary confinement is a severe penalty for a human 
because all humans, in varying degrees, need some contact 
with their fellows; though of course this is a less vital 
need than that for food. Some natural needs are to express 
certain behaviour - feeding and social contact, for 
example. Dogs obviously have certain needs in common with 
us, including some behavioural needs, such as, indeed, 
eating and social contact with conspecifics.
Even such basic needs could be challenged. The need 
for food could be met by some technical substitute for 
feeding. Intensive pig systems allow certain farrowing 
sows almost no opportunity for locomotion. However 
although behavioural scientists may seek experimental 
demonstration before granting the truth of even such 
basics, few would want to challenge the comment of Julian 
Huxley, "that it is the frustration of activities natural 
to the animal which may well be the worst form of cruelty" 
(21). Suppose someone challenges the need to feed, while
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of course granting the need for food: I.e. denies that. If 
the normal food obtaining method could be bypassed 
technologically (the animal fed intravenously, say) the 
lack of need or opportunity actually to ingest food in the 
normal way would be a deprivation. The process of feeding 
is normally pleasurable, to us, and presumably to (many) 
other animals, because, in both us and others, eating's 
being pleasurable serves the biological function of 
helping to ensure that eating occurs. But to eat, an 
animal has to find food, which in some cases involves 
searching for it, pursuing it and killing it. It seems 
inherently likely that such appetitive behaviour will also 
be pleasurable, or, if not itself pleasurable, will at 
least be directed by drives whose frustration will produce 
dissatisfaction, because it is easy to see how such 
devices for ensuring that food is sought for will have 
been selected (see 4.2 and 7.3). Similarly it is likely 
that the performance of other vital behaviour - social, 
reproductive and so on - selected for through mi lions of 
years will also be ensured by drives or pleasurable 
experiences.
To seek to judge an animal's wellbeing by its 
behaviour is a good approach for another reason. We can 
actually judge a fellow human's wellbeing more reliably by 
his behaviour than by what he tells us: he may lie or may 
deceive himself or may not wish to trouble us with an 
accurate account in what he tells us. But if we know his 
normal behaviour from the past, then we are likely to be
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able to judge his wellbeing with a fair degree of 
accuracy; we will have good indications perhaps that he is 
now going through a period of depression, or that he seems 
to be as happy as he ever was. We are comparing his 
behaviour now with formerly. His behaviour tells us what 
we are seeking to know. Now much as people vary, their 
behaviour will be as it were circumscribed by behaviour 
common to all or the great majority of humans, natural 
human behaviour, in other words, such as it might be 
studied by an ethologist (22). But much basic human 
behaviour is so familiar to us that we do not need an 
ethological study to identify it for us. Thus when we 
judge some person's wellbeing by his behaviour, our basic 
terms of reference are going to be our (obviously 
intimate) knowledge of natural human behaviour. Thus we 
might be concerned because our subject seemed to be 
departing from the natural norm - in locking himself away 
for long hours, for example, for no understandable reason, 
and ceasing to communicate even with close members of his 
family, though we have of course to keep due regard for 
the variations in behaviour among individuals. Now 
similarly we can judge the wellbeing of an individual 
animal that we know well - our dog, say - by comparing his 
present behaviour with his normal behaviour. But of course 
we would be greatly aided, even in the case of an animal 
we knew well, by knowledge of that species' natural 
behaviour, and this would apply still more, if anything, 
in the case of a relatively wild animal in a zoo (though I
214
have stressed what seem to me the striking closeness of 
behaviour in wild and domestic animals). We can hardly 
avoid, I think, taking that species' wild behaviour as a 
norm, even though we must be aware too of variation in 
individual members of that species and of the fact that 
life in the wild can involve suffering (see discussion of 
point 3) in 9.3.3 following).
9.3.3 A DEFENCE OF NATURAL BEHAVIOUR AS A CRITERION
Dawkins, in her assessment of how we can judge whether 
(mainly) domesticated or at least artificially selected 
animals are suffering or not, disagrees with the view of 
natural behaviour as a most important criterion. She gives 
three reasons for doubting the validity of the wild as a 
standard:
1) Wild and domesticated animals are very different, and 
even different breeds of the same species of domesticated 
animal differ greatly (23).
2) It cannot be assumed that captive animals suffer 
through not performing, or being unable to perform, 
particular natural behaviour (24).
3) Suffering occurs in the wild (25).
None of these seem to me substantial objections to 
natural behaviour as a criterion, though I agree that the 
third poses real problems. I will discuss them in turn.
1) This, even if the case, would not be applicable to 
judging the wellbeing of animals in zoos, most of which 
are relatively wild. But Dawkins gives no convincing
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evidence of large differences between wild and domestic 
animals, and some indications that there are not, e.g. an 
experiment in which Wood-Gush and Duncan released domestic 
hens on to a Scottish island, and lost all of them to mink 
very quickly, but then gave a second batch preliminary 
"commando-training" following which, apparently, the birds 
successfully selected "inaccessible and extremely well 
hidden nest sites" which they approached warily (26). 
Dawkins mentions Hughes' view that there seem to have been 
as many genetic changes in chickens in the last 100 years 
as in the preceding 4500 years, and that behavioural 
differences between "modern broiler strains and modern 
egg-laying strains are greater than those ... between a 
"primitive" breed such as brown leghorns and ancestral 
junglefowl" (27), She does not say what breed the birds 
receiving the commando training were, but they do not 
sound significantly different from ancestral jungle fowl 
if they could adjust so readily to dangerous wild living. 
Dawkins stresses that we need to find out whether there 
are genetic or environmental differences between wild and 
captive animals before using the wild as a standard for 
the welfare of captive animals, but the fact there are 
going to be inevitable differences seems far from a 
demonstration that the the differences are really 
significant, that they amount to fundamental differences 
in capacity for finding satisfaction, for instance.
2) To illustrate that captive animals are not necessarily 
suffering in not showing, or not having opportunity to
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show, natural behaviour, Dawkins gives only one example, 
that of their lack of opportunity to show the kind of 
behaviour by which they would respond to the presence of a
predator. But this is a) the one clear example of 
behaviour or experience which we would be inclined to feel
a captive animal was well off without; and b) Dawkins
herself gives some interesting evidence to suggest that 
even missing predators is not a clear advantage, because 
there is some evidence that animals will "seek out 
stimulation even when it puts them in danger": Kruuk's 
account of how, for example, some African mammmals will 
move so close to their predators they get killed by them, 
and Humphrey's example of monkeys choosing to see "horror 
films", i.e. voluntarily pressing a lever to see films or 
photographs which frighten them when seen the first time 
(28) .
3) Dawkins mentions first of all Lack's figures about 
robins and other song-birds, which I think may well 
indicate some degree of suffering as well as mere 
shortness of lives (see 7.1, p 152) though, as I said (p 
152), I think the situation is different with (for 
example) adult lions or chimpanzees (29). I have already 
mentioned another example Dawkins gives to illustrate 
suffering in the wild, that of animals eaten alive by 
hyaenas, but I think the comment of Kruuk that she quotes 
- "It is rare that the victim puts up any significant 
active defence" - does suggest the animal is likely to be 
in a stupor, like Livingstone’s dreamy state when caught
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by a lion, despite injuries he was aware of after his 
escape (30) (see 7.1, p 157). Still, I think the undoubted 
fact that a good deal of suffering does occur in wild 
living presents a real problem for the use of natural 
behaviour - which I regard first and foremost as behaviour 
such as would occur in the wild - as a criterion of 
wellbeing. After all, how can a suffering animal be, as it 
were, the standard for an animal in a state of wellbeing?
I suggest, as a solution, that our standard should be the 
successful wild conspecific. For not only does the wild 
present high risks for most individuals; it may be 
particularly stressful for the less successful animal of 
any species, the one lower down the peck order, and that 
is bullied by its conspecifics, or that does not succeed 
in staking out a territory, or in securing a mate (31) . It 
must of course succeed in finding food else it could not 
survive at all. We have to recognise that there are 
degrees of wellbeing in the wild, just as there are more 
and less optimal habitats. But the successful wild 
individual - the one who dominates, who wins a territory, 
who mates successfully, etc - seems to me the right 
standard. In as much as the captive animal shows similar 
behaviour to him, we have a strong indication of 
we 1lbeing.
Finally, Dawkins is concerned with how we tell 
whether an animal is suffering; I am concerned with a 
wider issue: how we tell whether it is positively well 
off, or in optimum conditions, not merely not suffering.
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Even In the narrower issue, I think the wild as a 
criterion is far from being invalidated by Dawkins' 
criticisms; in the wider issue, it is still more likely to 
be useful.
9.3.4 RELEVANT KINDS OF NATURAL BEHAVIOUR:
I mean roughly by the "natural behaviour" of a specified 
animal (A) behaviour such as we have observed, or have 
good reason to expect that we could observe, being carried 
out by conspecifics of A in their natural habitat in a 
state of non-interference by man. I am thinking mainly of 
groups of related actions (such as the various actions 
involved in building a nest) which groups of actions I 
refer to sometimes as behaviour patterns. There will be an 
enormous variety of separate actions and even of 
activities, but we can still pick out, I would think 
uncontroversially, certain main categories of behaviour 
which are likely to be distinctive of a particular 
species, and which will in some cases be in some degree 
innate in all or many members of that species:
1) Characteristic forms of locomotion: walking, running, 
leaping, climbing, brachiating, swimming, gliding, flying, 
etc, and also burrowing.
2) Feeding, and more than this, appetitive behaviour: the 
preliminaries of looking for food, and catching it in the 
case of a predator.
3) Mutual grooming, and self-grooming, and any other 
maintenance activities.
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4) Behaviour connected with the establishing of 
relationships with conspecifics (and in some cases 
possibly nonconspecifics), such as the establishing of 
territory and of dominance hierarchies or peck orders.
5) Breeding, i.e. courtship, nest-building, mating, 
young-re ar i n g .
6) Play behaviour.
These categories are only intended to be approximate, 
and are not necessarily exclusive. I will comment on two, 
locomotion and, very briefly, play.
The first, locomotion, is rather different from the 
others, in all of which it is likely to play a part. Few 
would dispute the importance of its being at least 
physically possible for a captive animal to engage in its 
characteristic forms of locomotion, but flying, and to a 
lesser extent swimming and burrowing, tends to be treated 
as an exception. The problem with flying I shall examine 
in the section on birds in the next chapter. With all of 
these ways of getting about there is clearly a great 
difference between minimal and adequate provision: should 
not animals have space to run as well as walk? To swim, if 
they do swim, more than a few feet? To perform more than a 
token climb? Most kinds of animal can use two or more 
means of locomotion. Are they all essential requirements? 
Clearly one should, at least in principle, err on the side 
of over-provision, of giving the animal the benefit of the 
doubt. On the other hand evidence that, in the wild, an
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animal never or hardly ever moved in a particular way, 
however much one might expect it to at a first glance, 
would make a difference. But to argue in such a way would 
be a very different matter from arguing that a pig or a 
fowl needed little opportunity to move around because its 
physical health was good. This is not a matter, one hopes, 
of any direct relevance to zoos, where the provisions for 
locomotion, even probably in the worst remaining 
menagerie-type cages, are better than that still regarded 
as acceptable in intensive husbandry systems. But animals 
are, in my opinion, much the same anywhere, and I think 
the same general principles for how they should be kept 
should apply to selectively bred as much as to relatively 
wild captive animals. I think that the natural behaviour 
criterion should be pre-eminent in that at least minimal 
requirements set by that criterion alone should not be 
able to be overruled by the application of any other 
criteria, including health. On the other hand it may well 
be that provisions which seem desirable on the natural 
behaviour criterion but which are well beyond the minimal 
requirements may be deemed inessential in the light of the 
application of other criteria.
Play is of particular interest because it does not 
need the necessities of living as a motivation. It is thus 
"tailor-made" for life in a zoo, and it would be both 
unsurprising1and undisturbing to find that any animal 
played more in zoos than in the wild
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9.3.5 ENCOURAGING NATURAL BEHAVIOUR
I have tried to show at some length why we should regard 
an animal's engaging in its natural behaviour as a strong 
indication of wellbeing, but what can we do to encourage 
an animal to do just this? Clearly, as I have just said, 
we must provide conditions which physically allow the 
locomotory behaviour typical of the animal. Sometimes we 
can keep certain kinds of animals in conditions which 
approximate very closely to their natural habitat. We may 
create or extend ponds or larger areas for wildfowl like 
the Emperor Frederick II or the Wildfowl Trust founded by 
Sir Peter Scott, or keep deer like the Pere David's at 
Woburn in a very large area with lakes and marshes (and 
where they live virtually naturally, facing, if not 
predators, certainly the elements with, for example, a 
high loss of any young born in particularly bad weather). 
Even exotic birds can sometimes be kept "free-flying", 
remaining presumably because of the availability of food 
(like conures and macaws at the Loroparque in Teneriffe), 
or they can indeed be attracted to an area, like wildfowl 
as above, or many other wild birds. There is, for example, 
a long-established colony of jackdaws at Glasgow Zoo, 
attracted by the availability of food and accommodation 
such as nestboxes. One can make a pond (such as one in a 
wildlife garden being constructed, again, at Glasgow) and 
in fact create what is to all intents and purposes a 
wholly natural habitat for aquatic insects like 
waterboatmen and pondskaters, and many of whose occupants
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(such as diving beetles) will just arrive of their own 
accord.
Most animals cannot be "kept" in such virtually wild 
conditions, and indeed the cases just mentioned vary 
greatly in their degree of wildness. The pond 
invertebrates feed themselves: they may prey upon others, 
or be preyed upon themselves, as wild animals. The parrots 
are provided with food, though they have great freedom to 
fly. But many animals such as various ungulates, and 
wallabies, may require little more than a field suitably 
enclosed. Rodents such as prairie-dogs or porcupines may 
need only an enclosure of reasonable size allowing 
burrowing: the animals will create for themselves what 
else they need, and will no doubt be normally fully 
occupied by excavations and their social relations. 
Surprisingly perhaps, as we have seen, lions may also be 
suitably catered for with little more than a suitably 
furnished large enclosure: though missing the chance to 
hunt, they seem easily able to adapt to what is in fact 
only a somewhat extended version of their long leisure 
periods even in the wild (and the males usually rely on 
the females to do the hunting in any case) . (I am taking 
it for granted that all these also have inside 
accommodation for night or retreat from the weather) . With 
this kind of relatively straightforward animal keeping, we 
are going to observe a good deal of natural behaviour, and 
probably enough to give us (along with the application of 
the other criteria) reasonable indication of the animals'
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we 1lbeing.
Even with animals quite easily catered for, there is 
always room for improvement in the light, especially, of 
knowledge of their wild behaviour. But such improvement, 
or "enrichment", becomes a much more urgent matter with 
the more "difficult" animals: the highly intelligent, 
exploratory, opportunist and sometimes also (to make it 
worse) physically powerful animals, such as bears, dogs, 
primates (especially the apes), and perhaps pigs. What is 
needed here is to exercise ingenuity in doing all possible 
to make their lives more interesting, in particular (I 
think) to do almost whatever can be done to elicit their 
natural behaviour. The most obvious deprivation of captive 
animals is the occupation of food seeking which, in many 
cases, would occupy them for long periods in the wild. So 
the remedy is to try hiding food, so that it has to be 
searched for, or even worked for in some way (and 
Markowitz has evidence of how many primates, 
for example, will, by choice, work for their food rather 
than merely receive it (32)). With these animals, it is 
not necessarily a matter of providing a more or less 
natural, or natural looking, area. For while little more 
may be needed for wallabies than a grassy enclosure, which 
will be near enough to their natural habitat, this may be 
far from enough, even with a tree or two or (more likely) 
a climbing frame or two, for chimpanzees. A wooded 
enclosure the size of the chimpanzee island at Arnhem (see 
chapter 14) will be a different matter. Where an area like
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this is not available, it is still of course desirable for 
the enclosure to be as natural as possible or at least 
have natural elements such as a grassy area and plants 
(see 9.6.8 below), but it is still more important to 
provide what is going to stimulate the animals, which may 
be, for example, an artificial termite mound into which 
they can stick straws to extract not termites but honey. 
The significant thing about this example is that it is 
provided in the light of knowledge of what chimpanzees do 
in the wild.
Knowledge of the animal's wild behaviour is likely to 
be the best source of ideas for what can usefully be 
provided to enrich its captive environment. What seems to 
me a paradigm example of how successful this approach can 
be concerns domestic pigs. In this case pigs were studied 
in semi-wild conditions for many months and (very 
significantly, I think) much natural behaviour was 
observed, almost exactly typical of that of wild boar: 
even to the very details of what sort of place the animals 
chose to nest in, the sort of spot they would defaecate 
in, the way a sow behaved when she farrowed. A pen, 
obviously covering a tiny area by comparison with the 
hillside, was then designed so as to include the right 
features to elicit most of the behaviour which had been 
observed in the larger area - nestmaking, rooting, 
defaecating (in an imitation of a path between bushes, 
rather than a cul de sac), and so on. And this approach 
worked: most of the pigs' wild behavour still occurred in
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the "enriched pig pen" (33) . This seems to me at least in 
one very important respect exactly the right approach to 
adopt in a zoo with any "difficult" animals - i.e. those 
where it is very clear that merely putting them in a 
fairly natural-type area is insufficient for their 
wellbeing. Zoos will normally have much more space 
available than, for commercial reasons, would have been 
appropriate for the "pig pen": indeed ideally a zoo would 
provide an enclosure more like the semi-natural hillside 
where the first part of the pig study leading to the
design of the pen occurred. But it is the wild study
leading to the identification of the essential stimuli for 
eliciting different parts of the animals' behavoural 
repertoire, and then the careful providing either of those 
stimuli or of substitutes for them, that is the essential 
lesson zoos can learn from this example. Not, I hasten to 
add, that the lesson will be entirely new to them. This is
the procedure they already very often adopt with regard to
breeding. To achieve breeding for the first time is often 
a matter of altering the captive environment - perhaps 
keeping male and female normally apart (as in cheetahs), 
or adjusting the photoperiod, or providing certain nest 
materials — to make it accord more closely in some 
significant respect with the wild. What I suggest we can 
learn from examples of applied ethology like the design of 
the pig pen is how to extend the approach whose importance 
we already appreciate in regard to breeding - to extend 
it, indeed, still further with the vital matter of
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breeding — but to extend it also into a general endeavour
to provide the right key stimuli to elicit, especially,
appetitive or seeking behaviour, and perhaps, in some 
cases, simply a wider range of locomotion. The stimuli may 
be identical to, or else suitable substitutes for, 
particular features of the wild.
The only misgiving I have with this approach is the 
question whether one might in some cases be eliciting the 
natural behaviour one wanted by a kind of super-normal 
stimulus (34) . Obviously what one wants is to produce
natural behaviour by (as near as we can get to them)
natural methods - i.e. the provision of natural stimuli. I 
feel sure, however, that such searching for and providing 
of the right stimuli is the right approach. Application of 
the other criteria would serve as a safeguard against the 
possibility of what would seem the "cheating " approach of 
using a super-normal stimulus, just as it will similarly 
function as a check on the acceptability of different 
behavioural engineering techniques (see below) and 
training methods.
Sometimes a great improvement to animals' wellbeing 
can be provided as a result of a study of the animals' 
behaviour in their zoo enclosure, as in a study of the 
"daily lives" of a group of mandrills at San Diego which 
resulted in the provision of high shelves which the 
animals forthwith slept on at night, presumably because in 
the wild they would have slept high in trees in their West 
African forest, and had been trying to do something
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similar unsuccesfully before the provision of the shelves 
(35). Markowitz has pioneered several more elaborate 
devices to elicit their natural behaviour from animals, 
such as flying meatballs for servals to leap to grab, or 
self-operated shower-baths for elephants, and 
trunk-operated switch boards giving a reward for the right 
combination, and arrangements by which polar bears or 
primates can perform some task and thus produce food (36) . 
As mentioned above, he has found that many animals will 
voluntarily work for their food in preference to merely 
being given it, which seems eloquent evidence of the need 
of some animals for occupation and even creative activity. 
Markowitz himself is no doubt well aware of the criticisms 
some of his work has received, criticisms such as that it 
conditions animals to respond (perhaps in artificial ways) 
to artificial stimuli, and thus may be rendering animals 
ill-equipped for reintroduction to the wild, but he 
advises those who may find some of his suggestions 
distasteful (or simply impractical) because of their 
mechanical or unnatural nature to work to the same end in 
whatever ways they feel are more appropriate, the end 
being the provision of a rich, stimulating captive 
environment, and this surely is the important point (37). 
There is clearly great room for, on the one hand, learning 
from study of the animals' wild behaviour, and, on the 
other, exercising ingenuity in how to simulate, or, more 
usually, substitute for features of their wild environment 
in the captive one. So there may well be ways by such
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methods of "behavioural engineering" of supplementing the 
more seemingly natural ways of enriching the captive 
environment of (especially) opportunists. The criterion of 
natural behaviour will still be important here in helping 
us to evaluate the desirability of any such devices, 
whether elaborate or very simple. That is, it will be in 
such methods' favour where it is clearly natural behaviour 
which is being elicited; we may still be uneasy if the 
device seems itself distinctly unnatural. Ideally we want 
natural behaviour elicited by natural stimuli, or 
something very closely related to natural stimuli. On the 
other hand, some behaviour not obviously natural at all 
may, when we judge by the other criteria (like health and 
direct indications), seem perfectly acceptable and 
desirable. An extreme example would be the driving of cars 
and the like which Hediger describes and admits to being 
himself far from enthusiastic about, but at the same time 
unable to deny the apparent great enthusiasm of the 
chimpanzees themselves for such occupations (38).
This last is an example (though a far from typical 
one) of a third, again very different, approach to keeping 
animals. So far I have mentioned two main ways (plus the 
almost entirely natural way, where possible, which I 
referred to first). This third is training animals to 
perform various tasks and generally treating them as 
domesticated animals, which certain typical zoo animals, 
as I noted in chapter 2, are — camels and llamas, and 
perhaps elephants, though the latter at the most only
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partially. To have llamas pulling carts, and camels giving 
rides, and so on, where this is possible, seems, in view 
of their being domesticated animals, unobjectionable and 
likely to be therapeutic. It seems less appropriate with 
obviously wild animals such as the carnivores, though of 
course training here is often perfectly possible, not 
least with bears, though this is not an option normally 
considered in zoos, at least in Britain. But it hardly 
seems objectionable with falconry, no doubt because the 
behaviour of the falcon remains very obviously, to a great 
extent, natural to it. The case of dolphins is perhaps 
more difficult, but I think the fact they respond so 
readily to training, and thus obviously develop a close 
relationship with their trainer, makes it difficult to 
condemn out of hand; after all, had they happened to have 
been domesticated long ago, which biologically speaking 
would probably be perfectly possible, we might have taken 
their being trained for granted. At any rate, I just want 
to emphasise how the criterion of natural behaviour 
remains one way of judging a trained animal's wellbeing: 
we can judge the training itself partly by the extent to 
which the actions the animal is trained to perform seem 
related to its wild behaviour. What complicates it is that 
with a highly creative animal like a dolphin, however 
unnatural in a sense what it may do, with a ball, say, in 
another way it is natural because it is part of its nature 
to be exploratory, to amuse itself in new ways, just as, 
of course, humans do. The training situation is also
230
natural in another sense, in that it clearly could not 
exist were the dolphin's nature not such as to allow the 
animal to enter readily into a kind of communication, and 
certainly a relationship, with a human. This is of course 
a point I have already made with regard to dogs and 
elephants (see chapter 6).
9.4 ABNORMAL BEHAVIOUR
The occurrence in captive animals of abnormal behaviour, 
ranging from sterotyped pacing and weaving to 
self-mutilation, ingestion of vomit or faeces, 
manipulation of faeces, etc may well seem the clearest 
possible indication of the unsatisfactoriness of their 
captive conditions (39) . There may seem nothing more to be 
said other than that, where such abnormal behaviour 
occurs, the conditions must be improved to at least a 
stage at which the objectionable behaviour ceases, and, if 
this is impossible or impractical, the animals concerned 
should simply not be kept, either at whatever zoo is under
consideration, or possibly not at all by any zoo. It may
seem obvious that abnormal behaviour is precisely what one
expects of a human kept in poor prison conditions (a
long-term prisoner in the Bastille, say), and thus of 
other animals kept in similarly dull, confined conditions, 
and thus again that the occurrence of such behaviour must 
constitute an absolute indictment of the captive 
conditions in which it occurs, an indictment from which
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there Is no appeal to, for example, the other criteria by 
which also we can assess an animal's wellbeing (40).
There is, indeed, no dispute both that abnormal 
behaviour such as is documented by Meyer-Holzapfe 1, Morris 
and others is regrettable, to say the least, and that it 
has been widespread in captive animals in the past, and is 
by no means unknown even in some good zoos today. It is 
likely to be uncommon today in zoos with large enclosures 
like Whipsnade and Marwell, and wel 1-furnished enclosures 
like those of Jersey and Howletts, but it is well-known 
how prevalent pacing and weaving is among, for example, 
captive polar bears and sometimes elephants (41) .
However there are several reasons why abnormal 
behaviour is not always an easy criterion to apply, why it 
is appropriate for a judgement on the grounds of an 
animal's abnormal behaviour to be qualified by the 
application of other criteria, and thus why an animal's 
showing abnormal behaviour should not be regarded as an 
absolute and final indictment of the unsatisfactoriness 
and indeed indefensibility of its captive conditions. The 
fact the criterion is not as straightforward as so often 
assumed does not make it less useful or important as a 
warning sign, even as a potential reason for condemning 
some particular captive conditions strongly, and certainly 
as an indicator of something wrong that needs to be 
remedied.
Once we attempt to define what we mean by abnormal 
behaviour, we should see why we cannot identify any
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particular behaviour as abnormal by some infallible, 
mechanical process - our judgement must enter in, and may 
clearly be fallible. It may seem adequate to define 
abnormal behaviour as, say: "Behaviour such as 
conspecifics of the animal concerned would not perform in 
the wild state". But as we have for very few species 
anything approaching a complete account of their 
behavioural repertoire, we need to reword our definition 
as: "Behaviour which we have good reason to believe 
conspecifics of the animal concerned would not display in 
the wild state" (42) . But animals in almost any captive 
conditions are going to show some behaviour which could 
hardly occur in the wild but which we are likely to regard 
as innocuous (e.g. drinking water from a bowl - or from a 
tap, as in the case of one of Gavin Maxwell's otters) and 
perhaps beneficial and desirable (e.g. reacting in an 
unconcerned, perhaps friendly, way to keepers or the 
public) . So our definition now should be: "Behaviour which 
we have good reason to suppose does not occur in the wi Id 
and which we believe to reveal a disturbed state in the 
animal displaying it".
It is, as I say, going to be a matter of far from 
infallible judgement identifying any particular behaviour 
cis (in our defined sense) abnormal. Take, for example, 
sterotyped behaviour. How do we decide that this indicates 
ci disturbed state? Not simply because it is stereotyped. 
Stereotyped or ritualised behaviour plays a large part in 
many animals' courtship, for example, indeed in their
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communication; in any case we are hardly going to regard a 
domestic dog as behaving abnormally because it ritually 
"buries" its food on the linoleum or ritually attempts (as 
it appears at first glance, and appeared to Descartes) to 
cover its droppings. We can agree that stereotypies we 
would expect to see under wild conditions are not 
abnormal. But neither are other stereotypies, necessarily, 
such as that of a polar bear that swims in a precisely 
regular way (in a particular part of her pool, one way on 
her front, then back on her back - I refer to a particular 
bear's habit at Glasgow). She does not seem thereby 
deranged, any more than this piece of behaviour seems 
disturbing. Humans, like other animals, can get into the 
habit of performing series of actions not only regularly 
but identically every time. Somebody swimming in his 
private swimming pool each day might do this (like the 
bear) . Kant's neighbours are reputed to have set their 
watches by his afternoon walks with their clockwork 
regularity. On the other hand a polar bear's weaving is 
similar both to the behaviour of deprived children in 
institutions, and to that of young rhesus monkeys 
experimentally deprived of their mothers' support, and 
therefore reasonably regarded as a sign of a deprived 
situation (43) . Take, as another example, the 
manipulation of faeces by great apes, even the throwing of 
them at visitors. The latter is presumably pleasurable 
(for the ape concerned), and its use hardly an indication 
of abnormality, if there is nothing else available; in any
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case faeces could be the best material for getting a 
response from humans (cf 4.4, pp 88-89 above). Humans 
would use it for the same reason (44) .
It may be difficult to identify a likely piece of 
behaviour as abnormal, or to assess how serious its 
abnormality is, because of the fact that it is not often 
easy to know the precise cause (which may involve several 
factors) of such behaviour. Sometimes the cause of, for 
example, a stereotypy is the conditions in which an animal 
was kept, or the way in which it was treated, in the past. 
Handrearing may be a cause, or the fact that an animal 
was, perhaps for a brief period after capture, kept in a 
confined area, or kept in more confined conditions in a 
circus. Habits earlier formed may prove ineradicable 
later, however great the improvement in conditions (45).
In cases like this it is clearly as unjust as it is 
inaccurate to blame those now responsible for keeping the 
animal, or the conditions they provide, for the animal’s 
abnormal behaviour. Sometimes there seems to be a 
hereditary factor; e.g. only one of the Glasgow polar 
bears shows substantial sterotypic behaviour. Another 
example is that of a stereotypy occurring in some black 
leopards and known as "stargazing". The tendency to engage 
in this appears to be inherited. In both these cases it 
seems therefore that the stereotyped behaviour is only 
partially caused by the captive conditions to which it is 
a response.
Abnormal behaviour such as sterotypies does not
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itself indicate physical or even serious or continual 
mental suffering, or at least not necessarily. The 
behaviour may give satisfaction or comfort through the 
release of endorphins. While it is true that the 
environment ought to be so stimulating that the animal 
does not need to find satisfaction in this way, this is 
something (it seems) that a human could do. For example, 
endorphins are possibly released in long distance running. 
This does not mean that a long distance runner's 
environment is necessarily hopelessly impoverished, though 
certainly the cases are not exactly comparable in as much 
as the runner would be unlikely to be in captivity of any 
kind. But then, suppose he was - in prison, or in what 
some might find comparable, some schools or the army. To 
go in for running, and actually partly (let us suppose) 
because of the effect of the endorphins, could still be 
an acceptable way of gaining satisfaction. Again, it could 
be, with a stereotyped animal, that, when it was kept at 
an earlier time in poorer conditions, it acquired the 
habit of gaining satisfaction this way; now it can not be 
cured of the habit, even though conditions are improved.
As well as distinguishing between different kinds of 
what we would count as abnormal behaviour, and noting that 
all are not equally bad — obviously self-mutilation is 
worse than at least mild stereotyping — it is only fair to 
recognise that the degree of abnormality makes a 
difference. An animal may show a little or a great deal of 
pacing or weaving. Any is no doubt a warning sign, but
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that is not to say that a little pacing occurring only 
occasionally (and this is something on the identification 
of which as abnormal, opinions in any case may well 
differ) is a reason for condemning wholly the conditions 
in which the animal concerned is kept (46) .
It is not necessarily correct or justified to call 
an animal which shows stereotypic behaviour "psychotic" or 
"mad" (47) . I imagine that schizophrenia is a common kind 
of psychotic condition in humans and can be so serious as 
to amount to insanity. What is most characteristic of such 
a psychotic condition would be the individual's failure to 
relate normally to other humans, and to take interest in 
other aspects of his environment, i.e. his retiring into 
himself. Neither of these would be true of a substantially 
stereotyped polar bear called Winston at Glasgow Zoo. He 
continues to relate normally to his two companion bears. 
Indeed quite a small change in his regime, like being 
given a large meal early in the day instead of later, can 
sometimes result in his not pacing or weaving at all 
during the day. I realise that schizophrenia is only one 
form of human psychosis or madness, and may not be 
typical, or comparable with nonhuman psychosis (if such a 
state has been veterinarily identified). But I still 
suggest that a fact David Jones comments on, from his 
twenty years experience as a veterinarian, that a 
stereotyped animal can still engage in normal social 
behaviour (i.e. have normal relations with his 
conspecifics) , does seem a clear indication of such an
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animal's not being psychotic (48). Even a self-plucking 
parrot can go on doing this in the company of other 
parrots (the original cause having probably been being in 
a small cage) and can be apparently all right otherwise. 
The feather plucking is obviously regrettable, distressing 
(at least to us) , and a sign of something wrong, but it 
may be apparently impossible to cure and it would hardly 
be wrong to go on keeping the parrot despite its condition 
if this seemed the kindest thing to do and the parrot gave 
signs of being (otherwise) in a state of wellbeing (49).
It would not seem necessarily accurate to call it 
psychotic.
In general, apart (perhaps) from when actually 
physically harmful, like self-mutilation, even abnormal 
stereotypies are probably adaptive, in that they help the 
animal to survive, to cope with its situation (perhaps 
through releasing endorphins, as above). The animal, of 
course, should not be put in a situation where it needs to 
behave abnormally in order to survive, to keep, perhaps we 
might say, its sanity. But at least that its abnormal 
behaviour may serve that very function seems a rather good 
reason for not calling the animal itself psychotic or mad. 
That the conditions, whether past or present, which caused 
the condition stand condemned (if we can only pinpoint 
them) is obvious enough.
I would add two reasons why I think it important to 
show, as I hope I have, that the occurrence of abnormal 
behaviour does not constitute an unanswerable indictment
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of any particular captive conditions. One is that abnormal 
behaviour may be shown in what seem to be and may indeed 
be very good conditions, such as those of the polar bear 
enclosure at Tacoma Zoo praised by Cherfas but found 
fallible by Ormrod, in that he, to his own surprise and 
disappointment, observed stereotyped behaviour by one or 
more of the bears (on which point he is not specific)
(50) . It may be that one of the bears had acquired a 
stereotypy long before being in that enclosure, but in any 
case Ormrod1s observations, though they do indeed cast a 
serious doubt over whether the enclosure is good enough - 
perhaps, as he feels himself, over whether polar bears 
should be kept by any zoo - do not constitute final proof 
of the correctness of that supposition. The other reason 
is that a zoo may find itself in a position where it 
accepts that its polar bear facilities are not good enough 
and therefore decides not to replace its present bears 
after their deaths. It still has the problem of what to do 
about the bears it has, and may well feel that the best 
thing to do is to continue keeping them as well as is 
possible, perhaps with certain improvements that can be 
made. Others may feel that, in such a situation, it would 
be better for the bears to be humanely killed (if, of 
course, they can not be sent to better accommodation 
elsewhere) . Some of the considerations above should help 
to decide the best course in such a situation, and make it 
likely, I think, that a decision to keep the bears already 
there for their natural lives is the best course.
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A point often made is that the exhibition of 
abnormally behaving animals is educationally undesirable, 
and even educationally useless or counter-productive. I 
should agree, at least with the weaker comment, but that 
is not my concern in this chapter, which is to examine how 
we may attempt to assess captive animals' wellbeing or 
otherwise (51).
9.5 DIRECT INDICATIONS
9.5.1 ANTHROPOMORPHISM
Barnett remarks that, while "the sight of a large mammal 
or bird behind bars is distressing", this feeling tells us 
"nothing of the needs or feelings of the animals 
themselves". He is right that we can be misled by 
attributing human feelings and wishes to other animals, 
and that "we must take account of other species as they 
actually are, not as we thoughtlessly suppose them to be", 
that we must, in other words, be careful to avoid 
anthropomorphism (52).
But anthropomorphism is a term easily misused, as 
Mary Midgley shows in the course of an excellent 
discussion of the subject. She reminds us how 
anthropomorphism is a concept that originally referred to 
the application of human attributes to God, and was by no 
means without problems even in that usage. Transplanted by 
1858 to use in accounts of animals, it was being applied 
to such mild assumptions as that they could possess vision
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or be alarmed (53) . Of course we can make false 
assumptions about the mental abilities of other animals, 
though, as Barnett notes as well as Midgley, we can make 
similar mistakes about other humans also (54). But it 
seems to me that the exaggerated use of the term 
anthropomorphism is as unscientific as it is to be unaware 
of the need for caution in attributing feelings and 
intentions to other species. It may appear very scientific 
to be careful not to assume animals to be unduly like man, 
but it is easy to go to the other extreme and, in effect, 
set man on an airy pedestal as if he had no animal 
connections. Is Hediger right, for example, to assume 
that, when an eagle flies up into the heavens, it is only 
concerned with finding food below, and that only man can 
enjoy soaring for its own sake (55)? Perhaps enjoyment of 
such a thing requires man's undoubtedly greater 
imagination and capacity for abstract thought. But it 
seems to me more scientific to keep an open mind on such a 
matter rather than assume that man, in this as in so much 
else that we have evidence about, stands on a pedestal.
One reason for my challenging at this point the too 
ready use of the concept of anthropomorphism is to remove 
what may seem an obvious objection to my thesis in this 
section: simply that there are various direct indications 
that animals give in their actions and in their display of 
feelings - i.e. actions communicating their feelings 
directly to us — about their satisfaction or otherwise 
with their captive conditions.
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9.5.2 ESCAPING
Barnett remarks that to us "a cage Is a prison - 
something from which to escape" (56) , but it is surely 
possible that it could be this for an animal too. An 
animal's apparently trying to escape - a leopard tearing 
at the bars or perhaps a lizard scrabbling at the glass - 
at least may be just what it seems. We may not always be 
justified in reading the intention of escaping into such 
actions, but I do think that an animal can have such an 
intention, as shown by the extreme case of a very small or 
otherwise very unsuitable cage: a large box, for instance. 
If we put a dog into this, he would scrabble around, 
frantically trying to get out. Would we really be any less 
justified then in describing his reactions in such a way 
than we would in describing similarly how a human would be 
likely to react to the same situation? Would it really be 
anthropomorphic, would it not indeed just be obvious, that 
the dog as much as the human was "trying to escape"? In 
other words, I think at least a very small cage would be a 
prison to an animal, just as to a human.
It is striking how readily we use the term "escape" 
of an animal, as readily as of a human. I think we are 
recognising how similar their situations are, and are 
indeed recognising that the situations are similar because 
humans and animals are similar: not only (as I mentioned 
in 9.3) do I think it is our own animal nature, our 
primate nature in particular, that is likely to make us
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unhappy with being put in a restricted area without 
company, much freedom of movement, and so on,- is it not 
perhaps our more specifically human nature - our ability 
to introspect, to think abstractly, etc - which can enable 
some humans to cope with this situation? As animals, we 
just want to get out, like any other primate, and like 
many other mammals (and birds) . Thus I think that any 
animal's escape is a "criticism" of the captive 
conditions; it speaks for itself, at least to the extent 
of suggesting that the "escaper" is dissatisfied with 
conditions, or perhaps is aware of being confined. (I 
think the words of Brambell that I have quoted, p 62, would 
support this.)
Conversely, an animal who makes no effort to escape 
from a cage or enclosure is giving some indication of 
satisfaction with it. Of course, he might have given up in
despair trying to get out; he might just be tired; he
might be just getting used to it. But unless we have some 
indications of such being the case, the fact of clearly 
not trying to escape is worth something as an implication 
of wellbeing. I think it is true of certain animal
enclosures at Glasgow (those for Axis deer and for camels,
for instance) that the occupants probably could get out if 
they tried; we assume this will not occur unless they are 
badly stressed, which we do our best to avoid. There are 
examples of situations where animals are actually allowed 
out from any enclosure, so that they could at least 
Physically escape if they wished. I say "physical because
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there may be mental or behavioural or other restrictions 
on their doing so. Monkeys at the Woolly Monkey Sanctuary 
are let out occasionally (except for mature males) into 
trees outside their enclosures but do not make a run for 
it; presumably this is some demonstration of satisfaction 
with life in the Sanctuary, though, having little or no 
experience of fending for themselves as under wild 
conditions, they could be afraid to venture into unknown 
territory. Just as likely, they simply have no need to go, 
having a known food source, good social relations in the 
Sanctuary, and no pressure from, say, a too concentrated 
population. This is clearly extremely different from the 
kind of menagerie set-up where the animals would, quite 
obviously, get away from their confined conditions (like 
humans in gaol) if they could. Peacocks (such as ours at 
Glasgow) are often kept unconfined; of course their 
behaviour as pheasant-type birds which mostly stay close 
to the ground and scratch a living from the soil makes 
them unlikely to go, as does their being territorial; if 
we did not know they were unlikely to depart, we could not 
keep them like this. Still, the fact remains they are 
staying through choice. And, as I said above, I think this 
would apply to some of the other animals also, even though 
they are kept in enclosures.
Many animals that do escape come back, as in certain 
examples that Barnett discusses. Where an escaped bear, 
say, returns he may be doing it because of fear at the 
unknown environment outside, like one bear alarmed by the
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noise of the planks a workman he met dropped in fright 
before running for help (57); he might, that is, be 
choosing the lesser of two evils. Still, at least his 
enclosure is a place of retreat for him, a place of 
security in the face of the unknown, so such an occurrence 
too is worth something as evidence for his wellbeing 
there.
9.5.3 CHOICE TESTS
If we could arrange specific choice tests for animals, 
such as those arranged by Dawkins to test whether hens 
prefer batteries or not, we could get some specific 
information on animals' preferences in regard to 
enclosures and their furniture. It has been found, for 
example, that pigs prefer moderate lighting, neither very 
bright nor darkness (58) . On the other hand, such a test 
might only be telling us which was the lesser of two 
evils. In some cases natural "choice tests" occur: certain 
animals arrive and lodge themselves with us by free 
choice. Zoos offer good food sources for many wild birds. 
Waterfowl can be attracted by the creation of suitable 
ponds (see 9.3.5).
9.5.4 DIRECT COMMUNICATION
Animals can give us other indications of how they feel 
about their relations with us. They can communicate their 
feelings directly to us, as when a cat purrs, lets itself 
be scratched or stroked by a human, or instead snarls; as
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when a primate 1 ip—smacks at us, even lets itself be 
groomed by us or grooms us in return (59) . These are 
direct signs of happines, or at least pleasure, or of the 
opposite. I accept that these could signal short-term 
moods hardly reflecting the animal's long term welIbeing 
or otherwise. I still think they are worth something. If 
we had good reason to think the lions at London were 
really, as supposed by Young, roaring because they felt 
wrongfully imprisoned, this would be a direct indication 
too; but I do not think we have such reason (see p 22 
above, note 2) . I think even a bear begging, or otherwise 
communicating with a human, and an elephant having a joke 
(see 4.4 above, p 89) are indications in some degree of 
wellbeing: they would not occur if the animals did not in 
some degree accept their relationship with man. (It could 
be said they were accepting it because there was no 
alternative; but there would be one: they could remain 
untame, unrelaxed (60).)
We do not always understand what animals are 
communicating. A good example is the chimpanzee "grin", 
which in fact is a sign of unease rather than pleasure. We 
must be ready to be corrected by ethological study. But 
the fact remains that with species, like dogs and cats, 
with which we are familiar, we can interpret signs of 
pleasure, distrust and so on, very easily, as is a fact of 
everyday experience. And, as the attempt recorded by Hebb 
to ban the use of words describing animals' tendencies and 
feelings from laboratory use shows, we can and actually
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need to interpret the signs that other primates make also 
(61) .
9.5.5 INDIRECT COMMUNICATION
There are various actions animals perform, where they are 
not actually communicating or seeking to do so with us, 
which also reveal a good deal of their state of 
relaxation, or the opposite. Examples are a cat's washing 
itself, a dog's grooming itself (and a great many animals 
groom), and animals playing. This could be either play 
with us, or play which we observe. One example of play 
with humans would be that of Aspinall and some of his 
keepers with gorillas and with tigers (62). I have already 
mentioned play with elephants. It is I think of great 
interest both that play itself is an interspecific 
activity - something that certain other mammals, anyway, 
understand, as we do - and that play can involve the use 
of such interspecific signals as the primate play-face 
(see 4.4. above, p p  88-89) . Animals' engaging in play 
among themselves - of course, a much more normal 
occurrence in zoos - is quite a strong indication, I 
think, of their wellbeing. Stevenson remarks that there is 
evidence of more time being spent on play in the wild in 
optimal than in suboptimal conditions, and that the 
occurrence of play in a zoo to a greater extent than in 
the wild, where this is the case, is an indication of good 
conditions (63) . This puts play into a special category, 
for, judging its occurrence by the natural behaviour
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criterion, we would regard it as a favourable indication 
that play should occur in captivity but hardly that it 
should occur to a greater extent than in the wild.
9.5.6 TAMING
All the favourable indications mentioned above in 9.5.4 
and 9.5.5 occur only, I think, following an animal's 
becoming in some degree tame; their occurrence may be just 
what we mean by an animal's becoming tame. Tameness itself 
is an importance indication of an animal's wellbeing. 
Indeed, I think it unlikely that any vertebrate, at least, 
is going to be in a state of wellbeing in captivity until 
it has become in some degree tame. This is a matter 
emphasised by Hediger (64); obviously it is something 
distinct from natural behaviour, by which we mean 
precisely what an animal would do in the wild state, 
although at the same time I think it of importance that 
wild animals can sometimes become tame extremely quickly, 
or in some cases be tame already (see chapter 8) . Becoming 
tame includes not fleeing from humans, becoming relaxed in 
their presence, probably becoming aware of friendly 
signals from humans, and also the giving of friendly 
signals to them. Of course, tameness or more than a 
certain degree of tameness may not be desirable in zoo 
animals; it is not an aid to them so far as reintroduction 
to the wild is concerned. But neither I think is it 
necessarily a disqualification, as demonstrated, it seems 
to me, by such remarkable cases as the lioness Elsa
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becoming in various respects wild and yet remaining 
friendly towards the Adamsons, and the tigress similarly 
released by Arjan Singh (65).
9.5.7 TRAINING
That an animal can be trained, although this only happens 
with certain animals in zoos (see 9.3.5 above, p 228 ff) , 
is also I think an important and very interesting 
phenomenon. It is widely appreciated how dogs presumably 
respond to being trained by us, and thus to accepting 
directions from us, to being submissive towards us, 
because of their wild nature as social, hierarchical 
animals who would be submissive towards a pack leader. The 
nature of what can be a very remarkable relationship has 
been recently explored by Hearne (66) . It seems to me 
equally the case that humans are only capable of having 
the relationship they can have with dogs because they too 
are by nature hierarchical (see chapter 6, p p 138 and 144 
ff) .
I think that there are relationships between animals 
and keepers in zoos which can approach in some degree the 
dog—human relationship. Elephants, despite in virtually 
every case having been born in the wild, are usually 
managed as domesticated animals, and trained by keepers at 
least to lie down, lift up a foot (as would be necessary 
for veterinary examination) and so on. I mentioned in 
chapter 6 the significance of the mahouts with the 
elephants in the triumph at Rome (p 145) . It is striking
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how through history there have been comments on the need 
of elephants to be managed by the keepers they know (67) . 
Elephant keepers find, I have gathered, that the keepers, 
where there is a group of elephants (and it might well be 
one keeper per elephant) , are, as far as the elephants are 
concerned, regarded as in a dominance hierarchy, just as 
are the elephants (with, of five keepers and five 
elephants, hopefully the most dominant elephant coming 
sixth in the hierarchy) . I do not suggest that animals 
cannot be trained by cruel means (see chapter 2, p 36) ; 
but I suspect such methods are to a great extent 
unnecessary because of the "natural" way in which a 
dominance hierarchy can develop between certain other 
animals and man.
There is a close relationship between training and 
taming, but I think the training relationship, in its own 
right, can be a useful indicator of an animal's wellbeing, 
or, perhaps more correctly, can be itself a respect in 
which the animal is in a state of wellbeing. I am saying 
that it is likely to find the relationship in some degree 
satisfying. I do not see why this should not be so in view 
of the clear satisfaction that a dog can get merely from 
being in the presence of and submissive to "his" human. 
There may be much else that is wrong. To take the one 
example I have been discussing, elephant accommodation may 
well in many cases be sub-standard in, for example,
British zoos. But that does not alter the fact that in the 
training relationship there may be something that is
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acceptable, even something rather admirable.
9.6 THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT
9.6.1 GENERAL
This criterion is concerned with any other considerations 
which may seem or be relevant to the assessing of the 
wellbeing or otherwise of captive animals. There are no 
specific observations involved here. We must simply 
consider the theoretical likelihood or otherwise of an 
animal's being in a state of wellbeing in captivity. In 
particular we need to view the animal in the light of its 
natural environment, and whatever behaviourally, 
ecologically and otherwise is known about it, and consider 
whether we would expect it to be all right in a particular 
set of conditions of captivity.
The matters discussed in 7.4 (Evolution and 
Adaptation) are particularly relevant: the fact that 
degrees of adaptability vary greatly, and that certain 
animals are going to have therefore much more specific 
requirements than others, and that some indeed may be 
unsuitable for keeping at all. That certain are (in some 
degree) specialists and others opportunists is very 
relevant (see above) . So is the fact that certain animals 
are capable of having a special relationship with man and 
can be kept more or less as domesticated animals. It is in 
fact important with many animals that they should be 
looked after by the right kind of people, such whose
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presence and whom contact with tends to Induce relaxation 
In their charges (rather like the effect of sympathetic 
people on children) (68).
The "domesticated animal" approach is, as we have 
seen, one of three very different approaches to animal 
keeping: three approaches which we might call a) 
"semi-natural"; b) "enriched" (if necessary with methods 
of behavioural engineering); c) "domesticated animal" 
approach. These three categories are, at best, 
approximate. They blend into each other - for example, in 
that animals treated as domesticated, still need good 
enclosures and are likely to need contact with 
conspecifics as well as with humans; they should not be 
stabled, perhaps alone, for long periods. Again, perhaps 
the "enriched" approach should not be seen as an 
alternative, still less as preferable to the 
"semi-natural" approach, but rather as a supplement to it, 
likely to be necessary for the more exploratory animals 
except perhaps when they can be provided with an 
exceptionally large naturalistic enclosure. Perhaps 
"naturalistic" is a preferable term to "natural" for 
describing enclosures, in that no enclosure is going to be 
truly natural for several reasons, among them its size 
(69) . But for the less demanding animals a naturalistic 
enclosure pure and simple is going to approach more 
closely to being, in practise, natural, i.e. providing 
virtually all the animal's needs as its wild environment 
would, whereas for the more demanding animals a
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naturalistic one will still be far from being natural: 
i.e. it will provide relatively few of the animal's needs, 
and hence need enrichment. The enrichment itself may well 
consist in the making of an area more natural or 
naturalistic (e.g. by providing plants where previously 
there were merely sterile surfaces), behavioural 
engineering methods should no doubt themselves be as 
naturalistic as possible (e.g. the provision of a “honey 
tree" for bears) and are also “natural" in as much as they 
are designed to induce natural behaviour (70) . The 
important thing is to recognise that there are 
substantially different approaches to animal keeping, 
suited in some degree to different kinds of animals, and 
any of which, or a blend of two or more, may be the most 
suitable for a particular animal's needs.
Perhaps all animal keeping tends towards one or other 
of two very widely differing approaches, the 
technological and the natural. The technological approach, 
precisely demonstrated in modern batteries, is not a new 
idea, to judge by an 1873 design for a “machine for 
feeding hens" in Paris illustrated in Hediger (71).
Hediger himself is an emphatic exponent of the natural 
approach to keeping animals, strongly opposed to 
artificial insemination, for example, and he might be 
equally opposed to the use of behavioural engineering 
methods, though certainly not of training methods (72) . 
There is a very important distinction between the kind of 
mechanised methods of keeping animals associated with
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intensive farming and behavioural engineering methods. The 
intensive farming methods have probably been designed, 
initially at least, by technologists and engineers rather 
than by animal behaviourists, as Ruth Harrison emphasises 
(73) , though such systems can be improved or at least 
ameliorated by changes made in the light of ethological 
study. These systems tend to ignore animals' behavioural 
needs, provided only that the animals actually survive and 
grow or produce eggs as required. Behavioural engineering 
approaches on the other hand are specifically designed in 
the light of study of animals' natural behaviour to try to 
elicit more of that behaviour in captive conditions, or at 
least to give animals an opportunity for varied or 
creative activity likely to enrich their lives. In many 
cases behavioural engineering approaches are superimposed 
on traditional and probably very inadequate methods of 
keeping animals, precisely to help to compensate for their 
deficiencies (74). The enriched pig pen (see 9.3 above) is 
different again in being, as it were, a complete system of 
animal keeping designed, certainly, to meet the economic 
requirements of pig farmers but also precisely to meet the 
behavioural needs of pigs, not to ignore their needs for 
economic ends. Whatever approach to keeping we use in a 
zoo, it should be to the same end, to provide the best 
conditions for the animal concerned in the light of our 
knowledge of its behavioural and other requirements.
The dichotomy of technological and natural approaches 
is to some extent reflected in a similar dichotomy in
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approaches to feeding, which I will look at now very 
briefly, then moving on to the problems posed by those 
animals which we have to use in a zoo as food for other 
animals. I shall then look briefly at four other problems 
or aspects of captivity, those of sensory deprivation, 
aspects of being seen and being stared at, stress and the 
desirability of the natural, and then a challenge to my 
whole approach: "ultra-technological" techniques such as 
brain manipulation or drugging.
9.6.2 FEEDING AND FOOD ANIMALS
It is an important responsibility of a zoo to provide the 
right food for its animals, indeed the best food it can 
manage, just because the animals are likely to have, 
through our decision, not theirs, no opportunity to find 
food for themselves. Deciding on the best food is not 
without its problems, but must surely be a matter of 
balancing the demands of nutritional value (which may be 
best served by a synthetic product) against those of 
interest of food, of exercise for jaw muscles and roughage 
provided (e.g. for cats with whole dead animals to 
consume), and also such physiological needs as those of 
cattle, adapted as they are to digesting plant food over 
long periods with the aid of internal microorganisms 
rather than consuming apparently better quality more 
concentrated food (75).
There is an obvious clash between our 
responsibilities to carnivores like cats, who will benefit
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from the provision of dead rabbits and chickens (say) , and 
our responsibilities to those rabbits and chickens 
themselves. There are three particular problems: a) live 
feeding; b) killing; c) the quality of life of the food 
animals.
a) Live feeding.
This is in Britain legally not an option except for the 
feeding of, mainly, live rodents to snakes, and for the 
use in feeding of various live invertebrates, like locusts 
or mealworms. The feeding of live vertebrate prey to 
snakes must be a grey area legally, such feeding to any 
other animal clearly being an offence under the 1911 
Cruelty to Animals Act. It is I think rare in any British 
zoo now, probably because of realisations of its moral 
questionableness strongly backed up by considerations of 
public relations, though no doubt regarded as acceptable 
by many private keepers of snakes. (Snakes take live prey 
far more readily than dead prey, which is why this 
particular problem arises with them.)
The practice seems to me morally objectionable, legal 
considerations apart, because, although rodents and birds 
would be of course taken by snakes in the wild, that is 
clearly not our responsibility, whereas what we do in a 
zoo is. That natural disasters cause many human deaths 
provides no moral (or legal) excuse for murders. There may 
be other reasons why we should regard live vertebrate 
feeding as objectionable, such as the fact the “prey 
would be In a more confined space than in the wild.
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perhaps that it would not be getting a "fair chance", and 
as a public spectacle there is an obvious danger of 
veering towards a mini-Colliseum. Probably little 
suffering in fact is caused by the live feeding of snakes: 
e.g. a mouse is probably unaware of the threat to it until 
virtally the moment of seizure by the snake (which I am 
assuming to be a constrictor like a boa or python) , and 
death, although not instantaneous, does occur within a few 
seconds (unlike, obviously, the deaths of many mice caught 
by cats) . Some would argue the virtues of recognising the 
reality of carnivores' nature and perhaps of the obvious 
enrichment of their lives from the provision of live prey 
(76). The law offers little protection to invertebrates.
It may be necessary to use live invertebrates as food 
(e.g. for other invertebrates such as scorpions), or at 
least impracticable not to. This matters less than would 
similar use of vertebrates in that we have good reason to 
regard invertebrates as less aware, but if only in view 
of Morley's comments about ants, we should minimise any 
use of live invertebrates as food and still more of 
injured or incapacitated invertebrates (see 4.1, p 65, and 
Note 8, p 93) . We should give them the benefit of the 
doubt with regard to suffering.
b) Killing.
This is regrettable but unavoidable if we are going to 
keep carnivores at all. As they have to have meat, there 
seems no additional moral problem in killing, for example, 
chickens or rats or rabbits in a zoo, when meat from cows
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or horses is being used anyway - i.e. from animals killed 
elsewhere. Obviously, any killing must be as humane as 
possible, and such factors as animals' probable awareness 
of the deaths of other animals should be remembered.
c) Quality of Life.
The quality of life of animals to be used for food is as 
important as that of any other animals in the zoo. We 
should not be intensively rearing mice or chickens or any 
other animals, difficult though this may be for reasons of 
economy or practicality. We should do as much as we can to 
provide naturalistic and/or enriched environments for any 
food animals. In a zoo we should be setting an example 
with regard to all our animals, including those for food 
and any others "off exhibition".
9.6.3 SENSORY DEPRIVATION
Clearly captive animals are likely to be in some degree 
deprived of the great variety of sensory experience 
available in the wild. Can we assess this, and do anything 
about it? I think our best approach is by observing how 
wide or narrow is the range of natural behaviour. An 
active dog, clearly busy smelling different bits of his 
environment, is obviously not suffering sensory 
deprivation (though this is not to say he might not get 
still more sensory experience, and enjoy it, somewhere 
else). A veterinarian informed me how he could easily tell 
a dog which had had a long period in kennels, where, as he 
mentioned, the dog would be deprived sensorily: I presume
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he would tell by the animal’s listlessness and lack of 
interest in his surroundings. So I think our problem of 
ensuring a satisfactory range of sensory experience in zoo 
conditions may be much the same as the problem of inducing 
a wide range of natural behaviour. It is the need for 
enclosure enrichment, for the right stimuli to be provided 
to elicit natural behaviour. At least, if this is achieved 
substantially, the animal will be deprived sensorily to a 
much lesser degree than otherwise. With more exploratory, 
perhaps more intelligent animals like primates and bears, 
there is a particularly strong need for change and 
variation in the enclosure. The provision of television 
for apes, as for example at Twycross, seems rather a sad 
solution, but perhaps what is good enough for humans is 
good enough for apes. Obviously such extra sources of 
experience, even such passive experience, should be 
investigated.
9.6.4 BEING SEEN AND BEING STARED AT
These problems are distinct, though similar. The problem 
about being seen is a basic one in zoos. With many 
animals, the better the captive environment provided, the 
less the public are going to see the animal. Small 
mammals, for example, do not sit around being seen in 
natural conditions. They hide away. This can apply even 
more to, for example, snakes. An ideal snake enclosure - 
from the point of view of the snake - would probably be 
the opposite from the human point of view. The whole human
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point is to be able to see the snake. The snake, by 
choice, would, except when hunting or perhaps basking, 
probably stay in a burrow so as to be in darkness and so 
as to be in as much tactile contact as possible with 
something solid, which snakes seem to like. Enclosures for 
smaller mammals which have been designed very much like 
mini-habitats - as at Palacerigg Country Park or the 
Highland Wildlife Park - can be quite difficult to spot 
the occupants in. One answer here is education. Spotting 
the animal in a really good enclosure is going to be a 
little like spotting an animal in its actual natural 
habitat which is (in some respects) better educationally 
and more interesting. I think also the essential 
unfortunate paradox which faces us here - the better the 
enclosure, for the animal, the less you tend to see of it 
- is compensated for by an important aspect of enrichment 
in which animal and human interests coincide: this is 
simply that the more you can stimulate the animal to 
behave naturally - e.g. hide a Fennec fox's food so that 
he searches and digs for it - the more interesting his 
captive life is for him and the more interesting it is for 
the public to watch him. The approach of having several 
"actors" - e.g. to all appearances a continually active 
weasel, in fact a succession of different weasels emerging 
in turn from "behind the scenes" - would be another 
possible solution, but seems rather, and perhaps rather 
unfortunately, stage-managed (77).
The problem with staring is simply that this again is
260
an essential aspect of zoos, whose main point is that we 
have animals in front of us that we can look at as long as 
we like, but that staring with many species, including of 
course ourselves, constitutes a threat (78). This probably 
applies mainly to primates. It is a reason for having 
large enclosures to which the public can not get very 
near, but which they have to observe in the sort of way 
they would have to observe the animals in their natural 
habitat. I think, for example, of the outside chimpanzee 
enclosure at Edinburgh, where I do not imagine the animals 
would be aware of being stared at. It may be that primates
get used to being stared at, and I do not know of any
studies on whether they are ill-affected. But it seems 
something that ought to be borne in mind, investigated if 
possible and guarded against if necessary. The use of one 
way glass could be considered. In effect some zoos are 
guarding against it with regard to some of their animals, 
especially those they are most concentrating on breeding, 
by keeping some of them in breeding areas, perhaps 
separate parks, closed to the public. But does that imply 
that we are likely to be subjecting those watched by the
public to a known source of stress?
9.6.5 STRESS
Obviously animals should not be suffering stress caused 
by their captive conditions as such. We ought to be 
keeping them basically stress-free. On the other hand an 
absence of stress is not natural, as already discussed in
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7.2.4 (p 164 ff) and 9.1 (p 200). Some stress Is going to 
arise from relations between conspecifics in social 
animals kept in proper social groups. This is presumably 
desirable, provided there is not an excess of stress, say 
from an animal's being unable to get away from a dominant 
conspecific, as it would in the wild. Refuges, screened 
areas, etc are important for, e.g., primates, for hiding 
away from dominant conspecifics. In view of the evidence 
that some animals will voluntarily seek out stressful 
situations (see 9.3.3, p 216), an ideal arrangement would 
seem to provide some device by which animals such as 
primates, anyway, can subject themselves to mild stress if 
they choose.
9.6.6 NEED FOR NATURAL ITEMS AND SURROUNDINGS
We humans often get particular satisfaction from being 
among trees and other plants, perhaps partly because, like 
other primates, that is where we would find much of our 
food: it would be evolutionarily useful to be programmed 
to get satisfaction from being in the kind of places which 
are likely food sources. If there is anything in this, it 
would apply to other primates too. In any case, the fact 
that we enjoy contact with plants etc suggests that other 
primates may, and perhaps other animals. Domestic dogs 
visiting the country presumably don't admire the view but 
no doubt often get richer supplies of smells than in the 
city. I think it is significant that prisons are 
associated for us with concrete and bricks, as well of
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course as bars. To be imprisoned with access to a garden 
would for most humans be, probably, a considerable 
amelioration of their situation. It might be assumed that 
it is humans' mental capacities that lead to their 
enjoyment of nature, and that this doesn't apply to other 
animals other than of course when natural things are an 
actual food source (as for herbivores). But I think this 
is probably not so. Of course, sometimes natural objects - 
e.g. actual branches - may be more interesting in several 
ways than artificial substitutes. They may have more 
varied shapes, bark that can be pulled off with the 
likelihood of small invertebrates underneath, etc. All 
this is already strong reason to provide real branches, 
etc rather than artificial substitutes. But grass 
underfoot or other vegetation, real trees, etc may be 
attractive to animals in the kind of ways they are to us 
too (79). I think Ormrod is right to emphasise the 
desirability of real plants etc in enclosures, and right 
to draw attention to unfortunate pseudo-provision of such 
real vegetation when it appears to be in the enclosure but 
actually merely surrounds it, or is even protected from 
animal contact by electric wires (80). There is of course 
a great difficulty in the provision of real trees and even 
other plants in enclosures in some cases: that they last 
only a short time because of damage from the animals. And 
this of course is because of the small area of those 
enclosures. But making enclosures as natural as possible 
is a very real way in which they can be made less
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prison-like of course as far as human onlookers are 
concerned, but perhaps genuinely much less prison-like as 
far as the animals' own experiences are concerned.
9.6.7 ULTRA-TECHNOLOGICAL APPROACH
One solution to the problem of animals' lying around 
doing nothing would be to adopt the kind of technological 
approach used by Delgado, who once stopped a charging bull 
in its tracks at the flick of a switch (wired up to its 
hypothalamus) (81). Apart from the human interest thus 
provided, such technology could have another use, that of 
making life unfailingly pleasurable for zoo occupants. We 
could substitute for the interest of their wild state the 
opportunity to stimulate their own pleasure centres, like 
Olds' rats (82). The simplest objection to this course 
would be a conservational one: that a breed of compulsive 
lever-pushers would hardly be suitable for reintroduction 
to the wild, nor would unfortunate animals whose natural 
behaviour was produced involuntarily by a human technician 
operating like a puppet master. Both these would also, I 
think, unless at the very least carried out for a very 
serious scientific purpose and of course as humanely as 
possible, be an unjustified invasion of the animals' right 
to autonomy.
Both the conservational objection and a simple 
respect for the animal as animal would also rule out any 
policy of fitting animals to zoo conditions by drugging 
them. Luckily this is hardly an option for zoos, who have
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problems enough encouraging activity without damping down 
their animals' consciousness level like unfortunate 
poultry in darkened batteries (83).
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Chapter 10 
THE CRITERIA APPLIED
I am not attempting to give final answers to all the 
questions, but rather to show the questions can be 
tackled, and answers found. I am really suggesting 
guidelines, which others may be able to follow better, 
with more details, more experience to draw on. They may be 
able to bring in other relevant factors. What is important 
is that the questions should be asked, and looked at along 
these lines, and that working or provisional answers be 
reached, and acted upon, however difficult for various 
reasons (not least the power of tradition) this may be.
A low score on a criterion means, as I see it, a case 
to answer. It may be outweighed by a high score on other 
criteria. But there needs to be a good reason for deciding 
that keeping a particular species is acceptable despite a 
low score on a criterion, still more so if there are low 
scores on two or three of them.
10.1 CATS
Because they can breed well, and also because as animals 
at the top of food chains (and other reasons like human 
pressure) they can easily be threatened in the wild, there 
is a strong conservation case for keeping cats. The 
problem with the BREEDING, as a demonstration of
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wellbeing in captivity, our concern in this chapter, is 
(as we saw in the last) that some cats will breed almost 
anywhere, as typified by a line mentioning lion cubs 
("lionets") in a 19th century Hood poem describing Exeter 
Change (see chapter 2, p p  32-33) (1). This does not apply 
to all cats - cheetahs were only bred first in recent 
decades at Whipsnade, and Clouded leopards are not 
straightforward to breed. In any case, when cats do breed, 
and this must be true I imagine also of lions and tigers, 
one contributory factor is the relationship with the 
keeper. This suggests that even in such menageries as the 
Change there was probably often a good, personal 
relationship with the actual keeper, however confined the 
space. So on breeding I think we can give "cats" in 
general a high score. (By "cats" I mean of course "cat 
keeping"; I shall in this chapter refer to other animal 
keeping similarly, for brevity.)
The same applies to HEALTH. They can be in very good 
physical condition in a zoo given careful feeding, which 
will include not only a varied diet but one geared to 
their limited exercise so that they do not become 
overweight. The question of exercise brings up the quite 
difficult criterion for cats of NATURAL BEHAVIOUR. 
Obviously they are going to lack opportunity for hunting 
and killing (except when a serval, say, occasionally 
catches a bird, for example, an event not unknown at 
Jersey at least). Equally obviously it would be a fuller 
life for the cats if they were not deprived of this (see
4.2 and 7.3), even though hunting must sometimes be a 
desperate business (as e.g. with a cheetah perhaps failing 
several times before making a successful gazelle kill).
The provision of live vertebrate prey for cats or other 
predators I do not regard as an option (see 9.6.2, p 255 
ff), but an artificial substitute like an electric hare, 
or flying meatballs for servals, would be highly 
desirable. In view of domestic cats' readiness often to 
chase almost anything it seems surprising we do not make 
more effort to give our cats something to chase. But I 
think very relevant here is the observation that cats do 
in fact relax a great deal of the time in the wild - I am 
generalising here, probably rashly, but there is no 
question that this is so of lions, as I said in 9.3, and 
in some degree of other cats - and only hunt occasionally. 
That their enforced abstention from hunting in captivity 
is not a severe deprivation seems borne out by the 
readiness of cats in zoos to sleep and generally relax.
The loss of the opportunity and motivation for appetitive 
behaviour does not seem a great deprivation for them (2).
I am here following Morris' theoretical distinction 
(already mentioned) between opportunists (animals like 
dogs and primates) and specialists (like cats) which, as 
he puts it, have nervous systems attuned to long periods 
of inactivity in the wild state, so that the adjustment to 
captivity is readily made (3). This consideration of 
Morris's would, so far as my scheme is concerned, come 
under THEORETICAL APPRAISAL.
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So cats (in as much as one can generalise about 
thirty-five different species) do well on breeding and 
health, and on theoretical appraisal, but not so well on 
natural behaviour. In practise I think there is a good 
deal of other natural behaviour they will show, such as 
maintenance activities like grooming, and territorial 
behaviour like scent marking and scratching, and various 
social behaviour, (it seems to me desirable for a pair to 
be together as far as possible, even though one could 
argue that most cats, being mainly solitary, are in more 
natural conditions when kept singly much of the time!]) All 
this depends on their being provided with as rich and 
interesting a captive environment as possible, and the 
continual providing of such enrichment is I think of 
crucial importance. To a great extent the interest of the 
enclosure will be more important than its area, though to 
me observation of a domestic cat's tendency to explore 
beyond its immediate home area, even though it presumably 
has no need to do so for hunting, indicates how cats need 
the largest, as well as the most enriched, area we can 
manage to provide. I would think that the provision of a 
varied diet, and one including, for example, regular whole 
dead animals which have to be cut up and worked at before 
being swallowed is also an important way in which their 
environment can be enriched and their jaws (for example) 
exercised. I have mentioned exercise little, and cats 
seem to remain healthy without much; but I would think 
that any behavioural engineering device such as I
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mentioned above would be highly desirable as a stimulus 
towards exercise.
There is a real problem here, significant for more 
animals than cats alone: the point that without the need 
to seek or catch their own food they lack the motivation 
which in the wild would result in their having exercise, 
though exercise as a "spin-off" from the serious business 
of living, not of course taken for its own sake. We can
point to many captive animals' health, and to other
indicators, as I am doing, to show how great their 
wellbeing in captivity seems to be; but still, efforts to 
seek other ways of stimulating animals to search for food,
or work to obtain it, both for interest and for the
exercise thereby obtained, should be a continuous, indeed 
never-ending, part of keepers' work.
On UNNATURAL BEHAVIOUR, cat-keeping can do badly, in 
the occurrence of pacing for example, but I do not think 
this is widespread today, and in any case is likely to be 
diminished by all those kinds of ways in which we can seek 
to stimulate natural behaviour. A cat relaxing, clearly 
accepting the near-presence of people without any 
distress, even indeed as an apparent source of positive 
interest, is I suggest giving us DIRECT INDICATIONS of 
wellbeing in captivity. (Humans not being normal food even 
for tigers, much less for other cats, it is unlikely, I 
think, that frustration at so many unobtainable meals 
walking past is a frequent occurrence.)
I think cat-keeping's overall score can well be high,
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and reflect the true situation. Of course there is danger 
of complacency; I am not in the slightest seeking to 
defend any and every case of zoo cat-keeping. But I think 
it can be assessed, and that in many cases it will be 
found to be quite successful, and that where it is not, 
remedies worth trying are available.
10.2 POLAR BEARS
Polar bears have been long kept (e.g. Henry I's "white 
bear" at the Tower), if not as long or widely as brown and 
black bears, but their captivity has been recently sharply 
criticised, even a petition presented to ask for their 
non-keeping (4). So far as their physical HEALTH is 
concerned, this (as with elephants) can be good with 
responsible keepers who ensure, for example, a careful 
diet (5). On the other hand, that most captive polar bears 
are in poor mental health has been strongly claimed; 
perhaps a similar judgement could be made on their general 
health, if defined widely (see 7.2.5, p 165).
Polar bears' BREEDING in captivity is poor (despite 
its enormous potential in public relations) (6). Some zoos 
that have bred polar bears regularly have used 
hand-rearing. Whether it is a matter of cubs not surviving 
at all, or their surviving only when hand-reared, there is 
no indication here of polar bears' wellbeing in captivity.
Clearly polar bears do not show, or are not usually 
given enough opportunity to show, much of their NATURAL 
BEHAVIOUR in captivity. They are large, powerful animals,
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and. they are opportunists, roaming over vast areas of 
the arctic. Zoos' first concern is to provide an enclosure 
they cannot get out of, and perhaps one that they cannot 
do endless damage to the contents of. Their second 
responsibility (second only to the requirements of human 
safety), to provide an interesting environment for the 
bears themselves, has tended to be neglected - perhaps 
understandably, however inexcusably. Tacoma Zoo in America 
has a naturalistic polar bear enclosure (see 9.4, p 238, 
and p 266, Note 50). Polar bear enclosures should probably 
be far larger and could well contain facilities for 
climbing as well as water. Trees, logs, etc if possible 
are probably quite suitable, although not associated with 
polar bears, because the latter are closely related to 
brown bears and appear to have adapted to arctic regions 
fairly recently. But bears, being intelligent and 
exploratory, are going to need extra stimulus: the area 
itself, even if large and "interesting", is not going to 
be enough. What they need is the provision of extra 
interesting items - to eat, or to manipulate and play 
with, whether in water or on land - and these ought to be 
changed virtually every day. It may well be that more 
elaborate techniques, such as those described by 
Markowitz, are desirable, or at least worth trying, 
although open to certain objections. Training, as 
suggested by Bareham, also seems a possibility (7).
In view of the fact that we regard it as a criticism 
of polar bear keeping that the bears have too little
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opportunity for natural behaviour, and perhaps as a 
consequence may be suspected of being incapable of various 
natural behaviour - e.g. catching their own prey - if they 
had the opportunity, I am puzzled why it should be 
regarded as an indictment of polar bear keeping that, if a 
person enters their enclosure, he is killed by the bears. 
Of course this is tragic, as in a recent case in New York 
when a child who entered a polar bear enclosure pool at 
night, in the course of trespassing in the zoo, was killed 
and eaten (8). But how is it itself any reflection on the 
conditions in which the bears are kept, and even less on 
the normality of the bears themselves? It may well be a 
reflection on the safety of the enclosure (though bears 
are hardly more dangerous than cars for those who rashly 
confront them). It seems like a demonstration of how 
normal the bears are, despite being captive.
Now not altogether divorced from the matter of 
natural behaviour is that of ABNORMAL BEHAVIOUR. I have 
already stated that I do not think the occurrence of 
weaving, etc necessarily provides a final indictment of 
the keeping of polar bears, not least because, though 
stereotyping can seem impossible to cure, its occurrence 
can also sometimes be affected very easily (see 9.4, p 234 
ff). At Glasgow, no sterotypies are seen in the evening, 
in the absence of the public. Bears are usually solitary 
in the wild, and it may be that stress caused by the 
presence of other bears is a causative factor in 
stereotyping. In any case, their normal solitariness is a
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good reason for trying keeping them on their own, though 
still with as many stimulating devices as possible. It may 
be that a zoo keeping three bears should have them in 
three separate, large enclosures. This would also make 
more variety for the bears feasible, with moves between 
enclosures. In any case, an extra enclosure is desirable, 
e.g. when three bears are kept as at present at Glasgow, 
to facilitate the moving of the bears from one enclosure 
for cleaning purposes (they are intelligent animals and 
can be reluctant to move into their house if they know 
they are going to be shut in for any length of time). This 
in turn would make it more practicable to provide more 
manipulable items, even just straw and bones, in their 
outside enclosure (i.e. if they could easily be removed by 
the keepers). So there are many practical considerations 
which could make it possible to keep the bears 
satisfactorily. Obviously money as well as a theoretical 
understanding of the problems is a limiting factor, and 
itself could help to make a decision not to keep the bears 
a right one. But even then, if the bears have to be kept 
for their natural lives, the problem of how to keep them 
in the best way still remains.
Despite all the problems with bears, there are 
numerous DIRECT INDICATIONS of the way in which a close 
relationship with man can be built up. They can be 
trained, and one of Hagenbeck's colleagues apparently once 
successfully trained a team of twenty-one polar bears in 
nine weeks to haul a sledge (9). Despite being solitary in
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the wild, they are close relatives of dogs and perhaps 
temperamentally as capable of being close companions of 
man, only unfortunately they usually become too dangerous 
when adult, and in any case are of course dangerous 
because of being so powerful.
Even though polar bears are solitary, large carnivores 
ranging far in the wild, it seems (as a THEORETICAL 
ASSESSMENT) far from proved, in view of their being, like 
other bears, very ready to be trained, very ready to take 
an interest in all sorts of items which they would not 
come across in the wild, that they cannot be kept 
satisfactorily in captivity, only that hardly any zoo, 
Tacoma being at least a partial exception, has yet 
succeeded in doing so. Unless a zoo is prepared and able 
(e.g. financially) to go to the necessary lengths to 
provide a stimulating enough captive environment for polar 
bears, it ought to phase out their keeping. But it seems 
clear that it may be feasible for certain zoos to continue 
at least experimenting, especially as many bears are 
already in captivity and still have to be kept.
10.3 PRIMATES
The keeping of primates, apes especially, is probably 
more strongly criticised than the keeping of any other 
species, as for example by Williams, supported (mildly) by 
Schomberg, and by Schaller (10), as well as Midgley (11).
A letter to The Times in 1980 about the need to breed
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gorillas in captivity drew a reply about the 
inappropiateness of zoo ape accommodation: "...metal 
grilles, bricks, concrete, steel, railing and iron bars. 
Some future there for a denizen of the rain forest" (12).
i
It is true that we can get the "prison feeling" most with 
captive primates, partly because of their being so 
obviously our nearest relatives and our quite rightly 
feeling (in my opinion) that they, even more than other 
intelligent mammals, have a right to autonomy, and partly 
because of the practical considerations which 
unfortunately so often lead to primate accommodation's 
being "prison-like". Primates large and small need much 
more than a simple enclosure to keep them in; large ones 
are very strong; all are clever, exploratory and 
manipulative. So there is an understandable tendency, 
indeed often a clear need, to provide indestructible or at 
least long-lasting equipment (climbing frames, etc) of, 
say, metal rather than natural branches. In addition, 
primates pose a hygiene and health problem usually solved 
by dull, sterile surfaces (see 7.2, p 160), and are prone 
to infection. To complete the problem, primates are the 
animals most zoos feel they could spare least because of 
their attraction for the public. I shall try to show not 
only how the criteria can assist us in judging primates', 
as any other species', wellbeing, but also that at least 
some primates can be kept satisfactorily and are so kept 
in certain zoos.
It is clear that primates' HEALTH in captivity has
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always posed problems. London Zoo's first ape was a 
chimpanzee called Tommy who survived there (in 1835) for 
six months; the first gibbon, in 1839, soon died of 
tuberculosis (13). We should remember they were at risk 
specifically because of their proneness to catch human 
diseases (e.g. respiratory ones particularly) and remember 
the extent to which humans were at risk also. That such 
animals survived only briefly does not necessarily mean 
they were not (like humans) sometimes victims of human 
irresponsibility or inefficiency, but certainly sometimes 
there was enormous concern and as much done as could be 
(14). There have been enormous advances in the health care 
of primates. Their physical health is unquestionably 
important; on the other hand it should not be regarded as 
a final criterion of their captive wellbeing, because of 
the possibility of overprotectiveness (see 9.1, p 199 
above); for example, glass protecting them from 
respiratory infection from humans can make life dull or 
restrict valuable human contact even with their own 
keepers (15). The sacrificing of the requirements of 
mental health to the requirements of physical health 
should not happen if due consideration is given to the 
other criteria, notably that of natural behaviour. Not 
that the latter should have complete precedence either. 
Safari parks have sometimes kept chimpanzees on islands, 
so allowing opportunity for much natural behaviour, 
without providing heated winter accommodation, such as is 
obviously necessary, on simple grounds of health and
281
comfort, for delicate tropical animals kept in a temperate 
c1imate.
For many years apes were kept without any captive 
BREEDING, perhaps because no-one was trying to breed them, 
partly because of the ease of replacing such animals from 
the wild, an of course notorious process (16). Today, it 
seems to me that there is a significant correlation 
between the level of breeding and captive conditions 
creditable on other grounds. The most successful primate 
breeding occurs in Britain at such places as Howletts, 
Jersey, Twycross, and the Woolly Monkey Sanctuary. Some 
other zoos have good breeding records too. Bristol, for 
example, breeds gorillas very successfully in more 
traditional accommodation - the sort which some critics 
would call "prison-like" - but no other zoo approaches 
Howletts' gorilla breeding. So, at least with primates, 
and especially if we count not just the occurrence of 
births but birth plus successful mother rearing, I think 
breeding is likely to be, at least with primates, a useful 
criterion of wellbeing.
So far as NATURAL BEHAVIOUR is concerned, primates 
are likely to need as large an area as can be made 
available, partly because they ought to be in a natural 
grouping which in many cases would number many animals, 
and partly because of being nomadic and exploratory (17). 
But more important, beyond a certain minimum of space, is 
the interest of the area, which means, first, enclosure 
"furniture". Obviously they need things to climb or swing
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from, whether these are bars or ropes or actual branches 
or better still trees (see 9.6.6, p 261 ff). Apart from 
the considerations I mentioned in 9.6.6, it is important 
that captive primates (like other animals) have as much 
experience as possible of the "real" objects, or things as 
similar as possible to those objects, that they would need 
to be used to, and know about, in the wild - simply so as 
to be as ready as possible for reintroduction. Obviously 
this especially applies with any animals where there is a 
real likelihood of their reintroduction, and yet 
apparently and extraordinarily it can be forgotten, as in 
a recent attempted release of a large group of Golden Lion 
marmosets.
The importance of natural materials, and of grass and 
other plants including trees, if posssible, does not mean 
that the most important thing is a reconstruction of the 
wild habitat in all its details (see 7.4, p p  180-181 
above). What is important is to provide the essential 
features of the wild habitat. Examples would be bedding 
for apes, making nest-building important, which Badham 
stresses as absolutely essential, suitable objects to 
climb on, swing from, etc, and facilities allowing for 
proper social groupings, which means at the least 
considerable space, but also areas for retreat (18). Two 
excellent examples of primate captive environments which 
do not "look" natural are the extended network of linked 
enclosures, some outside and grassed, some inside and 
heated, at the Woolly Monkey Sanctuary, and the gorilla
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enclosure at Howletts, rather like a great gymnasium 
floored with straw and equipped with chutes, ropes, etc.
The amount of natural behaviour, such as that involved in 
social relationships - the behaviour of the dominant 
silverbacked male at Howletts, for example - and the level 
of successful breeding, demonstrate the degree to which 
the animals have what they need (19). So I think that an 
explicitly artificial construction designed in the light of 
the maximum knowledge available of the animal's wild 
habitat, its behavioural repertoire in that habitat, and 
also its behaviour in captivity, is sometimes likely to be 
the animal's best captive bargain: to be what will induce 
it to perform the maximum amount of its behavioural 
patterns, and probably satisfy as many as possible of its 
sensory needs. As I have said, natural objects or material 
should certainly form a part of it. If in addition the 
captive environment can actually look like the real thing, 
this of course is in itself highly desirable for 
educational and aesthetic reasons, provided that the 
animals' real needs are being satisfied, and that their 
real requirements are not taking second place to mere fine 
appearances. The two may coincide, and it may be, for 
example, that Aspinall constructed his enclosure as he did 
because funds were lacking (as usually in Britain) for a 
naturalistic display on the lines of the best American 
examples. If so, the fact remains that he has gone for the 
most important thing, meeting the animals' actual needs, 
as far as they can be established, rather than neglecting
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these in favour of apparent realism. This is not to say 
that, where a large area is available, a more naturalistic 
enclosure may not be highly suitable and successful, as 
illustrated by the island chimpanzee enclosure at Arnhem 
Zoo in Holland (see chapter 14 below) (20).
There are clearly a whole range of approaches for 
meeting behavioural needs. Markowitz's methods are one 
way; there are others, perhaps just hiding food so that 
animals can spend a long, interesting time seeking it, or 
just a wide, and changing, selection of materials for 
gorillas, orangs and chimpanzees especially, but many 
monkey species also, e.g. macaques or capuchins, to occupy 
themselves with (21). If these can be natural materials, 
or natural-looking materials, or materials that otherwise 
look suitable, and do not look vulgar, degrading or 
untidy, so much the better. But these three considerations 
are of very minor importance compared to the animals' 
welfare. Otherwise ideal materials can be unsuitable 
because of health risks (the danger of being swallowed, 
say, or because they contain nails), but to avoid giving 
primates suitable objects to occupy them on mere grounds 
of tidiness is like starving a young child of enjoyable 
and educational experience (like painting, say) because 
such activity make a mess. I stress this point because I 
believe it can be a real, and most unfortunate, 
consideration in the management of primates.
I have been considering how natural behaviour among 
captive primates can be stimulated. There is unfortunately
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plenty of ABNORMAL BEHAVIOUR recorded which Indicates the 
consequences of the lack of a stimulating enough 
environment, most seriously when a primate is kept 
solitarily. It seems legitimate, and not anthropomorphic, 
to compare a primate kept solitarily - still worse one 
kept out of sight of, and without other contact with, 
conspecifics - with solitary confinement for a human (see 
9.3.1, p 211, and 9.5.2, pp 241-242). Little further 
comment is needed here on such abnormal behaviour as 
faeces-throwing (see 9.4, p 233). That chimpanzees should 
be reduced to manipulating faeces because they have 
nothing else is obviously appalling, but the use of this 
by choice to hurl at visitors seems a vivid demonstration 
of their intelligence and their interest in humans' 
reactions, as well of course as their need for occupation. 
It is closely related to chimpanzees' love, it would seem, 
of performing, described in happier circumstances by 
Morris. While it is abnormal behaviour in the sense that 
we ought not to be putting the animals in a situation 
where they are forced to do this, it is clearly not 
abnormal behaviour showing a state of derangement on their 
part (22). It is much better if chimpanzees, for example, 
can be kept in an enclosure which is not only 
significantly enriched, but also large enough to contain a 
substantial group of animals who will be more interested 
in each other than the humans watching them, and which is 
also far enough away from the public for people not to 
obtrude on, to be virtually ignored by, the chimpanzes
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(see 9.6.4, pp 259-260).
Primates can give many DIRECT INDICATIONS of 
wellbeing or the opposite. Positive indications would 
include greeting signals to humans such as lip-smacking, 
and playing (see 9.5.5, p p  246-247). A close and fruitful 
relationship is indeed possible, as illustrated by Leonard 
Woolf's account of a tame marmoset kept as a pet, though 
primates are indeed highly unsuitable in general as pets 
because such a relationship is unlikely to be able to be 
continued into adulthood and likely, except with the great 
apes, to destroy any possibility of their integration into 
a normal primate group (23). Negative indications of 
wellbeing would include, I think, signs of boredom (such 
as various items of abnormal behaviour), and attempts to 
escape, as already discussed in 9.5.2, p 241 ff.
THEORETICAL APPRAISAL includes considering primates' 
wild lives and attempting to judge whether it is likely to 
be possible to keep them satisfactorily in captivity. For 
some primates, such as chimpanzees, we now have available 
detailed studies of their wild behaviour, which bring home 
to us the challenge we face; perhaps, we may well feel, 
our arrogance in assuming that it is possible to keep 
animals whose mental capacities, the structure even of 
whose lives, seem so closely to rival ours (24). However 
Goodall, with all her appreciation of the rich lives of 
wild chimpanzees and herself critical of the ways such 
animals are often kept in zoos - as well she might be, 
just as Schaller is - also notes how her work should
287
provide information about "the conditions which a 
chimpanzee, in captivity, must enjoy if it is to show 
normal behaviour". She is far from denying, it seems to 
me, the at least theoretical possibility of keeping them 
satisfactorily, given proper appreciation of their needs 
(dietary as well as behavioural) (25). If the possibility 
is granted for chimpanzees, then it should be granted for 
any other primate.
The problem of staring1s being a threat in many 
primates (at least) and certainly the great apes should 
not be ignored (see 9.6.4, p p  259-260). As I have said, I 
think the answer is for an enclosure to be placed some way 
back from the public, perhaps behind a moat. Obviously, 
something is lost, the privilege or opportunity to see 
such animals close to, and to have various direct contact 
with them. Perhaps there is nothing wrong with such 
contact provided the animal is not being forced to engage 
in it; in other words, if it is close to the public by 
choice, but can retreat far away or, more important, out 
of sight if it wishes to. The animals must also be able to 
retreat out of sight of each other, and they must be 
looked after by people they are in sympathy with (which 
applies, probably, to all higher animals, not just 
primates (26)). The providing of the right conditions for 
primates is clearly so demanding that there is a great 
deal to be said for a zoo's keeping only a very few 
species.
I am attempting to justify the keeping of primates in
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captivity in zoos (in a wide sense of "zoo") on the 
grounds that, with due attention to their behavioural 
needs, as learnt first and foremost from their wild lives, 
as well as with attention to other matters such as their 
physical health, they can be kept in conditions of 
wellbeing, conditions such that to all intents and 
purposes they will not be substantially worse off than in 
the wild. It seems sometimes almost to be assumed that 
laboratory primates have different requirements, kept as 
they may be "usually singly or in pairs in cages designed 
so that the animals can be safely handled by the 
operator", perhaps with a "perch" as this is likely to be 
"more comfortable to sit on than the wire mesh floor", and 
where the term "suitable environment" seems to refer only 
to air conditioning, humidity and temperature (27). I do 
not dispute there may well be great care and efficiency 
here, and great concern over physical health, but in no 
way, it seems, are animals kept as here described in 
natural social groups; in no way have they opportunities 
to express even a fair portion of their behavioural 
repertoire.
Experimental work itself, in as much as it is at all 
injurious, still more if it is painful, to primates 
(particularly, but of course other animals also) can be 
justified only, if at all, as a necessary evil, something 
we must deeply regret but which necessity - our concern 
for our own survival and our children's - forces upon us; 
as necessity forces us, for example, to kill rats, even by
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painful means if there is just no other way; as it forces 
us, indeed, on occasion even to drop bombs on other 
innocent human beings. It seems to me that such conditions 
as those described above must be justified also, if at 
all, in the same way. It must be realised that keeping 
primates in pairs or solitarily in cages is an evil, no 
doubt a lesser evil than would be the case in the absence 
of the specialist care and attention that they receive, 
but still an evil, and therefore, at the very least, 
requiring to be phased out or replaced as soon as possible 
by a way of keeping which pays attention to all their 
needs.
It is creditable to emphasise how reluctant we should 
be to take any primates into "conditions of existence far 
removed from those they have previously enjoyed in the 
wild" (28). I think that deprived conditions are indeed 
worse for an animal that has known better (as applies to a 
human also); but that is not to say that the animal that 
has not known better does not have an equal right to 
conditions which satisfy its real needs, just because 
those needs are nearly as great for it, though born into 
captivity, as for the wild caught animal. This point has 
an important application to a difficult moral problem: 
that of how to justify captive breeding of primates not as 
a direct aid to conservation, but as an indirect aid 
because one is thereby satisfying a need for primates to 
be used by laboratories without using wild-caught ones 
(29) .
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10.4 ELEPHANTS
Elephants as zoo animals present a rather interesting and 
difficult case, much discussed, and I think rather 
over-simplified by some of the critics. I am trying here, 
as with other species, to do three things:
a) assess conditions in better and worse zoos (and 
show how the criteria help us to do this) ,*
b) consider theoretically how best they could be kept;
c) in the light of both a) and b), consider whether 
they should be kept.
On HEALTH I will only say that captive elephants can 
be in, at least, good physical condition, and that the 
fact they receive veterinary treatment is a clear 
advantage of their captive state. I will qualify this by 
accepting that the lengths of life of some recent captive 
elephants are not impressive, though they do not compare 
badly with lengths of life of wild elephants, only with 
that potential which we can reasonably expect captive 
animals to approach (30).
The BREEDING level of captive elephants is extremely 
low, but this is because of special difficulties with 
elephants, mainly that mature males are dangerous when in 
must and most zoos therefore refrain from keeping them. It 
might be said that this is inevitable in view of the 
deficiencies of much elephant accommodation, which 
requires keepers always to manage their charges as 
domesticated animals (31). Apart from conservational 
aspects, which are not my concern here, this lack of
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breeding Is obviously a deprivation for zoo elephants of a 
major part of their NATURAL BEHAVIOUR and lifestyle 
especially because, in the wild, a calf would remain with 
its mother for a long period and no doubt they would enjoy 
a mutually rich relationship. It is obvious that elephants 
should have social relations with other elephants, obvious 
because this would today be accepted with any other social 
animal that we keep in zoos. This is not to say that an 
elephant group in a zoo should contain a male: elephants 
are matriarchal, with bull elephants separated most of the 
time. The elephants in a herd are probably related, so 
that putting together two unrelated females is not 
strictly natural and therefore perhaps understandably not 
always effective (32). How much deprivation does a single 
elephant on her own experience? This will depend a great 
deal on her relationship with her keeper (on which see 
further below), but he can hardly spend enough time with 
her to compensate fully for the lack of contact with other 
elephants. How much of a hardship is it for an elephant to 
be chained? Chaining would not now be regarded as 
acceptable with any other animal in a zoo, so it must seem 
particularly objectionable with an, if anything, 
exceptionally intelligent one like an elephant, unless it 
is merely a short tethering process (say for a few 
minutes) for some purpose such as washing or veterinary 
attention. Elephants often are tethered for longer 
periods, e.g. at night, and this is a matter of necessity, 
for safety, where, say, doors are not adequate. But
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obviously they should be made adequate, whatever the cost, 
or other practical solutions found - or else elephants not 
kept.
Presumably a zoo keeping elephants should have a 
large enclosure or enclosures adequate for a small group, 
with as enriched outside areas as possible, and with 
inside areas which should be enriched too, but which 
especially need to contain stalls large enough and strong 
enough to obviate chaining (33). I am advocating here a 
natural way of keeping elephants as far as possible - i.e. 
in a group in a large area - but enriched artificially 
because there is no way in which we can expect animals 
which are intelligent and exploratory, but which also in 
the wild would spend perhaps twenty hours a day feeding, 
to occupy themselves without our providing extra devices 
for manipulation and investigation (and also as large a 
pool as we can manage). Even where conditions do not 
approach what I have outlined, I would add that quite a 
lot of natural behaviour can be observed, such as 
dust-squirting, playing of various kinds, and feeding in 
different ways.
Much criticism has been directed in recent years at 
London over the death and (so it is asserted) prior 
deprived life of an elephant called Pole-Pole (see chapter 
1, Note 24, p 24). It looks as if this was one elephant 
London should have admitted to having problems with long 
before, and that, as Cherfas puts it, "both would [have 
been been] better off without one another". In the end she
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was put down with an injection of the drug etorphine when, 
following examination under anaesthetic for a limp, in the 
course of unsuccessful attempts to move her to Whipsnade, 
she refused to get u p  again. The architect-designed and 
highly expensive elephant and rhinoceros pavilion at 
London, which indeed seems to provide little in the way of 
the animals' real biological needs, I shall discuss 
briefly in chapter 12 (34). London's own policy with 
regard to elephants, I understand, is now to train them so 
that they can actively mix with the public, and thus avoid 
what was one of the problems with Pole-Pole, that she was 
untrained in the fashion of the anti-disciplinary sixties, 
and in the end proved, sadly, unmanageable. This seems 
very likely a wise policy to adopt (see below), not least 
in view of elephants' mi 1lenia-long involvement with man 
and London's own 150 year experience in managing them as 
domesticated animals.
I have little to add under ABNORMAL BEHAVIOUR to what 
I have said in the last chapter. Clearly weaving, for 
example, should be taken as an indication of something 
wrong, presumably of a deprived environment. Stabled 
horses also sometimes weave, and this too is highly 
regrettable because of the boredom or frustration it is 
indicating, but, just as its occurrence in horses is not 
usually regarded as necessitating the entire severing of 
man's relationship with horses, weaving in elephants may 
still be regarded as something whose underlying cause must 
be set right, without that cause having to be identified
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as simply the keeping of elephants in the first place.
As I have also already mentioned, elephants give us 
numerous DIRECT INDICATIONS of the special quality of 
their relationship with man. They can certainly 
communicate with us, even, I think, joke with us on 
occasion, certainly play with us, and probably find 
considerable satisfaction or at least acceptable 
occupation in working for us (see 4.4.2, p 89). The 
importance of a continuous relationship with one keeper I 
have already mentioned, and how in a sense it seems to me 
a "natural" relationship (see chapter 6, p 145, and 9.5.7, 
PP 248-249). Thus it seems to me that to treat an elephant 
as a domesticated, indeed, as far as possible, a companion 
animal, is one acceptable way of keeping her. On the other 
hand, it is still desirable that she have contact with 
other elephants, as would be the case in Burma, say, 
partly because she will no doubt get certain satisfactions 
from this that human contact cannot replace, and partly 
because the human contact will in practice be limited 
(though the less it has to be, the better) (35).
My THEORETICAL APPRAISAL, then, is that different 
approaches are possible. One is to go for a naturalistic 
system as far as this is possible - i.e. a large area with 
a small herd - but in practise enrichment will be 
necessary, and if this is or seems artificial, this is 
much less important than that an elephant should be 
meaningfully occupied. The other is to treat elephants as 
domesticated animals, with more than the minimum training
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which is going to be essential in any system. One problem 
is whether such an arrangement can continue throughout the 
elephant's life. It has been suggested to me that beyond, 
say, the age of early adulthood an elephant cannot be 
"handled" without a degree of domination (i.e. of striking 
the animal) which today would be unacceptable.
The circus approach, in which a calf is removed from 
its mother at an early age, and trained in an elaborate 
way, is an extension of the domestic animal approach. What 
makes such an approach right or wrong morally is, I think, 
whether such a relationship with man (which will probably 
be with one person in particular) can be continued 
throughout the elephant's life, or whether there are going 
to be long periods of solitary, or at least confined, 
stabling, and whether there is going to come a period of 
retirement when all the earlier contact and occupation 
cease. Clearly both these are unfortunate fates for an 
intelligent, sensitive animal, and should not be regarded 
as acceptable.
It may well be that certain zoos should cease to keep 
elephants, and there should be more cooperation between 
those that do keep them, particularly in arrangements for 
breeding, but it does not seem necessary to phase out the 
keeping of elephants entirely.
10.5 UNGULATES
In general, ungulates can be kept satisfactorily, 
requiring most obviously to be in normal social groups in
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large enclosures, so that much of their NATURAL BEHAVIOUR 
can occur. In some cases this has its own drawbacks, as in 
an account of a male white rhinoceros kept eight years 
with one female without breeding, then moved to a 
relatively natural situation where he asserted his 
dominance over other males, gathered together a harem of 
seven, lived successfully, siring eighteen young, only to 
be finally defeated after four years by a newly mature 
male, and thus left alone again (36). What is striking 
here is that in no way had the animal lost his natural 
social behaviour, despite being in a situation for a time 
where it could not express itself fully. I think it is 
worth giving two other striking examples of the extent to 
which natural behaviour can be retained, for all three, 
quite apart from their conservational importance, are 
impressive evidence of how animals are not seriously 
affected by captivity. First, an example of behaviour one 
would not normally either wish or expect to see in a zoo. 
This was an incident in which a fox pursued by hounds took 
refuge in a paddock occupied by Przewalski's horses (i.e. 
wild Mongolian horses) at Marwell, and the stallion at 
once took what was obviously "wild-horse-wolf-repe11ing" 
action against the surprised foxhounds (and afterwards 
prevented his mares from venturing into, or far into, the 
paddock) (37). The other is the behaviour of a herd of 
Pere David's Deer, bred at various British zoos, in the 
process of being reintroduced into their former wild 
habitat in China. Within a week of release into a large
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area, one stag has asserted his dominance, gathered 80% of 
the females into his harem; the deer are finding food 
satisfactorily, including, unexpectedly, one particular 
plant recorded in "Chinese records" as being eaten by this 
deer; young fawns are hiding away in thick undergrowth; 
and so on. Quite clearly, to a considerable degree at 
least, their behaviour is natural; they, as it were, "know 
what to do", despite having been born in captivity (38).
Of course I am not saying that all captive ungulates 
show a complete or even a large spectrum of their natural 
behaviour. What I am saying is that we may reasonably 
expect to see a fair degree of their natural behaviour and 
that by this very factor we can judge to a great degree 
how far they are in a state of wellbeing in captivity.
Some ungulates will have special requirements. Pigs are 
probably an example of an opportunistic ungulate - i.e one 
that will take several different kinds of food, including 
meat or carrion when available, in different ways. However 
they do have a primary way of feeding, by digging with 
their snouts, and this particular need must be met. I have 
already refered to the enriched pig pen of Edinburgh 
University School of Agriculture, a blueprint for an 
artificial way of keeping pigs which yet, being designed 
in the light of a study of their behaviour in semi-wild 
conditions, appears to meet all their main needs (see
9.3.5, p 224 ff).
Obviously HEALTH and BREEDING are important criteria 
here too. Health can present particular problems with
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ungulates, the need for hard standing for example, to 
ensure proper wear of hooves in the absence of the degree 
of wear they would get in wild conditions (see 9.1, pp 
199-200). But this will depend on the amount of land 
provided (and available) and on the particular species 
concerned.
ABNORMAL BEHAVIOUR is a warning sign here as with 
other species. It is also very important that the right 
people should be in charge of ungulates, as of other 
animals, people such as can avoid stressing them and can 
speak to them calmingly. Some ungulates clearly can take 
very easily to a life close to man, such as the most 
familiar domesticated ungulates like sheep, cattle, pigs 
and horses. Camels and llamas are also, as I remarked 
earlier, domesticated animals, and it seems likely to be a 
good approach to have them occupied, where practicable, in 
pulling carts or giving rides (see chapter 2, p 26, and
9.3.5, p 228 ff) (39). On the other hand, they may be 
occupied enough with their own social relations. As I have 
emphasised, domesticated animals appear to have retained, 
so far as I know in any case where this has been studied, 
a large part of their natural behaviour. So, given a large 
enough area, and a reasonably interesting environment 
within it, they may not require further occupation (see
9.3.4, pp 218-219).
10.6 RODENTS
Rodents have obvious requirements in the means to express
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their NATURAL BEHAVIOUR, which in many cases will include 
burrowing. African crested porcupines at Glasgow have for 
many years now been kept in an enclosure they can burrow 
into, having formerly been in a tidy and wholly unsuitable 
enclosure with a concrete, if gravel-covered, floor. They 
are periodically moved temporarily from their main 
enclosure to another for a few months when the extent of 
their excavations makes this necessary. This seems a 
satisfactory solution of the problem of their eventually 
turning an enclosure of limited size into a sort of bomb 
crater. They have bred very well during the last few 
years, which thus seems to have gone hand in hand with an 
enclosure which allowed them to live fairly normal lives, 
and suggests how BREEDING can be a good criterion of 
wellbeing (40). Other smaller rodents, like gerbils for 
example, can be provided with a large peat-filled tank in 
which they can burrow and be shown to be very interesting 
and attractive animals. The same kind of approach is 
possible with many other rodents, and is surely the 
correct one, in that they ought to have such opportunities 
to burrow. Highly bred though laboratory mice and rats 
are, and adaptable though they are, it should surely be 
recognised as a great deprivation that they have, at least 
in normal laboratory cages, no opportunity for such 
burrowing. Where they can and do construct burrows, make 
nests and seem to be living normal social lives, then we 
have, I think, every reason to suppose they are in a state 
of wellbeing (41). I would accept that wild rodents need
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such "natural" accommodation more than domesticated ones, 
but I think the latter ought to have it too. I do not 
believe we have bred the natural behaviour which would 
take advantage of such a situation out of them, and I do 
not think we can be sure they really are all right unless 
we can see their natural behaviour, or other behaviour 
which we have good reason to regard as an adequate 
substitute for it.
10.7 BIRDS
Bird-keeping has a very long history, as obvious from the 
Chaucer criticism of it (see 1.1, p p  6-7, discussed in
5.2.4, p 118). It is obviously quite possible that it 
could only seem acceptable because of being traditional, 
or, more reasonably, that certain particular methods of 
bird-keeping only seem acceptable because they are 
traditional. I think that the criteria are again the right 
guide, and the right guide not only to how birds of any 
particular kind should be kept but whether they should be 
kept at all. Clearly it is normal to regard certain birds 
as unsuitable to be kept as shown, for example, by a 
comment in a book on cage birds that no-one would dream of 
keeping puffins or shearwaters (42). Why are they 
unsuitable? Because they fly so far, and are creatures of 
the sea and air? Obviously such judgements apply also in 
some degree to nearly all birds. I think the point is that 
while all birds fly (with of course some exceptions) and 
therefore the keeping of any presents a special difficulty
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- I.e. how we can keep them properly when it is essential 
to restrict them in a way that seems more drastic than is 
necessary with non-flying animals - they give us various 
indications, if we keep them, of wellbeing or otherwise, 
and it is reasonable to judge by these, especially if we 
keep a balance between the criteria. I shall try to show 
what I mean. One particular problem faces us, and that is 
how to regard those traditional ways of keeping birds 
which involve preventing them from flying. Clearly, the 
first and most obvious judgement, that a bird should have 
freedom to fly, is one that an experienced aviculturist 
(Lockley is interesting as being also a field naturalist) 
would make:
"...give your birds the maximum space you can afford. 
Birds are creatures of the air and light. Nothing is more 
depressing than to see a bird confined to a single perch 
in a tiny cage: this is sheer cruelty (as cruel as it 
would be to confine a man to a stool in a cage in which he 
could barely stretch his limbs)" (43).
Should there be any exceptions?
HEALTH, as with any other animal, is a good indicator 
of general wellbeing. A bird can be listless, or the 
opposite; an experienced bird keeper will be able to know 
at a glance if a bird is unwell (44). However physical 
health is not everything; sometimes it may overrule a 
judgement based on the requirement of natural behaviour. I 
am told, for example, that a parrot in an aviary is not 
necessarily well-served by being provided with a nestbox. 
If she has not been mated, she may still be encouraged to 
lay (infertile) eggs and runs a risk of being eggbound. I
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include this example to demonstrate how experience and 
practical knowledge is important; but in no way does it 
invalidate the criteria. Another health requirement would 
be the need for exercise, which Lockley certainly 
recognises; here health and natural behaviour requirements 
go together, which is what one would normally expect.
Successful BREEDING is taken as an important 
indication of wellbeing with birds, surely quite 
correctly, in as much as it is a demonstration of freedom 
from stress and that any particular stimuli necessary for 
breeding are being provided, and, as an important part of 
natural behaviour, may be assumed to give the bird 
considerable satisfaction. There is a problem here, and 
that is the fact that many birds will fail to breed in 
free-flying aviaries with plenty of vegetation - in, that 
is, what appear to be highly satisfactory conditions - 
while they will breed successfully in small cages which 
seem far less suitable. There are I think many examples of 
this (45). I presume that a bird in the large aviary will 
suffer stress from the nearness of other birds, whose 
concentration in wild conditions would still be nothing 
like what it is in the aviary, despite the latter's size, 
whereas in a small cage the bird, although confined, feels 
less threatened by other birds. There may be other factors 
which encourage breeding in a small cage but not in a 
larger aviary. Perhaps a particular species could be 
allowed the freedom of a larger aviary for a certain 
period, and then be restricted to a small cage for
breeding. At any rate, I do not think either criterion - 
the fact of breeding successfully, or the need to have the 
chance to display natural behavour - should have absolute 
priority; I think a balance should be sought.
Despite this problem with breeding, the requirement 
of freedom to fly surely remains paramount as a basic part 
of a bird's NATURAL BEHAVIOUR. Obviously a minimum should 
be provided, but how important is much more than the 
minimum (46)? We feel eagles (and seabirds, like Lockley's 
puffins and shearwaters) have greater needs than 
budgerigars or parrots. Is this justified? I think it is, 
in as much as we can base our comments on knowledge of a 
bird's wild behaviour. An albatross hardly ever lands, and 
presumably has a special need therefore to fly. Parrots 
spend much time climbing on trees, just as peacocks and 
pheasants spend much time walking and scratching in the 
soil, and presumably therefore have a lesser need for the 
opportunity to fly far than an albatross, and than a 
Golden eagle. It is however difficult to know how far one 
is being objective in these judgements. Clearly we are 
good at compartmentalising; we show special sympathy with 
a confined eagle, and less with a parrot.
Even though parrots fly less than eagles, they still 
fly, and they climb, so surely to keep a macaw chained to 
a "stand" is quite indefensible. Presumably it is because 
macaws are capable of developing a strong relationship 
with man, and give very real indications of enjoying human 
company, and also because they in fact do not probably
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need to fly as much as many other birds, that they can 
adjust to living on a stand (or at least appear to 
adjust), this including losing "the inclination to fly" 
(47). The direct indications (of the importance of a 
relationship with man - i.e. of enjoying human company) 
are important, but they can not outweigh the simple 
requirement to be able to fly, at least a short distance. 
Roots observes how parrots, cockatoos and macaws are 
sometimes kept in small cages too small to fly in, adding 
that this is perhaps acceptable provided they have 
"company throughout the day, and are allowed out of their 
cages for exercise", but, as he says, they often are not 
and face instead a "life of absolute monotony" (48). In 
view of such an experienced and professional 
aviculturalist's judgement that parrots often are kept 
without being let out, surely it ought to be unacceptable 
to have cages below a size allowing some degree of flight 
- for parrots or any other birds.
Here we have certain traditional practises which I 
think are quite clearly immoral (though keeping a parrot 
in a cage too small to fly is indeed much alleviated when 
the bird has much human company and is allowed out 
substantially). Another traditional practise with certain 
birds which seems quite out of line with what would now be 
regarded as acceptable treatment of any other kind of 
animal is pinioning and, perhaps, wing clipping. 
Interestingly Hediger adds, emphasising the importance of 
any captive animal's having opportunity to move in its
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characteristic way, "if we leave out birds" (49). But why 
should we? Is not pinioning, which consists in cutting the 
wing at the carpal so that there is no base for the 
primary feathers, and is thus anatomically, if not 
behaviourally, equivalent to cutting off the hand, a case 
of mutilation and obviously objectionable? It is quite an 
interesting case, and worth looking at.
Is it any more justifiable than such also traditional 
practises as the docking of tails, and even the cropping 
of ears, in dogs (or even something still nastier, 
debeaking of poultry in batteries and docking of tails of 
intensively kept pigs)? I think in fact it is more 
defensible than these. First, however, note that it is the 
effects of the operation, rather than the performance 
itself, which is the main matter for concern. The 
operation can no doubt be done humanely. We can hardly say 
that every invasive non-medical operation is necessarily 
unjustified or wrong; presumably the spaying of domestic 
dogs and cats is done out of genuine necessity and 
responsibility, arising out of the nature of reproduction 
(that there is going to be "over-production" unless 
something happens to limit numbers, as would happen in 
natural circumstances). Spaying, although indeed 
interference with a basic activity and instinct of dogs, 
is not interference with as basic an activity as is 
pinioning. Some humans do choose to have a vasectomy, for 
example,* it would be strange to choose amputation of arm 
or leg (where there is nothing wrong with them) (50).
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It is significant that it is a) birds (exclusively 
among vertebrates), and b) waterfowl (and also "large 
ground-birds") among birds , that are treated this way 
(51). The special factor about birds is that they usually 
have at least two means of locomotion, walking and flying, 
while waterbirds have three, walking, flying and swimming. 
To destroy an animal's means of locomotion presumably 
seems to matter less when that animal has two other major 
methods of locomotion at its disposal. But I think this 
only explains how pinioning could become or remain 
acceptable where similar treatment of some other animal 
would not. There is of course another factor and that is 
just that the special quality of flying makes it more 
difficult to confine a bird than a non-flying animal. But 
furthermore pinioning has made it possible to keep 
waterfowl and certain ground-birds in a free-er state than 
they would have if they were in cage or aviary. Pinioning 
can also have a serious, conservational purpose, and it is 
relevant that pinioned birds can still breed (52). I 
accept that it apparently does not upset the bird much, 
though the Wildfowl Trust make it a policy not to have 
pinioned birds with non-pinioned ones at migrating time, 
because it is painful to see pinioned birds (and 
presumably would be for the birds themselves to experience 
this) trying to take off with their fellows. My conclusion 
is that it is mainly its being traditional that makes 
pinioning seem acceptable, and that it should not be 
regarded as acceptable unless, at least, there is a very
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strong conservational case for its use in any particular 
instance.
Wing-clipping, as opposed to pinioning, has the 
advantage of not being permanent but the drawback of 
probably necessitating reinterference with the bird each 
year. It could, in a way, allow more freedom, or at least 
be done for the bird's protection. I think of a case of a 
cockatoo given the freedom of the house except when its 
owner is away, but where the bird is clipped to some 
degree so that it cannot fly well enough to injure itself 
by colliding with the light fittings on the ceiling. Here 
the considerable degree of freedom would presumably be 
worth the partial loss of flight.
It is sometimes possible to keep birds with a high 
degree of freedom, to have them freef lying and remaining 
around merely by choice (say because food is available) 
(see 9.3.5, p 221). Birds of prey can also be kept in a 
way which, while it limits their freedom, indeed involves 
very much their being trained, obviously still allows them 
to fly and virtually in the way they would in the wild 
state.
ABNORMAL BEHAVIOUR is well known in certain birds, 
such as parrots, and is as clear an indicator of something 
wrong as with certain mammmals' abnormal behaviour, 
though, like polar bears', it can persist even when the 
conditions seem to have been put right (see 9.4, p 237).
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10.8 REPTILES
It is still probably true that zoos in general know far 
less about how to keep reptiles satisfactorily than 
mammals or birds (52). But the criteria seem our best 
guide to how to improve the situation, to judge both 
captive reptiles' wellbeing, and how we may seek to 
improve it.
HEALTH is one obvious factor, whether judged by 
absence of disease (greatly aided by the the enormously 
important optimum temperature, and by dryness, though 
water is important too (53)), or by length of life or 
rates of feeding and of growth. These rates can vary 
enormously in, for example, alligators, which can grow 
very fast (sometimes thanks to extra vitamins), or almost 
stop completely, as recorded of an alligator in the Tower 
Zoo 140 years ago, and no doubt on numerous more recent 
occasions (54).
Measured by rates of feeding and growth, health as a 
criterion needs to be corrected where necessary by NATURAL 
BEHAVIOUR, and indeed by natural conditions: e.g., some 
reptiles, kept too continuously at what appears (not least 
from the reptiles' own preference) to be their optimum 
temperature, can grow very fast, but be "burning 
themselves out" (55). The most detailed knowledge possible 
of how any particular species lives in the wild should be 
our guide to how to keep it, and will probably indicate 
that any particular species needs a good deal more 
variation of temperature and of other conditions than is
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often appreciated. The degree of natural behaviour 
observed - e.g. territorial displays by iguanas - 
provides, more if anything even than with mammals or 
birds, the best indication we have of reptiles' wellbeing.
The most important kind of natural behaviour is 
usually taken, quite properly I think, to be BREEDING. 
Obviously we want this to occur for conservational reasons 
(indeed often as a first step towards zoos being 
self-supporting, reptiles being still very often taken 
from the wild rather than born in captivity), but apart 
from this, with reptiles perhaps especially, breeding 
seems an excellent criterion for captive wellbeing, mainly 
because it often is so difficult to achieve. The 
difficulty arises from the number of factors which can be 
important for different species' breeding, such as the 
right humidity, day length, temperature, degree of 
temperature variation during the twenty-four hours, need 
for a period of hibernation - which itself will require a 
drop of temperature, but not too much, as well as a 
suitable place to hibernate in, or separation of the sexes 
for a period (56). Sometimes what amounts even to 
disturbance, like a pair of snakes being transported in a 
bag or box, will produce a necessary level of excitement 
resulting in successful mating. Such a drastic remedy as 
this, the apparent providing for a short period of poor, 
stressful conditions, would clearly require careful and 
experienced management for its success to be likely, so it 
does not, I think, amount to an exception to the
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generalisation that reptiles are, as it were, enormously 
fussy, so that success in breeding them can often be a 
considerable achievement. Even unsuccessful breeding 
behaviour can signal significant improvements in 
conditions (57). Keeping reptiles can pose even 
considerable problems in pairing up animals correctly, so 
that failure to breed in itself does not prove an 
enclosure or keeping technique to be inadequate.
Some reptiles, such as some snakes, can be easily 
tamed, and thus give DIRECT INDICATIONS of their 
wellbeing, of, as it were, their acceptance of their 
captive state. I think a snake can indicate, when handled, 
whether it is being stressed, whether it is relaxed, and 
so on. Indeed it can register resistance to being handled, 
by its threatening posture and of course by hissing. Still 
it may be that a snake can become so tame that it will not 
resist even if handled or touched for long periods, but 
may still be stressed (see 9.1, p 201).
Our THEORETICAL APPRAISAL needs to recognise that an 
ideal snake enclosure, for the snake, would probably be 
one where the public never saw it (see 9.6.4, pp 258-259). 
We must attempt a compromise, trying to provide attractive 
areas where the snake will lie in view of the public. But 
it should have areas to retreat to, including a cool place 
for retreat from any area of higher temperature we are 
encouraging it to lie in so that it can easily be viewed. 
The theoretical appraisal should include detailed 
consideration of factors like the means of providing heat
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- e.g., radiant heat should be available, because this is 
how reptiles obtain their heat in natural conditions - the 
need for daily change of temperature, the degree, if any, 
to which one can expect a reptile to accommodate itself to 
conditions other than those like the wild, and the size of 
the area provided, and whether this is likely to be enough 
in view of the species' range in the wild (58).
Clearly responsible reptile keeping is a highly 
technical business, and should include as a high priority 
the obtaining of maximum information concerning the 
natural life of any species kept in captivity. It is a 
pursuit for enthusiasts and specialists, and many good 
reptile keepers probably are in fact keen amateurs, 
prepared to go to any length and trouble to improve the 
conditions of their reptiles and especially to get them to 
breed. The very difficulties of reptile keeping and 
breeding make cooperation between professionals and 
between amateurs particularly desirable, as now occurs in 
zoos in Britain through their Joint Reptile Management 
Committee, and among amateurs and professionals through 
such organisations as the British Herpetological Society, 
with its own journal.
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Chapter 11
CONSERVATION AS A MORAL CONCEPT
In this chapter and the next two I shall consider zoos' 
conservat1ona1 work as a possible moral justification for 
them, and will try to answer three main questions:
1) Is conservation in general a moral matter?
2) Is animal conservation in particular a moral matter?
3) Can zoos make and are they 1 ikely to make any 
important contribution to conservation?
The first of these three questions will be my main 
concern in this chapter, the second in chapter 12, and the 
third in chapter 13.
11.1 CONSERVATION AND STEWARDSHIP 
The concept of conservation itself is first worth 
briefly considering. It is a matter of "saving", obviously 
(this much may be presumed from the word's derivation), or 
protecting, but is this a kind of saving at all distinct 
from that suggested by the term "preserving" (1)? I think 
that, where preserving something tends to mean keeping it 
in existence, conserving it tends to mean keeping it 
either alive or metaphorically alive, that is, active, in 
working order, and so as to continue to be of practical 
uie to uiL and probably so mm to continue to develop. You 
normally conserve aomething you need or may need, or which
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other people may need. It usually involves being 
selective: you conserve what is useful in preference to 
what is not, or what is important in some other way rather 
than what is not, which is one reason why conservation is 
a generally responsible business. For example with 
building conservation, a policy of conserving all 
buildings as such would be virtually incoherent, producing 
a situation where there was no room to build any more. You 
could only sensibly favour the conservation of certain 
buildings (whether on architectural or historical merit or 
practical need or some other factor).
I think there is a considerable range of different 
kinds of things which we may properly conserve:
1) Precious objects, including works of art of various
kinds and buildings (2).
2) Skills and practises.
3) Traditions and ways of life.
4) Institutions (no doubt overlapping with the last).
5) Animals and other living organisms.
6) Ecosystems, natural areas and non-living natural 
objects.
7) Resources, including energy resources.
(This is not intended to be an exhaustive or even a 
very precise list, or its categories necessarily 
exclusive.)
I suggest that the correct and creditable attitude to 
adopt towards any of the items on this list is one of 
stewardship, which I would characterise in three ways:
318
1) Any particular Item In any of the categories may be 
regarded as better or worse of its kind, in some cases in 
a moral sense, sometimes (whether or not also morally) in 
aesthetic and perhaps other senses.
2) The better it is of its kind, the less it should be 
regarded as entirely one's own property (even if it is 
legally one's property), and the more as being held in 
trust for others.
3) The appropriate ways of using it and caring for it 
will be dictated by its own "rules" which the responsible 
and sensitive user will want to obey; he will be aware 
that he is to some extent following dictates not of his 
own making. These rules or dictates amount to the best or 
correct way of using and looking after the item, and are 
learnt from an understanding of that kind of item.
Stewardship is an attitude towards and a way of 
behaving towards something which I think would include 
conserving it (should it be worth conserving).
11.2 CARING FOR OBJECTS
I suggest that things, including certain non-living 
objects, whether natural or man-made, can demand a respect 
from us - that how we treat them, even if they are our 
property, may not or should not be entirely up to us, as 
shown by the fact that we can properly be blamed for 
mistreating them even if, again, they legally belong to 
us .
While I cannot establish this fully by argument any
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more than, for example, according to Hume (as usually 
interpreted) an "ought" can be deduced from an "is" (3), I
will try to show, mainly by means of examples, a) that 
"respecting objects" fits in with the common experience of 
most of us; b) that it is quite easy to see how respect 
for objects is morally good in a sense which often seems 
valid, i.e. is simply altruistic towards other humans; 
c) that such valuing is a necessity or near-necessity for 
human society, not just our own but probably any.
a) It was found after Lady Churchill's death that 
she had destroyed Graham Sutherland's portrait of her 
husband. We might feel that the painting, though 
undoubtedly her property, was not hers to destroy. I am 
not concerned here with whether works of art or any other 
objects (other than animals) have an intrinsic value, a 
value independent of their actual or possible use to 
humans, but only with whether certain objects would be 
normally regarded as having a value such that their owner 
had no right to destroy them or ill-treat them, and such 
that someone who did not own a particular object might 
still owe it a respect which could not be identified with 
a respect due to it as some other person's property.
The owner of a particularly fine house 
(architecturally or historically) might have a 
conservation order placed upon it. But irrespective of the 
legal situation, we might well feel disapproval towards 
such a person for demolishing his house, even though it 
was clearly his property (and, let us suppose, we have no
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personal involvement - we are not hoping, for example, to 
inherit it). Thus we do consider that a person can have a 
duty concerning an object which belongs to him, and a 
duty, when the object merits this, to conserve it.
b) Consider a person who feels it his duty to clean 
his car regularly. Although such cleaning can no doubt be 
taken to extremes (and although I am lax at cleaning my 
car and my conscience remains untroubled by this), I 
suggest that such an attitude of respect towards one's car 
is something itself we should have some degree of respect 
for (4), perhaps indeed because cleaning it is likely to 
go hand in hand with maintaining it (one might compare the 
military stress on the outward appearance of equipment), 
which is for several reasons helpful towards others. For 
example,
(i) if you can maintain your car, you are in a position 
to help others maintain theirs, or maintain public 
vehicles if such a need should arise;
(ii) a car can be a dangerous weapon, but is less likely 
to be a danger to others if well-maintained.
A respect for, even a love of, one's car (such as
might express itself as a feeling of duty towards the car 
itself) perhaps ought itself to be respected because such 
an attitude is likely to produce a really skilled or 
practical understanding instead of a rough understanding. 
One might say 'instead of an "amateurish" understanding', 
but of course the derivation of this term, which has come 
down in the world, is significant. The lover of cars will
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be the real mechanic, whether professional or not. A 
professional mechanic can be in the modern sense 
amateurish, as recounted by Pirsig (5).
But perhaps the important thing is that this kind of 
respect spills over into respect for other things, as 
shown in my second example, an actual case of a woman 
social worker who instructs young delinquent car-stealers 
in the art of maintaining motorbikes and thus instils in 
them a general respect pretty obviously in the interest of 
society and of us all as members of society (6).
c) I think any society depends on the keeping of 
certain machines or tools in working order, or at least on 
their not being wantonly damaged. We need (certain) 
objects; therefore an attitude of respect for (certain) 
objects is a good, a generally beneficial, attitude.
As things to be respected I have mentioned cars, 
houses and pictures. The owner of a work of art perhaps 
owes mankind the duty of not destroying it (a duty whose 
strength will be exactly correlated with the fineness or 
otherwise of the work of art) (7). The artist is very 
likely to feel a duty to his own talent (as in what I 
would presume to be an extreme case, that of Gaugin). So 
may the performing artist (as Janet Baker made clear in a 
recent radio interview). The composer undoubtedly may 
(Beethoven felt his talent as a gift from God). The 
performer can feel a duty, and I think it is likely to be 
felt as a moral duty, to be true, for example, to the 
spirit of the music he is playing.
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Sometimes unusual events may invest what would 
otherwise be ordinary objects with a special significance 
- for people, of course, necessarily - but still something 
which makes them, or ought to, almost "sacred" - e.g. the 
comment of a survivor of the Clydebank blitz about the 
removal by the local authority after the blitz of a 
well-known clocktower which had survived surrounding 
destruction: "I hated them for that" (8).
I am not looking at this matter of respecting 
externally as a sociologist might; I rather want to 
suggest that we are right to respect or value things in 
certain cases - when of course they seem to us worthy of 
being valued. Although we have to value selectively, and 
can select by assessing the strengths of the possible 
reasons for valuing any particular thing, at the same time 
there is a basic quality about valuing; it is a foundation 
for any other pursuit, indeed for keeping on living (9).
11.3 VANDALISM AND BAD CONSERVATION
The concept of vandalism, which I think is meaningful to 
all of us, demonstrates how we do not regard wanton or 
careless destroying of something of value as merely a way 
of behaving we do not care for; we condemn it, I think, as 
in itself immoral. Vandalism includes the stupid damaging 
of things of vital importance (crops or food supplies or 
telephone boxes someone's life may depend on) and it is 
easy to see why damaging these could be a moral matter.
But even if beauty or historic interest or great age is
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what we value something for, we still regard it as an 
immoral act to wantonly damage that thing.
I see vandalism as at least a partial opposite to 
conservation. If vandalism is immoral, then an attitude of 
caring properly for any fine things, which is what I think 
conservation is, or at least clearly akin to, is likely to 
be morally creditable. And indeed one can easily see how 
this can be if the things in question are of value to or 
of use to people in general, or many people, or future 
people (10).
Sometimes there will be disagreement about whether 
something is vandalism. My example of Lady Churchill's 
destroying of the Sutherland picture I would be inclined 
to call vandalistic, but she had her reason, her husband's 
intense dislike of the painting. The explorer Richard 
Burton's widow destroyed his life-long journals on his 
death to protect his reputation. This seems vandalistic, 
but she thought she was serving his interests (11) . A Mrs 
Radcliffe destroyed the series of letters on his 
metaphysical system that Bradley had sent her (12); well, 
if he was fool enough to write to her in these terms, why 
should she have bothered to keep them? But if she had put 
them aside as meaningless to her but possibly of use to 
someone else, this at least would, it seems to me, have 
been a creditable "conservational" or "respectful" 
attitude: that of anyone who though unappreciative of 
something himself yet recognises and respects someone 
else's apparent appreciation of it. I should add that
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vandalism, as I see it, can be committed by governments or 
powerful institutions as well as by individuals or groups 
of young delinquents. An example might be the hasty 
destroying without real need or thorough preliminary 
investigation of rare peat lands in Caithness and 
Sutherland by the merely commercial planting of sitka 
spruce and lodgepole pines (13).
Although I think conservation has a built-in 
implication of moral approval, rather as vandalism has a 
similar implication of disapproval, I recognise the 
possibility of bad conservation. There is first a 
terminological point to note. If we have a case of what 
would normally be vandalism but which we think is 
justified by special circumstances, we may either choose 
to call it a rare case of justified vandalism or deny that 
it is vandalism. Similarly the conservation of 
cockfighting, for example, we may either regard as a rare 
case of bad conservation or deny it to be conservation. 
Compare the term "murder", which normally carries our 
disapproval as part of its meaning. But even so 
occasionally some particular illegal killing of another 
human seems justified. We might then call it a justified 
murder or, more likely, perhaps deny that this particular 
case amounted to murder.
But there are more than terminological points here. I 
think that, just as it fits in with normal human 
experience for murder to be normally condemned, and for 
the simple reason that any human society would find it
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extremely difficult to function if if had no concept of 
murder, similarly it fits in with normal human experience 
that on the whole adopting a conservational, a caring, 
attitude to what is generally valued, or perhaps to what 
any member of the society values, is beneficial to the 
society.
But obviously it cannot be right to conserve anything 
just because it happens to be valued either by ourselves 
or by someone else. Cockfighting is an interesting 
example. Others connected with animals would be 
bullfighting or bearbaiting, and perhaps some cases of 
animal keeping as such - perhaps of course zoos 
themselves. I included "It ought to be conserved" as a 
possible justification for animal keeping in my list of 
possible justifications in chapter 1 (8b, p p  15 and 17), 
and of course the obvious weakness of this as a defence is 
that it could be used for anything, such as cockfighting 
or even worse things like the use of torture. Of course we 
have to evaluate. It is basic to conservation to involve 
selection, for we could not possibly conserve everything. 
If an attitude of conservation leads us to look for the 
good elements in something, if, even, we give things the 
benefit of the doubt as far as possible, and do not rush 
to destroy them, then I think we can see how it is a 
useful approach to adopt.
Cockfighting is a by no means merely academic 
example, as illustrated by a book on cockfighting by 
Finsterbusch (14). Clearly the author sees it as a good
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thing that these special breeds of fowl should be 
conserved, mainly just because of their special, fighting 
qualities. The foreword (by the President of the "Old 
English Game Club") mentions how -
"the courage of game Cocks lives in stories, legends and 
the language itself. Gameness to the end is a 
characteristic that is admired by all sporting men and 
women throughout the world."
The author has enthusiasm, an interesting story to tell, 
quoting many authorities; he is dealing with an amazingly 
widespread group of activities; he could no doubt claim to 
be an "expert" and could tell us we were in no position to 
criticise from our standpoint of ignorance. But of course 
we object to cockfighting; we regard it as cruel. And the 
strength of our case is that we can specify what we mean 
by cruelty, and in what ways cockfighting is cruel, and we 
can bring expert witnesses such as veterinarians and 
zoologists to support our case. And of course in this 
country the matter is academic in as much as it has been 
illegal since 1849 (15), though not academic in as much as 
it may be practised illegally, and in as much as there are 
other practises still legal which we might have as good 
reason for objecting to (such as hare coursing and perhaps 
fox or other hunting). There are no doubt elements even in 
cockfighting which are good in themselves and which would 
allow a reasonably convincing case to be made out for 
conserving it. This underlines the need, if we want to 
decide whether something should be conserved, to consider 
what reasons can be given.
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11.4 CARING FOR INSTITUTIONS
I Included institutions in the list of things which could 
be conserved, and was thinking of human organisations 
like, for example, schools and colleges. Clearly there is 
a strong case for at least hesitating to destroy something 
like an established school which has, say, proved itself 
academically. Scruton goes so far as to classify
institutions as persons (16), and I see that they do have
personality and are at least like developing, indeed 
evolving, organisms. Marvell put the pros and cons of 
national demolition and reconstruction very well in his 
Horatian Ode, and while I do not suggest the Zoological 
Society of London rivals the British constitution in 
importance one could reasonably hesitate to ruin even this 
"great work of time", even if one objected to certain of
its activities as strongly as some of its critics seem to
(17) .
There may be more worth considering in the 
comparison. After all one reason for conserving animals is 
the long time they have been evolving ("vaster than 
empires, and more slow", indeed, like Marvell's vegetable 
love) and I think striking comparisons between the 
evolution of human artifacts, and institutions similarly, 
and the evolution of organisms can be drawn. Consider the 
occurrence of vestigial features in dress, and the way in 
which any new "invention" almost invariably is a 
development of something already existing. There seems a 
good deal in Dawkins's "memes", analogous to genes (18).
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Perhaps human institutions can look after themselves, but 
then many would want to feel the British Parliamentary 
System, say, was something to protect against attack. Of 
course if an institution is clearly objectionable its long 
history is no reason for keeping it, no more than its 
being a tradition is really a good reason for keeping some 
practise we regard as strongly objectionable, but the 
defence is worth something; it is a reason for being 
careful, for being sure of our case.
11.5 HUNTING, APPRECIATION AND SKILLS
I have already mentioned different forms of hunting as 
activities which could be candidates themselves for 
conservation, but presumably to be regarded on humane 
grounds as objectionable and not therefore meriting the 
implied valuation of conservation. Now in fact hunting 
requires our consideration for it has a special importance 
in connection with nature conservation, most obviously 
because the whole point of animal conservation 
historically was to ensure a continuing supply of animals 
to hunt. One good or useful thing about hunting is that it 
does produce a motive for conserving not just animals, but 
the animals in their habitat; for, we might say in fact, 
real conservation in that the animals living their natural 
lives are conserved, or, to put it another way, the 
animals' ways of life, not just the animals themselves, 
are conserved. Thus hunters can, and do, claim to be 
protectors of the countryside, even in some degree
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creators of it (19). On the other hand the changes in the 
countryside they require are not necessarily desirable 
from other points of view (such as the way heather is 
maintained for grouse?). And conservation of the prey 
species may involve the determined removal of humans' 
rival predators, and historically a lot of human rival 
predators who had the misfortune not to be royal or 
wealthy were controlled too sometimes with extreme cruelty 
(20) .
But still the appreciation of animals, even of the 
prey itself and certainly of the prey's natural 
surroundings, is I think something that ought itself to be 
recognised and appreciated. Appreciation by hunters and 
wildfowlers of the prey's natural surroundings comes out 
in an account like that of the duckshoot in Anna Karenin 
(21), and of the prey as well as its habitat in Corbett's 
Man-Eaters of Kumaon. Corbett is a first-rate naturalist 
and some of his experiences concerning tigers seem not 
only remarkable but unobtainable except in the course of 
hunting one. Corbett was of course himself a 
conservationist and became a hunter of maneaters only.
Thus some of his experiences can be enjoyed where they 
could not be had they occurred in the course of 
unnecessary killing (22).
Corbett's skill is an example of one which, however 
distasteful or capable of being misused, ought itself to 
be conserved; i.e., whatever one thinks of hunting, there 
is always a possibility of a situation arising when it may
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be desperately necessary. And obviously it is a complex 
skill, may require life-long practise and study, and is 
thus likely to be possessed only by a true lover of 
hunting.
Actual shooting or hunting skills are required for 
culling in the course of conservation, or simply when for 
some reason it is necessary to kill an animal, and not at 
all easy to do it humanely (see, for example, chapter 2, p 
33 above, concerning the difficulty of killing an 
elephant); somewhat comparable are the skills of 
gamekeepers in releasing pheasants and partridges useful 
in the purely conservational attempt to release 
captive-bred Cheer pheasants (an endangered species) into 
the wild in India; knowledge of how to capture large 
animals by drugging them or other means - needed for 
relocation of wild animals threatened perhaps by natural 
disasters; the knowledge of wildfowlers proving useful in 
the protection of wetlands (23); and knowledge of the 
keeping in captivity of any particular species, whether 
this is professional or amateur knowledge. Often amateur 
keepers of birds such as parrots, or of reptiles such as 
snakes, may because of their enthusiasm and interest in 
one or a few species have experience the professional 
lacks. It is useful that such experience be available: if 
a sudden need arises for the captive breeding of a 
particular species, as it has with the Californian Condor 
(24), it is then likely to be too late to start acquiring 
the necessary expertise.
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Schomberg thus has a point when he gives as a ground 
for the city zoo's probable decline's not being 
necessarily a good thing, that "the major urban zoo with 
varied accommodation for every type of animal is...a 
necessary and valuable contributor to the art of wild 
animal husbandry" (25). Schomberg is rather implying that 
wild animal husbandry is a good thing in its own right, or 
is good because it can be improved and developed, and this 
second point of course is the fallacy noted by Jamieson 
(see p 9, and Defence 13a, p p  15, 16). But Schomberg's 
first implication is worth something: the recognition of 
expertise to be conserved unless we are very sure that it 
will never be needed or indeed is so inhumane or 
objectionable in some other way that even possible 
usefulness is no reason for keeping it - which would be 
the case with the expertise of cockfighting.
I have here given "animal" examples of particular 
skills which may be of something objectionable in some 
respects and yet advisable to conserve for use in special 
cases. But many examples from other fields come to mind - 
military or policing skills, even surgical skills - which 
are obviously only acceptable when used by authorised 
specialists in appropriate circumstances but, given those 
restrictions, of enormous importance.
This suggests the desirability of actively 
encouraging or not discouraging the conserving of 
different activities as a working rule, but at the same 
time with recognition of the need to be selective,
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particularly on humane grounds when necessary - which rule 
out activities like cockfighting. Clearly there will be 
cases which are difficult to decide on.
I included resources in the list of things which
could be conserved. Now while the obvious resources are 
coal, oil etc - and in the twelfth century were rivers, 
forests and sewers (26) - in a way this perhaps applies to 
everything conserved. That is, it is part of the meaning 
of conservation, as I have noted, that you conserve what 
is useful; what is useful is a resource. Now animals (or
rather certain ones) were a resource because they were
needed for hunting; partly they were thus a food resource, 
this being of course the basic or original reason for 
hunting, but partly and I think much more importantly as 
far as the royal and aristocratic circles who were in a 
position to conserve animals were concerned, they were a 
resource for a particular kind of pleasure. One can 
dismiss this as a mere pleasure in killing, or, more 
convincingly, as a mere pleasure in pursuit, but I think 
it would be a mistake to ignore the almost aesthetic 
pleasures, almost, indeed, spiritual pleasures involved. 
One gets people today talking about this with regard to 
fishing, though fishing has questionable aspects, some of 
them well illustrated in Walton's Compleat Angler (27).
I emphasise this aspect of hunting because it points 
the way towards what one hopes is the situation today, 
that we can agree to regard wild animals as a resource (I 
do not mean as a resource exclusively) for aesthetic and
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even spiritual satisfactions. I think the appreciation of 
animals could be seen as developing into a kind of 
appreciation free of any connection with hunting (except 
where this is strictly necessary, as I think is sometimes 
the case). Sir Peter Scott is one naturalist who used to 
go wildfowling but decided against the pursuit (28); no 
doubt there are many similar cases.
It should be mentioned that there are analogies 
between hunting and war, not least in the extreme 
seriousness with which both are pursued, though at least 
one is a recreational occupation; the accompanying 
trappings and rituals, again taken in both cases with 
enormous seriousness and serving to give the whole a kind 
of ritual, almost religious, quality; and the seriously 
regarded rules on apparently non-essential matters which 
occur in both, including honour in war and sportsmanship 
in hunting. (An interesting case is Corbett's guilt over 
shooting a sleeping tiger, though a maneater already 
responsible for many human deaths.) It would be felt, I 
suspect, as a moral matter by practitioners of both 
activities to conserve such rules and their obeying (29).
11.6 CONSERVING THE NATURAL WORLD
Now we might ask whether it is a moral matter to conserve 
natural areas, and I think it is because it is responsible 
in a whole manner of ways to do so (as far as possible; it 
is, as we have seen, essential to conservation to select.) 
We can list various ways in which it is likely to be in
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the interests of other humans that we do so:
1) the importance of rain forests as “sponges" which 
absorb water, releasing it gradually, and thus preserving 
surrounding farmland, preventing desertification and
flooding;
2) the whole interlockedness of species so that loss of 
one may injure us in unexpected ways: a point well 
understood long ago by, for example, Darwin, Frank 
Buckland and Corbett (both the latter with regard to 
tigers) (30);
3) the fact that tropical rain forests contain huge 
numbers of species, more than any other habitat, thousands 
of them plants as yet unnamed and unstudied, many of them 
doubtless potential sources of medically valuable drugs;
4) that it is in any case vandalistic to destroy 
needlessly species every one, whether yet known or 
unknown, of scientific interest, anatomically, chemically, 
perhaps behaviourally (perhaps even important for the 
light it may shed on humans, like Goodall's chimpanzee 
studies), perhaps with some important practical
app1ication.
This list could be multiplied considerably, and any and 
all these considerations are reasons why it is responsible 
to conserve tropical forests (very obviously) and in some 
degree any natural area at all.
Still, with the exception of the rain forest's 
importance as a preserver, itself, of habitable land 
around it, the reasons tend to be rather theoretical, and
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to be concerned with future possibilities rather than 
present certainties. In practical terms they will carry 
weight with those in a position to appreciate them - 
obviously the botanist or coleopterist (most animals are 
insects, and most insects are beetles), may weep over the 
prospect of the appalling losses that continued 
destruction of the Amazon forest at present rates will 
mean, but people without direct experience or involvement 
may not be deeply moved. Not all natural areas are vital 
to our survival, and some people stand to make great 
profits from their destruction (sometimes actually with 
government assistance) ; if financial considerations are 
the main ones, it may be that a quick profit now which can 
then be invested (even at the cost of the extinction of a 
species - say Blue whales, say) will make business sense 
(31) .
Now I have suggested already that caring is of great 
importance; that it is caring about something that is 
going to result in looking after it and (if one knows 
enough about it, as well as caring about it) using it 
properly. So much is obvious. Even with other people (and 
animals, so far as animal welfare is concerned) to whom 
our main moral responsibilities lie, while it may be the 
case that we should simply treat them properly as required 
by the demands of justice, of fairness, it is probable 
that it is sympathy, literally feeling with them, which is 
going to motivate us to help them (as with a response by 
thousands to help the starving in Africa, as a result of
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seeing their plight on television) . I do not think 
emotional involvement in any way lessens the moral value 
of response to human need; indeed Hume saw ethical 
behaviour as stemming from feeling. This is not to lack 
respect for any who act purely out of motives of justice 
or, like Kant, duty alone, if there are any such. But is 
not a concern for justice or fairness itself a matter of 
feeling, something one needs to care about? Do not 
children get extremely emotional if they think they are 
not being treated fairly?
The importance of the hunter to us I think is, as I 
noted, that he has a motivation for conserving animals in 
their habitats. Anyone who shares that motivation is going 
to have a good reason for, for example, not cutting down 
forests as we did in Britain, although we are so anxious 
now to persuade people in other parts of the world not to 
follow our example. The hunter, of course, uses the 
habitat; he removes from it the animal he kills. But if he 
is enlightened, though he kills animals he will avoid any 
danger to the population of the prey: he will conserve the 
stock. And it is perfectly possible to remove timber from 
forest without destroying the forest. In both cases rules 
are being obeyed, and this is a kind of ethics, rules 
about not being excessive, rules of good husbandry, rules 
set, in fact, by the nature of the thing that is required 
(prey or timber or whatever it is).
I find a striking analogy to this in the attitude of 
a landscape architect. Dame Sylvia Crowe who, in deciding
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how to deal with the problem of, say, laying out the land
around a power station in the most attractive way, and so
as to make the power station least intrusive, studies the
lie of the land (even for months) and then follows a
course which (she feels) is dictated by the nature of the
land. What better example could there be of the following
of Pope's advice on laying out a garden?
Consult the Genius of the Place in all;
That tells the Waters or to rise, or fall.
Or helps th'ambitious Hill the heav'ns to scale.
Or scoops in circling theatres the Vale... (32)
Dame Sylvia's approach seems extraordinarily like that of 
the artist who feels constrained by the requirements of 
his art, and of his materials. It involves understanding 
and appreciation of a system which one falls in with. The 
approach of the enlightened hunter similarly involves some 
understanding and appreciation of the system, in this case 
of an ecosystem, which he falls in with. The ethic does 
not forbid him to make use of the system; indeed the use 
is in a way essential, because otherwise the system would 
not matter to him; it is regarded as a resource, and 
appreciated as a resource.
There is nothing in this ethic, we may note, about 
not killing animals, though there may well be something 
about not hurting them unnecessarily. However, the hunter 
certainly does not always feel constrained to avoid 
causing suffering, as in an extraordinary example of an 
elephant hunter's own record of his leisurely destruction 
of an elephant, quoted by Carrington and perceptively
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analysed by Midgley (33). But contrast this attitude with 
Corbett, who, having killed a sleeping tiger, though a 
man-eater, is assailed by regret for having killed him 
asleep and thus failed to give him a fair chance, and 
feels an obviously genuine sympathy for the tiger for the 
pain it has suffered from injury by porcupine
quills (see p p  331-332 above).
I do not wish to appear to be saying that one cannot 
treat nature, or anything else, properly unless one 
regards it as a physical resource: something which one 
treats properly only because one gets from it a continuing 
supply of timber, say, or of dead tigers. This is one 
reason why I stressed the aesthetic or even spiritual 
aspect of hunting: for example in that in some degree it 
regards the country as a resource for spiritual 
refreshment. It is sad that this aspect can not be enjoyed 
without being hung on the peg of killing animals. It is 
precisely this situation, I think, with Izaak Walton, in a 
an example already noted, or in an article by Lord Hume 
about the gentle pleasures of fishing. If, like Peter 
Scott, one can transmute this appreciation into a purely 
aesthetic and scientific appreciation of the natural 
world, of course this is preferable. But so often the 
practical (if violent) purpose - the desire to fish or to 
shoot - is the motivation producing the understanding of 
the prey and its habitat which produces or is all part of
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the appreciation. What seems essential is to appreciate 
the “wild" as a resource of some kind: perhaps because you 
want to photograph or film it, or just wander or backpack 
or explore there, or birdwatch or mammal-watch or study 
plants, or just appreciate it in the kind of way that 
Wordsworth appreciated the wild of the Lake District.
Conservation is an intensely practical business, and 
no less so because of the fact, as I see it, that it needs 
to stem from some sort of appreciation which may be 
aesthetic or even spiritual. One way in which it is 
practical is that it is the people with power, or with 
influence, in the countries where the wild areas needing 
conservation are, that need to appreciate those areas 
(34). Hence the importance of stressing to them that it is 
in their interests, and their people's, to conserve their 
wild areas, whether this is because cropping their 
indigenous wild animals will be a more economic source of 
meat than keeping cattle less suited to the area (35), or 
because this way their forests can continue as a source of 
timber, but in a controlled way, or because of the wisdom 
in maintaining animals for hunting or, better, as a 
tourist attraction, or, even more fundamental, because 
conserving forests prevents flooding and desertification. 
This is a realistic approach, and, as enlightened 
self-interest, is in the spirit of conservation down the 
ages (even though conservation tended originally not to be 
for the ordinary man, but exclusively for the privileged 
few). That is, it is the using of something, and of
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appreciating how useful it can be (as it might be with a 
car or motorbike, or with a work of art or a tradition or 
expertise to be handed down, as in my earlier examples), 
but using properly with a real understanding of it, so 
that it is not misused and especially not destroyed.
Enlightened self-interest can very well be in the 
interests of future generations, as in the conservation of 
the Pere David's deer in China, which presumably was just 
for the Emperors' own enjoyment, but in fact saved the 
species for the world (36). This is very comparable with 
the laying out of great parks and gardens in past 
centuries, now enjoyed by ordinary people who may well 
never have been foreseen or intended as the beneficiaries. 
And there is something very disinterested, very public 
spirited or at least not selfish in any narrow sense, in 
the planting of slow-growing trees, because it is only 
future generations who can benefit.
There is as it were a natural logic and a natural 
ethic of conservation (37). Interestingly, although it is 
not concerned with the interests of the animals who are 
killed, yet in as much as the habitat is conserved the 
interests of all the animals in or benefiting from that 
habitat are served, even those killed in as much as they 
have been enabled to live a natural life up to that time. 
Hunters appreciate the need of animals for places to hide, 
as well as feed, and are thus likely, I think, to regard 
other animals as having rights to their necessary food, 
but on the other hand they have tended not to extend this
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understanding to rival predators, weasels and birds of 
prey. I think a respect for the relationship of all 
species is very much in line with a true ecological ethic 
such as an enlightened hunter (such as Corbett) would 
appreciate. Attempting to make rival predators extinct, in 
the way gamekeepers have tried with weasels and stoats, or 
shooting vast "bags" of tigers or any other prey, is not 
being true to a proper hunting spirit, any more than it is 
displaying a proper attitude of stewardship.
Keen though I am on the transmuting of hunting 
appreciation into appreciation without hunting if 
possible, we should not disregard the help, both of 
motivation and of specialised knowledge, which hunters (in 
a wide sense) can provide for the cause of nature 
conservation. It is fine to say that wildlife should 
simply be left alone, but this will not stop it being 
interfered with by developers, by those interested only in 
a financial profit. Ironically, it is those motivated by a 
desire to shoot birds who are most likely to protect their 
areas and ensure their survival.
I want now, in the next chapter, to consider why we 
should conserve animals in particular.
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Chapter 12
THE VALUE OF ANIMALS
I have tried to establish in chapter 11 that an attitude 
of stewardship towards all things, in the widest sense, of 
value is an attitude that we (to a great extent) admire 
and regard as a moral attitude, and that a concern with 
conservation stems from, or is at least fully in harmony 
with, such an attitude of stewardship. But some may accept 
all this, may accept, in particular, that ecosystems 
should be conserved, but still want to raise problems with 
the conserving of selected animal species (1) ; problems 
such as the following:
[Cl] Vast numbers of living organisms, perhaps 99.9%, of 
those that have ever existed have already gone extinct. 
This is not only a natural process; it is an essential 
part of evolution. Present species, including ourselves, 
would not exist had millions of others not disappeared. So 
why regard it as important to save those species which are 
in the process of going extinct at the moment?
[C2J If it is explained that many recent extinctions or 
likely ones in the near future are not natural but the 
result of man's activities, including the human population 
explosion, it can be asked why such extinctions are not 
still natural, in that their cause, man, is himself a 
natural phenomenon, and a product, like all other
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organisms, of natural selection.
[C3] In any case very many extinctions face us. Is not 
any choice between the various animals threatened 
necessarily arbitrary? What possible valid reason can 
there be for favouring tigers, say, above tapeworms or 
tsetse flies?
[C4] And how can man have a moral duty to save a species? 
To whom would he owe it? Presumably not the species, but 
how could he owe it either to the individuals of the 
species, whom, in the very cause of conserving the 
species, he sometimes has to cull? If the duty is owed to 
other humans, present or future, can this justify culling 
either? Is this not like killing animals for mere human 
convenience?
I accept that it is more important to conserve whole 
ecosystems; conserving animals is not an alternative, or 
should not be. But I think it is still worth considering 
why animals as such are worth conserving:
a) as an additional reason for conserving ecosystems 
of which all animals like all other organisms form parts;
b) as a reason for trying to save a particular 
species even if it is not possible or practicable to 
conserve its habitat and wild population;
c) as a reason for emphasising the importance of not 
losing even individual species where the ecosystems of 
which they form part are in fact likely to survive but 
without these particular animal species (eg the mammoth 
habitat example mentioned below).
12.1 ANIMALS AS WORKS OF NATURE
I argued earlier that particularly fine or outstanding 
objects merit respect (even from their owners), and in 
some ways animals seem interestingly comparable with works 
of art. I accept that animals are not actually works of 
art (2). It seems essential to the nature of a work of art 
that it be made by man; after all, the derivation of "art" 
is the latin ars, artem = skill. Clearly works of art 
usually are made, and with skill, though I think it at 
least arguable that an object's selection alone by an 
artistically-minded person could qualify it as a work of 
art, like a gnarled root, or polished pebble, picked up on 
the shore and displayed on the mantelpiece (or in an 
exhibition). In this case there would still have been 
skill exercised; skill in selecting rather than in 
actually creating the object in question (3).
In any case, the term "work of nature" exists, 
suggesting that we readily think of natural objects as 
similar enough to works of art at least to merit such 
terminological similarity. We might also regard animals as 
works of God, as in the comment on the hippopotamus 
(Behemoth) splendidly described in Job 40, vv 15-24, "He 
is the first of the works of God", or, less 
appreciatively, by Macaulay on seeing the first 
hippopotamus to arrive at London Zoo:
"I have seen the hippo both asleep and awake, and I can 
assure you that, asleep or awake, he is the ugliest of the 
works of God" (4).
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If we do regard animals as works of God, this presumably 
is equivalent to regarding them as divine works of art 
(5). We could perhaps analyse the concept of, for example, 
a hippopotamus perceived as a divine work of art. If we 
think of a hippopotamus this way, it is (I suggest) for 
two reasons:
a) obviously, because we think the animal was in some 
sense made by God;
b) because the hippo is beautiful enough (or ugly enough, 
if you are Macaulay) and has unity enough to be thought of 
as something that could be made by an artist, the divine 
artist.
Works of art, while not necessarily beautiful or intended 
to be so, must have some quality that marks them out as 
worth paying attention to; and similarly I think 
hippopotamuses do. We would be unlikely to regard a pile 
of dust as a divine work of art, because the pile of dust 
lacks beauty, unity and/or other appropriate aesthetic 
features. If we "subtract" reason a) - i.e., cease to 
think of the hippo as made by God, we are still left with 
the aspect of the animal delineated in reason b) .
I suggest we do readily think of animals as rather 
like works of art, and human animals similarly ("What a
piece of work is a man the beauty of the world! the
paragon of animals!.." (6)).
True, animals move around independently, in fact live 
their own lives, which may seem to disqualify them as
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being in the slightest degree comparable to works of art. 
But a doll's house whose occupants appear to be living 
actual lives, as in a story by M.R. James, might seem (as 
well as a source of unexpected moral problems) a 
fantastically fine work of art, incredibly correct to the 
last detail. All evolution could seem a divine 
entertainment, as in God's comment at the end of 
Mephistopheles' summary of the history of the world at the 
start of Russell's "A Free Man's Worship": 'it was a good
play; I will have it performed again' (7).
Animals "function" aesthetically in another way.
They, or rather their genes, are the opportunity for a 
kind of living sculpture engaged in by the selective 
breeder. Darwin commented that "Breeders habitually speak 
of an animal's organisation as something quite plastic, 
which they can model almost as they please." This can be 
either for practical reasons, as with our familiar 
domestic animals - dogs, horses, sheep, pigs, hens, etc - 
or for amusement or a delight in creating new and ever 
odder varieties, for example of pigeons - carriers, 
tumblers, runts, barbs, pouters and many more, all 
described by Darwin. I am not here approving or 
disapproving of these activities, except in as much as I 
would condemn the production by fashion of animals with 
problems in living properly. My concern here is simply to 
point out that people do regard animals, when so 
domesticated, as a kind of material of art, as well as, in 
the case of the new varieties they produce, as their new
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creations. So it is hardly a wild extrapolation from this 
to regard wild animals as rather like works of art, or at 
least to view them aesthetically (8).
Taxidermy is another example, well illustrated by 
Bartlett's work, and how he saw it, "preserving specimens 
of Nature's most beautiful work", and their display in a 
museum (as Bartlett's reconstruction of a dodo was 
displayed at the Crystal Palace) seems to me analogous to 
the display of pictures in an art gallery (9).
It seems to me that, in view of the fact that animals 
have been viewed aesthetically since ancient times, and in 
view of the various remarkable features of animals which 
in some degree modern science has extended our 
appreciation of (which I will try to sketch in 12.4), that 
we are eminently justified in viewing some animal species 
- such as oryxes or condors - as quite as valuable 
aesthetically as a great work of man like the pyramids or 
the Taj Mahal: as something obviously precious that we 
should conserve, if we possibly can, just in a spirit of 
stewardship.
12.2 ANIMALS AS TREASURE
Animals, especially impressive ones like tigers or lions, 
are sometimes compared to or thought of as treasures. This 
term (if one can forget the patronising or "petting" 
overtones of it when used of infants or animals thought of 
as infants) has the advantage of not necessarily referring 
to something made valuable by the skill or workmanship
involved in its construction, though it can be used like 
this. Two examples of its use which happen to be to hand 
arise in a discussion of Henri Rousseau's 1891 tiger 
painting in a short book on tiger conservation, the other 
in a Radio Times article about a children's series 
involving visits to view treasures in museums and starting 
with a visit to meet "living treasures" (such as a lion 
cub) at London Zoo (10).
The museum/zoo comparison seems to me a reasonable 
one. In my own view the prime role of museums should be as 
a place to keep in safety "treasures" of various kinds 
(and also of course various interesting objects that it 
would seem inappropriate to call treasures), two other 
roles being the display (preferably instructive, and where 
possible) of the treasures to the public and also their 
study. (I would thus see an art gallery as a specialised 
museum.) A zoo, as again a kind of museum, keeps living 
treasures (11). But it of course may be inappropriate for 
various reasons to keep and exhibit living treasures, 
where perfectly appropriate with non-living ones. One 
problem in keeping living treasures satisfactorily, or 
even at all, is that some of their quality as living 
belongs to the part they play in their ecosystem, 
including their relation to their habitat; another problem 
is that of course they require a concern for themselves, 
as living creatures, a concern I will emphasise in 12.5. 
But I think that some animals can, as individuals, be kept 
satisfactorily in zoos, as I have considered in 7.4 and
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chapters 9 and 10. And, as we will see In 13.2, It Is now 
becoming possible to keep certain animals properly even in 
terms of populations - to conserve them in the sense of 
maintaining the captive population as something "alive" in 
more than one sense, and from which the corresponding wild 
population may be able to be reinforced or replaced if 
necessary.
"Conservation", I believe, in a museum context would 
mean "restorative work". Now the word "preserve" may well 
seem most appropriate for the museum's role of keeping 
objects safely, especially in as much as the objects in a 
museum are not likely to be still used for whatever they 
were originally, to be preserved, as it were, as "dead" 
specimens, like flies in amber (see 11.1). We might feel 
that "preserve" was the word to use of a zoo's work too, 
because of its suggestion of keeping the living treasures 
in a virtually dead state, in which in poor zookeeping the 
animals may well seem metaphorically to be. But with 
enlightened zookeeping, such as I have tried to examine in 
chapters 9 and 10, and will look at other aspects of in 
13.2, particularly, the word "preserve" in a pejorative 
sense is not applicable. It might still be used in a zoo 
context in preference to "conserve", but merely to mark 
the point that the animals are being maintained out of 
their natural habitat, or "ex situ", rather than in their 
natural habitat as in conservation in the strict sense.
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12.3 AN INTERLUDE: THE DISPLAY OF ANIMALS AS "NATURAL 
WORKS OF ART"
My main aim In this chapter is to suggest the special 
claims that animals have for being conserved. I have 
discussed how we often regard them as works of nature - as 
something like works of art - and sometimes as treasures.
I am not suggesting that animals are like works of art or 
treasures to an extent greater than that to which they are 
unique, i.e. a special phenomenon of their own kind, some 
features of which I shall note below in 12.4. Before this, 
however, I want to consider what seems to me an 
interesting, though minor, aspect of the way in which 
animals are kept in zoos, and this is the aesthetic 
aspect.
Clearly we do often regard animals as beautiful, 
often as magnificent and impressive, sometimes as 
attractive in other ways. Sometimes we may be unaware of 
the features that make an animal appeal to us. But let us 
for a moment consider animals as something like 
magnificent pictures such as we would display in an art 
gallery. To display a picture or a sculpture properly is 
itself an aesthetic matter, requiring judgement about the 
most effective, tasteful and even, I suggest, respectful, 
way of displaying it. A picture's frame needs to be 
appropriate; a picture could be framed in a way that made 
it look ridiculous, just as it could be hung in a 
situation so inappropriate as to be insulting to the 
quality of the picture.
Now it is possible, indeed perhaps highly desirable,
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for an art gallery itself to be a work of art, and I think 
the best case for London Zoo's much criticised elephant 
and rhino pavilion (see 10.4, p p  292-293) would be to see 
it as a way of displaying elephants in a manner which does 
honour to them as magnificent works of nature, like 
displaying a great master in an art gallery to the best 
advantage. In an architect's eyes, the building -
"shows a freedom in concept using a sculptural form to 
reflect the occupants and designed to display them in the 
most dramatic way. The rough texture of the walls is not 
unlike that of an elephant's hide. Internally, the timber 
joists arch overhead like trees in a forest ... giving the 
appearance of animals standing in bright toplit clearings 
in a forest" (12).
The aesthetic aim is appropriate and creditable; whether 
it is achieved is a matter of aesthetic judgement which 
does not affect the case. But the obvious point to make is 
surely that the animals' needs should have come first, as 
is well put by the comment of an anonymous 'distinguished 
continental zoo director': "What for the roof so high, uh? 
They think sometimes maybe the elephant is meaning to fly 
up at night and be roosting?" whom Durrell quotes (13). Of 
course if the animals' needs could have been met as far as 
possible, and the aesthetic demands as well, this would 
have been ideal. One could argue that they have been for, 
as Eltringham remarks, stables have not needed much change 
through the centuries and elephants, regarded as domestic 
animals, perhaps just need a large stable, and as such the 
elephant house is no worse than one without the towering 
pinnacles, etc (14). However I want to suggest that even 
aesthetically speaking something more obviously suited to
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the elephants themselves would have been more appropriate, 
and to show this I want to mention another example, also 
at London, that of the Lubetkin Penguin Pool.
This, designed some fifty years ago by Berthold 
Lubetkin, "is certainly a masterpiece... and a work of 
art..." (15). Apparently it was inspired by the shape of 
an egg ("one of nature's most perfect shapes" - Lubetkin's 
comment):
"here was a single idea., flawlessly executed, and that 
somehow possessed, as if in diagrammatic form, all those 
fundamental principles of design upon which architecture 
depends".
Significantly the same article remarks that "It was 
functional, economic and practical, enjoyed by onlookers 
and penguins alike..." This is significant because it 
seems that the pool, despite this overwhelming praise, is 
rather unsuitable for penguins, and in particular is not 
deep enough to allow proper swimming. Because of the 
pool's architectural merit, some thousands of pounds have 
been granted to restore it to its original splendour. But 
ironically there will be no question, despite the money 
available, of, for example, the pool's being deepened in 
the interests of the penguins. This is not possible because 
the pool is protected by a conservation order. I approve 
of a system under which something of special architectural 
merit can have such protection because, as I have 
suggested, I think that fine works of art are clear 
examples of items which should be regarded as belonging, 
in the final instance, to the whole community or to
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mankind, and even protected from their owners if necessary 
(see 11.2). But what is interesting in this case is the 
pool's being flawed as an artificial environment for 
penguins. The architectural critic I have quoted, Stephen 
Gardiner, accepts that part of the pool's perfection is 
its being "functional" and that it is "enjoyed" by the 
penguins. It seems to me that in as much as this is not 
the case (and an ethologist, not an architect, is the 
person who can judge this), then it is not merely that the 
pool's suitability for penguins is flawed and that 
therefore, despite its artistic merit, it ought to be 
improved because the needs of penguins on welfare grounds 
should be recognised as completely superseding any 
aesthetic requirements. It is that the pool, being a 
functional piece of architecture, is itself aesthetically 
flawed in as much as it is failing to meet biological 
requirements. One odd consequence of this fact, if it is 
such, may seem to be that the quality of a functional work 
of art must then change through time, as (in the case of 
architecture for animals) we learn more of their 
requirements. But I think it is rather that, with such a 
work of art, a final judgement upon its quality must wait 
upon the acquisition of the fullest understanding of the 
biological factors involved. And in as much as we never 
will reach perfect understanding of these, so we will 
never be in a position to give a final judgement upon such 
a work of art's merit (16) .
I am suggesting that, at least in theory, there
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should be no conflict between designing a building - or 
equally an enclosure, of course - for an animal species on 
biological and on aesthetic requirements, because the 
aesthetic requirements must include the biological 
requirements, first and foremost, and perhaps other 
non-aesthetic requirements such as the enclosure's not 
giving misleading messages to the public about how it 
should regard the animal. However, I think the challenge 
to the zoo architect or designer becomes an even more 
interesting one if he appreciates the need to meet the 
biological needs of the animal (as well as other 
important, non-biological requirements). For all artists 
work under restrictions, under rules, and part of the 
artistic achievement is the way the artist solves the 
problems of those restrictions, achieves so much within 
them.
A last aesthetic point is that even works of art as 
such, like Henry Moore's sculpture. King and Queen, or 
many of the works of art in the Burrell Collection at 
Glasgow, have been presumed to be set off to advantage, or 
set off best, by a background of the natural world, such 
as trees and grass. It seems more than likely that for 
most animals a really successful (aesthetically) enclosure 
or building is going to need to be natural or incorporate 
a natural area. The message for zoo architects, on 
aesthetic grounds alone, seems clear.
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12.4 ANIMALS AS ANIMALS
I have considered animals as analogous to works of art 
(see 12.1) and as analogous to treasures (see 12.2). Now I 
wish to note six features of animals that are unique to 
living organisms and two more that are unique to animals, 
and to consider these both as a guide to why animals merit 
conservation, and as a guide in some degree to how they 
should be conserved or cared for. The last two features I 
shall discuss in the next section, 12.5.
1. They are highly complex and intricate mechanisms, as 
noted by W.S. Gilbert in these words:
"I don't think I ever wittingly stepped on a 
black-beetle. The mechanism of life is so wonderful that I 
shrink from stopping its action. To tread on a 
black-beetle would be to me like crushing a watch of 
complex and exquisite workmanship" (17).
Now that even just one cell, of the millions that 
make up a higher organism, can be described as "the most 
completely automated factory we know...[with] thousands of 
reactions and hundreds of reaction sequences" occurring
within it (18), Gilbert's response of wonder at a beetle
is even more appropriate than it was then. Here, as in the 
earlier sections of this chapter, we are still, as it 
were, contemplating an individual organism as we might 
contemplate a picture or sculpture; but even viewed thus, 
how much more bewilderingly complex, and beautiful in its 
intricacy, than any work of art; and of course, for that 
matter, how much more intricate, as a "working model", 
even than any robot (19).
2. Animals have a close relationship to their
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environments, being to different degrees anatomically. 
Physiologically and behaviourally (20) adapted to them, 
and forming, along with all the other living beings and 
nonliving materials of those environments, different 
ecosystems. Thus every animal is not only in itself an 
enormously complex mechanism; it is part of a complex 
system, or many systems, according to how we choose to 
analyse the situation.
3. Each animal is born or hatches (or buds off in the 
case of some coelenterates) and, after a limited length of 
life, dies. So animals are constantly being replaced; all 
seem part of a cycle of life. (See Chapter 16 below.)
Between "birth" and death animals change; they 
develop (a process which starts normally, of course, from 
fertilisation). Lengths of life vary a great deal, 
corresponding very roughly with an animal's size. We tend 
to feel more respect for an animal when it is very 
long-lived, and similarly for a plant, such as one of the 
great trees. There is conservational sense in this, since 
long-lived organisms are not readily replaced.
4. Animals may either be seen as coming in "sets" that 
we call species, of very similar though not identical 
specimens, or, probably more correctly, as not only 
individuals themselves but also part of species which are 
themselves strictly individuals with a history and an 
eventual end (21). Animals also come in an indefinite 
number of sets (our other taxa) of increasing size or 
generality. Whether the species is a set or an individual,
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an individual animal such as a tiger does not in a way 
require the protection that a picture does, because the 
latter is unique where the tiger is not; what is unique is 
the species, and this seems not only comparable with a 
human work of art but incomparably more valuable in 
numerous respects (such as 1) and 2) above) (22). The 
tiger (and every other species) is a little like a piece 
of music, such as a symphony, which in fact exists in many 
(transitory) copies, the actual performances.
At the same time the individual tiger is of course 
different from every other tiger, and, just as the 
symphony might be said to exist only in its performances, 
so the tiger species exists only in individual tigers. So 
although every individual (conservationally speaking) is 
in a sense dispensable, this is only true in some degree. 
Some individual tigers will be more important than others.
Related species, or related genera and so on, are 
themselves rather like a set of musical variations on a 
theme: they can be appreciated in (in some degree only of 
course) the same way. I am less reluctant to tender 
analogies between music and organisms in that others have 
suggested them before me, for example the distinguished 
anatomist Sir Gavin de Beer, Gregory Bateson and even the 
great, though appallingly cruel, physiologist Claude 
Bernard (23). The variations here would be not only 
anatomical but behavioral.
5. Many features of animals are controlled by their 
genes, essentially paired sets of highly variable complex
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molecules, duplicated in every one of an organism’s 
constituent cells, and which are "shuffled" in the process 
of formation of every egg and sperm and occasionally some
of them altered chemically, so that every new organism has
slightly different sets from its parents. It is possible 
to see all organisms as devices by which their genes 
survive and produce identical copies of themselves, though 
the validity of this vision of living things, even
explicitly as a merely biological vision, has been
challenged (24). This feature of animals is closely 
connected with the next.
6. Animals also evolve, of course, or rather are part of 
populations or gene-pools that evolve. This gives the 
species, considered as a work of art, a time dimension: it 
develops through millions of years, and of course the fact 
it changes, and will probably eventually disappear (or be 
transmuted into something else) is all part of its 
development (25). This could again be a reason for not 
feeling we had to preserve every individual member of a 
species, but at the same time feeling reluctant to let the 
species itself go extinct. It is the long term (over 
millions of years) development of species ("vaster than 
empires, and more slow..."), that does seem one of the 
reasons for our being reluctant to see them disappear. 
Individual animals, and especially individual plants, 
with very long life-spans equally command our respect.
7. Certain animals are in many ways persons, though we 
tend to restrict the concept of personhood to other
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humans. Some have personal relations with us, and many 
must do in some degree with each other (see 4.3 above). 
This feature of animals is closely conected with the next.
8. Animals are sentient, and many of them must have 
consciousness or awareness; many must be able to suffer 
and to experience pleasure (see chapter 4).
12.5 WHY ANIMALS MERIT "DOUBLE RESPECT"
These last two features of animals are of particular 
importance, and it is of course significant that they are 
the only two of the eight features we have listed which 
apply exclusively to animals rather than other living 
organisms. They are enormously important because they are 
not merely reasons why animals are of value to us as 
remarkable "furniture" of our world; they are reasons why 
animals are of value to themselves. I would agree with 
Elliot (in a rather academic speculation) that the 
absolutely last person surviving in the universe would not 
be doing harm in destroying, before he himself expired, 
any art galleries containing old masters (26). But if 
animals remained, he would have no right to harm them; his 
disappearance would not affect their value to themselves. 
They could continue to live their own lives.
I would make four comments on the last two features, 
especially the second of them, for I do not suggest an 
animal has to be regardable as a person to be of value to 
itse If:
a) These features are another aspect of their "richness"
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and complexity; they are thus two more reasons for 
conserving them.
b) It can give us pleasure or satisfaction to know our 
world, or some particular part of it, is shared by 
nonhuman beings who are themselves not only living but 
having experiences, including experiencing various 
satisfactions or pleasures.
c) But also, because their lives therefore have a 
positive value to themselves, these are reasons for 
conserving them: we should conserve them for their sakes.
d) It is the sentience of animals, especially their 
capacity for suffering and positive pleasure, and the fact 
that some of them are persons (or virtual persons), that 
is the reason why we should regard them as having rights 
(see chapters 4 and 5); why, that is, we should respect 
them on welfare grounds.
So at this point, I suggest, reasons for conserving 
animals and reasons for regarding them as having rights 
coalesce. Thus we should have for at least higher animals, 
any we have reason to regard as being conscious (not just 
self-conscious), a "double respect":
a) respect for them as fine and remarkable "things", as 
I have discussed in the previous chapter and this one;
b) respect for them as sentient beings, who can both 
suffer and experience pleasure.
This would be my reply to Rodman when, while 
appreciating Singer's demand that animals require our 
concern because they can (in particular) suffer, he
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expresses his dissatisfaction with the implication of 
Singer's view that we should feel no concern for 
non-sentient beings and other parts of the environment 
(27). Rodman felt a concern for an area of no great 
ecological or other obvious importance (just "sagebrush, 
scrub oak, and cactus") and would have still wanted to 
conserve it even if there hadn't also turned out to be 
dusky-footed woodrats (28). I see that Rodman may not be 
satisfied by my suggestion, for he finds it "odd to think 
that the plants have value only for the happiness of the 
dusky-footed woodrats", and I, while I would not grant the 
plants value only because of their usefulness to woodrats, 
would hesitate to grant them value in a universe occupied 
by no sentient beings. But I have no particular urge to 
deny them even that value. I am rather concerned to argue 
that they should certainly be regarded as having a value 
for humans and animals, a value because of their beauty 
and complexity as well as their usefulness as food, etc, 
but that the woodrats, in addition to having a value to 
humans as things of beauty and complexity (and no doubt, 
if incidentally, of other usefulness also), have a value 
for themselves because of their sentience, etc, and that 
we should conserve them for their sake (at least unless 
there are overwhelming considerations preventing this) and 
(whatever other considerations there may be) treat them as 
humanely as possible.
Rodman at least wants to conserve the woodrats (along 
with the sagebrush, etc), but Hollands, as an animal
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welfarist, can actually contemplate the likely extinction 
of whales with equanimity, seeing this as a loss merely to 
us and a happy fate for them in being spared their vile 
treatment at the hands of humans (29). We must, I think, 
grant a positive value to the lives of whales (and animals 
far further down the evolutionary ladder than whales) on 
at least two grounds. One is that, if we do not, and we 
are concerned, as of course Clive Hollands is very 
actively concerned, for the prevention of suffering in 
animals then the most logical step is to painlessly 
destroy as many of them as possible (see p 111 above, and 
Godlovitch, op. cit. (p 128, Note 23)). The other is that 
we must give a positive value to animals' lives for the 
same kind of reason that we give a positive value to the 
lives of humans: we should, in both cases, grant that 
their lives are of value to themselves.
So what of the four problems with which I began this 
chapter (p p  345-346 above)? To [C4] I would say that, 
while extinctions are natural and indeed essential to 
evolution, this is no more reason for not regretting the 
occurrence of any extinction before our eyes than it would 
be for not regretting human extinction, were this 
confronting us. It is in any case unlikely that any wholly 
natural extinctions of megavertebrates (see 13.2 below) 
are finally occurring (to our knowledge) in our lifetimes, 
simply because of the long-scale nature of such 
occurrences: they happen, one might say, on an enormously 
greater time scale than that on which we measure human
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activities.
I meant by "wholly natural extinctions" ones in which 
man is not involved. To problem [C2], which notes that man 
himself is natural, and therefore all his activities, 
including his near-crowding out of other large animal 
species, are natural too, I would agree that in a sense 
all this is true. But why should man's plea that his 
selfish activities are a result partly of human nature - 
which, as I suggested in chapter 6, I think is indeed the 
case - be any moral defence? The fact that we can 
recognise and discuss a tendency in ourselves and other 
humans suggests that we have some ability to control that 
tendency. And we had in any case better try our hardest to 
control our selfish (and our violent) tendencies else we 
are likely, of course, to be dooming ourselves as well as, 
and partly as a result of our treatment of, other animal 
(and plant) species.
To [C3], the argument that any choice between species 
is arbitrary, I would reply that of course human values 
must be involved in any .choices of animals to save from 
extinction, but that need not make any such choice 
arbitrary. It is essential to conservation to select, not 
try to conserve everything (see 11.1, p 316 ff), and we 
can and certainly do in fact have strong preferences on 
aesthetic and other grounds for certain species (a point 
well made recently by Tudge (30)), even though it is also 
true (as I suggested in 11.4, point 1) that every kind of 
animal is itself a "mechanism" of (as it were) "exquisite
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workmanship". Many invertebrate species still are, as it 
happens, rather like each other. I will return to this 
matter in 13.8 below.
To [C4], the question of to whom a duty to save a 
species is owed, I reply that it is owed to other humans 
and in some degree also to the individuals of the species 
concerned (31). While culling is admittedly to a great 
extent carried out for human convenience and gain, to some 
extent at least it is a necessary evil: we can genuinely 
cull red deer for the sake of the other deer - not, 
admittedly, for the sake of the individuals culled. I 
shall look at culling further in 13.4 below.
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Chapter 13 
ZOOS AND CONSERVATION
Having I hope established, in the last two chapters, that 
both the conservation of whole ecosystems and of animal 
species in particular may properly be regarded as moral 
matters, I want now to examine the conservational role of 
zoos. I will first state some of the arguments against 
zoos as aiders of conservation.
13.1 OBJECTIONS TO ZOOS’ CONSERVATIONAL ROLE
[Zl] Animal conservation is basically a matter of 
protecting habitats, which zoos as such obviously do not 
do. This is important because -
a) real animals living their natural lives can only be 
conserved in their natural habitats;
b) by protecting habitats, e.g. tropical rain forest, we 
protect vast numbers of animal and plant species, not just 
those attractive to humans, the so-called "charismatic 
megavertebrates", that zoos go in for;
c) animals in zoos are not "real" animals in the fullest 
sense, certainly not truly wild animals (the converse of 
a) above).
[Z2] But zoos' work is not only thus irrelevant to true 
conservation; it is positively harmful conservationally 
because it involves the removal of specimens from their
natural habitats, which process must in varying degrees 
damage those habitats, indeed even endanger the survival 
of the species removed (1).
[Z3] Even if zoos can save certain species, it is not at 
all certain, for a variety of reasons, that they can be 
reintroduced successfully to the wild (2).
[Z4] Where they can not be successfully reintroduced, it 
is doubtful if such saving - to live a life of perpetual 
captivity - is worthwhile, or kind to the animals 
concerned. It might have been kinder to let them "go 
extinct gracefully" (3).
[Z5] In any case, most of the animals kept and bred in 
zoos are not endangered; the captive breeding for 
conservation that is going on is minimal (4).
[Z6] Zoos are not in fact very good at breeding 
endangered species (5) .
[Z7] Saving an animal by captive breeding is vastly 
expensive. The thousands of pounds which it will cost to 
save Siberian tigers, say, by captive breeding would 
achieve far more if used to conserve the appropriate 
habitat; it in particular would save far more species (as 
in [Zlb)] above) (6).
[Z8] Breeding of endangered species is better done in 
"large-scale breeding centres" (7).
[Z9] Conservation in zoos distracts attention from the 
much more important conservation of habitats; we are 
giving the wrong impression, that species and not habitats 
are what matter (8).
372
[Z10] Conservation in zoos, in as much as it is 
successful, may have the unfortunate effect of making 
people think that is all that matters; that there is no 
need to save habitats because zoos are saving the actual 
animals (9).
[Zll] Conservation so far as zoos is concerned is merely 
a bandwagon they are seeking to jump on to justify 
themselves now that their practises are challenged (10).
I am not intending to attempt to answer these 
questions in order, but I hope that answers to most of 
them will emerge in the course of my account. My chapter 
on Education in Zoos will also be relevant to some of 
these questions.
13.2 CONSERVATIONAL CAPTIVE BREEDING
Obviously the most desirable thing is to conserve animals 
by conserving their habitats, for the reason given in 
[Zl]b) above, and to some extent the reasons given in 
[Zl]a) and [Zl]c) also. But with many habitats under 
threat it makes sense to breed some of the animals in 
captivity or "ex situ" for extra security. We then know 
that the species will continue in existence, whatever the 
situation in the wild, and we are ensuring at least the 
possibility of reintroducing animals either to replace an 
extinct wild population or to strengthen a diminishing 
one. Threats occur especially to large animals, which 
tend to disappear long before their habitat suffers severe 
damage. For example, no mammoths remain, though much
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mammoth habitat still does (11). Predators, such as cats, 
at the top of food chains tend to be particularly 
threatened also. Often the threat to the wild habitat is 
direct attack from man, as in the case of the Arabian 
oryx, the Californian condor, and to some extent gorillas
(12). Many of the countries where megavertebrates happen 
to live are unstable, with some perennial danger of 
revolution. In many cases wild populations of 
megavertebrates - e.g. of black rhinoceroses - have become 
split up into pockets, so that it is necessary to manage 
them in the wild. But in such a case as the oryx example, 
there was no way the natural habitat could be made safe in 
the first instance.
Suppose in any particular case a habitat cannot be 
protected; why is it pointless to attempt to rescue any 
particular species which are going otherwise to be lost 
too, especially when there is a chance of being able to 
reintroduce them to a protected habitat in the future
(13)? In view of species' analogies with works of art, I 
suggest an analogy between the habitat and an art gallery. 
If the National Gallery is burning down, we do not 
immediately accept the sad loss of all its paintings. We 
try to rescue the best ones quickly. This seems the 
obvious course with outstanding species similarly, if we 
assume, indeed, they can survive in zoos (which I have 
already discussed - see 7.4, and chapters 9 and 10). That 
certain species strike us as outstanding, the cases of the 
oryx and the condor seem to me clear illustration. This in
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no way devalues any species we cannot rescue. If we cannot 
save all, this is no reason for not saving any. Of course,
if we can save the habitat and thus save all the species
that is the best course; no-one is denying it.
So far as the claim that zoos are actually damaging 
wild populations by removing animals from them is 
concerned, I do not think this is still the case, at least 
to any appreciable extent, or with any reputable zoos
(14). Any capture of animals in the wild and their ensuing
transport is now subject to the CITES regulations, in the
drawing up of which zoos' representatives (notably Dr 
Michael Brambell, Director of Chester Zoo) have themselves 
been involved (15). Of course rules can be broken, and 
nowhere more probably than in the case of those covering 
trade in animals, and it may be also that certain animals 
are not classed as rare which should be. The fact remains 
that by and large the removing of endangered animals from 
the wild for zoos should not now be occurring; to the 
extent that it is, it is of course to be condemned. There 
is still room no doubt for strengthening of the 
regulations preventing trade in endangered animals, and 
certainly room for a great deal more enforcement of the 
regulations, but this has, I think, very little to do with 
zoos; it is to do with private collectors (16).
Obviously the situation was very different a few 
years ago. Of course the appalling situation described in 
Domalain's The Animal Connection, or occurrences such as 
the killing of ape mothers (and other adults) to obtain
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their young are indefensible (17). But that it is 
unjustified to accuse reputable zoos
(18), indeed any British zoos, of continuing to obtain 
gorillas in the old, barbaric way is shown by the recent 
criticism of John Aspinall, despite the exemplary quality 
of Howletts1 gorilla facilities, for purchasing three 
young gorillas (perhaps to save their lives) against the 
advice of CITES and the Nature Conservancy Council. The 
point is that the criticism was from the co-ordinator of 
the American Species Survival Plan and from an adviser to 
the British gorilla breeding panel, i.e. both zoo 
organisations (19). Mary Midgley criticises zoos
for purchasing gorillas in the course of her discussion of 
Marian Mensink's New Scientist account of an 
unsuccessful attempt to reintroduce a gorilla to the wild 
(20). The difficulties of reintroduction are indeed 
important, but Mensink says nothing of the gorilla's 
having come from a zoo, so her account is no evidence of 
zoos' buying gorillas from dealers. Certainly, animals 
should today not normally be taken from the wild at all, 
unless for some reason there is an "excess" of them or 
there is a serious conservational case for taking them, 
and if they are it should normally be by properly 
organised expeditions, who can ensure that the "right" 
individuals are being removed - i.e. individuals from a 
species whose collection can be justified, and individuals 
whom the population in question can stand the loss of, and 
also that the animals are caught and transported as
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humanely as possible (21). I think [Z2] above (p 369) is 
satisfactorily answered. I return to the problem of 
capturing and trading in chapter 17.
We are moving into a new era as far as captive 
breeding is concerned, in that it is now becoming possible 
for a whole captive population to be managed as a whole, a 
development spearheaded by the International Species 
Inventory System (ISIS) in America and soon to be 
supplemented by a central database in Britain (22). Such 
develoments are possible because of relatively new 
understanding of population genetics as well of course as 
computer technology. Stud books which now exist for many 
endangered species, and the various inter-zoo committees 
for various species, and arrangements thus readily made 
for non-commercial moves between zoos, are all steps 
towards the integration of different animal collections 
(23) .
It is now reckoned that a population of, say, 50 
breeding animals in the very short term, or 500 in the 
very long term, if managed as a whole, is enough to avoid 
inbreeding and to ensure the survival of a gene pool 
substantially the same as the wild gene pool of the 
species in question; to ensure, that is, the continuance 
of nearly as much variation between individuals as would 
occur in the wild population (24). This means that there 
is every chance that animals from such a captive 
population will in the future, if reintroduced to the 
wild, have the genetic capacity to respond to changes in
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the environment in the way that a naturally evolving 
population does. Thus, it seems to me, we can regard such 
captive breeding, where we are talking about the careful 
genetic management of a large enough captive population, 
as in a real sense close to "true" conservation. Although 
the population will of course not be in its actual wild 
habitat, it will be very close to being a natural 
population genetically, so it will be a "living", 
developing thing, very different from something in a 
merely preserved state such as we think of as being 
preserved in a museum (see 11.1). And also its members 
will be ready, because of their genetic makeup, for 
reintroduction to the wild, able to adapt to the natural 
environment and become in the fullest sense members of a 
wild population again.
While the total captive population should be managed 
as a whole, it is at the same time desirable that that 
population should be split up among various collections, 
because this acts as a safeguard against the spread of 
infection as well as being genetically advantageous 
(provided each separate population is of a certain minimum 
size) (25). Two possible drawbacks strike me. One is the 
extent to which pairing of animals needs to be managed, a 
point that Midgley rightly emphasises (26). But this is 
hardly more in a new centrally organised system than is 
necessary anyway in any individual zoo. And in any case 
the individuals concerned, even though they are subject to 
a system of "arranged marriages" (which incidentally.
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while - speaking of humans - we do not care for it in the 
west, seems to he an integral part of long surviving 
eastern cultures), are still free to respond or not as 
they choose to different partners, and a great deal more 
free than in many modern farming systems. Again, mating 
partners have to be arranged in all selective breeding. If 
we accept this, and no-one who keeps a pedigree dog, for 
example, is really in a position to condemn it, then I do 
not see that it is overwhelmingly objectionable with 
animals in zoos, though it may well be considerably more 
difficult to implement (27). The other drawback is the 
need for transport of animals between zoos. Clearly it is 
necessary here for zoos to exercise the fullest degree of 
care, and perhaps to be regulated very rigorously, but at 
least it is not a case here usually of large groups of 
animals being moved en bloc, and the very value of 
particular individual animals - i.e. monetary as well as 
otherwise - as well as unavoidable recognition of their 
various special requirements, should encourage high 
standards (28).
While some zoos are much larger, and some are much 
better and more important, than others (probably though 
not necessarily the same ones in all three cases), the 
gradual introduction of the integrated management of 
captive populations means that smaller zoos will have a 
useful role to play, provided they can bring themselves to 
co-operate, and accept the need for computerised records 
accessible to other zoos, and for the following of
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instructions which may even be sometimes to cease breeding 
from favourite and trusty animals. Obviously this is not 
easy, as Mary Midgley rightly emphasises, but as a partly 
computerised integrated management is altering the 
situation, and making it perfectly possible for small zoos 
to be part of a larger system, she seems to be overstating 
her case in saying "Most zoos are quite unable to 
contribute effectively to [serious conservation]" (29). 
Only time will tell, and it is up to "most zoos" to prove 
her wrong.
13.3 BREEDING TECHNOLOGY
Other breeding technology, such as the development of 
sperm and egg storage, fertilisation in vitro, embryo 
transplantation and the like, can all be seen as part of a 
total armoury of weapons which it is good to have 
available if necessary (30). It seems to me a certain 
parallel can be drawn with humans, in that such methods as 
artificial insemination, stimulation of ovulation by 
hormone injection and so on, are methods used (if at all) 
when natural methods have failed: similarly we would only 
use such methods in captive breeding when natural methods 
are ineffective or unavailable (e.g. an attempt to 
stimulate ovulation in a lone female Komodo dragon at San 
Diego and impregnate her with stored sperm from a now dead 
male (31)). I admit that the two cases are not an exact 
parallel in that research into artificial breeding 
involves, in varying degrees, experimentation on animals
which are not themselves needing assistance as humans 
seeking medical or other technological help would be. But 
it does seem to me that such research can be justified by 
its serious purpose, provided of course that it does not 
involve serious discomfort or worse for the animals 
concerned. Its spirit can reasonably be seen as a wish to 
leave no stone unturned in having all possible knowledge 
and every possible technical aid available for any 
particular need, should it occur, in the sphere of captive 
breeding for conservation. The problems are manmade. It 
seems to me responsible that we should arm ourselves in 
all ways possible to try to solve them.
I think I understand Mary Midgley's distrust of an 
overdose of faith in technology to solve all problems: no 
"technical fix", she feels, is going to be without 
"socially disturbing consequences" (32). But I wonder if 
even this is so. Foose and others foresee a combined 
system of wild and captive populations where the latter 
can be used to strengthen the former, perhaps with 
"reproductuve technology" being used to avoid disrupting 
natural populations (e.g. introducing sperm or embryos 
"into animals already resident in the natural habitat") 
(33). Such interference with wild populations may seem 
distasteful - I can imagine the critic saying "It's bad 
enough their messing about with their captive animals,- 
can't they leave the wild ones alone?" - but already some 
degree of management is probably essential for almost any 
population of large animals. If an increased degree of
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technological manipulation is going to help to solve the 
problems which are likely to face us as pressure on the 
wild increases still further in coming years, then it is 
irresponsible of us not to develop it now if we can. It is 
irresponsible not to manage if managing is necessary and 
we think we are capable of it, and I think that 
technological manipulation aimed at good management, aimed 
at conservation, is therefore acceptable and its 
development creditable. I agree with Midgley that an 
example of breeding technology she gives - human surrogate 
mothers for chimpanzees - is bizarre; in fact I think it 
is ludicrous; but the fact scientists and technologists 
can sometimes "go overboard" does not mean they can not 
also often acquire very real understanding and come up 
with real solutions. Problems often can be solved, even 
problems which involve animal behaviour, and upbringing, 
and fitting into social groups, even, perhaps, the need 
not to become too adjusted to captivity (which I agree is 
a particularly tricky problem for zoos conservationally); 
social behaviour, and relations between individuals, are 
subject matter for science, just as much as ova, sperm and 
embryos, and how to manipulate them (34). (This is not to 
say that I think all scientific developments, e.g. the 
creation of new species by direct genetic manipulation, or 
experimentation on human embryos, is necessarily 
acceptable. I think the maintenance of the natural world 
and its natural occupants by, if necessary, technological 
means is a different matter.)
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13.4 CULLING
There are problems here, including moral ones, such as 
the need, for example, for zoos to practise a careful
"natural selection", as far as the best scientific 
expertise available can direct it, which is bound 
sometimes to require killing animals. This is something 
zoos are reluctant to do, and if they do, to talk about, 
for public relations reasons, illustrated perfectly by a 
popular newspaper report of culling at Whipsnade (35). The 
report treated the incident as if it were shocking that 
captive animals should be killed because of excess 
numbers, whereas unless zoos can effectively prevent 
successful breeding by some other method, which is 
presumably very often not practical, killing of certain 
animals is virtually essential. Jamieson sensibly 
recognises this (36), but North who, unlike the Daily 
Express, should know better, speaks of captive-bred 
animals being "butchered" (37). If our objection to any 
culling whatever is such that we consider it makes the 
whole practise of captivity unacceptable, then we must 
surely, to be consistent, equally condemn the allowing of 
red deer to roam (comparatively) free in Scotland. For 
equally, in the absence of natural predators, it is 
impossible to avoid the need to cull (38). Besides, it is 
hardly open at least to non-vegetarians to regard the 
humane killing of captive-bred wild animals as morally 
wrong but the slaughter of cattle and pigs as acceptable.
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Many working animals, such as greyhounds, are in fact 
killed at the end of their working lives, as was the 
practice in the fifteenth century, as Dame Juliana Berners 
tells us in her poem "The Properties of a Good Greyhound":
... The ninth year cart saddle,
And when he is comen to that year 
Have him to the tanner.
For the best hound that ever bitch had 
At nine year he is full bad. (39)
I am not advocating such positively heartless treatment 
of greyhounds, but it seems unreasonable to bring the 
accusation of occasional killing of their animals against 
zoos as if it were a particularly heinous crime, instead 
of an occasional regrettable necessity, of course to be 
carried out humanely if at all. It is worth adding that 
the killing of surplus animals is taken for granted by 
both farmers and "fancy" breeders (40).
The introduction of centralised breeding management 
is not going to make a radical difference, but it will 
provide a second reason why some killing is in practise 
necessary. All such killing I would regard as a necessary 
evi 1.
I would agree with Regan that it is a misuse of the 
term "euthanasia" (which he discusses carefully and in 
detail) to use it for other than the humane killing of an 
animal in its own interests (41). As he says, this is not 
to condemn other killing which may be necessary, but 
merely to distinguish cases which are indeed different. I 
fear that such a plea will however be ignored, for it is
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clearly convenient to vets and others to use "euthanasia" 
for the humane killings they have to perform, e.g. by the 
request of dog owners who wish to be rid of their dog for 
other than concern for its own interests. The extension of 
the term "euthanasia" to all such killings in fact creates 
a need for a new term for what "euthanasia", strictly 
used, refers to.
The use of the term "culling", as also of course the 
practise of culling, could be challenged. One could object 
to the use of "cull", and likewise such a term as "crop", 
of animal killing because of the implication thereby that 
such killing of the surplus or dispensable members of a 
population is as acceptable, as unobjectionable, as the 
destroying of plants. It ought not to be so acceptable, in 
my view, because, as we have seen, animals are aware and 
have lives to lead as we do, whereas presumably we are 
right to feel that whatever we do to plants is at least of 
no concern to the plants. It is because of this obvious, 
but vastly important, difference between animals and 
plants that I would regard culling animals, but not 
culling plants, as (at best) a necessary evil. As I have 
said, I accept that much culling is for human gain, but 
the sort of culling we are speaking of with regard to zoos 
is culling out of virtual necessity, given, certainly, 
that we have zoos, which is not itself a necessity. If 
that is accepted, then it seems to me reasonable, and not 
unjustifiably euphemistic, to use a particular term,
"cull", for a particular kind of killing, done out of
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virtual necessity and humanely.
Maureen Duffy strongly opposes the use of culling 
(the activity, not the term, and in general, not by zoos 
particularly), and for a reason which I must respect: that 
we are making an unjustifiable distinction between humans 
and animals in adopting so readily the solution of culling 
for problems of over-expanding animal populations (which, 
as she says, are always a result of human interference). 
She notes how we would not contemplate the same solution 
for human population problems. I respect Duffy's argument 
because I entirely agree, as I have maintained, especially 
in chapter 4, that animal lives are of value for the same 
kinds of reason as human lives are of value. My own 
defence of culling is to plead necessity. For Duffy, this 
is not good enough: she feels we do not try hard enough to 
find other solutions, and no doubt she is right. She 
advocates birth control, and research to implement this 
with different species. I accept that this is a more 
humane solution than culling, and I think zoos should 
indeed try to use birth control where possible instead of 
putting themselves in a situation where they have to cull. 
However I wonder if birth control really is such an ideal 
solution in general. With seals or herring gulls, where 
Duffy would rather use it than culling, it would mean much 
interference which, apart from the distress or disturbance 
to the animals concerned (and I note Midgley gives this 
as a great problem of birth control), seems to me to carry 
the simple risk of going wrong and causing unforeseen
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damage to wild populations. At least culling carries no 
risk of biochemical or reproductive or ecological mishaps. 
And even humanely, it seems to me, culling is at least 
likely often to be "humaner" than nature. Red deer need to 
be culled by humans because of the absence of wolves. But 
as it happens, to be shot by an experienced stalker is 
probably a far less stressful death than to be killed by a 
wolf. So, in conclusion, while I think culling is an evil, 
and that we ought to make real efforts to avoid it if we 
can, I think it is far from being an unmitigated evil 
(42) .
13.5 INTERFERENCE AND RESPONSIBILITY
It may seem that this whole need for animal management, 
even manipulation, is something objectionable. I certainly 
think we should interfere as little as possible both with 
free living populations and with animals in captivity, 
provided we are also fulfilling our conservational 
r e s p o n s i b i 1 ities.For this is how I see it: we have a dual 
set of responsibilities. We have our concern for animals 
as sentient individuals, who in some cases, most obviously 
(but by no means only) the great apes, are virtually 
persons (43). This is animal welfare, and it should be a 
positive as well as a negative business, i.e. enriching 
captive animals' lives, not merely protecting them from 
suffering. But we also have our responsibility, and I am 
regarding it mainly as a responsibility to other humans, 
but not exclusively so, to conserve animals (see 12.5) . We
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should do this too, while almost certainly granting animal 
welfare considerations precedence in the case of clashes 
between the two responsibilities.
There are difficulties. I have always respected 
Leonard Williams' view that one should not go splitting up 
primate families when convenient in the way one does with 
dogs; and his Woolly Monkey Sanctuary has avoided this.
But with the coming of centralised management it is going 
to become more and more necessary to move animals from one 
collection to another. Those who work in zoos get to know 
their animals as individuals (44), so it is natural and 
creditable that keepers should be reluctant to let certain 
individual animals leave their care. Indeed there can be 
cases when it is inhumane, even in a relatively mild 
degree, to cease personally to care for an animal (45). I 
am tempted to call this problem the "Jimmy the Hyena 
factor" after a particularly tame hyena at Glasgow, a zoo 
"character", whose departure to another zoo (several years 
ago) my wife felt was regrettable. If such an animal goes 
elsewhere with full information accompanying him, so that 
his new keepers know as much about him as possible, 
including his name, his particular tameness and so on, and 
so that his zoo of origin can be kept in touch with him, 
this is a partial solution to the difficulty. I make no 
apology for the fact that I am seeing this in human terms, 
that I am suggesting the sort of thing which might ease 
the distress of, say, a human foster mother at having to 
lose the care of her foster child. For, as I have said.
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animals can become individuals, can become persons, to us 
(46), and we should recognise this, especially because it 
may very well be a two-way relationship with the animal 
knowing his human as an individual and suffering a loss on 
losing him. We should not dismiss this aspect of zoo 
animals as sentimentality. On the other hand, we have got 
to be aware of our very real responsibilities as guardians 
of populations, and the fact that our responsibilities 
have to be balanced. Usually our responsibilities will not 
clash: the better animals' conditions in zoos are, the 
more suitable they will be for reintroduction where this 
seems the best step.
13.6 ZOOS' FAILINGS
Perhaps it is well to sound a note of caution, to 
recognise the possibility that many zoos will not 
co-operate with others in the way they should, will not 
even keep proper records, still less (for example) 
computerise them. On the one hand we have certain zoos 
with a high level of scientific expertise; on the other we 
have many with really none at all (as I shall comment in 
chapter 14). On the one hand we have sophisticated plans 
for zoos to treat all captive animals of a species as one 
population, following the best genetic advice available to 
maintain diversity; on the other we have zoos continuing 
to inbreed animals with known consequences in breeding 
potential, etc, when they have no excuse for not knowing 
better (47). Clearly not all zoo directors are entirely
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co-operative or honest, though on the other hand certain 
zoos such as London and Jersey set a splendid example in 
both these respects (48). Obviously really poor zoos do 
not deserve to survive and perhaps will not. As it 
happens, however, one particular failing of zoos, their 
tendency not to co-operate, to regard each other as rivals 
rather than colleagues, is one which there is nothing like 
an outside enemy for curing, as history well demonstrates. 
As it happens also, the closest co-operation possible 
between zoos is precisely one of the respects in which the 
role they need to play now and in the future differs from 
their role in the past. It just may be, therefore, that 
outside threats will achieve what good advice from inside 
zoos may not do: i.e., get them working properly together 
in the way they need to if they are to do a proper 
conservational job. Outside threats could have the same 
effect with regard to behavioural improvements that zoos 
could make but are prevented by tradition or habit or 
lethargy from actually getting on with. After all, if I 
may take a zoological analogy, fast-running antelopes can 
run fast only because (among other reasons) their 
ancestors shared their world with threatening carnivores. 
In fact they would hardly be antelopes at all without the 
threats their ancestors faced. In a real sense carnivores 
have produced antelopes as we know them (by providing the 
necessary pressure for the useful mutations to be 
selected). So critics who aim at "phasing out" zoos may 
succeed instead in forcing them to evolve into the kind of
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zoos they should be. Of course this is a mere speculation 
on my part, and it is one that those involved can hardly 
acknowledge even if they suspect its truth (49). The 
critics, in particular, can hardly acknowledge what I have 
suggested as the role they may have, for if they became so 
reasonable and understanding of the potential role of 
zoos, they would thereby cease to be hostile enough to 
force, unwittingly, the changes that are needed.
13.7 REINTRODUCTION
I am assuming that reintroduction is likely to be 
possible in any particular case, which may seem unwise in 
view of the way Midgley correctly emphasises the problems 
with reintroducing primates (50). Primates may well 
present particular difficulties (51). But it cannot, I 
think, be denied that several attempted reintroductions 
have already met with a considerable degree of success, 
such as those of the Hawaian goose, the European otter 
(52), Eagle owl, Arabian oryx. Scimitar-horned oryx, Pere 
David's deer (see 10.5, p 296 ff), and at least one tiger 
as described by Singh (53). Failure or partial failure 
does not prove that the nature of the zoo-bred animal is 
at fault: it may be a fault in the reintroduction 
procedure, which is clearly very important. Experience of 
releasing captive bred animals is however not in every 
case something new. Gamekeepers have (whatever one thinks 
of the purpose of their craft) a well-tried technique for 
releasing to the wild pheasants and partridges. I note
that even a correspondent hostile to zoos and the 
possibilities of widespread successful reintroductions 
conceded this was possible with "grazing animals and a few 
birds" (54). But Singh has provided strong evidence of how 
a cat's basic hunting tendency and ability are innate, 
even though an opportunity for the "fine-tuning" provided 
by practise or maternal training may be needed too (55). 
Singh shows how this can be provided by a human who knows 
what he is doing (56). But it is hardly surprising that a 
zoo-bred tiger could be reintroduced successfully. Many 
domestic cats could survive on their own if necessary (as 
many other feral animals such as goats do) (57). True, 
domestic cats have more freedom than cats in a zoo. But 
consider mink bred on mink farms. Here are captive bred 
carnivores, kept in pens either outside or in sheds, even 
selectively bred for special colour varieties (Aleutian, 
Palomino, Pastel, etc) and yet they have escaped (of 
course only occasionally) and gone feral so successfully 
(their coat colour reverting to the wild form in a few 
generations, as with other selectively bred colour 
variants of probably almost any animal) as to become a 
major pest (58). If mink could read, one wonders what they 
would make of the dreadful problems of readjustment to the 
wild (such as "inevitable deep addiction to a captive 
life-style") that seem to have passed them by: at least 
mink seem to refute any generalised claims of the 
overwhelming difficulties of reintroductions (59). Singh, 
in the appendix to his book, notes how much official
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unwillingness there was to accept that it was possible to 
release successfully a captive bred tiger, on the grounds 
that it just could not support itself (which he shows 
patently not to have been the case), and that if it was 
possible it was undesirable because of the likelihood of 
the animal's becoming a maneater (which again Singh seems 
to show convincingly to be fallacious) or because of the 
tiger's not being pure-bred. Singh argues that the latter 
point too is an imaginary worry, at least with a single 
animal whose genes will be "swallowed up" in the gene pool 
(the tigress he releases does breed successfully) (60).
Obviously reintroductions must be approached 
responsibly (61); a transition period is necessary. But 
it does not seem to be necessarily impossible with any 
species. It will depend partly no doubt on the 
individual.
Clearly the more we are able to provide a captive 
environment which stimulates the occupant and encourages a 
wide range of its natural behaviour, the more that 
individual is likely to be a potentially successful 
subject for reintroduction. Even though the environment of 
any particular zoo animal is not in itself going to make 
any difference to the genetic makeup of its descendants, 
obviously it does make a great difference to the 
suitability of that particular animal for reintroduction.
So far as the genetic makeup is concerned, we should 
remember that periods of captivity by man are minute in 
length compared with evolutionary time. Even though
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selection of course operates in captivity (i.e. quite 
apart from whatever "natural selection" we are intending 
to practise, or of course artificial selection as such), 
and this is so whatever we do to minimise it, it is still 
a very short time. I have already commented on the degree 
of natural behaviour retained in even highly selectively 
bred animals, and obviously therefore also in "zoo" 
animals (see chapter 6, p p  189-192).
13.8 SPECIES SELECTION, VALUING AND FINANCE
The extent to which zoos can help by captive breeding to 
save endangered species is of course limited, and most 
obviously so by the minute selection of species from the 
animal kingdom as a whole that they keep, and no doubt 
ever could keep. But why should this invalidate that small 
contribution they can make to the immensely important 
cause of animal conservation? We could, true, make the 
real situation clearer by calling zoos "selected 
charismatic megavertebrate conservation centres" to 
emphasise their limited role, and perhaps then, just as 
bird gardens, presumably, need not feel morally inadequate 
for not even trying to breed endangered mammals, SCMCCs 
(or zoos) would not be condemned, as Mulvaney seeks to 
condemn them, for having saved at the most a dozen species 
from extinction, "a mere 0.00012 per cent of all the 
1 ife-forms on earth", perhaps "less species within the 
last 150 years than have become extinct within the last 
few days" (62). What Mulvaney leaves out is that we do not
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value all species equally, although he clearly 
differentiates between them as much as the rest of us. The 
evidence is there in his photograph, in the presence of 
his English setter. Dogs are special - to humans. We would 
regret their extinction more than we would regret the 
extinction of any of the vast number of invertebrate 
species, probably mostly beetles, that allow Mulvaney to 
shrink, as he does, the zoo achievement. I accept that 
every species, every protozoan, every alga, every 
bacterium, is of immense scientific interest and sometimes 
(e.g. many protozoans) of exquisite beauty too. Every one 
is the product of 2,000 million years of evolution. Still 
more do I accept that to save the rain forest from the 
appalling way in which it is being destroyed for the 
shortest of short term advantages is of the utmost 
importance, and much more important even than saving any 
charismatic megavertebrate (63). But what I do not accept 
is that the need to save natural habitats such as rain 
forests, and the millions of species contained in them, 
can in any way mean that it is not right to try to save 
such exceptional species - in terms of their appeal to 
humans - as the Arabian oryx or the Californian condor. To
save either of these is comparable, as an achievement, to
saving the Taj Mahal (see 12.1, p 350).
Imagine a world in which humans exist, and plants,
and animals too, but it happens (either because these
humans are not very zoologically exploratory, or for some 
other reason) that the only kinds of animals known are
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those which specially appeal to them, like tigers, oryxes 
and condors. It would be reprehensible if they carelessly 
or wantonly killed them off, but in fact they admire these 
creatures greatly and are careful to conserve them. Then, 
at last, discoveries are made, and the humans find that 
their world is even more wonderful than they knew; it is 
shared not only by tigers, oryxes and the like, but also 
by innumerable invertebrates including tapeworms, tsetse 
flies and thousands of beetles. Now the naturalists among 
the humans will realise that these newly discovered 
species are just as interesting as the larger, more 
obviously impressive ones they already knew, and will be 
just as keen, quite rightly in my view, to conserve them 
(should they appear to be in danger of extinction). But, 
and this is the point of my parable, I do not think that 
the new discoveries can logically be a reason why it now 
does not matter about conserving the tigers and oryxes. At 
least, I do not think the new discoveries should be 
regarded as a reason for this, for the features of the 
larger animals that made them worth saving are still 
exactly the same.
I realise that my emphasis on the animals zoos keep 
as being invariably ones that appeal to humans may seem 
unduly anthropocentric, and that it also fails to 
recognise the responsibility a zoo like Jersey feels to 
save species in need of help (such as many threatened 
island populations of boas, for example, or the Volcano 
rabbit, or peccaries) irrespective of their human appeal.
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I do not in fact think that the scientific importance of 
such work should be underrated, or indeed the way in which 
Jersey emphasises the importance of conservation in the 
field and "ex situ" as two sides of one coin. But I do 
think that the saving of a species like the Arabian oryx 
can be quite properly compared to the saving of some great 
work of art and given proper credit as something immensely 
worth doing even if it does not compare in importance with 
saving the South American rain forest (which I do not 
think anyone would suggest it did).
Perhaps, in my imagined world, the discovery of the 
invertebrates would make a difference. It would be another 
claim on the (no doubt) limited financial resources 
available, previously only required for large mammals like 
tigers and oryxes. Certainly, zoos are accused of 
swallowing up large sums of money which would be better 
spent protecting actual natural habitats, and it is noted 
that both Operation Oryx and the attempt to save the 
Californian condor by captive breeding have been immensely 
expensive (64). London Zoo is sometimes blamed for seeking 
or succeeding in getting large grants from the Government 
which could better go to protect wild habitats. My answer 
with regard to the oryx and the condor is first, that both 
are charismatic megavertebrates, and that their appeal to 
us is and should be perfectly comparable to that of some 
great human work of art (like the Taj Mahal). We would 
spend millions to save that; it is creditable, not 
profligate, to spend millions trying to save the oryx or
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the condor. The second point is that in these two cases 
captive breeding happens or happened to be the only way to 
do it, or at least seems the best way. Of course, if we 
could have saved either of these for the same or less 
money by protecting their habitats, that would have been 
the way to do it. But we are right to try to save them 
(just as it would be shocking if we allowed tigers to go 
extinct while spending on a mere painting of a tiger a sum 
that would have saved them), and by the best method 
available in the particular circumstances. The position is 
rather different with the general accusation against zoos. 
I am not personally arguing that zoos are justified solely 
by their role as captive breeders of endangered species, 
though some, such as John Aspinall, would argue that (65). 
So far as London is concerned, I think it has a perfectly 
good claim to government support as a national British 
institution, comparable to the British Museum (Natural 
History) (which I believe began as the Zoological 
Society's museum). It has difficulty in getting it, while 
other countries have national zoos, because the British 
government has always been stingy over such things 
(Buckland in 1880 was appalled by the Government's failure 
to make any proper contribution to an International 
Exhibition of Fisheries in Berlin (66)). Some critics seem 
to regard London Zoo as behaving immorally, but if that 
charge can be substantiated, then the Zoo should not 
exist, not merely have no claim for support. If (as I 
think) the charge can not be substantiated, then, as a
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major scientific and educational institution, it has a 
claim for government support. It has a claim for that 
support partly because of its conservational work, 
including work in the field, but because of other roles 
also (67). To say that the money would be better spent on 
the protection of natural habitats may still be correct, 
but not necessarily more so than the fact that (as
Mulvaney reminds us) the claims of disappearing forest 
are so desperately serious as to dwarf the claims to 
public money of the Royal Shakespeare Company or the Royal 
Opera House or any other such inessential institution. But 
in any case it is true of any zoo that much of its money 
comes from the gate, and, if the zoo did not exist, would 
in no way be available instead for conservation of wild 
habitats - just as, indeed, government grants for London 
Zoo (in as much as they exist) would, if withdrawn, be 
highly unlikely to be diverted to conservation in the wild 
instead (68). On the other hand, if zoos directly or 
indirectly raise money for conservation in the wild, that 
is as it were a bonus for the wild: money that would not 
otherwise have been available.
13.9 SUPPLEMENTARY CONSERVATIONAL ROLES
There are other ways in which zoos can help conservation. 
Their scientific and educational roles are both in the 
end, I think, most obviously justified by the assistance 
they can give, and do give, to conservation (see chapters 
14 and 15). Zoos can also act as a powerhouse of
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motivation for concern about conservation, i.e. enlisting 
the interest and concern of the public as well as actually 
raising money for conservation in the field. I do not see 
this as more than a supplementary conservation function 
that zoos can perform. But still it makes sense to argue 
that people are unlikely to be concerned about the 
survival of animals of which they have no real experience 
and that, while they can indeed see them in their natural 
habitats on film and television, they can also be 
influenced by the more direct experience available in a 
zoo. This can still apply, even given the very limited 
selection of animals in zoos referred to above. But this 
kind of conservational role for a zoo overlaps with its 
educational role, and I will look at it further in the 
next chapter but one.
One rather interesting minor aid to conservation they 
may provide is that of diverting at least some of the 
pressure that would be felt if zoos' millions of visitors 
(see chapter 2, p 40) really all wanted and could afford 
to experience wildlife "directly" in, say, East African 
national parks. My wife remarked once that she could not 
see why people should expect animals to be brought to them 
to look at when they know, if they want to see the Taj 
Mahal, they have no choice but to go and see it "in situ" 
(69). I do not know about the Taj Mahal, but I am 
interested by the need now under discussion to construct a 
model of Stonehenge because of tourist wear and tear, and 
a most marvellous and effective model was actually opened
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three years ago of the Lascaux Caves, with their 15000 
year old cave paintings, in France. It is a problem well 
known to the National Trust, who I am told have a phrase 
"honey pots" for public areas designed to do just what it 
seems to me zoos can do - help to divert a large 
proportion of visitors from visiting and thus damaging the 
actual wild or near-wild areas. The Countryside 
Commission's advice to those interpreting sites to the 
public includes directions for protecting areas from 
over-use by visitors (70) .
In recent months alone I have noted accounts about 
the pressure from the public on cheetahs and also on 
leopards in national parks, and of hotel visitor excess 
pressure on turtle egg-laying on a Greek island (71). 
Cherfas discusses tourist pressure on coral reefs (and 
other examples) in Zoo 2000 (72). I am not disputing that 
nothing a zoo can provide can rival seeing wildlife in the 
wild. Neither am I saying that zoos necessarily today 
dissuade many people or anyone from visiting African 
national parks, and they must sometimes of course do the 
opposite: encourage people who would not have thought of 
it otherwise to go and see the "real thing". I am simply 
suggesting that zoos may already, and certainly could in 
the future, provide as it were living models to help to 
protect the "real thing". The better the zoo can provide 
seemingly real habitats, the better of course it can 
fulfil this role.
One could take my model suggestion further and
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propose real models, e.g. laser sculptures (or updated 
clockwork toys like Descartes' hydraulic statues?) 
replacing animals altogether (73). This might be a good 
idea if there were not other strong reasons for keeping 
actual animals, if we had good reason to suppose that the 
animals we wanted to replace were not in a state of 
wellbeing in the zoo, and if there were any likelihood of 
being able to construct models of a more than Disneyish 
nature. This is a theme I will return to in chapter 16.
13.10 HYPOCRISY
The suggestion that zoos are insincere in their claimed 
aim of aiding conservation ([Z9 above]) is difficult to 
refute partly because almost any supposedly praiseworthy 
activity is open to this particular blunderbuss of an 
accusation. Any successful, or even unsuccessful, person 
has various motives. Peter Singer may have written Animal 
Liberation because this was a new field to get his teeth 
into and make his reputation with. This, even if true, is 
still irrelevant to any assessment of the book's 
usefulness or importance. On the other hand, I accept that 
there is a good deal of truth in a charge of hypocrisy or 
insincerity with regard to zoos. They all do happily claim 
to be assisting conservation, when (as Jamieson puts it) 
there is comparatively little breeding going on and most 
of it is not of endangered animals (74). But it is also 
true that there is no reason to doubt the genuine 
intentions, and the ability to put those intentions into
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effective action, of certain zoos and their directors - in 
Britain, say, Marwell, Jersey, Howletts, London,
Whipsnade, Chester to take just a handful of examples. At 
the same time, as I have said, people's motivations do not 
necessarily invalidate what they do. Durrell's passion for 
not only studying wild creatures but also collecting them 
clearly preceded his serious conservational aims - so much 
is clear from his own books, especially My Family and 
Other Animals. Maybe his later serious claims are a 
rationalising of what he just likes doing anyway. This 
does not matter. Those claims, and the actual 
achievements, can be evaluated in their own right, and are 
very properly normally and generally acclaimed. This does 
not relieve many lesser places of the charge of hypocrisy. 
But, as I have tried to show, it is a) up to them to 
follow the example of the best places; b) new developments 
in captive breeding mean that they all have a contribution 
to make, if they are prepared to do so. There are perhaps 
great practical difficulties in the way of their doing so, 
such as their likely reluctance to follow directions at 
any rate to the extent that will be necessary (75). But 
they need to do so. I am not seeking to defend zoos per 
se. I am seeking to show that zoos have a proper role to 
play if they can meet the challenge. Those which can not 
will deserve to disappear.
13.11 ON KEEPING ONLY ENDANGERED ANIMALS
Finally, I want to repeat that I am not myself claiming
403
that zoos' conservational role by captive breeding, i.e. 
their breeding of endangered animals, is their sole proper 
justification for existing. This view can be genuinely 
held, as it is by Aspinall. It no doubt suits some critics 
to hold this view because they can then accuse zoos, 
without much difficulty, of having many animals which are 
not needed for conservational captive breeding. I think a 
"middle of the road" view is the correct one. At the 
moment, the conservational captive breeding role may well 
be claimed and granted as a justification for, e.g., 
Jersey, Marwell and Howletts. It may be that the main 
conservational role of most zoos for the present is 
through their educational role, but they should also keep 
an eye on what animals need to be captive bred for 
conservational reasons, and keep these as far as possible 
in preference to other animals. The situation should 
change as centralised breeding management, already in 
operation in regard to some species, such as the great 
apes, becomes more extensive. Even where a zoo 
specifically and genuinely has as its aim the breeding of 
endangered species, it can hardly do this efficiently 
without the necessary experience, which means in practice 
that it can not only keep endangered animals. (There are 
also other minor roles for zoos, even in connection with 
wild habitat management, such as providing a place to send 
maneating tigers to (76).)
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Chapter 14
SCIENCE IN ZOOS
I want now to consider how far zoos' contribution to 
science can be regarded, as it normally is, as one of 
their major justifications. I shall first list and comment 
on various kinds of way in which zoos may assist science
(1) :
14.1 SCIENTIFIC ROLES
14.1.1 TAXONOMY
Zoos can provide living examples for the study of 
taxonomy, a major role of zoos in the 19th century. It is 
now performed mainly by museums, whose study collections 
are likely to be far larger than any zoo's because of 
various advantages of dead specimens, most obviously their 
ease of storage and convenience for study, and their 
permanence. I think of items like study skins of 
vertebrates, invertebrates of all kinds, especially 
arthropods with their non-decaying exoskeletons and so 
on. But it is much better where possible to have living 
specimens available for study also, most obviously so that 
behaviour patterns, themselves often significant 
taxonomic factors, can be studied (2). And to acquire the 
dead specimens we have of course to start with living 
specimens, which may very well be animals in a zoo (see 
14.1.7 be low) .
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14.1.2 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS, ESPECIALLY CONCERNING 
BREEDING
Zoos provide opportunities for the recording of various 
data such as the periods between births, lengths of 
gestation, perhaps details of courtship behaviour, notes 
on what particular animals eat, or details of their 
manner of eating (3). Certain observations or discoveries 
may only be possible, and certainly only likely or 
practicable, when one has the animals at close quarters 
and, perhaps, in one's care (4). Some observations will be 
part of more elaborate projects of a physiological or 
behavioural nature, or involve chemical analyses - e.g. 
of the constituents of gorilla milk, or of the saliva of 
different cats.
14.1.3 PHYSIOLOGY, ESPECIALLY REPRODUCTIVE
I mean by this still more elaborate and sophisticated 
physiological work, especially in the physiology of 
reproduction, such as I have discussed above in 13.3 (p 
379 ff). I will say little further about this here, other 
than that, so far as Britain is concerned, such work 
occurs mostly in the Institute of Zoology of the 
Zoological Society of London, and that it is becoming more 
and more geared to the requirements of practical 
conservation both with captive breeding and in the field. 
Hearn has recently stressed the non-invasive nature of 
much of this work: i.e., it does not involve drastic 
treatment of the animal (5).
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14.1.4 VETERINARY STUDY
Vast possibilities for the increase of veterinary 
knowledge arise from the care and treatment of animals in 
zoos: finding out what different species are susceptible 
to, and what is effective in treatment. It may seem that 
this knowledge is only needed because of the fact that 
various wild animals are kept in zoos, an extension of a 
point made by Jamieson (see chapter 1, p 9 above). Thus, 
given we have such and such animals in zoos, it is of 
course creditable we should not only treat them but engage 
in research in order to treat them better; but such 
research can hardly be a justification for zoos, because 
we would not need it if we did not have zoos in the first 
Place.
I think there is a good deal of truth in this. After 
all, veterinary science is essentially the applied science 
(and art) of caring for animals which man happens to keep 
and also, to a great extent, which he needs (or at least 
exploits). The very word "veterinary" comes from the Latin 
for cattle ("veterinae"; the term comes via 
"veterinarius"). But veterinary knowledge arising from 
study and treatment of "zoo" animals can be counted to 
some extent as desirable knowledge independently of its 
zoo applications in as much as:
a) Wild animals are related to, and can suffer from 
similar diseases to, domesticated animals. Understanding 
of the former interrelates with and assists understanding 
of the latter.
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b) Understanding of diseases in wild animals can be of 
great theoretical interest, e.g. because of the part 
played by disease in evolution (see p 167 above), and its 
genetic connections; and of practical importance quite 
apart from man's keeping of animals, e.g. because of the 
fact that parasites of man or domestic animals - such as 
trypanosomes (the protozoans which cause sleeping 
sickness) - can be endemic in wild populations.
c) Knowledge concerning the efficient use of techniques 
such as the administering of drugs to anaesthetise animals 
and to revive them, and the application of such drugs by 
gun or blowpipe, can be needed on occasion in the 
management of wild animals, apart from any question of 
taking them for captivity, e.g. in operations to transport 
wild animals from flooded areas, or areas scheduled for 
development.
So while no doubt veterinary research in zoos is 
partly a matter of studying what different species suffer 
from in captive conditions, it is much more than this: 
much of what is learnt is likely to be applicable to 
animals in the wild state. Zoo postmortem cases will 
often be of particular veterinary interest because of the 
comparative rarity of the animals in normal veterinary 
practise.
14.1.5 GENETICS
One can hardly do genetic studies on animals in the wild 
state because one has no control over which individuals 
are mated. Zoo animals are not the obvious material either
because, for example in the study of the genetics of 
mammalian coat colour, it is among various domestic 
animals that the mutations which geneticists need to 
study are "nurtured". So it is rabbits, rats, mice and so 
on that are the great sources of genetic knowledge. But 
zoos provide a useful supplement to these, making 
possible at least some study on the genes as they occur 
in (relatively) wild animals.
Zoos could play a greater role here were it not an 
essential aspect of their conservational responsibilities 
to avoid selective breeding, at least with animals rare in 
the wild; they may reasonably feel they have some licence 
with animals common in captivity to breed unusual 
variants. But note, in any case, that breeding as a 
leisure pursuit of the members of the various "fancies" 
has, since before the days of Darwin, produced a vastly 
important amount of material for the scientific geneticist 
to investigate. Indeed, Darwin's own investigations of the 
work of selective breeders (the subject of the first 
chapter of The Origin of Species) played a major part in 
the long mental gestation of his theory of evolution (6). 
Thus the study of domesticated, if not necessarily 
captive, animals was actually essential to perhaps the 
greatest scientific discovery since Newton. There is no 
question that keeping animals in captivity in a wide 
sense, although not normally as this occurs in zoos, is 
essential to much genetic study (7). With the development 
of the integrated management of conspecifics in different
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zoos as one population, as discussed in 13.2 (p 372 ff) , 
there may well be "spin-offs" from captive population 
studies for the understanding of the genetics of wild 
populations (8).
14.1.6 BEHAVIOUR
The kind of behavioural study normally done in zoos is 
observational, perhaps with some experimental input, but 
with none such as to cause any distress or injury to the 
animal. This would be, quite apart from moral 
considerations, inappropriate to zoos where the animals 
are there primarily (from the human point of view) for 
exhibition and obviously therefore not going to be 
available for scientific research such as will in any way 
injure them (9). Such behavioural observations are likely 
to be aimed at understanding the natural behaviour of the 
species concerned, rather than using it as a tool for 
understanding something else. This would be ethology 
rather than psychological study, or rather than using the 
animal as a model for some human medical problem (as in a 
study of lead poisoning in zoo animals referred to by 
Jamieson (10)).
This kind of behavioural study, while presumably 
encouraged by London's Secretary in the late 1930's,
Julian Huxley (himself an ethological pioneer), and while 
Zuckerman's famous study of baboon behaviour in the 30's 
is regarded as of seminal importance, seems not to have 
been in the ascendant at London in the post-war period
(11). London's scientific status was then being
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re-established by the founding of the Institutes of 
Comparative Medicine and Reproductive Physiology (12). The 
importance of ethology - i.e., the study of animals' 
natural behaviour often in the field, and very much in its 
own right as a subject of interest - was by no means 
universally recognised among biologists 35 years ago, but 
the situation is quite different today, as illustrated by 
remarkably contrasting comments on the usefulness of field 
studies expressed by Medawar in 1951 and in 1984 (13) . 
Studies of Celebes macaques at London and of chimpanzees 
at Arnhem, Holland, are just two examples of the 
recognised possibilities of zoo-based ethological study 
today (14). Work of this kind is an elaboration of the 
more isolated behavioural observations such as I referred 
to in 14.1.2 above. There is no sharp line between the 
two. Many kinds of "captive" behavioural study are 
possible, e.g., of the "flight" of a flying lemur, of the 
grazing behaviour of wallabies, or the swimming movements 
of a paper nautilus, or even gorilla social relations as 
experienced by temporarily becoming one of the group (15).
One might reasonably doubt the value of captive 
behavioural study on the grounds of the likely abnormality 
of the behaviour observed. Certainly this has to be taken 
into account, as it clearly usually is (16). The Zuckerman 
study (see above) is often referred to (e.g. by Rachels) 
as an example of how a researcher can be misled by the 
artificiality of a captive situation. Certainly it 
underlines both the importance of making allowance for
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likely abnormality compared with the wild in any 
conclusions one comes to, and for the keeping of animals 
in, as far as possible, natural groups. But a recent 
writer, Jolly, stresses how Zuckerman's suggestion "that 
year-round sex was the underlying primate bond" (as well 
as, I presume, his over-estimate of the part played by 
aggressive dominance in primate groups), while shown to be 
mistaken in the light of much subsequent research, was 
correct in terms of "all the data available at the time". 
Zuckerman described "hamadryas baboons fighting to the 
death over females", a result of there being far too many 
males in the group on London's Baboon Rock (see chapter 2, 
P 37 above). But the importance of correct sex-ratios in 
groups of animals is now fully appreciated by zoos (17).
To realise the falsity of assuming that no 
behavioural observations in captivity are valid one has 
only to look at a series of photographs such as those in a 
popular study of animal behaviour by the director of 
Prague Zoo: an oryx scratching with its horn, an okapi 
licking its eye with its tongue and a Clouded leopard 
cleaning its claws with its tongue (18). At the very least 
we are receiving a quite objective demonstration of the 
animals' ability to perform these respective actions. The 
ability is there even if in every case the performance of 
the act occurred only in response to captive conditions. 
But there is no reason to assume this generally, though 
there may be good reasons in any particular case, and we 
should be aware of the possibility. These particular
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maintenance activities of the oryx, okapi and Clouded 
leopard would almost certainly occur in the wild, perhaps 
with a different frequency to their occurrence in 
captivity. I am well supported, I think, by Sadleir's 
confidence that the reproductive behaviour, etc of (even) 
domestic animals has much application to wild animals
(19). (It is perhaps worth mentioning that, much as the 
occurrence of abnormal behaviour in captivity is to be 
regretted, at least any which seems to indicate a 
condition of distress of some kind in the animal (see 9.4, 
P 230 above), it is not the case that study of such 
behaviour could have no general application (other than to 
the study of animals' behaviour in artificial conditions)
(20) .)
14.1.7 STUDY OF DEAD SPECIMENS AND "BIOFACTS"
Providing , dead specimens (or parts of them) for 
anatomical study, I think it is fair to say, is 
the most definite way in which London Zoo assisted 
scientific research throughout its 19th century existence. 
And obviously other zoos can perform at least this 
function too, the now defunct Belle Vue for example (21).
Many animals are also a source of various "biofacts"
- e.g. regularly moulted exoskeletons of arthropods like 
crabs, lobsters, tarantulas, scorpions; antlers, horns, 
hair, feathers; carapaces etc of chelonids, sloughs of 
snakes, and shed scales of lizards. These, like dead 
specimens, can of course be studied (22).
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14.1.8 MILIEU FOR SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITIES 
I called this a list of ways In which zoos can assist 
science and think I should add one more, though it is not 
itself a kind of research. A zoo can be a focal point for 
other scientific (and conservational) activities such as 
meetings or the publication of scientific journals, or 
scientific studies not depending directly or even 
indirectly on actual animals in the zoo (23). This is 
really the respect in which the Zoological Society of 
London was scientific from the start, and London is still 
a scientific society with its "menagerie" a part but by no 
means the whole of its raison d'etre (24). One could 
compare the way in which a museum like the British Museum 
(Natural History) is a centre for research not necessarily 
much connected, if at all, with the museum's public 
displays, perhaps even less so now than formerly (see p 
368 above. Note 11).
Zoos such as London and New York sponsor and fund 
field research, in Africa and elsewhere, research which it 
is possible to argue, as Jamieson does, could easily be 
separated from its zoo "base". This may be so, but it is 
at least possible that the odd and intricate ways in which 
institutions themselves evolve and function mean that 
losing the one - the zoo - would mean losing the other too 
- the field research (see 11.4, p 327 above). In any case, 
studies in the wild and in captivity often complement each 
other (25).
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14.2 ON ZOOS NOT BEING SCIENTIFIC
Before I discuss any of these further, I must grant one 
Important point against zoos as scientific institutions, 
and that is that most of them are not anything of the 
kind. They were not, most of them (and I am speaking 
mainly of this country), founded as such, they are not 
directed or staffed by people trained in science or with 
any interest in or motivation for making scientific 
observations. Their enclosures are not designed with 
scientific study in mind, their animals are not selected 
for their scientific interest. They would probably regard 
their aim as to make a reputable living from recreational 
provision for the public, and their only recognition of 
science as having any application to their activities 
would be that some scientific information may help them to 
keep certain animals more successfully - keep them alive 
and in good health and encourage them to breed.
But however true all this is, and I hope I am 
exaggerating, it is not the whole picture. So far as this 
country is concerned anyway, it is only fair to recognise 
that the Federation Of Zoological Gardens of Great Britain 
and Ireland was founded as long ago as 1966 with the 
intention of encouraging the raising of zoo standards.
From the start applicant zoos had to undergo successfully 
an inspection (with special attention to quality of animal 
care), followed by regular reinspections. The Federation 
has been pressing since at least the early 1970's for zoo 
legislation. The Federation has, with support from the
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RSPCA, initiated a countrywide Keepers' Training Scheme.
It requires all its members to maintain at least basic 
animal records. Jamieson's doubting of the genuineness of 
many American zoos' conservational claims in view of their 
lack of records is reasonable enough; but at least it 
would not apply to all those British zoos who belong to 
the Federation. That many zoos' records are inadequate, 
though, is spelt out clearly by Durrell; he makes many 
other deserved criticisms of British zoos (26). His own 
zoo is in many ways setting an example with its 
scientifically-motivated staff, several (though not all) 
academically qualified, approaching their work in a 
serious spirit, and studying their animals to the utmost 
(and recording their observations) as well as maintaining 
them (with a concentration on breeding programmes).
14.3 THE USEFULNESS OF SCIENCE IN ZOOS 
I have suggested that scientific work in zoos could be 
divided into:
1. Taxonomic; 2. "Basic Observational"; 3. 
Reproductive-Physiological; 4. Veterinary; 5. Genetic; 6. 
Behavioural; 7. "Productional".
Perhaps the first of these should not be a division on 
its own, but part of 2. "Basic Observational" (so far as 
measurements go) and of 6. Behavioural. But I wanted to 
show that the older role of zoos as "taxonomic 
demonstrators" was not entirely superseded.
Let us agree that research in zoos can be classified
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In another way, as having one or more of three or possibly 
four aims:
1) To add to biological knowledge. ("Biol")
2) To assist care and breeding of animals in zoos.
("Zoos")
3) To assist management and conservation of animals in 
the wild. ("Wild")
4) To assist the solution of human medical problems. 
("Med")
Suppose we try to decide to which of these ends each of 
our six kinds of study are directed. We could make a 
diagram of it:
(Y * Yes) 1)"Biol" 2)"Zoos" 3)"Wild" 4)"Med"
1. Taxonomic Y
2. "Basic Observat." Y Y Y ?
3. Reprod.-Physiol. Y Y Y Y
4. Veterinary Y Y Y ?
5. Genetic Y Y Y
6. Behavioural Y Y Y
7. "Productional" Y
What we find, I think , is that the five main kinds of
scientific study, 2. -6., are contributing to biological 
knowledge in its own right, to the applied science of 
keeping and breeding wild animals, and to the management of 
wild populations.
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I would add, concerning the obtaining of knowledge 
useful to man's medical care, that this (Defence 13d in my 
list, p 15 above, discussed on p 19), while unusual, can 
occur, as in some work concerning marmoset breeding. The 
particular example given by Jamieson (see p 414 above) 
seems indeed to merit his comment of "at best unimportant 
and at worst deplorable", but it is hardly, I think, 
typical (27). Other knowledge too obtained in zoo studies 
could no doubt occasionally be relevant to the biological 
study of humans. A striking example would be de Waal's 
chimpanzee study. Sadleir comments too on the possible 
relevance of domestic animal reproductive data to 
understanding human reproduction, and his words would be 
as applicable to wild animals presumably (28).
14.4 KNOWLEDGE OBTAINABLE FROM CAPTIVE STUDY
Is any knowledge only available from the study of animals 
in captivity rather than in the wild? The answer is Yes. I 
shall give just three examples of cases where it appears 
certain that significant information could not have been 
gained without keeping the animals concerned in captivity. 
In examples (i) and (ii) this is stated by biologists 
uninvolved with zoos.
(i) The fact that females in heat in Mongolian gerbi1 
communities visit neighbouring communities to mate, 
returning to their own burrows where their young grow u p  
under the care of their mother and uncles (29).
(ii) Details about the territory and behaviour of
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slow—worms, about which "little can be concluded ... 
without keeping them in captivity" because of their being 
"so inconspicuous" (30).
(iii) The extent to which chimpanzees' jockeying for 
power, etc in their social relations amounts to 
"politics". A great deal was learnt about this (and 
apparently could not have been learnt in the wild, because 
of the extremely close observations needed on fully 
identified individuals through an extensive period) in a 
study of the Chimpanzee Colony at Arnhem Zoo in Holland, 
referred to above (31).
I admit that animal studies like (i) and (ii) would 
probably not usually be done in a zoo. Probably it is no 
coincidence that gerbiIs and slow-worms are both rather 
small: this is a reason for the convenience of captive 
observations (32). Zoos tend, for obvious reasons, to keep 
large animals (though gerbiIs and slow-worms are both, 
incidentally, highly convenient for and effective in zoo 
education). And perhaps it is the case that such large 
animals are likely to have a large range in the wild, so 
that it tends to be impractical to keep them in such a way 
in captivity that anything of scientific importance can be 
learnt about their large scale movements, or the 
organisation of their groups as it occurs in the wild, or 
of course how they find food in the wild. It does seem to 
me that most of the interesting and important recent 
discoveries about many of the kinds of animal kept in zoos 
- lions, tigers, gorillas, orangutans - have been made in
424
the wild. And it is true that, for example, apes and big 
carnivores were kept for decades before we learnt much 
about the organisation of their social groupings - which 
researchers have done by field studies. But that is not to 
say that useful supplementary work, or even comparable 
work such as that at Arnhem, has not been done in zoos. 
There are several other captive environments for 
particular primates which allow study of importance: for 
example gorillas at Antwerp, and at Howletts, chimpanzees 
at Taronga Zoo, Sydney, and at Edinburgh, and the Woolly 
Monkey Sanctuary.
And even if successful behavioural studies in zoos 
are a rather recent phenomenon, much veterinary 
information and "general observations", particularly of 
course on reproduction, have been obtained from or made in 
captive situations.
What I think I have shown is that it can be in 
principle useful to study animals in a captive situation, 
and, more broadly, in an artificial situation as 
contrasted with study in the wild. And sometimes captive 
or "artificial" study is essential for eliciting certain 
information or solving some particular problem. Of course 
studying animals "in captivity" is not synonymous with 
studying them in zoos, and zoos may often be unsuitable 
for various reasons. But they can be very suitable. This 
at least is clear.
This is not in itself to give a moral justification 
of any captive study, still less morally to justify all
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zoos because some of them can genuinely assist the 
obtaining of new knowledge. It might still be the case 
that we should not have zoos; but at least we have to 
recognise that their disappearance would be a loss, and 
not only a minor loss, for scientific study. We have to be 
satisfied on other grounds that the keeping of particular 
animals in particular conditions is acceptable (see 
chapters 9 and 10); but if we are, then the above 
considerations surely help to persuade us that such 
keeping has a serious justification.
14.5 ZOOKEEPING AND SCIENCE
Most zookeepers would probably identify zoos' scientific 
work with their conservation work, accepting that zoos 
have a particular conservation role in the captive 
breeding of endangered species, and seeing their 
scientific role as helping towards that. In practise, in 
the process of keeping the animal and trying one's hardest 
to get it to breed one is probably going to learn and 
discover a good deal. And in fact this is a very real 
motive for finding out how the animal behaves and breeds 
in the wild. Just as knowledge of behaviour etc in the 
wild helps one to breed better in captivity, one can also 
learn from captivity in the process of attempting to 
duplicate what happens in the wild; obviously this is a 
very good test of understanding.
While the justification for this scientific approach 
is not a scientific but a conservational one, the
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conservational justification may be only convincing if one 
is trying to go about one's challenge scientifically. By 
"scientific", I mean, roughly, a) taking a systematic and 
experimental approach, and b) being aware of and 
responsive to relevant scientific information. I recognise 
that breeding is an art as well as a science, and also 
that very human factors come in, like the relationship 
between the animal and its keeper. Formal scientific 
qualifications are no substitute for and no guarantee of 
keeping ability or success. But the fact remains that the 
keeper and the zoo itself must be scientific in some 
degree if they are to be at all conservationally credible, 
for example in the keeping of adequate records, as 
Jamieson notes, and they should be as scientific in their 
approach as they can manage, it being granted that 
different degrees of scientific approach will be required 
with different kinds of animal. For example, it may well 
be that the breeding of certain reptiles needs a very 
scientific approach, in that such an awareness of the 
importance of the various stimuli effecting the animal is 
needed, and such scientific sophistication in adjusting 
them satisfactorily is required also, that a trained 
biologist would be desirable either as keeper or as 
consultant. Just how important for science, and extremely 
difficult to attain, are some of the skills needed to keep 
and breed reptiles and amphibians successfully, is 
graphically, though sadly, illustrated in Koestler's 
account of the Austrian biologist Kammerer, who, earlier
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this century, claimed remarkable results from his work 
with the Midwife toad. He apparently demonstrated a 
Lamarckian effect which, if confirmed, could have enormous 
evolutionary significance. Yet the testing of his results 
is probably out of the question, simply because of the 
rarity of Kammerer*s own ability to keep and breed the 
animals through many generations (33). Obviously such 
skills as Kammerer*s are exceptional, but clearly, in view 
of the scientific as well as other abilities needed in 
some animal keeping, there is a strong case for keeping 
such expertises available, even if not needed at the 
moment, in case of future need (see 11.5, p 330 above).
14.6 CONCLUSION
In some degree I am making a case for the scientific 
potential of zoos, rather than their present reality 
(though the reality is at least rather better, I think I 
have managed to show, than Jamieson makes out). So I 
think it important to appeal to zoos to work hard at 
captive breeding, at recording, etc, and this is partly 
because animals have rights (if humans do) or at any rate 
deserve our respect (see chapters 5 and 12): because, 
indeed, they are very like us in relevant respects (see 
chapter 4).
So we should regard it as irresponsible, even 
arrogant, to be keeping them unless we are:
a) doing our utmost to do it as well as possible (the 
animals are in our hands; we, as humans, have taken on the
428
responsibility of looking after them),
b) we are learning all possible from keeping the animals.
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Chapter 15 
EDUCATION IN ZOOS
I shall use the word "education" In a rather wide sense, 
to mean worthwhile Instruction, or learning, or almost any 
situation which produces some desirable extension of our 
mental faculties. I think education, to count as such, 
should not be trivial; still less can it be the 
inculcation of immoral attitudes or beliefs. Education is 
something we normally approve of, something that is 
valuable (1).
15.1 OBJECTIONS TO ZOO EDUCATION
A challenge, moral and otherwise, to zoo education 
could be mounted on four main counts:
[El] Animals should not be confined in zoos even for 
educational purposes.
[E2] Any instruction or learning that occurs as a result 
of having animals available in a zoo may be desirable 
considered in its own terms alone, but it is devalued, or 
simply morally unjustified, in as much as it is occurring 
because of something unjustified - the confining of the 
animals concerned.
[E3] Any instruction or learning that occurs can be 
invalidated by the impression also given, even the wrong 
moral instruction that is also given, that it is
acceptable to confine animals for our convenience.
[E4] In any case the zoo as a "learning situation" is 
likely to be:
a) not very useful, e.g. because the animals are not in 
their natural habitats;
b) boring, because the animals are doing little;
c) misleading, because of the animals' artificial 
conditions and abnormal behaviour.
Perhaps some supplementary challenges or objections 
are worth adding:
[E5j It is much more important to interest British 
children and young people in our native wildlife than in 
exotic animals from abroad; zoos can give the unfortunate 
and inaccurate impression that our own wild animals are 
less interesting (2).
[E6] Zoo education tends to be a matter of "chattering 
children", more concerned with their "lollies or candy 
floss" than the animals, or "better organised groups... 
more concerned with completing [questionnaires] than... 
with studying animals with any degree of empathy or 
understanding" (3).
[E7] "Every zoo now seeks to make its entertainment 
respectable - and worthwhile - by giving it a veneer of 
education" (4).
[E8] Most people do not go to zoos to be educated, "and 
in any case the facilities offered by most zoos are 
lamentable" (5).
[E9] Many zoos "make no real effort at education" (6).
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[E10] Most of the "educational benefits of zoos [could] 
be obtained by presenting films, slides, lectures... [or 
even] by exhibiting empty cages with explanations of why 
they are empty" (7).
15.2 THE OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED
I entirely agree with [El] (p 432 above) that animals 
should not be confined in zoos for any reasons, including 
education, if by "confined" we understand "kept in a way 
which does not ensure their wellbeing". I think this moral 
challenge can be met on the lines I have attempted in 
chapter 7 (especially 7.4) and chapters 9 and 10. I also 
grant that, if we have good reason to think any particular 
animals in a zoo are not in a state of wellbeing, then 
both [E2] and [E3] follow; the most important thing on 
educational grounds, as simply on the grounds of our 
responsibility towards any animals we keep in terms of 
their welfare, is both that their conditions should be, 
and should be such as to be seen to be, satisfactory, and 
that other reasons for keeping the animal are 
satisfactory. I agree that if, let us say, the animal 
should, on conservation grounds, not be there at all, or 
if acquiring it involved immoral behaviour (of which a 
blatant example would be the killing of several other 
chimpanzees in order to capture one), then the educational 
use could not possibly compensate for such occurrences. 
This is where I agree with [E2]. It is perfectly possible 
for a situation to be valuable to us in terms of our
experience, but unjustifiable because of the ill-treatment 
to some animal (or human) which is involved. I touched on 
this in regard to Corbett's account of pursuing a tiger; 
the richness of his experience would not, in my view, have 
justified killing the tiger; but of course the tiger was 
not killed for Corbett's gain, but out of necessity to 
protect other humans (see 11.5, p 329 above). To vivisect 
animals (as Harvey did) to study the workings of their 
hearts would be (in certain respects) very interesting; as 
an educational exercise, such actions would of course be 
grossly immoral (8). But in the zoo case, my whole point 
is that we must justify the keeping itself of the animal 
by showing the degree to which such keeping is in the 
animal's interests. In some cases, in addition to an 
animal's being kept well, its being kept is justified on 
conservational grounds, or other strong grounds (e.g. 
where an animal has been rescued following injury, and its 
return to the wild is inadvisable on humane grounds); the 
problem of justifying taking animals from the wild I shall 
however consider in chapter 17.
[E3] may seem very similar to [E2], but the point 
here is the message being put across in the situation 
where the animal is, in reality or just apparently, not 
being kept well. I agree with [E3], but would note that 
this point can, I think properly, be "reversed". That is, 
where any animals concerned are clearly and obviously 
being well-kept, we are giving positive moral instruction 
(e.g., demonstrating that animals need to be looked after
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properly) in addition to whatever other study may be 
occurring.
Provided that the moral challenge (of [El], [E2] and
[E3]) can be satisfactorily answered, as I believe it can 
in many cases (and where it can not, then educational 
considerations are just one additional reason why the zoos 
in question need to set right what is wrong), I suggest 
that the opportunity to see and study animals in zoos is 
educationally valuable in several ways. To have animals - 
whether few or many, individuals or species - there in 
front of you is clearly a great advantage in learning 
about them. You can observe their structure, proportions, 
colour and pattern, details of the hair or whatever the 
body covering is, details of the sense organs, shape and 
size of their limbs, and so on, directly. Most of this we
might be able to see as well in mounted museum specimens,
but the colours of such specimens fade, and living animals 
are not the same even throughout the year, still less 
throughout their lives. Observations of one characteristic 
of animals, their changeability, can be made much more 
obviously in a zoo than a museum. Other observations too 
are not possible at all in a museum. In a zoo we can 
observe how an animal moves its limbs, moves about, feeds, 
grooms itself, and in general how it behaves, including 
how it relates to its fellows.
To the comments in [E4] a) and c) (p 433 above), I
would first recall a comment of the authors of a
well-known 'A' level biology textbook, Grove and Newell:
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"We cannot too strongly urge that for true appreciation, a 
living animal is preferable to a dead one, and a dead one 
is better than any drawing or written description" (9). At 
least a zoo does have real animals, live animals, and that 
is something. I would add that in some cases it would be 
in practise impossible to see those animals in their 
natural habitat (tigers are a striking example, which I 
enlarge on further in 16.3 below). Besides, many zoo 
enclosures do at least in some respects simulate the 
animals' natural habitats, and in any case information 
about or discussion of the animals' natural habitats is 
often provided by zoo education staff, or school staff, or 
by guide books, information sheets or labels. Again, 
confrontation with the animal itself is a splendid 
starting point, educationally, for appreciating its 
adaptation to its natural habitat. The captive conditions 
may not be all that artificial; where they are, they may not 
be adversely so. Likewise, the abnormality of zoo animals' 
behaviour can easily be exaggerated (see 14.1.6, p p  
417-417 above), and it is a fundamental requirement of 
keeping animals well to endeavour to provide conditions 
which allow and encourage natural behaviour (see 9.3.4 and 
9.3.5). (I shall comment on [E4] b) below.)
What Grove and Newell are emphasising in their 
comment is also part of the answer to the suggestion that 
zoo education could with advantage be fully replaced by 
the use of film and video (see [E10], p 434 above). No 
doubt for many of us, the marvellous developments in
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natural history film-making in recent years have provided 
a whole new dimension to our understanding of the natural 
world. I particularly appreciated seeing, in Life on 
Earth, creatures like sea gooseberries, and Protopterus 
(a kind of lungfish), which I had studied long before, but 
never observed either in life or on film. The opportunity 
for us all to watch on television cheetahs or elephants or 
lemurs, in their natural habitats, in one way makes zoos 
educationally less important than in the last century. 
Films, indeed widely available illustrated books, have 
removed the urge (or need) that people had a century ago 
to flock to zoos (see chapter 2, for example p p  33-34).
But so far as study of animals is concerned. Grove 
and Newell's comment still holds. A live animal is better 
than a dead one, and a dead one than a book. And, we could 
add, an animal in its natural habitat is better than one 
in a zoo, and one in a zoo is better than one on film. 
Obviously film is a magnificent educational aid. But then 
Grove and Newell, as textbook authors, were hardly 
intending to imply that books too were not a magnificent 
educational aid. They were stressing the importance of 
actual animals for students of zoology - animals in the 
end, not books, being what zoologists study. Similarly 
(obvious though the point is) zoos provide actual animals 
on which student zoologists (and sometimes qualified 
researchers) can make real observations. In a radio 
discussion of zoos in 1984 Robert Robinson described 
watching a crocodile at London Zoo, and how it looked
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stuffed; the keeper explained it wasn't, that if he waited 
long enough, he would see its eyelid move (which he did); 
this, Mr Robinson commented, was marvellous; it was not 
available on film (it was only a pity that children rushed 
by without appreciating such things) (10). In a zoo one is 
not having suitable observations selected for one by a 
film director. Films are not in all respects more 
accurate, because their directors have to select shots of 
animals in action, whereas in real life some animals, such 
as lions, spend "a great proportion of the day... sleeping 
and lolling around" in the wild as in zoos (11). One may 
say how dull the zoo is compared to a film. Sometimes it 
may be; but that is not to say that it is not also in some 
respects more accurate in the scientific instruction it 
offers. I have seen behavioural study of animals in 
captivity dismissed as too easy to be worth doing, but I 
suspect that only someone who had never tried it would 
think this. Of course it is going to be still more 
difficult in the field, sometimes seemingly almost 
impossible (12). But that is what makes the zoo so good as 
a halfway house. It is still extremely difficult to 
identify individuals (in a large group), to record 
behaviour systematically and interpret one's observations 
(13). This is why a zoo can provide such good learning 
exercises, if nothing more. One is coming up against the 
problems of realities in a way which somebody who merely 
watched films could never appreciate (14). (And 
incidentally, as David Attenborough himself has
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demonstrated, some of the sequences in natural history 
series like Life on Earth have to he rigged - or even 
shot in zoos.)
To the comment that zoos are boring ([E4] b), p 433 
above), and in some degree as a reply to several of the 
other objections also, I would respond with certain 
personal experiences. Certainly all the animals in zoos 
are not continually exciting, as indeed they tend to be on 
films (as commented on above). But when I read, as I have 
recently, that even young children are rather bored by 
zoos, I can't help recalling an occasion years ago when I 
took my six year old niece to Edinburgh Zoo. I do not know 
how much she learnt, if anything, but I do know that she 
was enormously excited at the prospect of seeing again her 
favourite "elephant seal", and that she maintained this 
level of excitement for hours while she rushed from animal 
to animal and I, just, managed to keep up with her. This 
same niece kept many animals as she grew older, and has 
now graduated in Ecology, which suggests that her early 
enthusiasm for the zoo may not have been unconnected with 
her continuing adult interest in the natural world. When 
critics emphasise the icecream and sweets, whose presence 
seems in their eyes to demonstrate clearly the frivolity 
and non-educational value of a zoo visit by young 
schoolchildren ([E6], p 433 above), I would reply that I 
can recall from my own experience occasions when I have 
given a guided tour to a party of, say, ten year olds, and 
we have observed all kinds of behaviour, like young
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Barbary rams challenging each other, peacocks displaying, 
lemurs engaging In "stInk-fIghts", and It was as obvious 
to their teacher as to me that the children's visit was 
worthwhile, that it was in no way deserving to be scorned 
as sub-educational. And when I read how zoos just do not 
offer any experience worth having, I have only to recall 
actual experiences of my own to know the at least partial 
inaccuracy of such a comment, experiences like observing 
dogfish and skates at London Zoo, and appreciating the 
grace of their swimming, as well as the precise way in 
which their gill openings operated, the grace too of 
turtles at London and in the Edinburgh Zoo aquarium, the 
beauty of enormous fanworms at the Schonbrunn Zoo in 
Vienna, and of ring-tailed lemurs in the Charles Gore 
Pavilion at London, and the fascinatingly careful, slow 
climbing of the pottos and lorises in the Nocturnal House 
below. These are just odd examples of experiences I know I 
found valuable, and, while I cannot to anyone else prove 
their worth or even that I am not lying in claiming to 
recall them, they represent for me indisputable evidence 
that some zoos do offer some valuable experiences. I would 
not bother to mention them, did not some critics of zoos
not merely seek to condemn them morally, but also attempt
to persuade us that zoos are so insufferably boring as not 
to be worth going to in any case.
It is claimed too that we should not be raising 
children's expectations unduly, for they have no right to
see tigers for example - with which I would agree (see
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5.2.4, p 116 above); what I am saying Is that If the 
tigers are In a state of wellbeing In a zoo, then seeing 
them can be a valuable experience for children and others. 
It may then be added that it is much more important for 
children to learn about and appreciate their own wildlife 
([E5], p 433 above). I agree that to see a weasel or a 
badger is a marvellous experience, and that to appreciate 
such animals, our own wildlife, is, probably, more 
important than appreciating exotic but not more 
interesting animals from far countries. But the two are 
not exclusive alternatives. If our own wildlife is the 
more important to us, that seems no reason for depriving 
children and others of the chance to experience something 
else that is also good, if less important - and of similar 
biological interest. It also of course happens to be the 
case that several British mammals are difficult to see. 
Thus, indeed, those who manage to see them are likely to 
be having, probably partly because of the efforts they 
will have had to make, a richer experience (see 9.6.4, p p 
258-259 above). Of course we should encourage such real 
natural history. However it seems to me significant that 
the former director of Palacerigg Country Park near 
Glasgow, David Stephen, himself a distinguished field 
naturalist, chose to have, at Palacerigg, some enclosures 
(containing, as one would expect, fine habitat 
reconstructions) to give visitors a fair chance of seeing 
such animals as wildcats and badgers. He knows a great 
deal about the wild lives of such animals, including (no
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doubt) just how unlikely most of us are to see them 
without such assistance. Thus I do not see that the 
comment that our children should learn about our own 
wildlife, even though it is a sentiment we should all 
agree with, in some way rules out zoos as also having a 
useful educational role to play. Of course in Africa our 
exotic animals are their (relatively) local wildlife. 
Jordan and Ormrod have illustrated how much, in West 
Africa for example, a zoo gives people, who would never be 
able to otherwise, a chance to see and appreciate their 
own wildlife (15) .
One objection, from a Sunday Telegraph journalist 
([E7], p 433), seems little more than a sneer. Perhaps the 
Sunday Telegraph also, one could respond, "seeks to make 
its entertainment respectable - and worthwhile - by giving 
it a veneer of" - news and serious comment, perhaps? There 
is, however, a serious point in that zoos, like the Sunday 
Telegraph, have various motives, among which is that of 
surviving, which itself necessitates endeavouring to be 
successful in business terms. It is probably true that 
many zoos have started education departments to help to 
justify their existence, to try to appear more serious 
places, perhaps even to make money. This does not mean 
that the work of those departments is thus prevented from 
being educationally useful or worthwhile. I agree that the 
zoo owners' motivation could be relevant to the quality of 
their educational provision; but clearly a firm business 
attitude does not exclude - it may even make more likely -
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the offering of a "high quality" educational product.
Such objections as [E8] and [E9] (p p  433, 434) are 
surely implying that zoo education as a whole can be 
criticised or even condemned on the grounds that some 
zoos' educational provision is poor. But the fact that 
some schools are very good is not affected by the fact 
that some other schools are very poor. Even if it is true 
that a great many zoos' educational provision is not very 
good, or even very genuine, the fact remains that certain 
zoos are clearly doing good educational work. At any 
rate, against these particular objections, I think one can 
properly use Defence 10 (p 15 above, discussed on p p  
17-18).
Objection [E8] also included the comment that most 
people do not go to zoos to be educated. In some degree 
one can make the same reply. Defence 10, to this. One 
reason why I included some examples of what I have found 
for myself to be worthwhile experiences in zoos was to 
indicate that such experiences are possible. It also seems 
rather likely that a great many people besides me find 
some parts of some zoos equally rewarding. If most zoo 
visitors are not taking full advantage of their 
opportunities for learning and for rich experiences, this 
is probably just as true of, for example, museums - 
especially free ones. It also does not matter to the 
animals, as neither do the ice cream and the sweets, 
provided they do not find their way into animals' 
enclosures. As zoos receive a very wide range of visitors,
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obviously including many without special interests or 
qualifications, it does not seem to me unduly disturbing, 
though obviously disappointing, that a study of what 
visitors to zoos learn, or of how well-informed they are 
about animals, should reveal a level of animal knowledge 
only a little above that of the geneal public, and much 
less than many with a special interest or involvement in 
the countryside (16). But what I think is very impressive, 
and very important, is that the same researcher, Kellert, 
has also found in zoo visitors "a great concern for issues 
of animal welfare and rights as shown by a high score on 
the moralistic scale and a low score on dominionistic", 
and a "very high [score] on the humanistic scale", where 
"Humanistic" means "primary interest and strong affection 
for individual animals, principally pets..." (17). It may 
well be that zoo visitors as a whole are not well informed 
about animals, that they have false ideas about them, but 
they apparently care about them and about their interests 
very highly, and appreciate them as individual living 
beings. This seems to me a very strong indication of the 
educational value of zoos both for the general public and 
for children, not necessarily biologically or academically 
in any way, but in terms of the stimulus zoo visiting 
gives to the development of their sympathy with and their 
appreciation of animals. Just how much the simple chance 
to see animals and get close to them means to a great many 
people is demonstrated by a finding in a recent visitor 
study at Calderglen Country Park in East Kilbride. It
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turned out that a far larger proportion of the Park's 
total visitors than anyone had suspected, about 80% in 
fact, visited the children's zoo in the course of visiting 
the Park - far more than visited the Park Interpretation 
Centre, which had been assumed to be a greater attraction. 
One old age pensioner visited the children's zoo every day 
to feed a particular donkey (18). Such findings, and some
of those of Kellert, show, I think, how [E10] (p 434) is
missing the point; biologically films, for example, could 
in some ways replace zoos, though by no means in all ways, 
as I tried to make clear above in regard to behavioural 
studies. But so far as the value of meeting animals is 
concerned, films are quite irrelevant; they offer 
something fine, but little to do with what for many zoo 
visitors - whether general public or schoolchildren - is 
the most valuable element of their visit, the chance to 
meet (in some degree) and appreciate real animals.
This aspect of zoos I shall look at further in the
next chapter. I have said nothing of the work of zoo
education departments as such. Obviously there is a great 
deal I could say of their work, for example about how zoo 
education can contribute to environmental education, and 
to a wide range of subjects, such as art, geography, 
history and English as well as to biology, and how it can 
contribute too at a very wide range of academic levels 
(19). But, unlike what seems to be implied by [E8] and 
[E9], I think that the most important part of zoos' 
educational provision is simply their making available to
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children and adults real animals to observe. I must also 
emphasise a point already made (see 13.9, p p  398-399), 
that having some degree of direct contact with animals can 
well stimulate people's concern for and willingness to 
support the conservation of animals' wild habitats. This 
is I think indicated by Kellert's findings about zoo 
visitors' high level of concern for animals. This is 
likely to include, at least if visitors are given some 
guidance and encouragement (such as a zoo and its 
education department are in a position to do), concern for 
the protection of wild habitats. It seems reasonable to 
emphasise how much appreciation and concern for, say, 
rhinoceroses and tigers are likely to be stimulated by 
some kind of actual contact with them. Of course film and 
television can help enormously. It just seems to me the 
case that zoos, in offering a kind of direct contact with 
animals, can make a contribution too.
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Chapter 16 
ENRICHMENT OF THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT
There Is one further role or multi-role of zoos to 
recognise, and this is that of a place for viewing, 
meeting, having contact with, and being close to animals. 
It seems to me that zoos, alongside many other things such 
as parks in cities and trees in city streets, and flowers 
and aquariums in homes, are ways in which man enriches his 
own environment.
16.1 INVOLVEMENT WITH ANIMALS
First we need to appreciate the extent to which contact 
or involvement with animals as such seems to be important 
to many people, though of course not to all. The 
traditional fondness of kings for horses and lions is 
surely only partly to be explained as a fondness (shared 
with many other people) for status symbols (1). They also, 
I suggest, simply like having animals around, as obviously 
applies to our own royal family, and I would presume 
applied to Kubilai Khan too. (If it did not, he must have 
found it, one would think, a trifle unnerving having lions 
and tigers strolling around the palace, as apparently 
reported by Marco Polo (2).) If I am wrong here, why 
should they choose animals as status symbols rather than
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something else? I suggest the situation is rather that 
almost any activity or hobby which includes having or 
collecting items lends itself to having items which are, 
or are regarded as, of better quality than others of the 
same kind. So within any society of interested humans, 
"status symbols" emerge. Animal keepers of any kind tend 
in this direction. Any of the royal and the wealthy who 
"go in for" animals naturally select those regarded as 
more expensive or exclusive. But if I am right, and no 
doubt tradition comes into it also, then the vast numbers 
of royal beasts down the centuries, even the millenia (see 
chapter 2), are striking evidence of a widespread human 
fondness for animal involvement. I think Cherfas is right 
to see a main attraction of hunting as the animal 
involvement it provides. For example fox-hunting as a 
method of controlling foxes costs about five hundred 
pounds per fox. Whether or not fox hunting is unnecessary 
or cruel, its mere expense indicates that it must have 
some extraordinarily strong appeal and the involvement 
with horses and dogs seems a most likely part of that 
appeal (3). I suggest that involvement with animals is 
also a large part of the appeal of horse racing, of the 
keeping and breeding of (for example) budgerigars, mice, 
fish and all the other creaures with their own Fancy 
devoted to them, and of course the enormous degree of dog, 
cat and other pet or companion animal keeping (4).
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16.2 ON ZOOLOGICAL AND OTHER GARDENS 
Next, it Is worth considering the term "zoological 
garden(s)" from which of course "zoo" is derived (see p 43 
above. Note 48). Gardens were, I understand, a Persian 
invention, and the Greek "paradaisos" was first used by 
Xenophon of Persian parks and pleasure gardens (5). Even 
if Xenophon was referring to hunting parks, the concept of 
garden as it then developed in Europe seems essentially to 
be a cultivated bit of nature that you enjoy being in, 
that is peaceful, relaxing, and beautiful (6).
Furthermore, though plants are the first essential, it is 
not only normal to find animals there, most obviously 
birds, but it has long been traditional to introduce 
animals, such as peacocks and "ornamental waterfowl".
C.S. Lewis was reminded by Whipsnade of Eden or Paradise, 
and of course Eden traditionally contained animals (7). As 
Milton (with touches of Isaiah's vision of predator and 
prey at peace) portrayed it,
"About them frisking playd
All Beasts of th‘Earth, since wild, and of all chase 
In Wood or Wilderness, Forrest or Den;
Sporting the Lion rampd, and in his paw 
Dandl'd the Kid; Bears, Tygers, Ounces, Pards 
Gambold before them; th'unwieldy Elephant 
To make them mirth us'd all his might, and wreath'd 
His lithe Proboscis;" (8)
Milton observes how the beasts of the chase were at 
peace like all the others in Eden, and I think it is fair 
to give at least credit to the selection of "garden", 
essentially to us a symbol of humans and nonhumans too at 
peace, as part of the designation of the Zoological
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Society's animal collection in 1826. At the very least 
this was a place where the animals were going to be safe 
from being hunted or baited. It was made clear to visiting 
equestrians that whips as well as horses were to be left 
outside, and it seems likely that the "leafy, quiet 
surroundings and the happy way in which the animals 
responded was at., utter variance with the cracking whips, 
flares and 'barkers' hitherto associated with creatures 
from distant lands". Animals were not an attraction even 
then merely because of the absence of attractions like 
films. A kind of very popular "proto-film" was already 
available in London: the "Diorama", dissolving painted 
views of various great architectural sights, and the 
"Colliseum", which showed a changing panoramic survey of 
London (9). Thus the success of the Zoological Gardens in 
the face of such rival attractions tells us something of 
the special attraction of animals.
16.3 ON REAL PLANTS AND ANIMALS
Gardens contain real plants; not, that is, plastic ones. 
Whatever gardens do for us, presumably the plants we take 
into our houses, or the trees which line some city 
streets, do for us also, no doubt in a lesser degree. But 
do they - the trees, for example - have to be real to do 
this? This question became of practical importance in Los 
Angeles in 1972 when nine hundred plastic trees were 
erected, presumably because the atmospheric pollution 
threatened real ones (10). Would anything be lost? Real
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trees produce moisture and ease the effect of very hot 
weather, and they absorb dust and noise, so plastic trees 
clearly would not be a good physical substitute, even if 
they satisfied us mentally or spiritually. Perhaps in 
theory an artificial tree could be produced with all a 
tree's physical properties (so far as they were known) 
which could affect human beings. Would we still be losing 
out with the imitation? This I presume could depend on 
whether we noticed the difference, though the possibility 
or likelihood of our knowing they were artificial just 
because we were told so can not be left out of the issue. 
If we lost out just because of being told, though we would 
not have noticed otherwise, this could still be a real 
loss, if only in the way that gazing entranced on (as we 
thought) the 15000 year old Lascaux Cave paintings (see 
chapter 12, pp 399-400 above) and then being told they in 
fact were not the originals, though we would not have 
guessed, would make a difference (11).
Many of us, anyway, strongly prefer real plants to 
plastic ones, and surely for sound reasons. What of 
plastic animals? These seem even worse, though Disney 
World "audio-animatronic elephants" are a fine 
demonstration of technical wizardry if you like that kind 
of thing (12). Iris Murdoch and Mary Midgley have noted 
the merits (for us) of real kestrels over against plastic 
ones "going up at carefully randomized intervals": 
suddenly seeing a kestrel could restore our mental 
wellbeing, but if we either think of the kestrel merely as
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a device of “mental hygiene" or if it actually were a 
computerised model set up for the purpose, then the whole 
point would be lost, and it would not have the reviving
effect on us (13). There is surely no question both of the
special effect that animals can have on us, and on the 
fact that this is somehow connected with the animals' 
being independent of us, that they are living their own
lives, and are not existing merely in order to have such
and such an effect on us.
I do not dispute that there is something particularly 
admirable about animals living a free existence in what is 
(no doubt to varying degrees in different cases) their 
natural environment, and that it is a sight of such an 
animal (Iris Murdoch's kestrel, say) which can most 
obviously and perhaps most powerfully uplift or refresh 
us. I strongly suggest however that our companion or pet 
animals, and any animals that we keep or have contact 
with, can in some degree have this special kind of effect 
on us too. It is not the sort of thing probably which the 
people concerned put into words very much. They are likely 
to take it for granted in many cases. And there is 
evidence that keeping dogs or cats, for example, can lower 
blood pressure, and be beneficial particularly to 
depressed humans, something which we may be aware of but 
be very far from fully understanding, or even not be aware 
of but still perhaps benefit from (14).
I think animals in zoos can have this effect on us 
too. There is the problem (as with some of the examples I
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have just mentioned of animals that people keep), that 
animals in zoos are not living their natural lives or if 
in some degree they are (and the possibility as well as 
the desirability of working towards such ways of animal 
keeping were issues I was concerned with in chapters 9 and 
10), they are clearly not living (by definition) in their 
natural environment. And even if their conditions simulate 
or substitute for their natural environment very 
effectively, this is only because of our human management: 
the animals are living, as it were, by our favour and in 
the state we have arranged for them. However, I do not 
think this makes very much difference. Even a horse is a 
different kind of being from ourselves, in a way something 
"other", something that is closer than us to the natural 
world, even though we are visiting him in a stable. I do 
not say that a wild horse would not be still better, even 
a great deal better; but we could not get close to the 
wild horse, and most certainly we normally could not get 
close to a tiger in the wild. A journalist recently 
visiting Corbett Park, for example, had still not seen a 
tiger after eight hours on elephant back for the purpose, 
and Prince Philip, visiting another park, probably would 
have been no luckier had not his royal status ensured 
scouts out all night in land rovers seeking tigers (15). I 
have been told of a Japanese film crew which arrived by 
arrangement at Chitwal National Park to film tigers but 
had still not set eyes, still less a camera, on one a 
fortnight later. That is, in regard to some animals,
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meeting them in the zoo and in the wild are not
alternatives. Most of us will meet them (and be,
sometimes, refreshed or enriched by the experience) in the 
zoo or not at all.
And even though zoo animals are being looked after to 
a great extent, rather than looking after themselves, they 
still are in some ways living their own lives, even if it 
is just getting their respective kinds of food, being 
washed, or having their toenails trimmed, etc, and in 
particular of course breeding (in some cases), or (if I 
can put it this way, because I think it is of particular 
significance) being born, and eventually (or all too soon, 
in some cases) dying. In other words, life in the zoo is 
going on; and more precisely, the individual lives of a 
great many creatures, some of them very different from
each other as well as from us, are going on. This is part
of the ordinary interest in new births at the zoo (which 
newspapers make good use of). I think also it is a kind of 
awareness of nature, especially the births and the deaths, 
something that those of us in towns are likely to be much 
less well aware of than those in the country, a dimension 
of experience which E.B. White gets across in his book 
Charlotte's Web, a story about a farm pig's friendship 
with a spider called Charlotte, who finally dies, her 
friend's grief being a little eased by meeting briefly 
(before they "parachute" away) the vast number of 
Charlotte's children who emerge from the cocoon she left 
behind (16). Living and dying is part of life on the farm;
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I do not think it fanciful to observe that this fact, 
obviously true equally of a zoo, is part of, if no more, 
its educational value, its potential richness for 
everybody, but especially those in cities.
Of course you are going to get this perhaps still 
more in the country, or better still in the wild, in 
wilderness areas, where you may be aware of a myriad 
organisms living their lives, even perhaps feel 
"..the sentiment of Being spread
O'er all that moves and all that seemeth still.."
and "the joy...
Communing in this sort through earth and heaven 
With every form of creature..." (17)
But you may meet nature too, if in a lesser way, feeding 
the hens or looking after the pigs (I am not thinking of 
intensive systems), or cleaning out the camels, hosing the 
elephant or feeding the cheetahs: people (in many cases) 
work in zoos because they, too, like contact with animals. 
And merely seeing the animals, or perhaps meeting them 
(which is not quite the same), offers some contact with 
nature too. Many naturalists have, like Konrad Lorenz, 
found it rewarding to keep animals. Even Peter Singer, a 
self-confessed non-anima1-lover, though a magnificent 
exponent of their claims to justice, mentions how becoming 
a vegetarian and growing his own vegetables "brought me 
into closer contact with plants, the soil, and the 
seasons" (18). There are innumerable indications that 
looking after animals does something very similar. This is 
not in itself a justification for keeping animals, still 
less a justification for eating meat. But it is a fact
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that we should recognise.
16.4 COMMUNITIES OR PRISONS?
But is my picture of a zoo as an acceptable community of 
animals as well as humans more than a sentimental 
whitewashing of the true situation? It was all very well 
for A.A. Milne to present his child's eye view of the zoo 
as an exciting place for meeting animals. But were not the 
animals themselves "pathetic prisoners" (19)? Recent 
criticisms emphasising how prison-like still are many zoo 
enclosures are reiterating comments made by Galsworthy of 
the London Zoo lion house and by Saki of the Mappined 
Terraces (with a summary of the animals' real needs in 
behavioural terms which astonishingly was written over 
seventy years ago) (20). Of course there have been 
enormous improvements in this country, as the Mappined 
Terraces were a far-reaching development in their time 
(though not good enough for Saki), but not everywhere 
either in this country or abroad. The tiger cages at Rome 
Zoo were recently described as bare prisons by two 
veterinary students (21). Cages in older menageries were 
no doubt even worse, and in some cases until comparatively 
recently, as we saw in chapter 2 (p 33 above). Of such 
cages, bear pits and so on, one can explain the problems 
that give rise to them, but one cannot justify their use, 
except perhaps in some cases as holding cages for short 
periods. So there is a prison-like element in some zoos 
which has to be recognised.
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But it is possible to keep animals, and even 
powerful, dangerous ones, in very different enclosures, 
such as those of Howletts (e.g., for gorillas and tigers), 
Marwell's (for ungulates, especially), Whipsnade‘s (e.g., 
for ungulates, elephants, and lions). There were, at least 
in some degree, redeeming features of many older zoos 
also. There was another side to the older London Zoo, and 
even to menageries like Bostock and Wombwell's. At London 
there were the animals' relationships with their keepers, 
not least the large cats (indeed, even at the Tower Zoo). 
This was not enough compensation, but it was something. 
Elephants, camels, llamas gave rides and met the public,
and led active lives (see p 35 above). Elephants not only
met the public at London, they even (it seems to me) joked
with them (see p 89 above). At least one man provided
enrichment for wolves (p 35 above). I am accepting that, 
where such activity is possible, work such as horses 
engage in is a good thing for other animals (see 9.3.5, p 
228 ff). C.S. Lewis not only appreciated the wallabies at 
Whipsnade; he also appreciated the bears, so much so that 
a tame bear appears in his That Hideous Strength, a 
"great, snuffly, wheezy, beady-eyed, loose-skinned, 
gor-bellied brown bear" called Mr Bultitude, obviously 
based on a bear he knew (and called Bultitude) at 
Whipsnade (22).
There was another kind of contact, now outlawed in 
British zoos, that of feeding the animals. This is rightly 
objected to now because of what we know of the harm done
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to animals' health by uncontrolled public feeding. This is 
unavoidable, but a pity because offering an animal a 
present, such as food, is not only a way in which a human 
can indulge himself. It is a natural way of establishing a 
relationship with an animal, as well of course as 
producing some behaviour which is interesting to watch:
If you try to talk to the bison he never quite 
understands;
You can't shake hands with a mingo - he doesn't like 
shaking hands.
And lions and roaring tigers hate saying, "How do you 
do?" -
But I give buns to the elephant when I go down to the 
Zoo! (23)
I say a "natural" way because I think members of various 
species sometimes communicate among themselves in this 
way. It is also possibly innate in humans. In its time, 
feeding, I am suggesting, was a valuable activity in the 
zoo (even though we now know how bad it was for animals' 
health (24)). I think that R.J. Wheater, Director of 
Edinburgh Zoo, is right in suggesting that handling of 
stick insects, contact with tame boas and so on, are the 
acceptable modern substitute for the former animal contact 
through feeding.
At its best I think we can have a situation in a zoo 
where with many of the animals we can enjoy a relationship 
approaching that which we can have with a companion or pet 
animal. Of course this will never be possible with all, 
and I do not say that it would be necessarily desirable 
with all if it were possible, because we need to balance 
the value of such a relationship with an obviously tame
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animal with the need to prevent animals in zoos becoming 
too dissimilar from their wild counterparts. There is a 
real problem here, but I suspect it is not an overwhelming 
one, not least because I think that the differences even 
between wild and domestic animals are less substantial 
than often supposed (see chapter 8, especially p 190, and 
13.7, especially p 391 ff). Be that as it may, I think 
that where it is possible, this is one way in which 
animals can be kept acceptably: where they are no doubt 
trained in varying degrees, have contact with members of 
the public as well as zoo staff, and have plenty of 
activity. Of course, their enclosures must also be of high 
standard. But is the relationship with humans in fact a 
valuable one? Is not the only admirable state for an 
animal a wild one? I do not see why this should be so if 
one is going to grant that our relationship with a 
domesticated animal can be a valuable one. It would be 
difficult to dispute that this was so in at least one 
case, that of dogs. But if our relationship with dogs can 
be such, why should not a relationship with some other 
species, a relationship just a little like that of human 
and dog, be valuable also? Lewis went so far as to regard 
the state of an animal living at close quarters and peace 
with man as the ideal one, as portrayed with Mr Bultitude 
(25). I do not agree with him that even such an idyllic 
state as this would be superior to the wild state, but I 
think Lewis is right, even so, to emphasise the remarkable 
and special nature of the relationship possible with an
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animal such as a dog, a relationship possible, I believe, 
in some degree too with a relatively wild animal in a zoo. 
I think such a relationship can be valuable to the animal 
as well as to the human, as also I think a comparison 
sometimes made between the animal in good captivity and 
man in a civilised state is in some degree valid (26). 
Clearly zoo animals (and this will apply even where they 
have little relationship with their keepers or anyone 
else) at least have medical and other protection, which is 
a substantial advantage of their state, even though they 
require even more conditions of captivity which fulfil 
their needs, especially that of meaningful occupation (see 
7.1 especially, p p  157-158, and chapter 9, especially 9.3, 
P 209 ff) .
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Chapter 17
CAPTURE, TRANSPORT AND TRADE
I have left this purposely to almost the end, not because 
It is of minor importance, but because I recognise that 
capturing an animal, i.e. from the wild state, is 
considerably more difficult to justify than keeping it in 
captivity. In the end I think the strongest justification 
for the latter is a convincing demonstration that the 
animal can be kept well in captivity; but indeed it cannot 
be kept well until it has adjusted to captivity (if it was 
not born into it) and has indeed, as it were, accepted 
that situation. Clearly we cannot justify the process of 
capture in this way; capture, even if carried out 
efficiently, is likely to be a highful stressful 
experience for any animal; and it seems, in any case, to 
be an improper invasion of its rights to autonomy, to 
living its own kind of life. I have argued that the 
happily captive animal is at least partially domesticated; 
this of course by definition cannot be so of the wild 
animal.
So my reason for leaving the matter until now has 
been so that I could make clear the strength, as I see it, 
of the conservational, scientific, educational and 
"environmental" cases for keeping animals in captivity.
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For only these, plus the likelihood of the captured 
animal's ending in an adjusted state of captivity, can 
possibly be regarded as justifying the action of capturing 
it.
I have previously thought that only a strong need for 
conservational assistance to a particular species by 
captive breeding could justify capturing an individual 
member of it, or for that matter even keeping it (1).
This might well be the only justification for capturing 
some highly endangered animal, but if we make it a 
necessary reason for capturing or keeping any animal we 
are put in a situation where we must depend on chance 
capturing activities by other individuals in the past, and 
not even necessarily just in the past - there might be 
situations where we accept that we can keep animal A 
because someone else X (of whose activity we must 
disapprove) has captured it and for some reason it has 
come into our hands. This could be ludicrous: it might 
well be that it was much better for us, or someone we have 
arranged with, responsibly to capture the animal rather 
than X; and it does not seem right so readily to take 
advantage of X's illicit doings.
Besides, if there is such a strong case for a 
scientific role and an educational role of zoos, it seems 
unreasonable entirely to outlaw the necessary preliminary 
act of taking an animal into captivity, except in those 
circumstances where it is endangered but able to be helped 
by captive breeding.
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The essential provision, I suggest, for justified 
capturing is simply that it be responsible. This means 
that it must be done carefully and as humanely as possible 
by professional or trained people who have some official 
permission or certification and whose motivation is not 
simply that of helping themselves to an easy source of 
money.
We earlier saw (in chapter 5) how animals' rights are 
very similar to ours (or should be regarded as such), and 
it is individuals who have rights, not species, because it 
is individuals who can suffer and also find satisfaction 
in living. So even though our motives are conservational 
and entirely genuine, it still seems an intolerable 
invasion of animals' rights rudely to capture them. It may 
seem it could never, even in theory, be justified with 
humans.
But I suggest it could. It is possible to imagine 
situations, no doubt fanciful, in which the capturing of 
humans would be a morally admirable course of action.
Situation 1: Superior creatures from another planet 
capture a group of humans to protect them from injury from 
other invaders, or from death, taking them and setting 
them up in a new area, where they are able to settle down 
and live reasonable lives.
Situation 2: In war, a group of people are rescued 
against their will, or without its being possible to ask 
them, from a danger which they are not aware of.
Situation 3: Rescuing a South American tribe because
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of a known threat to them, but which it is not possible to 
explain to them (no doubt because of language barriers), 
and setting them up in, say, a reserve in some safe place.
Obviously it is better if one can to avoid having to 
interfere with anyone's freedom in this way. One would 
need a very special justification, which would only apply 
in very special circumstances, but it is possible to 
conceive of such action being the right course to take. It 
would be like locking someone up for their own good, which 
would never normally be the right course of action to 
take but conceivably could in certain circumstances. 
Respect for a person's autonomy is very important, but it 
is not absolute, just as legal rights (or at any rate 
certain legal rights - I am thinking of capital 
punishment, as discussed by Stone (2)) are not absolute.
It is possible to interfere with someone else's freedom 
for their own good, though of course such a course of 
action lends itself to abuse. There need to be safeguards.
So, with animals, how are they to reach the state of 
captivity? Either they are already there, so that their 
captive situation is a fait accompli, whether or not we 
approve of the way in which their or their ancestors' 
capturing originally occurred. Or we may do it now in a 
responsible way, and an example of the capturing of 
certain animals which I would regard as undoubtedly 
responsible is the taking of the last surviving free male 
condors, though of course this is a very unusual case (3). 
For capturing to be responsible, it would have to be done
469
competently and humanely, but it would also have to be 
done in the light of conservational responsibilities. But 
what I think we can not say is that it is categorically 
wrong to capture a wild animal, anymore indeed that it is 
categorically wrong to lie or to kill another human being 
(though of course it normally is).
But what of the reality of the capturing of wild 
animals? Domalain gives an appalling picture from his own 
experience of wild animal trafficking in south east Asia 
(4). He tells of gibbons and leopards and crocodiles 
captured by cruel means (caught in spiked pits or females 
killed for the obtaining of the young), then held for long 
periods in grossly inadequate containers, of disease 
killing many, of transport to Europe by irresponsible 
airlines, of delays and refusals to accept responsibility 
by those who had ordered consignments, of sick animals got 
rid of by unscrupulous traders as quickly as posible, of 
many dying even after reaching their destinations. The 
situation such as he describes it is clearly morally 
indefensible.
Even if Domalain's book is out of date (and it was 
published in its original French edition only twelve years 
ago), and even if it is inaccurate and exaggerated, or 
unrepresentative, or partly written out of a grudge 
against former colleagues or rivals, there is enough here 
to make clear the likelihood that trading in wild-caught 
animals causes a great deal of suffering. We know from 
elsewhere (see Chapter 6) what some people will do if no
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check on their identities and their activities is made and 
no controlling regulations enforced. Indeed it is an extra 
complication that according to Domalain the operations are 
more clandestine than they otherwise would be, and 
therefore also more inhumane, because of the need to dodge 
the various conservation regulations. And of course it is 
obvious that transporting an animal, as well as capturing 
it, is going to be a stressful process even where the 
operation is done responsibly and with friendly human 
contact and comfort; where it is done by semi-criminals or 
at least persons interested only in the money, the 
suffering caused intentionally or by ignorance and lack of 
concern will clearly be much greater. (Not that we meet 
such occurrences only in SE Asia: I understand for example 
that the stress caused to literally millions of broiler 
chickens in British intensive systems caught up roughly at 
the end of their six week lives for transport to slaughter 
is very great.)
I am not concerned here about the conservational 
aspects, not because they are not important, but because:
a) The CITES regulations exist to control the trade 
in wild and particularly endangered animals.
b) If the regulations are being broken or are not 
strong enough, I do not think zoos are at all 
substantially responsible (see chapter 13). According to 
Domalain, they are, but if he is right they are clearly 
behaving illegally; they are also clearly disobeying the 
policy of, for example, the National Zoo Federation in
471
Britain and would face expulsion if found guilty of such 
actions. That is, I do not think any zoos (in Britain, at 
least) are committing this particular crime now; any that are 
are of course to be condemned, and if possible forced to 
close.
What I am objecting to is the trading in wild caught 
living animals on welfare grounds, whether or not there is 
in a specific case any conservational reason for not 
taking them. I am saying, that is, that animals, however 
common, should not be captured, etc, if this is going to 
cause them suffering. I am sure that Brambell would echo 
my sentiments, but he would explain that it was a matter 
of being realistic: CITES is a trade convention, not a 
welfare one. He makes the point that it is useful to have 
trade in a species controlled even just to ensure that the 
authorities can learn what is going on, so as to take 
action in the future if necessary. But again this is a 
conservational matter rather than a welfare one, and it is 
the latter which Domalain's book brings to our attention.
It seems to me that there is a case for the 
responsible catching of animals for conservational and in 
some degree scientific and educational purposes, but only 
where it is done by responsible expeditions. In theory it 
could be done by accredited catchers if there was some 
check on them, but it seems unlikely that there can be 
any effective check: we are in a murky world unpleasantly 
reminiscent of the slave trade. The catching should be 
done by proper expeditions for conservation reasons.
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indeed, but still more for welfare reasons. The whole 
setup described by Domalain, which is a world away from 
the proper keeping of animals, should be outlawed. A 
proper expedition means that the animals are caught 
properly; that they are then looked after properly, and 
transported properly (e.g. as on Jersey's expeditions, and 
even on one as described by Attenborough in the 1950's - 
see chapter 5). Domalain concedes that a properly 
organised expedition is a different matter from the sort 
of thing he describes (5). I am in no way arguing that 
only zoos should be able to, or are capable of, 
responsibly collecting animals from the wild. I have 
commented earlier (chapter 10) on the skills of some 
private reptile enthusiasts, for example. An expedition 
organised by, say, the British Herpetological Association 
would, I am sure, be very responsible. But there should be 
firm checks, on welfare grounds, on the credentials of the 
collectors: they would need to be accredited with the BHS 
above, or some other reputable organisation. There is 
another qualification, and that is that in some cases, e.g 
with cockatoos in Australia, the birds are killed as pests, 
but their export for reputable collectors illegal. What 
happens as a result is not simply that all the birds are 
killed when some of them might have gone to be kept by 
genuine parrot enthusiasts, which would seem a happier 
fate for them, but that many are exported illegally by 
dealers prepared to transport them in appallingly inhumane 
ways. So in fact there is a good case, I think, in some
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cases for certain strict conservational regulations 
against animal export to be relaxed, actually on humane 
grounds. So this means I can hardly condemn all trading 
even in wild caught animals. But there should be, as I 
say, requirements of licensing, on humane grounds, of the 
persons involved. I do not wish to appear to have an 
unrealistic faith in the effectivenes of licensing 
regulations. I am merely stating what seems to me clearly 
the moral situation: that uncontrolled trading can not be 
justified on welfare grounds. The economic difficulties of 
putting this into practise, the need of poor countries for 
money from exports of wildlife or wildlife products, I 
appreciate. But then I am not saying it should all be 
banned; I am saying it should be controlled, and on 
welfare grounds, not just conservational grounds.
The selling of an animal is obviously not necessarily 
bad in itself. Breeding dogs or any other animal and 
selling them can be a highly reputable occupation - indeed 
it is even more likely to be such if the animals are very 
valuable as great care is accordingly more likely to be 
taken over them. But when they are just caught and treated 
as expendable, and managed by people who do not know how 
to do it (and the job would be very difficult for anyone, 
even well-qualified and well-intentioned, to do adequately 
because of the number of different species likely to be 
involved) this is obviously quite wrong simply because it 
will lead to terrible treatment of animals.
So dealers should only normally be dealing in captive
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born animals. If animals are to be taken from the wild 
they should be collected by zoo personnel themselves, or 
by members of reputable organisations like the BHS 
(above), or by persons known to them, or by responsible 
officials of the governments of the countries concerned.
Zoos probably in many cases do choose to purchase animals 
(if they are purchasing them, for many animals are now 
exchanged or lent between zoos without money being 
involved) which are captive bred for various reasons, such 
as the likelihood of their being free of injuries likely 
to be incurred in capture, and because they are more 
likely to know which animals they are buying, and know 
their history. But it seems to me that they should make 
their policy very clearly to refrain entirely from any 
purchase of wild caught animals, quite apart from any 
conservation considerations, unless they indeed know and 
can vouch for the person in charge of the actual catching 
and transport of the animal.
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Chapter 18 
CONCLUSIONS
I have, I hope, shown that various kinds of relatively 
wild animals can he kept in zoos in what may reasonably be 
regarded as a state of wellbeing, and I have discussed the 
various criteria by means of which I think we can and 
should judge the suitability of their conditions. No doubt 
much zookeeping today would still, by a careful 
application of those criteria, be judged to be falling 
short of what our responsibility to the animals concerned 
requires. And of course humans are fallible, and sometimes 
indeed positively cruel, so the continuing of some 
substandard zookeeping is hardly surprising, and may be 
thought to be virtually certain so long as zoos continue 
at all. So ought we to solve the moral problem in 
practical terms, once and for all, and just abolish zoos? 
Is this the right moral solution, whether or not it would 
be a practical one?
I think not, for such reasons as the following:
1. Certain zoos are of a very high standard, both so far 
as the way in which their animals' needs are catered for, 
and, in some cases, in their conservational aims and 
achievements.
2. New ethological research is showing us, and is likely
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to do so more and more, ways in which we can keep various 
relatively wild animals fully satisfactorily. The very 
moment when it is becoming feasible to keep many animals 
much better than they have been kept previously seems an 
inappropriate time for seeking to abolish the whole 
practice of zookeeping.
3. How short-sighted, too, advocating such a course might 
be only the coming years may reveal. I have tried to show 
the conservational roles of zoos as more various and also 
probably much more genuine and important than is often, 
perhaps, appreciated.
4. One conservational role arises from a very important 
(in a wide sense) educational role, that of encouraging 
and helping to develop in zoo visitors, adults and 
children, an empathy with and appreciation of other living 
beings. Even if this is a clearer achievement of zoos (see 
chapter 15) than their instructional role, it is still an 
important one (indeed more so even than the inculcation of 
academic understanding). It is a conservational role in as 
much as such empathy and appreciation can be a source of 
concern for the conservation of animals in their natural 
habitats.
I think therefore that the abolishing of zoos would 
mean the loss of much of great value, and much of great 
value in moral terms, in that such empathy and concern for 
other creatures is very much a moral matter.
It might be said that I am ignoring or forgetting the 
poor side, the exploitative side, even the cruel side of
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zookeeping. I have not examined these at great depth 
partly because others, some of whom I have referred to, 
have already done that more than adequately, and partly 
because my aim has been to a great extent to present what 
I see as the genuinely good side of zoos, to make a moral 
case for them which I think deserves (as it were) to be 
made. I think the abuses involved in animal catching and 
transport are very real, and I have stressed the moral 
demand, as I see it, for strict controls on such catching 
and transport on grounds of welfare as well as 
conservation. It is fair, however, to emphasise too that a 
great deal of such abuse can not be blamed on zoos. But 
the strictest of controls are required, and I think they 
are desirable too for zoos themselves, and this because of 
the fact, as I emphasised in chapters 2 and 6, 
particularly, that the ability of some humans to engage in 
the most outrageous cruelty deprives us of any guarantee 
that it is safe just to trust to people's own decency and 
responsibility, even though in the case of many people, 
both professional and amateur, who keep animals such 
controls will be superfluous.
I think therefore that the critics of zoos should be 
listened to, and their criticisms complied with where we 
can not genuinely show them to be mistaken. On the other 
hand, I think there is a danger in some critics, e.g. some 
of those associated with Zoo Check, of sometimes letting 
their respect for truth be blunted by their reforming 
zeal, their right, as they no doubt feel it, to regard any
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weapon they think may be effective as justified in their 
fight against remorseless exploiters of animals.
Sometimes, as I have said earlier, those running zoos 
can be hypocritical, not least in their readiness to claim 
all zookeeping as genuinely conservational in aim or 
achievement. But some critics of zoos can also be either 
hypocritical or else just muddled, not least, it seems to 
me, in their espousal of the probable need for 
conservational breeding centres essentially distinct from 
existing zoos. Sir Christopher Lever, for example, defines 
such a centre as necessarily specialist, scientific and 
conservational, and explicitly denies (so at least I 
understand him) that any zoo fulfils those specifications 
(1). But it seems to stare one in the face that Jersey 
(i.e., the Jersey Wildlife Preservation Trust), at least, 
is specialist, scientific and conservational, and Sir 
Christopher seems to regard Jersey (as it regards itself) 
as a zoo (2). I fail here to understand the point of 
criticising (say) British zoos, no doubt justifiably in 
many respects, while, it seems, determinedly refusing to 
pay credit to the work of such a pioneer as Jersey. Even 
if Sir Christopher disagrees with Jersey's policy (e.g., 
perhaps, in regard to whether it is useful to keep and 
breed certain animals outside their country or climate of 
origin), it still remains the case that Jersey is, 
precisely, a conservational breeding centre in the terms 
he has specified.
There seems, in some critics, a reluctance, also, to
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give due credit to the fact that, despite zoos' failings, 
they (or at least certain of them) may be capable of 
evolving, and even likely to evolve, into the right kind 
of zoo or conservational breeding centre. As I noted 
earlier, I think institutions, which of course include 
zoos, tend themselves to evolve, and it seems to me at 
least probable that, in practical terms, one is more 
likely to arrive at a (let us say) fully satisfactory zoo 
by improving a less satisfactory one than by endeavouring 
to start a fully satisfactory one from scratch. In any 
case, even if this were the best course in some respects, 
it seems most unlikely to be the best course with 
institutions that keep animals. For, if we close zoos 
down, and then set about starting "proper" conservational 
breeding centres, where are the animals to be obtained 
from? Surely not (in most cases) from the wild, for even 
presently existing imperfect zoos recognise the moral 
objections (apart from the legal ones) to taking 
endangered animals from the wild.
So I do think in some respects that the critics of 
zoos can be at least rather unclear. It seems to me so 
obvious that their right course is to praise what is good 
in zoos, and to condemn their faults, in as strong terms 
as they feel appropriate. But why seek to condemn all 
zoos, good and bad? Even where the critic genuinely does 
oppose all zoos on moral grounds - a position that I think 
it would be difficult to hold with regard to, e.g., Jersey 
or Marwe11 - he can hardly dispute that some are better
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than others, so that it would seem a more sensible course
to criticise the worst rather than weaken the force of his
attack by criticising all, good and bad.
I have not defined zoos at any point, and I doubt 
that there is much need to do so - after all, the term 
only came into use by the decision of a music hall artist 
- but perhaps I ought to have done so, especially in view
of a tendency of some critics to define "zoo" in such a
way that "zoos are bad" becomes a necessary truth. That 
is, they sometimes immediately exclude any example one 
offers of a good zoo, if they admire it also, from being a
zoo. This, of course, is partly playing with terms. I
suggest that the diversity of origins of zoos should
assist us in directing, so far as we can, the ways in
which they develop in the future. As I mentioned in 
chapter 2, I think that in some ways deerparks should be 
regarded as the best zoos of past centuries. After all, 
why should not the extremely large enclosures of a zoo 
such as Whipsnade be regarded as being evolved from 
deerparks as much as from menageries? One major pioneer of 
conservational captive breeding was, of course, the Duke 
of Bedford of Pere David's deer fame, though his work was 
not appreciated by contemporary zoos. Modern "deerparks", 
or large breeding parks, may be in many cases the best 
kind of zoo (or whatever we choose to call it) for captive 
breeding of, say, ungulates and perhaps some carnivores. 
But there is a role, too, for zoos of smaller area near 
cities, provided they can keep their animals, and select
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which animals they keep, along the lines of (as I would 
suggest) the kind of criteria which I have tried to 
outline. If it can be demonstrated that the animals in 
such zoos are thriving, then there seems, as I have said, 
great value in the opportunity so provided for the 
emotional and even moral, as well as in some degree, one 
hopes, biological education, of visitors to them.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 18
1. Sir Christopher Lever, "Introduction" to McKenna, op. 
cit. (p 23 above. Note 18), p 16.
2. Ibid, p 12.
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